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Abstract
The global dimension o f M exico’s 1994 financial crisis brought a renewed 
interest in the institutional framework o f international finance. The failure o f  
M exico’s financial reform raises important questions. At the level o f policy­
making, the prescriptions based on the premise o f less state intervention and 
a major role for the market have to be taken more cautiously. At the level o f  
analysis, the role o f institutions has to be emphasised more in the 
explanations o f the effects o f policy decisions upon economic behaviour. 
The purpose o f this thesis is twofold. First, it tries to explain President 
Salinas’s success in implementing a far-reaching programme o f economic 
liberalisation, despite the fact that pro-market policies are not particularly 
popular in Mexico. Second, it tries to explain the apparent failure o f  the 
financial reform, despite the fact that it conformed to the dominant 
orthodoxy and was implemented by a technically proficient technocracy.
The favoured approach in this thesis says that M exico’s financial reform 
was the result o f political entrepreneurship. The charismatic leadership o f  
President Salinas aligned a powerful coalition o f support for economic 
reform. Salinas used extensively the organisational and institutional 
infrastructure o f the quasi-authoritarian Mexican state to overcome the 
‘legitimacy deficit’ o f his government. Regarding M exico’s 1994 financial 
crisis, the evidence points to the combination o f  three sets o f  interrelated 
factors. First, the financial reform stifled domestic savings and re-directed 
most o f  the capital inflows towards portfolio investment. Second, the end- 
of-sexenio political cycle that produced a great deal o f political turmoil and 
economic uncertainty. Third, the policy mistakes that exacerbated the size 
and depth o f the crisis.
The thesis is organised into three parts. The first part— chapters one to 
four— develops the framework, both theoretical and historical. The analysis 
addresses four main themes: state autonomy, external dependency o f  
domestic states on international capital, political change under President 
Carlos Salinas and financial policy. The second part presents the analysis o f  
three cases o f institutional change in the financial system— development 
banking reform, commercial banking privatisation and autonomy o f the 
central bank. Each case study shows how the reforms conformed to the ideas 
o f the dominant consensus on economic policy and how they delivered an 
inefficient incentive structure. The third part— chapter eight— brings 
together all the elements presented throughout the thesis to establish the 
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1Chapter 1
State Autonomy and Policy Reform: 
A Theoretical Framework
The purpose o f this thesis is to show how financial reform under President Carlos 
Salinas (1988-1994) was aimed to engineer new bases o f support for the regime and 
consequently to consolidate the President’s political leadership within the new 
parameters set by an increasing integration to the world economy, on the one hand, and 
by increasing political competition, on the other. The analysis is framed within the 
theoretical discussion o f state autonomy— namely, the extent to which policy choices 
made by the state are influenced or determined by social groups. Nordlinger (1981) 
defines state autonomy in terms o f the ‘conscious preferences o f public officials, who 
are said to be acting autonomously as long as they are not deliberately giving in to 
demands o f societal actors.’ Under this approach, state autonomy is simply the creative 
exercise o f  political leadership.
The issue o f state autonomy in this work is relevant from two different perspectives: 
first, as the result o f specific institutional arrangements in the political system; and 
second, as an essential component o f policy reform. This chapter draws from M exico’s 
experience o f policy reform under President Salinas to assess the pertinence o f an 
analytical framework based on this notion o f state autonomy.
This chapter starts with a brief overview o f the theoretical debate on state autonomy: 
specifically, the extent to which state’s policy choices are influenced or determined by 
interest groups. This debate serves as an introduction to the main determinants o f  
policy-making. The second section brings the concepts o f  institutions and organisations 
into the theoretical discussion o f state autonomy. The third section introduces the notion 
o f  state autonomy into the analysis o f policy-making where state, interest groups and 
voters represent categories o f agents having differential political influence. A multi­
layered model that distinguishes three levels o f political organisation according to the
2actors' political influence frames the discussion. The fourth section explores the role o f  
state autonomy in policy change. This section also addresses the distinction between 
internal and external autonomy. Finally, the fifth section links the previous discussion 
with the main claim o f the thesis and explains how the argument is organised 
throughout the remaining chapters.
1.1 Theoretical Debate: An Overview
The literature o f  political economy does not have an encompassing theory o f  policy 
reform. In fact, this literature is characterised by a vast diversity o f approaches and 
topics o f  analysis, although with an underlying unity o f purpose: ‘to demonstrate how 
economic and political outcomes reflect choices constrained by institutions’ (Alt and 
Shepsle 1990: ix). Most o f the studies in this field have taken an inductive approach and 
‘rather than specify a theory a priory , we set out to sharpen concepts o f both dependent 
and independent variables and to specify more precisely some o f  the mechanisms at 
work and the circumstances in which they are more or less important’ (Nelson 1990: 
17).
The theories discussed in this section are classified according to their approach to policy 
reform, whether they are society-centred or state-centred.1 The society-centred 
approaches concentrate on the configuration o f power between interest groups, while 
leaving a secondary role to the state. The state-centred approaches, by contrast, explain 
policy reform in terms o f the preferences and organisational power o f  the state elites. In 
the latter case, the state represents a set o f organisations with well-defined objectives 
and subject to political leadership. These two approaches are the most important rival 
explanations within the political economy literature o f the phenomenon o f policy reform 
in the developing world during the last couple o f decades.
1 Migdal (1988) discusses the relative strength of the state vis-a-vis society from an interesting, though 
opposite, perspective. We are interested in the extent to which society influence state decisions. His main 
interest, by contrast, is to assess the capacity of the state to influence the behaviour of the society. That is 
to say, Migdal wants to explain to what extent state policies can effectively transform the societies they 
govern.
3Society-centred Approaches
Society-centred explanations to policy-making were dominant in political science and 
sociology during the 1950s and 1960s (see Dahl 1961). These theories were based on 
the pluralist model, where policy decisions are the result o f competition between interest 
groups and the state is a neutral arena where this competition takes place (Skocpol 1985: 
4; Frieden 1991).2 Based on this premise, the ‘modernisation’ theory claimed that in 
democratic political systems, where citizens are considered to be political equals, 
competition among interest groups produces efficient policy-making (see Huntington 
1968). Nevertheless, states adopted and then persisted in pursuing policies that 
increased distortions in the economy, exacerbating inefficiency and inequality. This 
phenomenon led Robert Bates (1981: 3), among others, to raise a new question: ‘why 
should reasonable men adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the 
societies they govern?’
In the decades o f the 1970s and 1980s ‘public choice’ theory, another society-centred 
approach, attempted to answer this question with the argument o f rent seeking. It says 
that interest groups influence self-interested politicians in order to extract rents from the 
state (Grindle 1991: 43; Haggard and Lee 1993: 7-8). The pioneers o f these approaches 
developed new concepts like rent seeking, principal-agent and collective action. They 
used the basic assumptions o f neoclassical economics but applied to political 
phenomena (see Buchanan and Tullock 1965; Olson 1965; Krueger 1974; Mueller 
1979). This field has made great contributions to the understanding o f fundamental 
issues in democratic political systems, like voting behaviour, public goods provision 
and policy-making, among others.
In the society-centred approaches, power is understood as the disproportionate 
responsiveness o f the government to particular groups (Klein 1994: 126). Individuals 
perceive that the only means to attain their goals is collectively organised and their 
organisational capacity depends to a great extent on the economic resources they 
control. Lindblom (1977), in his book ‘Politics and Markets’, argues that economic
2 The pluralist model found very fertile ground, for instance, in explaining trade policy in developed 
countries (see Baldwin 1985; Milner 1988).
4forces shape the balance o f power in politics. In the US, major corporations translate 
their economic power into political and social power through their influence on public 
decisions. In this setting, policy-making does not maximise social welfare, but 
economic rents for interest groups. The state has, thus, a perverse role either by 
safeguarding the interests o f some organised interest groups at the expense o f  the rest o f  
the society or by supporting a predatory group o f politicians and bureaucrats (Bates 
1981). The obvious policy recommendation from this set o f analyses is that the state 
should be kept at a minimal size, safeguarding private property and providing public 
goods (Evans 1992: 144). Most o f the agenda o f policy reform was shaped from this 
basic principle: ‘less state and more market’. However, according to Peter Evans (1995: 
21), ‘the neoliberal attack on the state has passed its zenith. The political hegemony o f  
neoliberalism and the theoretical hegemony o f the neo-utilitarian vision, which provided 
its intellectual underpinnings, are on the wane.’
The phenomenon o f policy reform in developing countries during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s poses a challenge to the pluralist model and public choice theories. It is 
difficult to accept the hypothesis that interest groups forced the state to implement the 
policy reform. In most cases, these groups were unable either to determine the precise 
impact o f the policies on their own welfare or to mount organised campaigns either 
supporting or blocking the reform efforts (Bates and Krueger 1993: 457). Few studies 
using these approaches bothered to ask whether policy reform was in fact a result o f  
interest groups pressure or whether it sprang from economic constraints or political 
leadership. Those studies did not ask how reformers overcame resistance from rent- 
seekers, who had a vested interest in preserving the status quo (Haggard and Lee 1993: 
9). The public choice analysis also found puzzling the introduction o f  structural 
adjustment programmes, which are consistent with the ‘benevolent state’ o f  neoclassical 
economics but apparently politically irrational at the same time. For example, the 
removal o f  subsidies and the reduction o f trade protection to some industries go against 
the interests o f important groups with strong capacity for social mobilisation and 
economic disruption.
Another critique o f the public choice and pluralist approaches is their utilisation o f  very 
stylised models that neglect the peculiarities o f the wider historical and institutional 
context where complex political and economic events take place. For pluralists, the state
is just a neutral arena where the social forces interplay. This model, however, has 
provided satisfactory explanations for economic and political phenomena in countries 
with well-developed market economies and well-institutionalised democracies (Findlay 
1991: 13-14).3 In such cases, the assumption o f rent seeking describes quite accurately 
the behaviour o f  state actors responding to organised interest groups trying to extract 
economic rents. Unfortunately this is not the common scenario in most o f  LDCs where 
‘political elites have inherited or built organisational structures that significantly 
constrain the ability o f societal actors to achieve their political and economic objectives’ 
(Haggard 1990: 3). The state tends to dominate civil society, which is weak and 
fragmented, and not generally organised for sustained political activity. Policy making 
in LDCs is centred more in the executive branch o f the state, dominated by high-level 
administrators and political leaders (Grindle 1991: 52). Rational choice theories might 
be better to explain policy-making and policy reform in LDCs if  they replace their 
society-centric view with a more state-centric perspective, based on political elites 
actively engaged in maximising their political power or on rent seeking bureaucrats. As 
I argue next, social forces do not have to be removed from the analysis but their role has 
to be downgraded from being active determinants o f policy decisions to become broad 
constraints to state choices.
State-centred Approaches
State-centred approaches received a great boost from the study o f  LDCs as part o f  the 
effort to understand situations where the society-centred models could not explain major 
policy reforms (Geddes 1994: 3). In most cases, the interests injured by the reforms 
were those that, shortly before a shift, had appeared to be economically and politically 
dominant in the country. Why did the state introduce policies that go against its own 
traditional supporters and sources o f power? This underlying puzzle o f ‘positive 
economics and negative politics’ is one o f the central issues in the new state-centred 
literature (Nelson 1990; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Evans 1992; Bates and Krueger 
1993). To solve this puzzle some scholars have introduced enlightened technocrats or 
state leaders who are somehow liberated from the pursuit o f  self-interest and thus able to
' For two good studies on the US political economy see Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Keech (1995).
6pursue the public interest beyond short-term individual goals (Srinivasan 1985: 58). 
Merilee Grindle (1991) went further and developed a model, where policy elites are 
strategic managers with a complex set o f preferences, facing complex policy contexts, 
and seeking politically, bureaucratically and economically viable outcomes. Policy 
elites and political institutions were reintroduced at the core o f the policy-making 
analysis within the new political economy literature.
As I mentioned above, in most LDCs, the pluralist assumption o f a strong organised 
society, usually associated with an active legislature and a strong party system, does not 
hold with the same regularity as in western democracies (Stepan 1985: 317). It is often 
the case in developing countries that the most active actors shaping policy-making are 
not legislators or voters, but ministers and bureaucrats. Elections are less relevant for 
policy-making and therefore state actors have greater freedom to pursue their own 
agendas (Haggard 1991: 238). In these cases the process o f preference formation 
becomes crucial to understanding the final outcomes (see Grindle 1991; 1996; Grindle 
and Thomas 1991). According to Ronald Findlay (1991: 18), state autonomy is chiefly 
associated to three factors: first, the low degree o f organisation within society; second, 
the authoritarian nature o f the existing political regime; and third, the control o f the state 
by a small elite. Even political parties are more often mechanisms employed by elites to 
control mass followings rather than means by which interests are articulated from below  
to the top (Meier 1991: 302).
State-centred approaches to policy reform emphasise the role o f institutions, political 
leadership and bureaucratic capacity.4 In these frameworks, institutions and charismatic 
leadership determines the balance o f power between policy coalitions. Ardito-Barietta 
(1991: 283) goes further to suggest that strong political leadership can change not only 
the balance o f power but also the policy preferences o f some groups. In the case o f Latin 
American countries, political leadership committed to reform was determinant for the 
introduction o f structural adjustment policies— Pinochet in Chile, Salinas in Mexico, 
Fujimori in Peru and Menem in Argentina (Grindle 1996). Also determinant for policy 
reform was the presence o f  a coherent technocratic elite within the bureaucracy, able to
7manage the technical issues, like the speed o f implementation, sequencing and 
packaging o f different types o f reforms, and the use o f compensation mechanisms for 
the ‘losers’ in the new situation (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Haggard and Webb 1994). 
However, policy-making still involves the active participation o f groups from the 
society. A strong and effective state requires a combination o f internal coherence and 
external connectedness with groups outside the boundaries o f the state. This is what 
Peter Evans calls ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans 1992: 176). As John Waterbury argues 
(1992: 192), ‘top-down’ change without the support o f organised constituencies 
probably cannot be sustained.
Models, which emphasise state actors, have successfully introduced the role o f  
economic crises to explain policy reform (see Grindle and Thomas 1991; Ardito- 
Barletta 1991; Waterbury 1992). Significant institutional reforms usually face very 
strong opposition from those groups profiting from old arrangements. However, ‘when 
economies stagnate or decline over extended periods, elite coalitions that had been 
instrumental in sustaining prior policy regimes weaken. This dynamic poses a dual 
challenge to governing elites: it simultaneously robs them o f long-familiar political 
support but opens up the possibility o f constructing new coalitions around alternative 
policy regimes’ (Grindle 1996: 47). Alternatively, an economic crisis usually increases 
the perceived benefits o f reform and therefore improves the position o f  those groups 
within the state who favour reform. Regime stability is often at stake during a crisis and 
therefore decision making moves all the way to the top o f  the political hierarchy. A 
double opportunity, thus, is created for reform-minded politicians. First, they gain 
access to the top echelons o f the state hierarchy. Second, they have extraordinary control 
o f the state apparatus to advance their own agenda o f reform.
In sum, the state is neither a passive agent o f society at large and its various interest 
groups contending horizontally, as in liberal pluralist models, nor an executive 
committee o f a dominant class, as in vulgar Marxism, but rather a dynamic independent 
force (Skocpol 1985). The literature on state autonomy opens a third wave o f thinking 
about the developmental role o f the state, where ‘the state is an organisational structure
4 See Grindle and Thomas (1991), Waterbury (1992), and Grindle (1996) for the role o f political 
leadership; Haggard and Kaufman (1992) for the role of institutions; and Evans (1995) for the role of the
that is durable and effective with the capacity to induce change and innovation’ (Evans 
1992: 141)2 The former two waves failed to find the right role for the state in 
development. Neither the post-war instrumental and paternal state from structuralist 
theories nor the minimalist state o f neoliberal thinking during the 1970s and 1980s 
coped with the challenges o f development.
1.2. Basic Concepts
This section introduces the two central analytical concepts used throughout the thesis. A  
frequent attack on the pluralist model and public choice theory is their neglect o f  the 
wider institutional framework and organisational environment where policy-making 
takes place. Not even state-centred approaches have an explicit theory o f  institutions 
and organisations despite the fact that they acknowledge them and emphasise their role. 
These two major concepts are the building blocks in the framework used for the analysis 
o f policy change. They enter into the analysis by constraining the choices and decisions 
o f rational individuals. This thesis moves away from the competition paradigm o f the 
pluralist model and from the rent seeking assumption o f public choice and concentrates 
in the institutional framework and the organisational environment where decision 
making takes place. Following the same logic than in microeconomics, policy choices 
take place at the intersection where individual preferences and institutional constraints 
meet.
Organisations6
Organisations represent sets o f individuals that benefit collectively from specific 
institutional arrangements and who consequently share common objectives and policy
bureaucratic apparatus.
s Evans (1992) empirical case is rested not on structural adjustment policies but rather on 
industrialisation policies. However, his framework can explain the important role o f the state on bringing 
about institutional change.
0 Organisation is a concept borrowed from new institutional economics to understand the dynamics of 
institutional change. According to this theory the main purpose of organisations is to promote change 
when it is in their interest to do so, they are entrepreneurs of institutional change (North 1990).
9preferences.7 Individuals shape organisations, but more important for the purposes o f  
this analysis is the fact that choices are constrained by the specific environment 
prevailing in those organisations where individuals operate. This organisational 
environment has two main components: the culture o f the organisation that usually takes 
the form o f ideology, traditions and values; and the functional structure representing the 
hierarchies, procedures and rules regulating decision-making. This environment is 
usually the result o f a historical process in which the organisation shapes itself 
according to its own objectives and the institutional framework it faces. The culture o f  
the organisation, its functional structure and its individual members are the three main 
elements providing organisations with a particular identity and specific role in both 
politics and economics. Despite the fact that individuals ultimately make decisions and 
choices those decisions can also be attributed to organisations when the individual acts 
as a member o f them. An organisation can thus be defined as a body with decision 
making capacity and made up by a set o f  individuals sharing common objectives and 
values within a functional structure.
Individuals usually manifest their preferences through organisations in the form o f  
coordinated collective actions like lobbying activities, electoral support, labour and 
investment strikes, demonstrations, and insurrections. However, organisations are not 
always created despite the fact that it may be advantageous for all individuals involved. 
This is the problem o f ‘collective action’ present when dealing with public goods that 
require individuals to act collectively but facing at the same time the incentive to free 
ride on the other individuals efforts (Olson 1965). The collective action problem can be 
resolved provided it is possible to introduce a selective incentive structure to the 
organisation. The larger and more heterogeneous an organisation is, the weaker it 
becomes and therefore the less effective to advance its own objectives. The problem o f  
collective action will be crucial in this framework to understand why state organisations 
are more effective than social ones to impose their policy preferences. Attending to the 
‘Weberian’ definition o f state I distinguish those organisations within the state from 
those within society depending on whether they have the intrinsic capacity to make
7 Political parties, government agencies, trade unions, and entrepreneurial chambers are different types of
organisations in this setting.
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binding decisions for the rest o f the polity or not.8 This may sound that by definition 
state organisations impose their views upon societal organisations. However, this is not 
always the case when the wider institutional framework is taken into account. Social 
forces can effective constrain the state who cannot freely choose any public policy and 
impose it to the rest of the society without running the risk o f  overturning the existing 
regime.
Organisations are embedded in complex and multiple social systems. For the purposes 
of this thesis I shall narrow down the discussion to the organisations operating in the 
political and economic systems. The nature and objectives o f each organisation depends 
on the system in which they operate. Each system has its own function and institutional 
framework which in turn shapes the incentives o f the participating organisations. The 
internal workings o f each organisation along with the interaction between different 
organisations deliver the social phenomena I am interested in. This framework 
distinguishes two central issues regarding the role o f  organisations in human interaction: 
the process o f preference formation9 within each organisation and the balance o f power10 
between organisations with alternative policy preferences. Different organisations 
usually have very different objectives and policy preferences considering the individual 
background o f their members and the interests o f the organisation itself. Each 
organisation perceives the reality from a different perspective and therefore have 
conflicting ideas about the direction that institutional change should take. The 
interaction between organisations is thus dominated by a notion o f conflict and power.
x In this thesis we follow the Weberian definition of state (Weber 1978). In this definition the state has the 
monopoly of power associated with legislative, executive, and judicial authority. The state embodies the 
public power in the form of organisations controlling the administrative, legal, and military apparatus 
with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organisations located in a particular territory 
and to implement these decisions (Evans 1985: 46-47). The state is thus a set o f organisations but it is 
also and simultaneously the people who carry out the functions essential to the state — individual policy 
makers, bureaucrats, and administrators that are placed in authority over others (Alt and Crystal 1983: 
23).
0 The process o f preference formation has been barely studied despite its crucial importance for 
understanding apparently politically irrational policies. Grindle and Thomas (1991) deal explicitly with 
the role of preferences in policy reform.
10 The ultimate purpose of each actor participating in politics is to improve her relative influence on 
public decision making. Accumulation of power defined as the “...capacity of a man or a number o f men 
to realise their own will in a communal act even against the resistance of others who are participating in 
the same act (Peterson 1980: 185)” is thus the main goal in politics. Power, as a concept derived and 
solely understood in the wider context of institutions and organisations (see Dugger 1980) cannot be 
excluded from any analysis of policy-making.
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Although the interaction between organisations is constrained by the existing balance o f  
power, their actions introduce a dynamic to such balance. They have strong incentives 
to devote resources to improve their positions in the existing configuration o f  power. 
This simple economic calculation has profound implications for the way the polity is 
organised and likewise for the performance o f the economy (North 1990). Organisations 
are not only important constraints to individual choices but they are also agents o f 
institutional change. Next section shows how institutions and public policy have this 
dual role too.
Institutions
Emphasising the role o f institutions in social processes is not a new strand o f research in 
academic work. Thorstein Veblen [1904] and John R. Commons [1934] first introduced 
institutions as an analytical concept to economic analysis early this century. These 
authors made pioneering work on the role o f culture, power, and ideology. However, 
according to William Dugger (1992: 64), ‘even today there is no clearly defined body o f  
principles on which institutionalists are generally agreed and by which they are known.’ 
In contrast to classical institutionalists, who concentrated only on the role o f institutions 
on individual behaviour, new institutionalists combine institutions and individual 
preferences to explain political and economic choices. The definition o f institutions 
used in this thesis is different to the one traditionally adopted in political science and 
more in the line with the literature o f new institutional economics. I use Douglass North 
(1990: 3) definition o f institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.’ This rather loose definition introduces to the analysis the required 
flexibility to identify and describe the actual determinants o f  individual and 
organisational behaviour in a complex setting like the Mexican political economy.
Individuals have limited capacity to process all the information required to make 
decisions and therefore create rules to overcome this natural shortcoming o f  human 
rationality (North 1981; 1990; Meier 1991). These rules secure some regularity to 
otherwise infinite possible scenarios reducing in this way the computational 
requirements o f everyday choices. Nonetheless these rules become at the same time 
major constraints to those same choices they are intended to facilitate. Public policies 
are the most obvious cases o f this apparent contradiction; they, once implemented, are
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constraints to individual behaviour, but at the same time the process itself o f  policy­
making is constrained by formerly introduced policies. In other words, implemented 
policies are rules but the process through which rules are made has its own rules. This 
thesis is concerned with how policy-making is constrained by existing rules (rule 
making process), and once policies are implemented how they in turn constrain 
individual decisions and choices (rules themselves). The first part— how policy-making 
is constrained by existing institutions— falls within the field o f politics exclusively. 
However, the second part— how implemented policies constrain individual 
behaviour— can be usefully applied to both politics and economics.
By studying institutions the present study intends to improve the understanding on the 
dynamics o f how public decisions are made and enforced." By enforcement I mean the 
process through which these decisions are actually made binding for the rest o f the 
society. Enforcement usually takes the form of sanctions to actors’ behaviour either by 
coercive means or by reducing the effectiveness o f  their actions upon desired 
outcomes. The set o f feasible actions to achieve certain ends is limited and marked off  
by the institutional framework. The logic o f the system force actors and organisations 
to observe established rules, otherwise the desired results may not be attained. For 
instance, a private organisation that wants to influence effectively a particular public 
policy must choose from the set o f actions regarded as ‘legitimate’ given the existing 
constraints.12 In the same way state organisations cannot use different mechanisms o f  
control to those implicitly agreed upon in the original social contract, otherwise they 
run the risk to have the regime overthrown.
The analysis identifies two major categories o f institutions: formal and informal. The 
first set o f  rules is usually the body o f legislation existing within the polity that includes 
constitutions, international agreements, decrees, laws, by-laws, etc. They follow a 
formal procedure for their introduction and are enforced by the authority in most o f  the 
cases. The state has the monopoly o f their enforcement but not o f their introduction or 
modification, where social organisations have also an important role influencing their
11 For public decisions we understand those that are binding for the whole polity.
12 We use the notion of private and social actors interchangeably in the same way that public, state actors, 
and authority are equivalent notions in our framework.
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content and nature. The second set o f rules comprise those informal practices, codes o f  
conduct, conventions, and ideas that evolve over time becoming embedded constraints 
to actors behaviour within a given polity. The relative importance o f  formal vis-a-vis 
informal institutions depends on the specific system where the interaction takes place. In 
long-established democracies formal rules may be more relevant in policy-making 
processes than informal practices.13 Conversely in countries with old cultural traditions 
but under authoritarian regimes or democratic transition, informal rules more than 
formal legislation constrain individuals behaviour.14
1.3 The Politics of State Autonomy
In the context o f this thesis, the politics o f state autonomy refer to the interaction 
between state and society in making decisions concerning the whole polity.’3 This 
interaction is regulated by the existing political institutions. They constrain the ability o f  
groups to organise and press their interests and the capacity o f government officials to 
act. Moreover, political institutions shape the configuration o f  power between state and 
society, which in turn translates into differential access to decision-making. This section 
introduces a framework to study the political influence o f the state vis-a-vis society. I 
use this framework to evaluate state autonomy in Mexico from a historical perspective.
The Model
The framework is based on a multi-layered model where each level represents a 
different degree o f political organisation. Voters operate at the most basic level, where 
the degree o f political organisation is very low and political participation takes place 
mostly through elections. Interest groups operate at an intermediate level, where actors
The United Kingdom is an important exception, being an old democracy where evolved informal
institutions are as important and maybe more than formal ones.
14 Mexico is an interesting case in which imported democratic institutions were superimposed on an 
ancient culture dominated by myth and religion. These two sets o f rules are often in conflict, however, 
the mechanisms for enforcement are usually more effective in the case of the old informal institutions.
15 I make a fundamental distinction between political system and state. The state is made up of, and
limited to, those organisations that are endowed with society-wide decision making authority. In this
sense we follow the Weberian definition of state (Weber 1978). In contrast, the political system 
represented by an institutional framework is the arena where the interaction between social organisations
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display greater coherence and their influence is exercised through policy networks. 
Finally, the government operates at the highest level, where the actors have the highest 
organisational coherence and direct access to decision making.
Figure 1.1
Levels of Political Organisation
Policy Space










• Coherence of policy preferences
• Internal consistency
The degree o f political organisation is translated into political influence that is in turn 
represented by the size o f the policy space circumscribed by political institutions under 
which actors operate (see Figure 1.1).16 State autonomy is represented by the size o f the 
policy space at the third level. Political institutions are also classified depending on the 
level at which they are relevant. The first and more general level includes institutions 
determining the extent to which society at large can constrain state actions— namely, 
those that establish the type o f political regime, whether authoritarian or democratic. 
The second level concentrates on institutions structuring the interaction between the 
state and interest groups. Finally, the third level analyses institutions that shape the 
preferences and behaviour o f  those individuals controlling the state apparatus.
and the state takes place. This is a fundamental departure from some other authors, who define the state 
in a broader sense making it equivalent to our definition of political system.
10 The policy space is the range o f options with possibilities of being introduced open to the decision 
maker without risking their hold of power (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 8). This space is determined by the 
institutional framework and organisational environment where the decision maker operates.
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1st level: Voters
The social contract, understood as a broad agreement on basic rules by all the members 
o f a given polity, is the most important institution at the first level. Compliance with this 
contract takes the form o f political legitimacy that in a democratic system is associated 
with elections. At this level, unorganised individuals can voice their main concerns by 
casting their votes, elections are the mechanisms through which society at large 
participates in public decisions, in exchange for a tacit acceptance o f the political 
leadership. Public policies will reflect voters concerns, usually related to economic 
issues, to the extent that incumbents face the real threat o f being sacked through an 
electoral process. As long as elections matter, the electoral calendar w ill also have 
important implications for the timing and implementation o f policy decisions.17 The 
more democratic institutions are, the more influence voters have on shaping politicians 
agenda— median voter hypothesis— and therefore, the smaller the outer circle in figure
1.1 becomes.
Voters, given their low degree of organisation and policy coherence, are more 
concerned about general outcomes than specific policies. Voters in societies with low  
levels o f political awareness accept unpopular policies— e.g. stabilisation 
programmes— in exchange for popular outcomes— e.g. consumption booms. The 
electorate in Mexico backed President Salinas’s unpopular policies in the 1991 and 
1994 elections. In these cases, electoral outcomes rarely convey the policy preferences 
o f voters. In fact, it is difficult to define a coherent set o f policy preferences at this level. 
However, electoral outcomes do represent the amount o f  popular support for the regime 
depending on the performance o f the economy immediately before the elections. 
Political elites are continuously re-engineering the bases o f popular support for the 
regime (Haggard 1990: 3-4).
Voters in Mexico, as a political group, do not have a coherent set o f policy preferences 
and do not represent an internally cohesive organisation. It may be argued that political 
parties are the organisational representation o f  voters. For Joseph Schumpeter (1994:
17 Politicians and policy makers seeking to remain in office behave according to an electoral cycle in 
which important decisions that may impair their popularity in the proximity of elections will be 
postponed or not taken at all.
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283), political organisations like parties are simply the response to the fact that the 
electorate cannot articulate their preferences and co-ordinate their actions without a pre- 
established framework. Political parties are intended to regulate competition among 
potential state leaders for the vote o f the electorate. However, the close links between 
the PRI and the Mexican state further decreased the ability o f voters to influence 
policies. Until recently, elections were not effective mechanisms o f social participation 
and therefore legitimacy was more associated to ideological discourse. The Mexican 
regime rested on the foundations o f the PRI and its allied unions o f  peasant 
organisations, a powerful political machine that based its claim to power in M exico’s 
revolutionary past. In Mexico, political leaders have not so much incorporated 
threatening social organisations into state agencies as they have into the PRI (Migdal 
1988: 232).
President Salinas, aware o f increasing political constraints at the first level resulting 
from effective electoral competition, replaced the traditional corporatist structure o f  the 
PRI by a new network o f geographical units organised under the umbrella o f the 
Programci Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL). This programme represented a 
major change in the patronage machinery. The automatic right o f PRI operatives to 
distribute state resources was extensively curtailed and the availability o f  resources for 
local development was increasingly channelled through PRONASOL. This programme 
meant that quick disbursing o f funds was distributed to organisations from local 
communities by the President’s office. The old PRI-dominated networks o f  patronage 
were increasingly directed to reassert the President’s popularity (Grindle 1996: 94). 
According to Miguel Centeno (1994: 65), PRONASOL was the key to consolidate the 
position o f President Salinas, who built new bases o f support at the same time that he 
dismantled the old ones.
Finally, M exico’s political democratisation increased the influence o f the electorate in 
policy-making, further limiting the autonomy o f the state. Political parties, the Congress 
and non-govemmental organisations are increasingly capturing political spaces where 
they can exercise some influence on the President. The political reform still has to make 
a deep and comprehensive reform of the legislative, including procedures, committees, 
re-election, staff and ‘profesionalisation’.
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2nd Level: Interest Groups
At the second level, the most important institutional feature o f the political system is the 
society’s organisation into interest groups. The institutions at this level structure the 
relationship between the state and organised groups within society. The form o f  this 
interaction depends on the incentives for individuals to organise themselves into interest 
groups. States with greater executive autonomy are exposed less to influence from 
interest groups than those with an active legislature that are more receptive to them. 
Interest group activity in an executive-dominated state usually takes place through 
informal links and negotiations with the bureaucracy, whereas in a state dominated by 
the legislative interest groups pressure is exercised in the form o f lobbying. Interest 
groups have more coherent policy preferences and are internally more cohesive than 
voters but less so than the state. They are more concerned with specific policy outcomes 
rather than with policies themselves. As long as policies deliver economic rents, secure 
property rights, or provide public goods, interest groups will not promote a change in 
those commanding the state.
In Mexico under President Salinas, the political discretion o f major businessmen, the 
absence o f an explosively sensitive public opinion and the political pragmatism o f  state 
officials enhanced the communication and collaboration at this level. In fact, the 
organisational structure o f some state agencies, like the Ministry o f Finance or the 
BdeM, provided the right conditions to develop one o f the best-established policy 
networks. Juan Ignacio Gil, President o f the National Insurance and Bonding 
Commission (CNSF), conceded that ‘the nature o f Mexican politics is such that personal 
contact between state officials and private financial executives is a common practice’ 
(Interview: Mexico City, September 1st 1995). The exchange o f personnel between the 
state and commercial banks became an important element in the policy network for the 
financial system. The experience o f these ex-public officials provided an excellent asset 
in terms o f connections and knowledge about the internal structure o f public 
organisations and the actual functioning o f the policy-making process. Because o f  the 
profitable relationship between the financial sector and the state, former bureaucrats 
often move to financial firms where they have good business and career opportunities 
(Camp 1989: 85). In addition to their obvious economic importance, the private
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financial organisations are politically significant because they usually represent or lead 
the private sector in general (Garrido and Quintana 1987: 108).
The most prominent private organisations for the financial system are the large financial 
groups, usually organised around a bank. Three major banks only have traditionally 
dominated the system, namely: Banco Nacional de Mexico (BANAMEX), Banco de 
Comercio (BANCOMER) and Banca SERFIN.18 These three major financial groups 
control most o f the financial resources in the country and the network o f connections 
with the state.19 Regular collaboration usually takes place between the state 
organisations and the large financial groups only. Despite this phenomenon o f  market 
concentration, the nature o f each major private organisation and its relationship with the 
government is different. For instance, BANAMEX is a leading private financial 
organisation with a reputation for being a sympathetic collaborator with government 
policies, in contrast to SERFIN, which is considered more critical and distant regarding 
its relationship with the government.20
The marriage o f finance and industry further increases the ‘political leverage’ o f  these 
interest groups. Large groups enjoy privileged access to decision making and the 
benefits derived from those policies. For instance, the foremost beneficiaries o f  state 
policy during the borrowing period in the 1970s were large financial and industrial 
groups. These groups had better access to foreign finance, state subsidies, subsidised 
development finance, parastatal orders and (if relevant) trade protection (Frieden 1991: 
193). More recently, the divestiture programme under President Salinas mostly 
benefited this group. Foreign investment was forbidden during the privatisation in order
ls This configuration has changed somewhat in recent years as a result of the commercial banks’ 
privatisation and the banking crisis in 1995.
19 The concentration in Mexico’s financial markets dates back to last century, but it speeded up during the 
1940s and the 1950s. In 1950, 14 banks controlled 60% o f total resources, and by 1960 only 7 banks 
controlled the same share of the market. Furthermore, 13 banks controlled 72 per cent o f the 1,003 
branches, 80 per cent o f private bank resources, 77 per cent o f exhibited capital, 81 percent o f profits. 
The largest four banks (BANAMEX, BANCOMER, Banca Serfin, and COMERMEX) controlled 57 
percent o f the total branches, 63 percent of total resources, 63 per cent o f exhibited capital, and 61 per 
cent o f profits. By 1968, the same four banks controlled 67 per cent o f private bank resources, 49 percent 
o f exhibited capital and 65 percent o f private bank profits. BANAMEX and BANCOMER alone 
controlled 41 percent o f the branches, 45 percent of the total resources, 32 percent o f exhibited capital, 
and 40 percent of the profits (White 1992).
20 In the 1930s the Legorreta family, controlling BANAMEX, identified themselves with Eduardo Suarez 
and his views towards development. More conservative fractions within the business elite found an ally in 
Luis Montes de Oca (Hamilton 1982: 131).
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to protect the interests o f domestic investors. The deregulation o f banking operations 
also improved the banks' profitability between 1991 and 1994. The state policies have 
consistently favoured the interests o f  major businessmen but always within the policy 
parameters set by the state itself.
3rd Level: The President and the Bureaucracy
Finally, the third level is concerned with how institutions shape the behaviour o f  
political leaders and state managers, the actors who actually make the final decisions. 
The state, as an organisation mainly engaged in policy-making, usually has a well- 
defined and coherent set o f policy preferences. As opposed to the other two aggregates, 
voters and interest groups, the state is concerned about both, outcomes and policies 
themselves. That is to say, state actors are not only concerned with remaining in power 
by delivering the outcomes demanded by the society, but they are also interested in 
advancing their own specific views over competing ones on how to deal with public 
issues. Decision-makers have some discretionary power to handle the public issues, 
regardless o f institutions and organisations (see Grindle and Thomas 1991). Within this 
policy space they articulate their responses according to personal experience, values, 
ideology, or training. Political leaders have the policy space to define the content, 
timing and sequencing o f reform alternatives. However, they shape policies to make 
them politically and bureaucratically acceptable for divergent interests in the society.
In Mexico, one o f the most prominent political institutions at this level is the 
centralisation o f  decision making in the executive branch o f the state, especially in the 
presidency. This state actor wields maximum power for a six-year period. Among the 
political responsibilities o f the President, according to Merilee Grindle (1996: 49), are: 
to keep the stability o f the political regime; to settle the most important disputes that 
cannot be solved at lower levels; to build support coalitions for the regime; and to create 
confidence among social groups. Regarding policy-making the President’s main tasks 
are to set the broad outlines o f official policy; to determine the objectives for national 
development; and to appoint and empower high level officials (Thompson 1979: 56; 
Grindle 1996: 185-189).
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Mexico has a relatively well institutionalised public bureaucracy that expands the 
capacity o f state leaders to set the terms o f policy-making. The President relies to a great 
extent on the bureaucracy for policy development and implementation. The bureaucracy 
in Mexico is a centralised body, deeply embedded into the economic and social 
relationships o f the state, and highly sensitive to the leadership o f the President. 
Opinions about possible policy measures are solicited and channelled back to the 
President, usually through communication networks that the bureaucracy has 
established with the PRI and the private sector (Thompson 1979: 53).
1.4 State Autonomy and Policy Reform
Most o f the institutional studies on policy reform are structured around variables like 
institutional framework (Haggard 1990; Geddes 1994), bureaucratic capacity (Evans 
1995), international forces (Maxfield 1990; Stallings 1995) or political leadership 
(Grindle 1996). However, few o f them have explored how these variables enter into 
each specific stage o f the process o f policy reform.21 I found it useful to introduce this 
dimension to the analysis because the effect o f these variables on the final outcome is 
neither unique nor homogenous throughout the process. The process o f policy reform 
can be decomposed into two meaningful analytical stages: agenda setting and 
implementation.22 These two stages are essentially different in terms o f the decisions 
made, the organisations and institutions involved and the role played by the wider 
historical and international context. Yet the issue o f state autonomy is crucial in both o f  
them.
At the stage o f agenda setting, actors make decisions on what ought to be done. The 
politics o f international capital, either shaping ideas and preferences o f state elites or 
inducing policies, is essential at this stage. The international context in the form o f  
economic conditions and policy trends is more influential in shaping the policy agenda 
o f domestic states the more dependent they are on international capital, which has been
21 Grindle and Thomas’s (1991) study on policy reform is one of the few that goes deeper into the 
analysis of each of the stages of the process itself.
22 The stage of agenda setting is sometimes referred to as decision making. We avoid using this term 
because it may create some confusion since decisions are made throughout the process, including the 
implementation stage.
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the case in most LDCs throughout history. At the stage o f implementation, actors make 
decisions on how to get things done. Political negotiation, bureaucratic capacity and 
balance o f political power come to the fore at this point in the process. The relative 
strength o f interest groups to negotiate with the state also shapes the implementation o f  
policies. External factors set the general parameters for the policy agenda, whereas 
domestic institutions shape the specific political processes o f the implementation 
(Bowles and White 1994: 244).
The role o f an autonomous state in policy reform is better perceived by looking at the 
specific conditions where this shift takes place. Williamson (1994) discusses several 
hypothesis about policy reform; they can be grouped into two different categories: first, 
those related to the specific context in which the reform takes place; and second, those 
about the state capacity required for a successful reform. From this perspective, the 
phenomenon o f policy reform is usually the combination o f  external connectedness, on 
the one hand, and internal autonomy, on the other (Evans 1992: 176). External 
connectedness provides the initial stimulus for reform through economic shocks 
transmitted from abroad and conditions the policy responses through the prevailing 
international policy culture (Haggard 1990: 28).
The financial system provides an excellent case to illustrate the two main dimensions o f  
analysis, namely: international dependence and domestic autonomy. Regarding the first 
dimension, the financial system is the most important link between the domestic 
political system and international capital. With regard to the second dimension, the 
policy coalition organised around the financial division o f the executive bureaucracy is 
the dominant group within the state. The interest groups operating in the financial 
system are among the most influential and best organised in the Mexico. Furthermore, 
the outcomes from the reform to the financial system are particularly consequential for 
economic performance: the financial system determines savings and investments 
decisions; the most important prices in the economy, interest and exchange rates, are 
determined in the financial markets; and state financing depends crucially on the 
conditions in the financial system.
Agenda Setting: The Politics of International Capital
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The agenda is formed by two types o f  issues depending on the circumstances under 
which they come to be included (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 73). The issues introduced 
in the context o f  a crisis, often imposed on the state by the wider historical and 
international context, are usually linked to essential political goals like regime stability. 
Alternatively, issues from politics-as-usual situations, usually the result o f  technical 
analysis, are often related to the day-to-day management o f the state. Policy reform 
belongs to the first type o f policy issues, those in which the stake at play is very large 
and involves the top levels o f the state’s hierarchy. They come to be included in the 
agenda as a reaction to situations threatening the stability o f  the regime, like sustained 
periods o f  economic stagnation or increasing international pressure for reform.
The financial dependence o f  LDCs places their political leaders in a disadvantaged 
position vis-a-vis international capital. Policy trends concerning capital in the 
international arena are major guidelines for domestic political leaders when setting their 
policy agenda. In fact, at this stage political leaders often become agents o f  international 
capital, translating the demands o f capital into concrete policy actions in their domestic 
countries. Capital exercises its influence mainly by threatening politicians and policy 
makers with capital flight. They do not engage in negotiations, they only react to 
policies. Policy makers are, however, very well aware o f  the demands o f these groups 
and use the behaviour o f capital markets as an indicator o f capital approval o f  their 
policies.
At this stage, the international dimension enters, in the form o f international policy 
networks in which some ministries or agencies within the state are in continuous 
communication and collaboration with international organisations. External influence is 
usually stronger the more centralised decision making in the executive is relative to the 
legislative, and the more insulated it is from domestic interest groups. All these 
elements have a strong content of an international policy culture, transmitted either 
through policy networks or political leaders and bureaucrats educated in major 
intellectual centres (Ikenberry 1990; Kahler 1992). To the extent that state elites control 
the process o f policy-making, this international policy culture is more influential in the 
content o f public policies. As at the other levels, the more autonomous the state is the
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larger is the space for external forces to influence policy decisions by shaping the 
preferences o f the state elites. It is always easier to influence a small circle o f top elite 
officials than to change the views of a whole society.
In an increasingly interrelated world, dominated by market economies, international 
capital in the form of investment has become a condition sine qua non for economic 
growth (Block 1977: 15). This means that domestic states cannot ignore the implicit 
demands o f  external finance when shaping their policy agendas. Furthermore, power 
relations between states also constrain domestic decisions. Powerful states committed to 
the worldwide spread o f democracy and free-market economies like the US may press 
other states through economic incentives or sanctions to introduce some changes to their 
political economy.
As mentioned earlier, an economic crisis is a major component o f policy reform in 
which opportunities for reform are created. Lying between economic circumstances and 
policy reform is a political process, by which international influence translate into 
effective political actions aimed at policy reform (Bates and Krueger 1993: 454). For 
example, the effects o f external shocks during the 1980s were mediated by pre-existing 
institutional arrangements leading to a shift in the balance o f power between different 
groups. In states heavily reliant on international capital, the financial agencies gained 
substantial power and their responses were shaped according to the policy prescriptions 
o f major international actors (Maxfield 1990; Stallings 1992). The content o f the 
reforms thus reflected not only the severity o f the external financial constraints but also 
the nature o f the political conflicts surrounding the crisis and the political strategies o f  
state leadership.
Implementation: Domestic Politics
At the stage o f policy implementation the requirements o f international capital moves to 
a second place and domestic political negotiation take the prime role. Operational issues 
like timing, scope, and contents are decided upon at this stage (Bates and Krueger 1993: 
11-16). It is at this stage where most interest groups articulate their actions in order to 
advance their interests. In other words, most collective demand making occurs, interests 
are accommodated, and conflicts are resolved, when policies are implemented (Meier
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1991: 305). The distribution o f power among those with competing views on how to 
deal with the issues already included in the agenda determines how the policies will be 
implemented. State managers and bureaucrats become middlemen between state 
resources and domestic interest groups (Evans 1985: 205). They design the schemes 
through which funds are distributed among competing domestic groups. Lobbying and 
rent seeking find their most profitable opportunities when resources are distributed at 
this stage.
As opposed to international capital, those groups with fixed assets not easily 
transferable between countries become active rent-seekers, devoting resources to gain 
preferential access to state benefits. Transnational corporations and domestic 
industrialists were very influential during the 1960s and early 1970s when the main 
form o f international capital was direct investment (Bates 1988: 7). However, by the late 
1970s and throughout the 1980s, multilateral lending replaced direct investment as the 
main form o f international transfers and hence conditionality more than direct 
negotiation became the major determinant o f how policies were implemented.23 By the 
1990s, investment in securities, in turn, replaced loans as the main financial instrument 
in international transactions. In the new framework, signals o f sound economic policies 
and investment climate became paramount.
A state apparatus with significant autonomy from social forces, and supported by capital 
is essential for the implementation and management o f policy reform. In other words, a 
coherent bureaucracy prevents the state from being captured by rent seeking interest 
groups, but also provides institutional channels for societal involvement in the reform 
(Evans 1992: 163-165). Internal autonomy allows the state to break up the existing 
alliances favouring the status quo. The initiative for reform usually comes from groups 
within the state,24 despite being originally motivated by external events. According to 
Douglass North (1981: 32), ‘institutional innovation will come from rulers rather than 
constituents since the latter always face the free rider problem.’ Most o f the policy
Conditionality refers in the literature as the negotiation between MFOs and domestic states over a set of 
changes to economic policy that had to be implemented in return for a loan or a grant (Lipson 1988: 48).
24 Frieden (1991) argues, however, that economic interest groups are the most compelling explanation of 
economic policy in Latin America during the 1970s and of regime change in the 1980s. This view sharply 
contrasts with most of the literature on policy reform, which affirms the prime role of the state bringing 
about change.
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reform in the 1980s was promulgated through presidential decrees rather than as law 
debated and passed through legislatures (Grindle 1996: 35; Veltmeyer et.al. 1997: 80). 
Some authors go further to suggest that policy reform in LDCs was designed in 
Washington and imposed without debate, or any input whatsoever from the social 
sectors that were expected to bear the costs o f their implementation (Veltmeyer, et.al. 
1997: 19-20). Nevertheless, top-down reform without the support o f organised groups 
probably cannot be sustained; therefore, to account for the stability o f policies, they 
have to be included in the analysis (Waterbury 1992: 192; Bates and Krueger 1993: 
457).
Policy reform usually represents a break from existing arrangements and therefore 
requires new bases o f support to make it viable in the long run. These bases o f support 
are often groups from the society expecting to benefit from the new order o f things. 
However, these future benefits are still uncertain at the moment o f reform and, 
therefore, strong political leadership is required to align these groups behind the reform 
efforts. Investors must be among the supporters o f the reform efforts, otherwise the 
success o f the reform may be jeopardised. Without money flowing into the economy, is 
difficult to convince a sceptical population o f the benefits o f reform.
Finally, the organisations involved in M exico’s financial reform were agencies in the 
financial branch o f the executive bureaucracy and the financial groups. Financial 
liberalisation never reached the electorate. The Congress was also excluded from the 
actual discussion and implementation o f the financial liberalisation. Isaac Katz, an 
expert on the Mexican financial system at ITAM, acknowledged that ‘the Congress has 
not been a major player in the design o f the policy for the financial system... Most o f  the 
regulation for the financial system comes from proposals o f  the executive sent to the 
congress for their approval. This legislation requires a high degree o f technical expertise 
that rules out the possibility o f an actual debate in the Congress; and it is usually 
approved without major modifications’ (Interview: Mexico City, September 13th 1995).
1.5 Central Hypothesis and Structure of the Thesis
The main claim o f this thesis says that the main stimulus for M exico’s financial reform 
came from political imperatives as understood by President Salinas and his economic
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team. The analysis o f M exico’s financial reform shall try to show how economic reform 
was intended to engineer new bases o f support for the regime and consequently to 
consolidate the President’s political leadership within the new parameters set by 
economic globalisation and political democratisation. Economic reform, gradual 
democratisation, and social spending were all policies subordinated to the goals o f  
reasserting presidential authority, government capacity and the PRI’s electoral 
hegemony. M exico’s financial reform was the result o f political entrepreneurial 
initiative ci la Meier (1991). The charismatic leadership o f President Salinas aligned a 
powerful coalition o f support for economic reform. Each case study discusses how 
Salinas used extensively the organisational and institutional infrastructure o f the quasi­
authoritarian Mexican state to overcome the legitimacy deficit he inherented from the 
1988 elections. President Salinas, I claim, devoted an important part o f  the state’s 
resources to gain popular support for the regime from the beginning o f  his term. His 
government was very well aware o f political constraints. Largely for this reason, Salinas 
sought to boost the purchasing power o f the peso, leading to an enormous increase in 
the current account deficit. The deficit went up from $2.7 billion dollars in 1988 to 
$24.4 billion in 1992 and $28.8 billion in 1994 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 68). 
President Salinas emphasised the need to provide a positive image o f M exico in the 
outside world in order to attract investment and boost the economy.
M exico’s financial reform represents a case where President Salinas redefined the 
economic role o f the state in order to reduce the state’s exposure to economic swings 
and to increase state capacity. According to Jorge Dominguez (1987: 76), while good 
economic performance helps regimes and incumbents to generate legitimacy, poor 
performance serves to undermine legitimacy. Salinas sought to avoid potential conflict 
and to make new alliances with powerful groups, like financiers and large industrialists, 
by scaling down the economic activities o f the state. His reform also intended to release 
state resources so they could be re-directed to strategic areas where the state could 
exercise more effective control upon society and the economy.
The political discourse during this period stressed the importance o f improving state 
capacity to satisfy the needs o f the poor. In his inaugural speech, President Salinas 
outlined this vision:
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‘...the crisis has shown us that a larger state is not necessarily a more capable 
state; a state that owns more is not necessarily a state that is more just. The truth 
is, in Mexico, more state has meant less capacity to respond to the social needs 
o f our fellow countrymen and, in the end, greater weakness o f the state itself. All 
the time the activity o f the public sector was increasing, attention to the 
problems o f the highest social priority was decreasing’ (quoted by Golob 1997: 
132).
Anne Krueger’s (1974) ‘pluralist’ hypothesis represents an alternative approach to the 
one presented in this thesis. According to this approach, public policy is the result o f  
competition between interest groups. In other words, organised interest groups push the 
government to introduce reforms. Considering Mexico’s financial reform from her 
perspective, it follows that the coalition o f  interests that favoured the reform outweighed 
the coalition that opposed it. However, I claim that broader state priorities like regime 
legitimacy weighted more heavily than support from specific constituencies when the 
decision to reform the financial system was taken. The interest groups that benefited 
from the reforms, though powerful, did not have the capacity to subordinate the 
government’s political agenda to their own private interests. In this case, the relevant 
groups— international and domestic capital— displayed considerable influence but the 
state still preserved the power to set the parameters for economic policy-making. For 
instance, President de la Madrid’s financial policy favoured a new interest group 
organised around the stock exchange and the brokerage houses. Important policy 
decisions served the interests o f this group like the sale o f non-banking concerns after 
the nationalisation and the emission o f government securities. However, these decisions 
responded in the first place to the financial needs o f the state during the ‘debt crisis’.
Alternatively, according to the ‘benevolent planner’ hypothesis o f neoclassical 
economics, the financial reform responded to the legitimate need to improve efficiency 
and foster economic growth. Under this approach the reform was an economic 
imperative for the government, which is the guardian o f the public good. I claim that 
although appealing from a normative perspective, this explanation has obvious 
shortcomings. First, it is based on the rather naive assumption that policy makers and 
politicians are selfless agents. Second, it does not explain why Mexico did not reform 
the financial system earlier, in the 1970s. At that time, the financial system already
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lacked the flexibility to adjust to external shocks that called for reform (Aspe 1993; 
Ortiz 1994). In fact, there was already a trend all over Latin America towards financial 
liberalisation. Edward Shaw (1973) and Ronald McKinnon (1973) laid down the 
theoretical foundations for financial liberalisation as early as 1973. Moreover, President 
Salinas was not more ‘benevolent’ than President Echeverria.
The combined facts that President Salinas did not run his electoral campaign on 
economic reform, and that the Mexican electorate is not pro-market, appears to reject 
the public choice hypothesis o f the ‘median voter’. The answers to M exico’s financial 
reform provided by the pluralist, neoclassical and public choice approaches seems 
unsatisfactory and, therefore, require further analysis. Given the sui generis 
characteristics o f the Mexican political system, this thesis looks for the answer on the 
political imperatives o f the state. Policy change in Mexico cannot be understood without 
addressing issues like political leadership, state financing and coalition building.
Financial Collapse
Despite the fact that the thesis is mainly concerned with the casues o f policy reform, it 
was not possible to avoid an enquiry into the consequences o f  these decisions in terms 
o f the M exico’s 1994 financial crisis. This event illustrated how politically motivated 
decisions have very often-pemicious economic effects. I claim that the financial reform 
was one o f the two main elements that caused the 1994 crisis, the other being the 
political cycle associated to the presidential succession. The incentive structure resulting 
from the financial refonn under President Salinas reduced the margin for policy error 
while political democratisation pushed the government to take decisions whose 
outcomes were difficult to anticipate. The lack o f effective reform to M exico’s 
presidentialism made the combination o f free market reforms and stronger political 
competition mutually frustrating. The financial system is highly sensitive to political 
events. In the case o f Mexico specifically, the financial system is one o f  the most 
important institutional arrangements through which the consequences o f the political 
transformation currently taking place are transmitted to the rest o f the economy.
I believe that the combination o f financial reform and a quasi-authoritarian regime 
brought about an incentive structure that fostered speculative, short-term and extremely
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volatile investment, at the expense o f productive, long-term and more stable investment. 
Reasserted presidentialism in a liberalised economy created a fragile equilibrium where 
investment and capital inflows depended to a great extent on the perceived strength o f  
the President and not on the stability o f  genuinely democratic institutions. The six-year 
cycle o f  presidential authority seems to explain very well how the same bureaucracy, 
same managers and same government, has different degrees o f economic and political 
control along the sexenio. Towards the end o f the term, presidential power wanes at a 
very fast pace leaving the bureaucracy and the political machinery without effective 
mechanisms to steer the economy and discipline the political elites.
As opposed to the 1994 crisis, the economic crises in 1976 and 1982 are easily 
explained by orthodox economic theory. Fiscal and external imbalances induced by the 
government’s expansionist policies became critical at the end o f  the presidential term. 
The accumulation o f debt and over-dependence on oil characterised the economic policy 
between 1979 and 1982. Capital flight was the ultimate cause o f the collapse o f  the peso 
and the subsequent economic crisis. However, under this perspective it is much harder 
to explain the failure o f economic policy to avoid the crisis in 1994 (Philip 1998: 24). 
This crisis has two fundamental differences to those in the past: public balances were in 
equilibrium, and external imbalances were not caused by the government’s expansionist 
policies. Yet, they share a remarkable similarity: all o f them were ultimately caused by 
capital flight at the end o f the presidential sexenio.
Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised into three parts. The first part— chapters one to four— develops 
the framework, both historical and institutional. The first chapter outlines the theoretical 
discussion on state autonomy and develops a simple analytical framework to study 
public policy decisions. The subsequent three chapters address three main themes: 
external dependency of domestic states on international capital, political change under 
President Carlos Salinas and financial policy in Mexico. The second part presents the 
analysis o f three main institutional changes to the financial system— development 
banking reform, commercial banking privatisation and autonomy o f the central bank. 
Each specific case study shows how the reforms conformed to the ideas o f the dominant 
consensus on economic policy and how they delivered an inefficient incentive structure.
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The third part— chapter eight— brings together all the elements discussed throughout the 
thesis to explain M exico’s 1994 financial crisis. Finally, the appendix explains the 
methodology followed in this thesis and describes the sources o f information.
Each o f the three case-study chapters is divided into four sections. The first section o f  
each chapter shows how the postulates o f the dominant economic orthodoxy shaped 
each institutional change in the financial system. The second section presents the 
specific circumstances under which each particular reform took place. The third section 
illustrates how the political imperatives o f President Salinas’s 'government pushed for 
each one o f the reforms. Finally, the fourth argues that the outcomes from the refonns 
failed to deliver a sound institutional framework for the financial system. This structure 
resembles Robert Bates and Anne Krueger’s (1993: 11-16) policy stages: the period 
prior to the reform, when the issues are the political and economic factors leading to the 
decision o f policy change; the reform itself, when the emphasis switches to timing, 
scope, content and implementation; and finally, the post-reform period, when the 
questions are the outcomes and their institutionalisation.
Chapter two discusses the politics o f international finance as the initial source o f reform. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first establishes the ‘political leverage’ o f  
international capital from three different angles: financial globalisation, state financing 
and balance o f  payments financing. The second section describes the new consensus on 
economic thinking, how it was reached and how it is related to the financial reform in 
Mexico. Finally, the third section introduces the notion o f transnational policy networks, 
in order to show how the existing institutional arrangements in the world economy 
favoured the rise to power o f a technocratic elite committed to pro-market reforms in 
Mexico during the 1980s.
Chapter three is chronologically organised into three sections. The first section argues 
that the present autonomy o f the Mexican state is the result o f  a quasi-authoritarian 
framework dating back to the 1940s. The second section shows how the reconfiguration 
o f power between policy coalitions during the 1980s placed reform-minded technocrats 
in key positions o f government. Finally, the third section argues that policy reform 
under President Salinas was intended to engineer new bases o f support for the regime
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within the new parameters set by an increasing integration to the world economy, on the 
one hand, and by increasing democratic competition, on the other.
Chapter four is also chronologically organised into four sections, each part dealing with 
a specific period in the history o f M exico’s financial policy. The first section comprises 
the period between 1925 and 1952, when the government introduced the institutional 
framework o f the financial system existing prior to the reform. The second section deals 
with the period between 1952 and 1982, when the financial policy was characterised by 
strong state intervention. The third section presents the period between 1982 and 1988, 
when the first attempt o f financial liberalisation took place. Finally, the fourth section 
presents the main period o f study o f this thesis (1988-1994), when the government 
removed all the controls on banking operations.
Chapter five presents the case o f the reform o f development banking. This is a special 
case because there was not an explicit attempt at reform, yet the state changed 
fundamentally the traditional role o f development banking during this period. This case 
also introduces an additional element to the analysis: interest groups, closely linked to 
development banking but outside the financial system, like small entrepreneurs, workers 
and peasants organisations, were relegated from the decision making process. This fact 
has important implications for interest groups activities. I shall argue in this chapter that 
the limited influence o f non-financial interest groups in the reform o f development 
banking, despite having big stakes in the reform, was caused by the reconfiguration o f  
power within the state in favour o f the ‘financial coalition’.
Chapter six analyses the case o f the privatisation o f the commercial banks. I argue that, 
among all the reforms to the financial system implemented under President Salinas, this 
was the most representative case o f a state-engineered change. The state deployed its 
institutional capacity to bring about swift and fundamental change to arguably the most 
important sector in the Mexican political economy. This policy was pivotal to advance 
President Salinas’s economic and political agenda. First, the privatisation improved the 
investment climate in Mexico more than any other single policy— capital inflows 
skyrocketed during the second part o f the sexenio. Second, the privatisation 
consolidated President Salinas’s political leadership by securing the support o f  the 
financial elite and providing liquidity to finance the social spending programmes.
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Chapter seven discusses the reform to the legal status o f Banco de Mexico (BdeM). I 
argue that the reform was mainly ‘cosmetic’ and aimed at increasing capital inflows and 
securing financing for the state. Late in the 1980s and early 1990s, Central Bank 
Autonomy (CBA) ranked very high in the new international economic consensus and 
the change to the legal status o f BdeM in 1993 responded to this trend. In fact, I argue 
that this reform was motivated more by the need to improve investment conditions and 
not so much by the goal o f achieving price stability in the long run, as is claimed by 
economic theory. Capital inflows, increasingly guided by signals o f future 
macroeconomic stability, were critical for the success o f the economic transformation 
pursued by the state under President Carlos Salinas.
Chapter eight provides an explanation to M exico’s financial collapse and it is organised 
into four sections. The first section presents the links between the financial reform and 
the 1994 crisis. The discussion centres on the surge in portfolio investment and the 
banks’ lending boom. Both events were direct consequences o f the financial reform and 
important causes o f the 1994 crisis. The second section introduces the political 
conditions leading to the crisis. In this part, the main issues are increasing electoral 
competition, the political business cycle and the political turmoil during 1994. The third 
section discusses two crucial policy mistakes: namely, the government’s delaying 
corrective action in the exchange rate, and changing the term-structure and exchange 
rate exposure o f the public debt. Finally, the fourth section describes the main outcomes 




The Politics of International Finance: 
Fostering Reform
This chapter elaborates on the international dimension o f our explanation to the 
phenomenon o f  economic reform in Mexico under President Carlos Salinas. In order to 
show how external events influenced the decisions o f the state, this chapter starts by 
establishing the link between international trends and domestic policy choices and then 
identifies the dominant economic policy paradigm along with the transmission 
mechanism. The increasing integration of international finance and the historical 
financial needs o f  the Mexican economy have often subordinated the policy choices o f  
the state to the preferences o f international capital (see Maxfield 1990). M exico’s 
economic reform under President Salinas was heavily reliant on capital and therefore 
most o f the reforms aimed to improve the investment conditions. The government 
expected that capital inflows would create the required leeway to engineer new bases o f  
support for the regime.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section establishes the political 
leverage o f international capital from three different angles: (1) the increasing 
integration o f domestic economies into a new global economy; (2) the financial needs o f  
the state to sustain its bases o f support; and (3) the balance o f payments financing.1 The 
second section is a description o f the new consensus on economic thinking: how it was 
reached and how it is related to the financial reform in Mexico. Finally, the third section 
introduces the notion o f policy networks in order to show how organisations and 
institutions were the crucial link between the preferences o f international capital and the 
initiative for economic reform in Mexico.
1 In the literature on Multilateral Financial Organisations (MFOs), political leverage refers to the sources 
of these organisations’ influence on decision making in domestic states.
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2.1. International Capital Leverage
During the 1980s most o f the highly indebted developing countries experienced massive 
capital outflows. These countries not only stopped receiving financing for their own 
development, but they were also transferring their own resources to rich countries. Yet, 
most o f the states in these countries did not default on their debts, despite the enormous 
costs for their own economies. More strikingly, they were very receptive to policy 
recommendations coming from international capital. If these states were not having any 
capital inflows then, why they were so keen on compliance with their financial 
liabilities. Alternatively, from a more specific perspective, external savings in Mexico 
have represented barely 2.2 percent o f the GDP on average from 1950 to 1990 compared 
to 18.3 percent o f domestic savings. Nevertheless, international capital has been a major 
influence in Mexican economic policy choices. I argue that the integration o f  
international finance has increased the political and economic costs o f defecting from 
the new economic world order. The notion o f a global economic system, outside which 
any country cannot really prosper and develop, has fostered economic integration, both 
in trade and in finance.
Success stories o f countries geared towards this global economy like the Southeast 
Asian tigers have pushed the rest o f the developing world to accept this idea o f  
integrated economies. From a purely practical point o f view, nations that expect to 
conduct multilateral trade require short- and medium-term financing plus other bank 
services and therefore cannot stop relying on the international financial system (Lipson 
1988: 44). In this new world order, international capital has become one o f  the major 
policy actors with the capacity to create a coherent set o f policies and effectively impose 
them upon domestic states. There are three features o f international capital that allows it 
to act as a coherent organisation: first, close interdependence between financial 
organisations at a worldwide level; second, strong capacity to co-ordinate between 
them; and third, Multilateral Financial Organisations (MFOs) permanent organisational 
infrastructure (Lipson 1988: 44).
Economic and financial integration has greatly enhanced the leverage o f  international 
capital to influence domestic policy choices. However, this leverage is ultimately rooted 
on domestic needs, namely: economic development and financial stability are heavily
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reliant on capital inflows. The destabilising potential o f capital movements is paramount 
in terms o f the configuration o f political power and the economic costs for the whole 
society. Small economies thus depend to a great extent on avoiding big swings on these 
movements and the survival o f states in these economies is therefore conditional on the 
legitimacy granted by powerful states and MFOs (Centeno 1994: 24).
Financial Integration
In the 1980s the phenomenon o f economic integration accelerated at a great pace. 
Commodities, money and information moved across national borders faster and more 
efficiently than ever before. The average annual growth rate o f  world exports from 1980 
to 1990 was 5.3 percent, significantly higher than the average annual growth rate o f  
world GDP that amounted to 3.1 percent (World Bank 1996: 209). Larger flows o f  
goods and services brought along greater exchange o f ideas, information and policies 
between countries. Technological innovation in telecommunications and the 
development o f international markets, organisations and networks reduced to an 
important extent the costs o f economic transactions, and consequently increased the 
interaction between international and domestic actors. The phenomenon o f  integration, 
however, has not been more rapid and complete in any economic sector than in finance. 
The annual average growth rate in securities operations between 1980 and 1992 was 
nearly 10 percent, the same figure for foreign exchange operations was around 25 
percent (Woodall 1995).
Financial integration has been mainly the result o f the relentless search o f  international 
capital for new business opportunities. The thrust on emerging markets,2 the 
development o f the euromarkets,3 the experience with the ‘junk-bonds’,4 among others, 
are examples o f the international capital need for profits. This emphasis on profits has
2 The financial markets in developing countries with middle income levels are known as emerging 
markets. They became very profitable and therefore the most preferred destination o f international capital 
during the 1980s.
3 The eurodollar markets or euromarkets referred initially to those dollar-denominated deposits made in 
banks outside the US. Their purpose was to avoid the banking regulations o f the US. However nowadays 
these markets also include those deposits denominated in other strong currencies in banks made outside 
the country where the currency is legal tender.
4 During the 1980s part of the third-world debt was transformed into tradable bonds as a result o f the 
Brady Plan. These bonds were known as ‘junk-bonds’ because of their high-risk and high-yield.
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been accentuated by recent trends, especially the expansion o f institutional investors, on 
the one hand, and the ‘securitisation’ o f  funds, on the other. Nowadays international 
capital is increasingly concentrated in organisations such as pension funds and insurance 
companies. These organisations try to maximise the amount o f capital under their 
control by offering higher yields to potential investors. Facing strong competition from 
each other, their managers are constantly looking for new investment opportunities in 
stock exchanges from all over the world. In doing so, they move enormous amounts o f  
funds from one country to another. At the same time the securitisation o f  funds— firms 
borrow directly from the markets rather than through the banks— has increased the 
supply o f financial assets that are tradable and hence priced openly in the global 
markets. This increased supply o f tradable stocks on the global financial markets means 
more and larger transactions across national borders. According to a survey published 
by The Economist (October 7th 1995):
• Daily foreign exchange trading increased from an average o f only $10 billion-20 
billion dollars in 1973 to $60 billion in 1983 and then to $900 billion in 1992. The 
ratio o f foreign exchange transactions to world trade jumped from 10:1 in 1983 to 
more than 60:1 in 1992.
• US cross-border security transactions increased from 3 percent o f the GDP in 1970 to 
9 percent in 1980 and then to 135 percent in 1993. The same figure for Britain soared 
from virtually nothing in 1970 to more than 10 times the GDP in 1993. The IMF 
estimated that total cross-border ownership o f tradable securities in 1992 was $2.5 
trillion dollars.
• The stock o f international bank lending surged to $4.2 trillion dollars in 1994 from 
$265 billion in 1975. The outstanding volume o f international bonds jumped to more 
than $2 trillion dollars in 1994 from $259 billion in 1982. Heavy issues o f  debt have 
fueled the growth of the global bond market by governments. The total stock o f  
government bonds has risen from 18 percent o f global financial assets in 1980 to 25 
percent in 1992.
According to Clive Crook (1993) the boom in portfolio investment in LDCs is 
associated to the economic reforms that have captured the attention o f foreign investors. 
LDCs are also perceived as more creditworthy than they were in the 1980s thanks to the 
reforms and the easing o f financial restrictions. The removal o f  controls in rich countries 
regarding investment in foreign investment has also contributed to this expansion. For
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instance, at present a company from an LDC can issue shares in the US using an 
American Depository Receipt (ADR).3 ADRs issued under a procedure called Rule 144a 
do not have to comply with the rules usually insisted upon by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. In 1991 Mexico raised more capital by issuing ADRs than 
through syndicated loans and bond sales combined (The Economist, August 25th 1993).
Table 2.1
Mexican Eurobond and Equity Issues, 1992-1993(1)
Eurobond Issues Equity Issues
Issuers Amount(2) No. Issuers Amount(2) No.
Government 1,580 10 TELMEX 1,243 6
CEMEX 1,400 3 BANCOMER 638 2
BANCOMER 750 1 CEMEX 460 2
NAFIN 724 6 ICA 283 2
BANACCI 700 3 Grupo Carso 235 2
BANCOMEXT 456 3 TRIBASA 210 2
TELEVISA 400 3 DINA 173 3
FEMSA 300 1 Grupo Embotellador 138 2
DESC 275 2 Coca-Cola Mexico 134 2
Volkswagen 262 1 Liverpool 133 2
ICA 225 1 Sears the Mexico 101 2
MCTTR Trips 207 1 TMM 75 2
CREMI 200 2 Grupo Radio Centro 52 1
HYLSA 175 1 SIMEC 42 3
DINA 150 1 QUADRUM 34 1
La Modema 150 1 Grupo Posadas 28 1
(1) Until October 12,h 1993
(2) $ Million dollars 
Source: IFR(1993)
The Mexican financial markets have increased substantially their cross-border securities 
transactions (see Table 2.1). Changes introduced in October 1989 to the Foreign 
Investment Act granted greater freedom to foreigners to invest on the Mexican stock 
exchange. Since then it is possible for foreign investors to buy shares with full corporate 
rights o f any Mexican company. This decision aimed to make the Mexican exchange the 
most open to foreign investment o f any in Latin America {The Financial Times Business
5 ADRs are tradable securities, quoted in dollars and paying dividends in dollars. They are issued by 
American banks, which certify that the receipts are backed by a corresponding amount o f equities, held 
abroad on behalf of the bank.
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Reports, November 3rd 1989). In July 1994, there were 72 stock issues from Mexican 
blue chip companies like BANAMEX, BANCOMER, Cemex, Televisa, Telmex, Vitro, 
among others, in the hands o f US investors. At the end o f December 1993, the balance 
o f foreign investment in the Mexican stock exchange reached a historic high o f $54.6 
billion dollars, an increase o f 90.3 percent over that registered a year earlier (Mexico 
Company Handbook 1994: 30-32). In 1993, further changes to the Securities Market 
Act and to the Mutual Funds Act introduced the possibility o f  trading foreign securities 
in the Mexican financial markets, opening the possibility o f Mexico becoming a 
regional financial centre.
To the extent that financial markets are internationally integrated, money and capital 
move to the markets, instruments and currency denominations that offer the highest 
return. According to Maxfield (1990: 7), ‘policy makers must act within the constraint 
o f a policy’s impact on capital inflows and outflows or suffer the balance o f  payments 
consequences.’ With increasing capital mobility the government cannot set both interest 
rates and exchange rates simultaneously. A fixed exchange rate with capital mobility 
implies endogenous monetary policy such that returns on capital are equal across 
countries. This competition between countries to attract capital leaves states with an 
enormous disadvantage vis-a-vis international capital when it comes to deciding upon 
financial matters. Important state decisions that have also contributed to financial 
integration like the deregulation of domestic financial markets or the liberalisation o f  
international capital flows were dictated to a great extent by the needs o f  international 
capital, namely by the need to find new profitable business opportunities. Financial 
integration is thus partially the result o f international capital initiative but now that has 
become an essential feature o f the new global economy it is also one o f the pillars upon 
which international capital exerts its power and influence over states.
State Financing
As mentioned before, the leverage o f international capital, though greatly enhanced in 
the context o f financial integration, is ultimately originated from the financial needs o f  
states to remain politically and economically viable. The financial requirements o f  the 
Mexican state after the second world war were relatively modest since it maintained its 
finances in balance until the 1970s (Aspe 1993: 126). Over all these years the public
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deficit was consistently below 3 percent o f the GDP (see Figure 2.1), the borrowing 
requirements o f the state were thus minimal, and so was the leverage o f  international 
capital. In the 1940s and 1950s foreign credit came from MFOs that did not have any 
strong conditions attached (Gurria 1994: 12). These credits, however, were contracted 
for specific investment projects and could not be used to finance other expenditures. 
During this period private capital inflows were in the form o f foreign direct investment 
and therefore international capital was represented by multinational corporations, who 
were very influential in the design o f sectoral policies but scarcely significant in general 
policy-making. This period in Mexico was characterised by sustained growth, and 
economic and political stability. The state did not experience any major challenge to its 
legitimacy and gradually consolidated its control over society.
Then, in 1968 the Mexican state faced the first o f various crises that would take place 
over the following three decades (see Basanez 1991b). This was a political crisis, which 
took the form of increasing tension between the state and social organisations, most 
prominently universities; and the turning point was the killing on October 2nd at the 
Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Mexico City. Sergio Zermeno (1978: 55) identifies three 
main causes for this political crisis: (1) the state lacked responsiveness to the demands 
of the society; (2) the state reduced its economic support to universities; and (3) the 
nationalist ideology that emerged from the revolution conflicted with the state’s 
development strategy.
The immediate response o f  the state to this first crisis was a new development strategy 
with stronger emphasis on income distribution and a more active role o f the state in the 
economy. On average, public spending increased in real terms by 15.9 percent every 
year from 1972 to 1982 (Gurria 1994: 15). This expansionist economic policy was 
however not accompanied by the corresponding increase in public revenues creating an 
enormous gap in the public accounts that had to be closed by increasing reliance on 
international capital. The public deficit jumped from 2.3 percent o f the GDP in 1971 to 
9.1 percent in 1976 (see Figure 2.1) and consequently the public debt also increased 
from 2 percent o f the GDP in 1971 to 6 percent in 1973 and then to 10 percent in 1975 
(Fitzgerald 1979: 42). The strategy o f increasing public spending partially re-built the 
traditional bases o f support for the regime, namely workers, peasants and middle- 
classes. However this increase in public spending was possible only because the state
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had access to new sources of international lending (Haggard and Maxfield 1993: 297), 
especially from the euromarkets that received a great amount o f funds from oil 
exporting countries after the rise on the international oil prices in 1973 (Gurria 1994:
13). Commercial banks replaced MFOs as the main providers o f external credit; 
countries like Mexico that had good credit ratings, and with good economic prospects 
became the main recipients o f these funds. According to Jeffrey Frieden (1981: 411), 80 
to 90 percent o f commercial bank eurocurrency lending to developing countries 
consisted of loans to various public sector entities: central governments themselves, 
central banks, state-owned enterprises, national development banks and state-owned 
public utilities. The cost o f greater freedom in domestic economic policy was stronger 
leverage o f international capital. On August 31st 1976 external financial pressures 
forced the government to devaluate the peso, after more than twenty years o f fixed 
exchange parity to the dollar. The exchange rate jumped from 12.50 pesos per dollar to 
15.69 and then to 22.69 in 1977 (INEGI 1994: 1006).
Figure 2.1
Public Deficit, 1950-1994
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Source: Aspe (1994: 69); Zedillo (1995: 51)
After a brief interlude o f stringent conditions from the IMF to reduce the public deficit, 
external borrowing and public indebtedness (Basanez 1991b: 63);6 the state resumed its
” The credit extended to Mexico by the IMF in 1976 included a clause setting a maximum limit to the 
external annual borrowing at $3 billions dollars. This limit was nevertheless exceeded by far in the next
few years.
41
rapid expansion o f public spending in 1980 (see Figure 2.1). This time the emphasis on 
public expenditure to achieve faster economic growth was based on the grounds that the 
new oil wealth would finance Mexico’s development in a non-inflationary way (Aspe 
1993: 128). Taking advantage o f such wealth required the expansion o f  public 
investment and therefore once more the state resorted to international capital looking for 
financing with the corresponding exposure to its influence. This time, both the public 
and the private sector started a rapid expansion o f external borrowing. For instance, 
between 1980 and 1982 the stock of public foreign debt grew from 20.9 percent o f  the 
GDP to 29.8 percent, whereas private indebtedness went from 7.9 percent to little more 
than 18 percent o f the GDP (Aspe 1993: 129).
In 1982, another crisis associated with balance o f payments difficulties not only brought 
to a halt capital inflows, but for the next six years a substantial amount o f  internal 
resources were mainly directed to satisfy the increasing cost o f the external debt. It 
became evident that international capital had enough leverage to extract domestic 
resources even at the expense of economic growth. Throughout the presidential 
administration o f Miguel de la Madrid the economy stagnated and the traditional bases 
o f support o f the regime were severely weakened. In the 1988 presidential elections the 
dominant group within the Mexican state faced the strongest challenge in its history 
from a left-wing coalition headed by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. The state under President 
Carlos Salinas turned to international capital for the third time since the 1970s in order 
to gain political legitimacy and create new bases o f  support for the regime. However, for 
the first time for 20 years, international capital did not finance the public deficit— it was 
for private investment instead, mainly portfolio investment.
Balance of Payments Financing
The Mexican state has been committed to exchange rate stability and free convertibility 
since the 1940s. It has been state policy to overcome public fear o f devaluation and the 
consequent capital flight by intervening in the exchange market to guarantee the peso’s 
value (Maxfield 1990: 127). The importance o f securing international credit was crucial 
to the Mexican state after the foreign exchange crisis o f the late 1940s and the early 
1950s (Maxfield 1993: 248). The recent phenomenon o f financial integration has further 
increased the ability o f the state to intervene in the exchange markets by expanding its
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access to foreign exchange in the form of capital inflows. International capital made 
possible the enormous growth in the balance o f payments deficits in Mexico since the 
early 1970s (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2
Current Account Deficit, 1970-1994
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Source: INEGI (1994: 877-900); International Financial Statistics, IMF (various years).
As a result o f the development of the euromarkets, commercial banks started to offer 
credits to developing countries without strong conditions regarding the final destination 
o f the funds, although with higher interest rates and shorter periods for repayment. 
Credits coming from the euromarkets were used to finance to a great extent the current- 
account deficit allowing states to run bigger deficits for longer. Before, under fixed 
exchange rates and restricted capital flows current account deficits had to be financed 
out o f capital inflows in the form of direct investment or multilateral lending. In the 
past, credits for these purposes had been severely restricted because o f US regulations 
on the subject (Gurria 1994: 13).
In this context increasing current account deficits produced recurrent balance of 
payments crises in each of the last four presidential ‘sexenios’ in Mexico (see Figure 
2.2). During the first four or five years o f each presidential term current accounts 
deficits grew continuously until one or two years before the end of the sexenio when 
they were no longer sustainable. Currency devaluation and capital flight then brought 
down those deficits. Most political leaders were very aware o f the enormous costs o f 
currency devaluation in terms of support for the regime. A devaluation in 1954
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weakened the workers support for the regime, in 1976 Echeverria delayed devaluation 
because he thought something similar could happen in an election year (Basanez 1991b: 
58), and President Lopez Portillo declared in 1982 that ‘a President who devalues, is 
devalued’ (Proceso, March 22nd 1982). Therefore a great amount o f resources are 
employed to avoid currency devaluation every time there is pressure to do so. When 
international capital starts to leave the country, states use their international reserves to 
finance current account deficits and then, when their reserves start to falter, they resort 
to international capital, especially to the MFOs.
Every time there is a balance o f payments crisis the intervention o f international capital 
is central, both in producing it and in providing support to overcome it. In Echeverria’s 
sexenio, as a result o f fiscal and external imbalances there were some signals o f  peso 
overvaluation and capital flight started as early as 1973, pressing for devaluation 
(Basanez 1991b: 58). However, access to commercial bank loans made it possible to 
finance these imbalances delaying devaluation until 1976 when finally international 
reserves were completely exhausted and commercial banks stopped their lending. This 
crisis situation brought the active intervention o f the IMF, which extended a credit to the 
Mexican state for $800 million dollars in order to replace the extinguished international 
reserves and avoid any major disruption on international transactions (Gurria 1994: 18). 
In exchange the IMF had a very strong input in the design o f  the stabilisation 
programme for the next couple o f years (Aspe 1993: 128; Basanez 1991b: 59). 
Nevertheless, the stringent conditions from the IMF to eliminate the fiscal and external 
imbalances did not last for long, and in 1981 they reached very high levels again. This 
time, however, an especially adverse international context was added to the precarious 
domestic situation: higher interest rates and lower oil prices.
Interest rates in the euromarkets started to increase in the last quarter o f 1980 in order to 
control inflation in the US, which is damaging for financial investments and against the 
interests o f international capital. By December o f 1981, LIBOR reached almost 17 
percent, the highest level in history.7 American interest rates shot above 20 percent for
7 LIBOR refers to the London Inter-Banking Operations Rate. This was the common reference interest 
rate for the operations in the euromarkets.
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brief periods (Frieden 1991: 60-64).8 This was a major change in current trends, from 
having negative real interest rates in the 1970s, by 1981 they were 8 percent on average. 
This situation prevailed throughout the following years, though to a lesser extent (Gurria 
1994: 21). Oil prices started a continuous fall on May 26th 1981, when the OPEC 
announced its failure to curb production in order to stop the fall in oil prices initiated at 
the beginning o f that year. Pemex announced a decrease o f four dollars per barrel to its 
export price o f oil on June 2nd 1981 in order to defend its market share; other countries 
followed Mexico and then the fall in oil prices became generalised (Gurria 1994: 22). 
Falling oil prices had a double effect on the balance o f payments, exports stagnated and 
international lending came to a halt.
International bankers mentioned the need for devaluation as early as 1978 setting forth a 
debate between different state actors about the convenience o f devaluation (Maxfield 
1990: 129). President Lopez Portillo, however, decided to maintain the prevailing 
exchange rate o f 22.80 pesos per dollar with a minimal slide o f 4 percent during 1981. 
Foreign loans made it possible to delay the peso devaluation and capital inflows were 
increasingly used to defend the peso. Nevertheless as overvaluation increased, capital 
flight mounted to an estimated $11.8 billion dollars for 1981, almost two-thirds o f new  
foreign debt contracted (Gurria 1994: 25).9 Capital had a double role in the making o f  
the crisis: by leaving the country domestic capital had exhausted the stock o f  
international exchange required to finance the current account deficit and the external 
debt itself, on the one hand; and commercial banks loans made possible capital flight at 
a grander scale by providing additional international exchange, on the other. The fight 
against devaluation was the main cause o f the rapid expansion o f the external debt, but it 
was mainly a politically motivated fight. At the end, devaluation became a decision 
related to the political viability o f the existing regime and international capital was the 
strategic supporter o f the Mexican state in this decision. President Lopez Portillo 
declared: ‘I did everything humanly possible to avoid devaluation... I was tremendously
K The increases in interest rates during this period was caused mainly by the restrictive economic policies 
implemented by the US and other industrialised countries in order to control inflation. Furthermore, these 
policies appreciated the dollar and induced to an economic recession in the developed world (Gurria 
1994: 21).
0 Estimates of capital flight for the whole sexenio o f President Lopez Portillo range from $25.3 billions 
dollars in Dornbusch (1989: 8), to $27 billions in Frieden (1989: 31), to $36 billions in Maxfield (1989: 
77).
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anxious to avoid the political weakness o f  devaluing before the presidential succession... 
I did not want to weaken the political system with a devaluation when there only 
remained a few months before the choice o f my successor...’ (quoted by Maxfield 1990: 
131-132).
In the next two sexenios, under Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas, the threat o f  
devaluation was still a continuous problem, but the fight against inflation moved to the 
top o f  the state’s agenda. The stabilisation programme under President Salinas, less so 
under de la Madrid, was based on the exchange rate. The policy o f exchange rate 
overvaluation brings down inflation without major economic recession in sharp contrast 
to those orthodox programmes based on fiscal and monetary restraint. Nonetheless, a 
side effect o f exchange based stabilisation is the loss o f  international competitiveness 
that translates into large current account deficits. Though economically risky, the 
increasing deficit in the current account was politically profitable. Rapid import growth 
benefited the Mexican electorate and therefore the PRI at a time when economic growth 
was slow.
The support o f  international capital is crucial to making this policy viable, otherwise the 
lack o f financing for the current account deficits may eventually lead to capital flight 
(see Rodriguez 1997). At first, the stabilisation programme was a success and annual 
inflation went down from 159 percent in 1987 to less than 12 percent in 1992 
(Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 41), but at the same time the current account deficit 
reached almost $25 billion dollars in 1992 and 1993 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 
68). The exchange requirements to finance these deficits were paramount and could only 
be provided by international capital. At this point, the state speeded up economic reform 
in order to keep international capital flowing into the country and thus sustain the fight 
against inflation without economic recession. All the policies in the reform programme 
were strictly conforming to the new international consensus on economic policy.
2.2. The Emergence of a New Consensus
Economic ideas are important because they eventually become policy choices (Kahler 
1990: 33). This process takes place through two different mechanisms: (i) power 
relations in which international capital uses its leverage to induce the adoption o f
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policies conforming to specific ideas; and (ii) social learning in which the exchange o f  
ideas between policy elites from different countries creates a limited set o f  policy 
options. The fact that certain ideas may be dominant at a given moment does not mean 
that they convey the ‘truth’, it means only that they are adopted, out o f  conviction or 
convenience, by most o f the relevant actors. Very often these ideas are effectively 
challenged on logical and empirical grounds by alternative views. Therefore the 
dominance o f the ideas is not given by their logical and empirical foundations, though 
still important, but by the coalition o f interests supporting them.
The previous section already established the leverage o f  international capital; now this 
section turns to the content o f the ideas and policies that have shaped the reform efforts 
in LDCs during the last couple o f decades. I am interested in how these policies and 
ideas became a new consensus by the 1980s, when capital flows seemed to spread 
neoliberal economic ideology all over the world, including former socialist countries. 
As I mentioned before, under the assumption o f procedural rationality,10 ideas and 
ideologies are essential to structure the everyday interaction among individuals and 
organisations. They represent a framework composed o f a set o f shared assumptions on 
how to understand reality and aimed to provide guidance to individual choices. The 
ideology embedded in each organisation and the cultural and personal backgrounds o f  
their leaders limit therefore the range o f policy options available to tackle public issues. 
These ideas however are not specific to domestic environments anymore. The increasing 
interaction between policy elites and economic agents from different countries has 
created a common ‘international policy culture’ that supports particular views for 
dealing with common public issues (see Ikenberry 1990). This culture has become the 
‘intellectual lenses’ through which policy makers perceive reality everywhere (Centeno 
1994: 23).
The questions that come to mind when looking at the widespread introduction o f  
neoliberal policies during the 1980s are why so many countries and why at that 
moment? John Ikenberry (1990) argued that common economic and political 
circumstances at international level engendered a common policy response orchestrated
10 For a deeper discussion on the role of institutions under the assumption of procedural rationality see 
North (1990: 22-24) and Grindle and Thomas (1991: 28).
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by leading industrial countries and MFOs. There are two essential elements in this 
approach: (i) important events at international level in combination with analytical 
developments, success stories and competition among countries for capital created a 
new consensus or in Ikenberry’s words an ‘international policy culture’; and (ii) policy 
change being a govemmentally engineered change required the alliance between 
domestic policy elites and MFOs in the form o f international policy networks. This 
section concentrates in the content o f this new consensus, leaving for the next section 
the analysis o f the international policy networks.
Neoliberalism11 vs. Structuralism
Neoliberalism and structuralism have been the two major policy trends influencing the 
content and orientation o f development strategies followed by most developing 
countries in Latin America, including Mexico, since the Second World War.12 In the 
1960s James Street (1967) recognised that the trust in the free market has been one o f  
the principal exports o f industrialised countries to the developing world (Street 1967: 
48). Earlier, Raul Prebisch (1963) expressed his concern about the role o f  neoliberal 
ideas and policies shaping the development efforts in Latin America. Prebisch (1963:
14) thought that the main challenge to development thinking was to avoid ‘the 
traditional propensity to introduce from abroad nostrums that are largely alien to the real 
requirements o f Latin American’s situation.’ Structuralism was thus bom as a critique to 
the imported models o f neoclassical economics and tried to be rigorously inductive, 
more concerned with the specific distinctions between countries in terms o f  available 
resources, cultural backgrounds and historical factors than with first principles (Street 
1967: 53-54). At the core o f the debate between these two positions is the role o f  the 
state in economic development: structuralism supported an active state to promote and 
protect the industrialisation process in its initial stages, on the one hand; and
11 By Neoliberalism we understand the set of policies based on the assumption that the market is a better 
resource allocation mechanism than central planning, and therefore that are intended to create the 
conditions for a market oriented economy.
12 A similar debate has taken place between monetarism and keynesianism. However the main issue in 
this debate is macroeconomic management, more than structural development strategies. The role of the 
state is also at the core of this debate but in this case it is about the possibility to smooth economic 
fluctuations through the traditional economic policy instruments, namely fiscal and monetary policy. 
Their main contested issue is whether monetary and fiscal policies have real effects on the economy.
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neoliberalism advocated a minimalist state, the ‘night watchman’, acting as a third party 
responsible for securing the conditions for market competition, on the other.13
The development strategy o f Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) followed by 
Mexico and many other developing countries, especially in Latin America, had its 
inception in the writings o f Raul Prebisch while he was at the United Nations’ 
Economic Commission for Latin America. Prebisch (1950) claimed that the existing 
international economic structures condemned developing countries to have low rates o f  
economic growth if  active government intervention was not undertaken to promote 
industrialisation. The sole action o f the markets could not deliver the right conditions 
for development because o f structural imbalances in international trade. Prevailing 
structures led to industrialised countries specialising in the production o f  manufactured 
goods and new technologies, and middle and low-income countries relying on exports 
from primary activities such as mining and agriculture. Increasingly adverse terms o f  
trade for the poor countries created a two-tiered international economy. This 
phenomenon posed the urgent need for poor countries to break the dependency 
relationship on rich countries for manufactured goods and technology. The prescribed 
way to attain this goal was by upgrading the productive structure o f primary-exporting 
countries through an active promotion o f the infant domestic industrial base (Edwards 
1995: 44). Most o f the Latin American countries introduced protectionist policies during 
this period in combination with selective credit controls, subsidies and direct ownership 
in some strategic economic sectors. Countries like Mexico and Brazil built a relatively 
strong industrial sector as the result o f these policies up until the 1960s.
In opposition to the policies prescribed by structuralism in favour o f an active state in 
economic development, neoliberalism championed free market policies and restricted 
the role o f the state to provide public goods and enforce property rights (see Friedman 
1962). The main neoliberal critiques o f ISI were that protectionist policies ignored the 
benefits o f participating in the international division o f labour, the costs and distortions
13 In the literature on policy change the role of the state is nevertheless ambiguous, on the one hand it is 
expected to be very restricted; but on the other, economic reform requires a strong and very active state to 
bring about change. Neoliberal policies like privatisation, trade liberalisation, and deregulation presumes 
the existence of a state apparatus with a significant degree of autonomy from social forces, and supported 
by external forces such as the MFOs (Veltmeyer et.al. 1997: 95).
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o f state intervention were paramount, and countries pursuing market-conforming 
strategies were performing much better than those who did not (Haggard 1990: 10-13). 
Neoliberalism’s main claim is that unleashing market forces improves the efficiency o f  
the economic system and thus raises the population’s living standards. In order to secure 
these conditions the state has to implement some fundamental policies: reduction o f  
public deficits, independent management o f monetary policy, privatisation o f state- 
owned enterprises, opening-up to international trade and reforms to the regulatory 
framework. Neoliberalism has become the dominant policy trend for the last couple o f  
decades and thus the economic reforms introduced during this period in most o f the 
developing countries were oriented towards dismantling the state intervention in the 
economy. This rise o f neoliberal thinking in Latin America is associated to the recurrent 
balance o f payments crises throughout the region since the beginning o f  the 1970s. 
Another historical event reinforcing this new trend was the collapse o f  the Soviet Union 
with the corresponding failure o f the centrally planned economies to provide a viable 
option for long term development. The failure o f the socialist state to operate the 
economy left the neoliberal paradigm without an effective ideological counterweight 
and therefore it became the only effective policy paradigm for the developing world 
(Centeno 1994: 21).
New World Order and the Washington Consensus14
Major events at the international level, both political and economic, took place during 
the 1980s that changed dramatically the configuration o f the world order and 
strengthened neoliberal ideas. Increasing flows o f commodities, capital and ideas across 
countries gradually weakened the old world order at the same time that laid the 
foundations for the new one. The end o f the cold war, which had dominated the 
relations between national states since the Second World War, had profound 
consequences for the emergence o f a new consensus on economic thinking. In the new 
world order military rivalry is replaced by economic competition. The traditional 
bipolar system that emerged after the second world war and dominated by the military 
powers, the US and the USSR, has been replaced by a tripolar system dominated by the
14 The term of Washington Consensus, introduced by Williamson (1994), comes from the fact that it was 
originally sponsored by Washington-based organisations like the IMF and the World Bank.
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economic powers, the US, Japan and Europe (Stallings 1995: 350-351). Stallings (1995: 
2) argue that there was not a unique response to this new international policy context but 
three different ones based on geopolitical factors: (i) the western hemisphere dominated 
by the US where radical reforms were introduced; (ii) East-Asia under the leadership o f  
Japan where moderate market reforms took place; and (iii) the European Community led 
by Germany and where the reforms have been o f a mixed nature. In this new world 
order, divided into three major blocks, ‘ policy packages (models) selected by third 
world countries will resemble those advocated by the countries that buy their goods, 
supply their finance and provide their ideological guidance’ (Stallings 1995: 365). 
Mexico and most o f Latin America had no other choice but to follow the Anglo- 
American model o f capitalism based almost exclusively on free markets.
The second major event at a global level that had profound implications for the 
developing world was the debt crisis o f 1982 and the ensuing negotiations between 
states and international capital. The Baker plan announced in the fall o f  1985 was a 
major boost for the introduction o f structural adjustment policies and the influence o f  
MFOs.15 The main interest shifted away from adjustment in public and external 
imbalances to structural economic changes aimed to create ffee-market economies. The 
main points o f this plan according to Dombusch (1989: 11) were: (i) new loans from 
commercial banks as required in the rescheduling o f debt; (ii) increased participation 
and lending from the MFOs, especially the World Bank; (iii) focus on debtor country 
economic liberalisation, with emphasis on free enterprise and supply side economics; 
(iv) improved world macroeconomic environment to complement debtor countries 
efforts; and (v) greater access to foreign markets for all countries. These points 
expressed what later would be known as the Washington Consensus. The new 
consensus on economic thinking is grouped broadly in three main themes: (i) 
macroeconomic stability, which means balanced public finances and independent 
management o f monetary policy; (ii) reduced state intervention in the economy that 
implies privatisation, deregulation and greater emphasis on property rights; and (iii) 
greater openness to international trade, which requires reduced barriers to trade and
15 IMF Managing Director and World Bank President express broad support for the debt initiative 
proposed by U.S. Treasury Secretary James A. Baker. It calls for comprehensive adjustment measures by 
debtors, increased and more effective structural lending by multilateral development banks, and expanded 
lending by commercial banks.
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capital flows (Edwards 1995: 58; Stallings 1995: 12; Veltmeyer et.al. 1997: 21-22). The 
most well known expression o f this consensus is found in Williamson (1994: 26-28) and 
cover the following issues:
1. Fiscal discipline, no inflationary financing;
2. Public spending priorities, financing to those areas with higher economic returns 
such as health, education and infrastructure;
3. Tax reform, broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates;
4. Financial liberalisation, market determined interest rates;
5. Exchange rates, sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-traditional 
exports;
6. Trade liberalisation, eliminate quantitative restrictions and reduce tariffs;
7. Foreign direct investment, elimination o f barriers to entry;
8. Privatisation, divesting all parastatal enterprises;
9. Deregulation, eliminating all distorting regulations;
10. Property rights, clear definition and effective enforcement.
As mentioned before, neoliberal ideas found the right juncture for becoming a 
consensus among international policy-making circles in the 1980s after the debt crisis. 
The crisis increased the leverage o f MFOs and hence their influence on policy-making 
in developing countries. Moreover, neoliberal ideas, although having been around for 
some time, only became dominant in the industrial countries recently, during the 1970s 
and 1980s, precisely when the future generation o f  policy makers o f  developing 
countries were studying there (Dominguez 1997: 26). The convergence o f  these two 
processes facilitated the spread o f neoliberal policies all over the developing world. The 
next section turns to the analysis o f the specific role o f  MFOs and domestic policy elites 
on the transformation o f this new consensus into effective policy choices. I argue that it 
was not the conditionality clauses16 attached to the credits extended by MFOs to 
indebted countries that induced policy change but that it was the policy dialogue that 
took place between key state officials trained abroad (i.e. the ‘technocrats’) and MFO 
executives through international policy networks.
10 Conditionality clauses are those that demand specific policy actions from LDCs in exchange o f  external 
financing, whether debt rescheduling, debt relief, multilateral credits, bilateral loans, or grants.
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2.3. international Policy Networks
By international policy networks I mean those transnational structures and international 
flows o f communication that link organisations engaged in policy-making throughout 
the world. These organisations are usually grouped into policy communities who share a 
common set o f ideas and have appropriate control over policy-making in particular 
issue-areas (Kahler 1990: 126). The specific network for financial policy is increasingly 
transnational, cutting across national borders in the same way as economic ideas and 
capital do. This network links, for instance, the organisations o f international capital 
such as investment banks, fund managers, commercial banks and especially the MFOs 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Interamerican 
Development Bank (IDB), to domestic state organisations like central banks and 
national treasuries. Most o f these organisations have a homogeneous and coherent view  
o f the economy consistent with neoliberal postulates o f economic liberalisation and 
economic integration.17 Policy recommendations from MFOs and international 
commercial banks are met by heightened reliance on technocrats committed to 
neoliberalism in state organisations, who in the specific case o f Mexico, gradually 
gained control o f policy-making, especially after the debt crisis (Grindle 1996: 111).
Political leaders from major industrialised countries lead this transnational policy 
network, like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Top executives from 
the MFOs like Robert McNamara from the World Bank in the 1970s and Jacques de 
Larosiere from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s are also at the top.18 
These political leaders and financial executives came into the spotlight as important 
promoters o f policy change in LDCs after the debt crisis in 1982. They provided 
political leadership, financial support and policy advice to back up the ideas o f  
neoliberalism embodied in the programmes o f structural reform. However the emphasis 
o f this analysis is on the organisational infrastructure that these individuals relied upon 
to carry forward their ideas— that is to say on the Multilateral Financial Organisations.
17 Michel Camdessus, managing director of the IMF, asserted that “...it is the job o f this institution [the 
IMF] to remind countries that globalisation is there and that they must promptly adapt to it (Interview 
with The Banker. October 1995: 38).”
Multilateral Financial Organisations (MFOs)
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What is more compelling about the international policy networks is that states are 
constrained less by other states than by sanctions and incentives organised primarily by 
MFOs. The mechanisms to do so include the deterrent threat o f effective economic 
sanctions and the incentive o f continued access to credit. For instance, LDCs’ debts are 
politically secure because this network o f  multilateral banks, private lenders and leading 
industrial states backs them. According to Charles Lipson (1988: 44), MFOs ‘are jointly 
capable o f consolidating debts in emergencies and severely punishing those who default 
without insufficient cause.’ The MFOs are at the core o f  the international policy 
networks; they provide the organisational infrastructure for the communication and 
collaboration between policy makers from industrialised and developing countries. 
Furthermore, according to Miles Kahler (1992: 96), they have the power to influence the 
economic prospects of debtor countries by: (i) inducing a particular set o f  economic 
policies through financial inducements and policy dialogue; (ii) affecting the overall 
confidence in the country’s economy and thus the size o f capital inflows; and (iii) 
altering the expectations o f the agents in the economy, and therefore the effectiveness o f  
any policy change.
As argued before, the globalisation o f the world’s capital markets increased 
substantially the importance o f these transnational organisations for domestic policy­
making. They are not only direct providers o f  funds but they are also agents o f  
international capital. Their loans increasingly spearhead capital inflows to LDCs. In 
fact, they have now come to see themselves more as facilitators o f private capital flows 
than sources o f  financing. Adjusted for inflation and for the growing needs o f  the 
developing world, the World Bank’s financing role has diminished significantly (The 
Banker, October 1995: 32). Richard Frank, managing director o f the World Bank 
explained: ‘ the reason that [World Bank’s] lending has been going down is that 
countries are turning to the private sector’ (quoted by The Banker, October 1995: 32). 
Now, half o f the projects financed by the World Bank attract other investors and in
18 Although McNamara left the World Bank in 1981, before the era of so-called structural adjustment, he 
launched the concept o f policy-based lending, meaning loans with inescapable conditions attached, and 
ensured its initial implementation in some highly indebted countries (George and Sabelli 1994: 55).
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some cases the approval o f the Bank is essential for other agencies to participate (see 
George and Sabelli 1994).
The two most important MFOs, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank,19 have had traditionally different roles. The IMF has been concerned with 
securing exchange rate stability among all its member countries, its main financial 
activity is to provide short-run credit to domestic states in order to ensure that 
international transactions take place efficiently without major interruptions. The World 
Bank has been more concerned with long-run economic development, the main activity 
o f  the bank is financing infrastructure and sectoral investment.20 Nevertheless late in the 
1970s the World Bank and the IMF started a process o f convergence and self­
transformation from passive financiers to active promoters o f economic orthodoxy. This 
process was further consolidated as a result o f the debt crisis in the 1980s. Since then, 
these organisations have used policy-based lending extensively to induce policy makers 
in LDCs to align their policies with those in vogue in industrialised countries (Nelson 
1990: 25).21 The World Bank has been conditioning its structural and sectoral 
adjustment loans upon the adoption o f policies consistent with the neoliberal 
paradigm.22 The IMF has extensively used stand-by loans and Extended Fund Facilities 
(EFFs) to induce debtor countries to follow its policy advice, initially directed to bring
19 The World Bank consists o f two major subsidiaries: (i) the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD); and (ii) the International Development Agency (IDA). Between 1947, the year it 
was created, and 1993 the IBRD has loaned or committed $235 billion dollars in more than 3,500 loans. 
If the credits extended by the IDA are included then this figure rose to $312 billion dollars. The IDA, 
founded in 1960, is concentrated in poorer countries and the credits it extends are softer than the IBRD 
loans. A typical World Bank loan consists of the following conditions: (i) 5 year grace period in which no 
repayment is required; (ii) 15 to 20 years period to pay back at market interest rates; and (iii) the loan is 
never rescheduled or cancelled. The World Bank funding comes from sales of its own bonds in the 
international financial markets and it operates as a profitable commercial bank. It has accumulated $16 
billion dollars in profits (George and Sabelli 1994).
20 The main sectors attended by the World Bank in its programme of sectoral lending are: (i) 
Agriculture/Forestry/Rural development with 19 percent o f total lending; (ii) Energy with 18 percent; and 
(iii) Transport with 14 percent (George and Sabelli 1994).
21 In 1980, over half o f the lending agreements between the IMF and LDCs included clauses on public 
spending and a quarter included trade liberalisation conditions (Goldstein 1986: 9). The same was true for 
the structural adjustment loans o f the World Bank.
22 The structural and sectoral adjustment loans represent 15 percent o f all-time lending o f the World 
Bank. The bank under the leadership of Robert McNamara invested heavily in physical infrastructure for 
the developing world and by virtue of its importance as a project financier earned itself a seat at the table 
as an adviser to governments on macro-economic policy reforms during the 1980s era o f “structural 
adjustment” (The Banker, October 1995: 30).
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down inflation and secure exchange rate stability, but since 1985 increasingly to bring 
about structural change (see Table 2.2).23
Table 2.2
Conditionality Contents of IMF and World Bank Programmes
Policy Area IMF (2) World Bank (3)
Trade liberalisation 35 79
Exchange rate action 79 . 45
Tax reform 59 67
Financial reform 44 51
Privatisation 59 65
Source: Edwards 1995: 57
(1) Percentage of programmes including specific conditions
(2) All conditionality programmes from 1983 to 1985
(3) All structural adjustment loans from 1982 to 1989
MFOs are controlled by representatives o f rich countries, and therefore are active 
promoters o f their policy preferences despite the fact that LDCs are also represented. In 
other words, these organisations are agents o f supranational interests to influence policy 
choices in LDCs (Street and James 1982: 680). Miles Kahler (1990: 57) argued that the 
new orthodoxy served the interests o f the leading industrial countries during the 1980s 
and as long as it continues to do so, the international dominance o f  this orthodoxy is 
likely to remain.24 For instance, financial liberalisation in Latin America was essential 
for US capital to remain globally competitive; liberalisation opened new business 
opportunities to US investors (Veltmeyer et.al. 1997: 113). In fact, Veltmeyer et.al. 
(1997: 16) go further to argue that liberalisation, actively promoted by MFOs, was 
intended to expand exports and therefore generate foreign exchange to pay for their 
imports and foreign debt.
The MFOs’ involvement in LDCs’ policy-making has not been free o f  controversy or 
conflict. Their policy strictures are very often at odds with the political interests o f  many
states in LDCs, mainly regarding the content o f the programmes and the nationalist
23 The main elements of the EFFs are: (i) longer periods o f IMF support; (ii) directed to programmes 
attacking structural shortcomings; and (iii) the main policy areas covered are: trade liberalisation, public 
sector pricing and subsidies, and interest and exchange rates policies (Kahler 1990: 42).
24 Kahler (1990) uses the expression of G-5 to denote the group integrated by the US, the UK, Germany, 
France, and Japan.
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resentment for their strong intervention (Kahler 1990: 100). Adding to this controversy 
is the semi-secret nature o f their operations and agreements. Jeffrey Sachs (1994: 523) 
denounced that ‘the IMF’s performance has not been properly scrutinised. Under current 
procedures, detailed and independent scrutiny is all but impossible. All IMF operational 
documents, including IMF advice as well as the terms o f the loan agreements, are 
treated as confidential in perpetuity.’
The influence o f MFOs has gone through three different periods. The first period went 
from their creation after the Second World War up to 1982. During these years there 
was a clear division o f functions between these organisations: the World Bank promoted 
infrastructure investment; the IMF advised governments on macroeconomic policy; and 
the IDB had a basically political role. The second period ran from 1982 to about 1989 
and was dominated by the promotion o f structural adjustment reforms. During these 
years all the organisations worked together to overcome the effects o f the ‘debt crisis’. 
Finally, the third period took place mostly in the 1990s and was characterised by the 
‘Washington Consensus’ first and then ‘good governance’. The purpose was to help 
LDCs to grow within the framework o f the new international political economy.
In the 1980s, the record o f policy reform implementation was dismal despite the strong 
intervention o f the MFOs pushing for reform in LDCs. Stephan Haggard (1986) found 
that twenty four EFFs agreements were not implemented in their original form and 
sixteen o f these were cancelled out o f the thirty cases studied. Inadequate finance and 
often confused cross-conditionality were the main factors limiting these organisations’ 
influence during the 1980s despite the increasing financial needs from LDCs. 
Furthermore a reputation for compliance seemed to produce little additional lending 
from the MFOs. Instead the tightness o f conditionality was linked to the bargaining 
position o f the recipient country: those countries most dependent on MFOs’ financing 
received the most stringent conditions (Kahler 1992: 108). Mexico, for instance, was a 
reluctant reformer until the late 1980s despite the conditionality o f several programmes 
contracted with the IMF and the World Bank (Cook 1991).
According to Miles Kahler (1992: 123) the bargaining model based on conditionality 
clauses does explain part o f the pattern o f limited influence o f the IMF and the World 
Bank on LDCs that was apparent in the 1980s. However it does not explain the apparent
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increase in economic policy change over the following years. An alternative model o f  
influence based on social learning and policy dialogue provides a better answer to this 
trend. Although MFOs played a less central role than is sometimes argued, they 
influenced the new convergence o f doctrinal views in Latin America through empirical 
research, economic and sector analysis, lending practices, policy dialogue and 
conditionality (Edwards 1995: 56). These organisations were more effective influencing 
policy change in LDCs through the construction o f a common base o f  consensual 
knowledge than through direct conditionality. In fact, policy change in Mexico was 
possible thanks to the process o f learning through technocratic alignment with 
transnational epistemic communities who share a common set o f cause-and-effect 
beliefs (Kahler 1992: 126).
Technocratic Alignment in Mexico
Dominant ideas do not only influence human choices for their own internal and logical 
coherence but also for their ability to change the configuration o f power within decision 
making circles (Biersteker 1995: 174). Influential actors in the international arena 
support those organisations within each country that have similar policy preferences to 
theirs (Ikenberry 1990: 100). This support can take a wide range o f forms, but the most 
important are external recognition and financial support, both o f them crucial to define 
the configuration o f power between competing groups within any given state. According 
to Kahler (1992: 127) international capital supports those organisations and individuals 
that advocate a model o f economy that matches mainstream economics, usually 
technocrats within agencies responsible for macroeconomic and budgetary oversight 
like the Ministry o f Finance and the central bank. In fact, the process o f  international 
networking starts early in the policy maker's career when they study abroad at top 
universities from industrialised countries. It is usually at these educational centres where 
the new orthodoxy in the international policy culture shapes the views o f policy elites in 
LDCs.
According to Centeno (1994: 24), US support for Salinas’s economic reform was based 
on the ability o f the US-educated Mexican elite to establish working relationships with 
their American counterparts, on the one hand; and on a policy agenda along the same 
line as US interests, on the other. The intellectual legitimacy o f the Salinas’s reforms,
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both within policy-making and academic circles and in general, was perhaps the most 
important international factor (Centeno 1994: 25). This support was reflected in the 
behaviour o f the World Bank; between 1980 and 1985 Mexico received only one 
structural adjustment loan for the amount o f $352 million dollars. In contrast, between 
1985 and 1989, when Mexico received eight o f these loan for the total amount o f $3.32 
billion dollars (Stallings 1992: 78).25 Mexico’s government established a close 
communication with the MFOs under President Salinas. Year after year, the government 
and the IMF signed ‘letters o f intention’ that contained the major guidelines for 
economic policy. This process was an implicit certification on M exico’s economic 
policy.
In Mexico, close relations between international policy communities and anti- 
inflationary technocrats in the Ministry o f Finance and Banco de Mexico (BdeM) date 
back to the late 1940s; the long tenure o f key officials within these organisations has 
lent considerable stability to the alliance (Kahler 1990: 127). Since then, BdeM has been 
sending bright Mexicans to attain post-graduate degrees in economics to top US and 
British universities and then placing them in key positions in the economic agencies o f  
the Mexican state (Ardito-Barietta 1991: 288-289). However, it was not until the 
outbreak o f the debt crisis in 1982 that the rise o f the technocrats to the top o f  the state 
hierarchy found the right juncture (Centeno 1994: 159). At that moment they were 
already in strategic positions favoured by the upcoming orthodoxy, for which their skills 
were especially suited. The team in the Ministry o f  Finance designed and implemented 
solutions to some o f the most difficult problems facing Mexico during the 1980s: 
tackling inflation, tax reform, external debt, public-sector deficits and the privatisation 
o f state enterprises (Golob 1997: 108).
The ‘technocratic revolution’ had its first major boost in 1982, when Miguel de la 
Madrid, who had a career based on the Ministry o f Finance-BdeM network26 with an
25 Mexico became the all-time largest borrower of the World Bank towards the end o f the 1980s, ahead of 
India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, China, the Philippines, Argentina, Korea, Colombia, Morocco, and 
Nigeria (George and Sabelli 1994: 11).
26 According to Torres (1997) the creation of the Ministry of Programming and Budget consolidated the 
rise of the technocrats to power. Despite the fact of being a separate and independent organisation from 
the Ministry of Finance-BdeM network, most o f its leaders were technocrats from this network. 
Therefore we do not make a distinction between the whole network and the specific Ministry of 
Programming and Budget.
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MA degree from Harvard University, became President.27 President de la Madrid 
strongly backed the resurgence o f this faction within the governing elite. Thirteen out o f  
his eighteen cabinet appointees and a large number o f deputy ministers and local 
governors had based their careers in this same network (Kaufman 1989: 115; Heredia 
1992: 274). In fact, the most important command centres o f the economic bureaucracy 
were filled by powerful figures with strong commitments to economic orthodoxy: Jesus 
Silva Herzog, a MA in economics from Yale University as minister o f finance; Miguel 
Mancera, a prominent orthodox economist as head o f  Banco de Mexico; and Carlos 
Salinas, a Harvard PhD in political economy, as minister o f  programming and 
budgeting. All these appointments facilitated the negotiations with the ex-bankers and 
the international financial community throughout the administration o f  President de la 
Madrid (Hamilton 1985: 166).
Table 2.3
President Carlos Salinas’s Economic Team
Position Degree (University) Field
Carlos Salinas President PhD (Harvard) Political Economy 
and Government
Pedro Aspe Minister of Finance PhD (MIT) Economics
Ernesto Zedillo Minister of Budgeting 
and Planning
PhD (Yale) Economics
Jaime Serra Minister of Industry 
and Commerce
PhD (Yale) Economics
Manuel Camacho Mayor of Mexico City MA (Princeton) Public Affairs
Miguel Mancera Head of Banco de 
Mexico
MA (Yale) Economics
Jose Cordoba President’s Chief of 
Staff
PhD* (Stanford) Economics
Donaldo Colosio Head of the PRI PhD** (Pennsylvania) Economics
Source: Grindle 1996: 113.
* Obtained his degree in 1994. 
** Did not obtain his degree.
27 Centeno (1994) introduced for the fist time the term technocratic revolution to denote the take-over of 
key state positions by a cohesive group with specific technical qualifications and a specific policy agenda.
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Miguel de la Madrid managed to deliver the presidency to Carlos Salinas, another 
technocrat, despite a poor economic performance throughout his presidential term.28 
Salinas started to re-engineer the bases o f  support for the regime as soon as he took up 
the Presidency. His first major move was the configuration o f a strong and coherent 
economic team; all the members o f  this team held degrees from the most prestigious 
American universities and had made their political careers in the above-mentioned 
Ministry o f Finance-BdeM network (see Table 2.3). They also displayed cosmopolitan 
attitudes, and were skilled and confident negotiating partners with banks, foreign 
governments and MFOs. By the 1990s, Mexico had achieved an international reputation 
as a country in which technocratic elites and technocratic decision making was 
incontrovertible (Grindle 1996: 111).
Since international confidence building was so crucial to the success o f  Salinas’s 
economic reforms, his economic team was free to act on its ‘cosmopolitan’ vision. 
According to Stephanie Golob (1997: 128), Pedro Aspe, one o f the most prominent 
members o f this team, ‘saw no contradiction between Mexican sovereignty and respect 
for IMF guidelines and the rules set down by creditor banks.’ The policy elite in Mexico 
was favourably disposed toward economic orthodoxy despite the sacrifices required to 
pay the external debt and the costs o f internationalising the economy. These policies 
reflected their social and professional biases but more importantly, they also brought 
non-interference. For Centeno (1994: 202), ‘economic interdependence allowed the elite 
to pursue internal policies autonomously.’
Conclusions
This chapter discussed the issue o f domestic states’ dependence upon international 
finance, and linked it to policy reform. That is to say, how the flows o f  ideas and capital 
across national borders have become the transmission mechanisms through which 
policy trends at a global level are translated into domestic policy choices.29 However, 
the strength o f the link between international trends and domestic economic policy
28 Between 1982 and 1988 income per capital fell in real terms and inflation peaked up towards the end of
the sexenio.
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depends on the relative needs o f the state to finance itself and to finance the balance o f  
payments. Capital inflows, increasingly guided by signals o f sound economic policy, are 
fundamental for the success o f development strategies pursued by states in LDCs.
These policy trends are determined by the prevailing orthodoxy in economic thinking. I 
argued that there is a symbiotic relationship between ideas and policy preferences, in 
which they shape each other, sometimes blurring the frontier between the two. It is 
difficult to say whether ideas shape the policy preferences o f international capital and 
create global trends; or alternatively, international capital creates new consensual 
knowledge through financial inducements. The dominant consensus on policy-making, 
also known as 'Washington Consensus', stressed balanced public finances, (non- 
inflationary state financing), less state intervention in the economy (privatisation and 
deregulation) and trade and financial liberalisation.
The mechanism through which these ideas were translated into policy choices in Mexico 
was the aligment o f President Salinas's economic team with an international policy 
network. MFOs are at the core o f these epistemic international policy communities that 
cut across national borders. They exercise their influence more by building policy 
consensus (social learning) rather than by direct conditionality.
This chapter showed how the ‘political leverage’ o f international capital fostered 
economic reform in Mexico under President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). Now that the 
role o f international forces shaping the configuration o f power in Mexico is well 
established, the next chapter moves on to the analysis o f the domestic political 
institutions in Mexico. They granted state organisations the required autonomy from
29 Stalling (1992) argues that international factors are crucial in explaining broad shifts in policy, both in 
contrasting the 1980s with the 1970s, and explaining the thrust of change during the 1980s.
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social forces to engineer new bases o f support for the regime and consolidate the 




Making the Reform Possible
In the last chapter, I argued that the structural dependency o f domestic states on the 
world economy and the emergence o f a new consensus on economic thinking during the 
1980s were the initial drives for policy reform in Mexico and throughout the developing 
world. This chapter introduces the domestic component in M exico’s economic reform. I 
argue that President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) used extensively the institutional and 
organisational infrastructure o f the Mexican state to introduce a comprehensive 
programme o f economic reform aimed to reassert his political leadership. As opposed to 
former Presidents, Salinas' political strategy was further constrained by increasing 
electoral competition. The two most important elements in the argument are the semi­
authoritarian nature o f the Mexican political institutions and their transformation during 
this period.
M exico’s semi-authoritarian political system has penneated policy-making and the state 
has traditionally dominated society regarding policy initiatives. According to Merilee 
Grindle (1996) public policies are the result o f an autonomous state. Alternative 
interpretations, however, assert that the state has the capacity to deflect pressures from 
the regime’s popular constituencies, but is vulnerable to pressures from key segments o f  
the Mexican business elite and their allies from international capital (Hamilton 1982, 
Luna 1992). The evidence is not conclusive in favour o f  any one o f  these two 
interpretations. The role o f the state in policy-making depends to a great extent on the 
period and the particular policy issue under study. For instance, during Salinas’s 
sexenio, when the state was perceived as autonomous to a great extent, it was not 
possible to liberalise the oil sector because o f pressures from the left-wing Partido de la 
Revolution Democratica (PRD) (Pedro Aspe, interview with George Philip, London 
January 1992). In contrast, trade liberalisation after 1986 is an example where the state 
acted with great autonomy and entered GATT and signed NAFTA despite strong
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opposition from organised business groups. Alternatively, Salinas’s financial reform 
illustrates how the state is very responsive to the policy preferences o f  international 
capital, while preserving the capacity to check popular opposition to pro-business 
policies.
The precise circumstance under which the state is more or less autonomous depends on 
the specific institutional arrangements. There is a vast literature that has attempted to 
identify those institutions.1 This literature has produced some well-established facts 
pointing towards a state-dominated, corporatist and semi-authoritarian political system  
(Cosio Villegas 1975), built upon a contradictory political culture that includes 
authoritarian and liberal qualities (Hamilton 1982; Basanez 1991) and dominated by the 
President and a bureaucratic elite (Philip 1991; Torres 1997). The analysis o f  policy­
making in Mexico since 1988, however, must be complemented with the process o f  
democratisation currently taking place.
This chapter is organised in three parts. The first part presents the major political 
institutions and organisations that have historically dominated policy-making and 
argues that the present autonomy o f the Mexican state is the result o f  a semi­
authoritarian framework dating back to the 1940s. The second part shows how the 
reconfiguration o f power between policy coalitions during the 1980s placed reform- 
minded technocrats in key positions within this institutional framework, so they could 
advance their policy agenda. Finally, the third part discusses the issue o f  
democratisation in Mexico since 1988 and shows how policy reform under President 
Salinas was intended to engineer new bases o f support for the regime within the new
1 Among the most important studies on the political economy of the Mexican State are: Vernon (1963), 
Gonzalez-Casanova (1965), Glade (1968), Hansen (1971), Cordova (1972), Cosio Villegas (1975), 
Hamilton (1982), Camp (1989), Kaufman (1989), Basanez (1991b), White (1992), and Grindle (1996). 
Their approaches, however, have vastly differed. Gonzalez-Casanova (1965), for instance, examines the 
political forces that have determined the decisions about economic promotion and development, 
providing a link between political institutions and economic performance. Glade (1968) also looks at the 
interaction between the political and the economic sphere but he concentrates on the role o f development 
banking. The mixed nature, political and economic, o f development banks, according to Glade, illustrate 
how political institutions impinge upon economic performance. Hansen (1971) tries to explain the 
Mexican economic miracle during the 1950s and 1960s based on the political institutions. Cordova 
(1972) and Camp (1989) assess the role of political institutions in the relationship between political 
power and economic development by concentrating on the specific interaction between the private sector 
and the state.
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parameters set by an increasing integration to the world economy, on the one hand, and 
by increasing democratic competition, on the other.
3.1 The Politics of a Semi-authoritarian State, 1940-1982
The institutional framework o f Mexican politics that emerged after the revolution2 
created a sort o f  ‘Weberian’ state, where public policy was usually the result o f  
bureaucratic initiatives mediated by the interests o f large business and political elites 
(Kaufman, Bazdresch and Heredia 1994: 363).3 Broadly speaking, the politics o f policy­
making in Mexico between 1940 and 1988 were dominated by three major institutional 
features: (1) the existence o f  a powerful social control mechanism built into the 
Mexican political system, i.e. the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); (2) the 
organisational capacity o f  big business and their ability to create major economic 
disruptions through capital flight; and (3) the centralisation o f decision-making power in 
the President and the executive bureaucracy. The stability o f the Mexican political 
system during this period was based on the capacity o f  the PRI and its popular 
corporatist organisations to dominate the electoral arena, on the one hand, and on the 
ability o f the President and executive bureaucracy to introduce coherent policies and 
deliver good economic performance, on the other.
This section discusses how the political institutions prevailing in Mexico before 1988 
created an embedded state a la Evans (1992), sensitive to popular concerns and 
receptive to business interests. At the first level, the manipulation o f  electoral processes 
by the PRI, through corporatist structures,4 left unorganised groups without effective 
influence on policy decisions. At the second level, an increasingly organised and
2 Some of the most important institutions and organisations of the present-day Mexican political system 
were created and consolidated during the two decades following the Mexican Revolution: specifically, 
the presidency, the Partido Nacional de la Revolucion (PNR), which later became the PRI, and the 
popular corporatist organisations. In this new configuration o f power, the President became the most 
prominent figure, although crucially reliant on other institutions. The executive bureaucracy and business 
corporatism are two other major political institutions that developed during the 1940s and 1950s and 
complemented the original ones.
' Max Weber (1978) developed the idea of an autonomous or bureaucratic state, dominated by a group of 
administrative personnel with coherent policy preferences and independent o f interest groups influence.
4 The PRI is formally integrated by three different corporatist organisations: the National Peasant 
Confederation (CNC), the Workers Confederation o f Mexico (CTM), and the National Confederation of 
Popular Organisations (CNOP).
66
wealthy business elite managed to open the state to their economic interests. Finally, at 
the third level, the concentration o f decision-making power in the President and the 
executive bureaucracy granted them the capacity to reform the political and economic 
structures according to their own agendas. Roderic Camp (1989: 239), who addressed 
explicitly the issue o f state-society relations, asserted that the state has historically led 
this relationship. In the literature on M exico’s pre-1988 political system, the empirical 
base o f society-centred approaches is still weak at best.
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Political parties, defined as organisations acting on the boundaries between state and 
society, are crucial to determining the capacity o f the state to reform critical economic 
and political relationships. Political parties in democratic countries are organisations 
mainly directed to gain political power and as a by-product o f their activities they 
articulate social demands and policy preferences. In Mexico, however, competition for 
political power was hindered by the PRI’s electoral hegemony, at least until 1988.5 
According to Robert Kaufman (1990: 91), ‘between the 1920s and the 1980s, 
government elites deployed this machinery to mobilise electoral legitimisation and co­
opt competing labour and business interests, combining highly concentrated executive 
authority with considerable tolerance for public debate and dissent.’ The PRI was an 
electoral apparatus aimed at securing continuity and stability for the regime, while 
creating an image o f a democratic system. It was responsible for political mobilisation, 
control and conflict resolution, all at the same time.6
Consequently, the PRI had a limited role as an organisation articulating voters’ 
demands. Its own organisational structure was o f  the ‘top-down’ type, where directives 
were set by the top echelons o f the hierarchy, enforced by a large party bureaucracy and 
followed by the party’s massive popular constituencies. At the top o f the hierarchy was
5 Since the foundation o f the PNR (predecessor of the present-day PRI) in the late 1920s, the party has 
not lost a single presidential election; and before 1988 it had not lost any election for governor either, and 
the Congress had always been dominated by the party.
6 Dale Story (1986a: 131-132) summarises very well the role of the PRI up to 1988: “ ...with national 
elites becoming so technocratic, the PRI provided the President with the necessary political legitimacy, 
the symbolic aura of the Revolution, and the machinery for running campaigns, winning elections, and 
maintaining contacts with the masses.”
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the President, although not formally, subordinating de facto  the party to the state. 
Popular mandate was non-existent under this scheme, electoral politics was just a matter 
o f ritual. Electoral platforms were just the irrelevant repetition o f the general principles 
o f the Mexican revolution rather than the articulation o f voters’ preferences. The 
structure o f the PRI allowed for individual political mobility but not for formal 
consultations on policy issues among the party supporters. Broad social concerns had to 
be articulated by the executive bureaucracy as a mandate from the President.
This presidential mandate was formally legitimised by the ideology o f the revolution 
embedded in the electoral platform of the PRI and by winning periodical elections using 
the organisational infrastructure of the PRI. However, the real legitimisation o f the 
regime was based on the ability o f the President and the executive bureaucracy to 
produce the impression o f economic progress.7 According to Amaldo Cordova (1972: 
13) and Roderic Camp (1989: 224), economic development was the most important goal 
o f public policy. In fact, as soon as the state started to deliver bad economic results in 
the 1970s, the legitimacy o f the regime weakened and the task o f wining elections 
became increasingly difficult for the PRI. Since then, a perverse political business cycle 
started to develop, where Presidents ran economic policy with short-term electoral 
purposes further damaging the economy and deteriorating the regime’s legitimacy. The 
task o f wining elections was more difficult every time.
In sum, the PRI’s electoral hegemony excluded the possibility o f having a political 
organisation that effectively articulated demands from the unorganised segments o f the 
society. However, the President and the bureaucracy apparently placed economic 
development as a major policy goal, if  not out o f adherence to the electoral mandate, 
then out o f fear o f causing disturbances which could threaten the regime viability 
(Thompson 1979: 55; Camp 1993: 127).
7 Nora Hamilton (1982: 3) and Miguel Basanez (1991a: 56) argue, however, that the Mexican state 
embodies an ideological contradiction between its historical origins in the Mexican Revolution and its 
contemporary function of maintaining conditions for peripheral capitalist development. Populism and 
capitalism have coexisted as ruling principles for the state in the ideology emanated from the revolution, 
in what Basanez (1990a) called the contradictory state.
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Business groups
Rogelio Hernandez (1988) pictures business groups in Mexico as passive recipients o f  
the benefits granted by the state.8 This was a true representation o f the private sector in 
the early 1940s but to the extent that the state’s economic policy favoured a small 
economic elite during the subsequent years, business groups consolidated, their 
economic power expanded, and their political influence became institutionalised. At 
present the influence o f these groups upon the state’s economic policy is strongly 
institutionalised into continuous consultations, both formal and informal.9 Antonio Ortiz 
Mena, former minister o f finance (1958-1970), conceded: ‘our contact with the private 
sector leaders was constant when I was in government. We would call them, given them 
our ideas about a policy, wait for their reaction, and then we would analyse these 
reactions, take them into account, and incorporate them in our final policies’ (quoted by 
Camp 1987: 116).
According to Jeffry Frieden (1989: 29), large business groups derived their political 
influence mainly from their ability to organise into sectoral chambers mainly intended 
for lobbying, and from their potential to upset the economy by taking their capital out o f  
the country (i.e. capital flight). Their organisation into business chambers was a long 
process that started in the mid-1930s and consolidated over the years. The first step in 
this process was the introduction o f the Commerce and Industry Chambers Act in 1936,
x At present there is in Mexico still a group of medium-size entrepreneurs that depend on the benefits of 
the state. For instance, Pedro Aspe, minister o f finance (1988-1994), in an interview with Este Pais 
(January 1992) told the story about a businessman who went to see him and told him:
-Mr Minister, I do not have the pleasure of knowing you, but 1 need to talk to you: I am willing to give up 
all my assets. I have been educated not to fight against the state, not against the government.
-Excuse me, but I do not understand, Aspe replied.
-Yes, I am here to place all my goods at your disposal, the businessman insisted.
-Excuse me, I still do not understand anything.
-Doctor, please, do not make it more difficult to me. Last week I received a fiscal audit and I understand, 
in these cases sometimes you win, and sometimes you lose. Just let me know what do I have to do.
-Listen to me, we generate numbers randomly in our computers and in that way you were selected. There 
is not any political or harassing reason behind it.
This case is very illustrative of the political culture of the businessmen who grew and developed assisted 
and protected by the state.
l) Roderic Camp (1993: 143), however, argues that the decision making process listens to demands from 
business groups more through informal internal channels than through formal public channels.
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which made compulsory the organisation o f the private sector into chambers.10 These 
organisations were the only legitimate actors for formal consultations on economic 
policy.
During the 1980s, however, some large entrepreneurs decided to expand their sphere o f  
political participation becoming active members o f the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), 
the old opposition party in Mexico, traditionally representing middle classes and small 
entrepreneurs. The most notable case was that o f Manuel J. Clouthier, former President 
o f the CCE, who ran as presidential candidate for the PAN in the 1988 elections. Still, 
the actual leaders o f the business elite restricted their sphere o f action to the traditional 
mechanisms o f negotiation and consultation. In December 1987, however, the signing 
o f the Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) changed in a fundamental way these 
mechanisms.
The Entrepreneurial Co-ordinating Council (CCE), founded in May 1975, became the 
most important business organisation. It was the result o f the increasing politicisation 
among entrepreneurs. The CCE was explicitly created to articulate the political demands 
o f large business and soon became the major entrepreneurial organisation used for the 
state consultations on economic policy. The CCE grouped both specialised 
organisations with compulsory membership like CONCAMIN, CONCANACO, 
CANACINTRA and ABM, and mixed organisations with voluntary membership like 
COPARMEX and the CMHN. Consistent with its technocratic nature, the CCE groups 
also specialised professional organisations like the Centre o f Economic Studies o f the 
Private Sector (CEESP), the Mexican Entrepreneurs Council for International Affairs 
(CEMAI), the Centre for Social Studies (CES) and the Centre for Law Studies. These 
last sets o f organisations are the main think-tanks o f the private sector for economic, 
social, international and law studies.
10 The most important business chambers are: the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN), 
funded in 1918; the Confederation of National Commerce Chambers (CONCANACO), founded in 1917; 
and the Mexican Bankers Association (ABM) founded in 1928. Later on, other entrepreneurial 
organisations complemented the above-mentioned sectoral chambers, like: the National Chamber o f the 
Transformation Industry (CANACINTRA) created in 1941 for small and medium firms and characterised 
by its pro-governmental positions; the Mexican Confederation of Employers (COPARMEX) founded in 
1929 as a response to the Labour Federal Act, and regarded as the employers’ trade union; and finally the 
Mexican Council o f Businessmen (CMHN) founded in 1962 as a reaction to the reforms introduced by 
President Lopez Mateos.
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Business groups have also resorted to informal practices to enter the decision-making 
circles o f the state. According to Camp (1989: 229), the dual role o f some actors and the 
exchange o f  personnel between public and private organisations are two o f  the oldest 
and most important informal practices in the politics o f the Mexican state. The exchange 
o f  personnel, mainly in the financial sector, strengthens the personal contact between the 
financial executives and public officials. As Raymond Vernon (1963: 154) put it, ‘for a 
political structure such as Mexico has managed to achieve, the familiar iceberg analogy 
has special reference. Most o f the struggle between the private and the public sectors 
over the subject o f  government policy goes on sub-rosa, beyond the ken o f  newspapers 
and the public. Only a bit o f the process is visible to the naked eye.’ M exico’s public 
sector decision making is characterised by a protective ambiguity. Very little about the 
future direction o f the economic policy can be known outside the inner circles o f  the 
state (see Glade 1991).
In contrast to the long process o f business organisation into chambers, their ability to 
exit the economy as a source o f political leverage is a relatively recent phenomenon 
associated with the increasing integration o f domestic financial markets into one global 
financial system (see chapter two). Recent examples o f their capacity to create major 
economic disruptions by resorting to capital flight include the exchange rate crises o f  
1976, 1982 and more recently 1994. Capital flight is usually the response o f  
international capital and large domestic business groups to a deteriorating investment 
climate.
The President and the Bureaucracy
The autonomy o f the Mexican state rests to a great extent on the extreme centralisation 
o f  decision-making power in the executive branch o f the state, especially in the 
President.11 The President, described by Merilee Grindle (1996: 49) as the major 
political leader,12 wields maximum power for a six-year period.13 According to Robert
11 The presidency is one of the most studied features o f the Mexican political system. For a 
comprehensive analysis of this institution see: Carpizo (1979) or Philip (1991).
12 The main political responsibilities of the President, according to (Thompson 1979: 56), were: (1) keep 
the stability of the political regime; (2) settle the most important disputes that cannot be solved at lower
levels; (3) build support coalitions for the regime; and (4) create confidence among social groups.
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E. Scott (quoted by Torres 1997: 35), the presidential supremacy stems from the deep- 
rooted tradition o f a strong executive, broad constitutional powers and control o f the 
official party. However, the most important source o f presidential power is the informal 
rule that says: ‘the incumbent President has the right to choose his successor.’ This 
meta-constitutional faculty allowed the President to reassure his supremacy over other 
institutional actors. This single decision did not only determine the career prospects o f  
every single individual engaged in politics and/or government, but also the business 
opportunities for the economic elite. As a result, absolute discipline to the presidential 
command became a distinctive feature o f the Mexican political economy.
Besides the President, Mexico has a relatively well institutionalised public bureaucracy 
that expands the state’s capacity to set the terms o f policy-making.14 The bureaucracy in 
Mexico is, according to Eduardo Torres (1997), a centralised body, deeply embedded 
into both the economic and political relationships o f the state, and highly sensitive to the 
leadership o f the President. Opinions about possible policy measures are solicited and 
channelled back to the President, usually through communication networks that the 
bureaucracy has established with local governments and the private sector (Thompson 
1979: 53).
The relationship between the President and the bureaucracy is mediated by ‘policy 
coalitions’.15 Every President since Lazaro Cardenas has reshuffled the executive 
bureaucracy and changed the configuration o f power between policy coalitions, 
attending to his own government agenda, and within the parameters set by the 
international world order. Sylvia Maxfield (1990) distinguishes two dominant policy 
coalitions in the Mexican political system. On the one hand, the ‘financial coalition’, 
organised around the financial division o f the bureaucracy (i.e. the Ministry o f  Finance, 
BdeM and large development banks) and advocating a conservative economic policy
"  The sexenio  does not only represent the presidential term, according to Torres (1997: 35), it also sets 
the pace of Mexican politics, ‘registering key dates and providing predictability to political action.’
14 Torres (1997) claims that although a strong presidential institutions greatly contributed to political 
stability and economic growth, these outcomes cannot be fully understood without considering the 
emergence of two complex policy networks in charge of the management o f politics and economics 
respectively.
15 There is a vast literature on policy coalitions and the configuration of power within the Mexican 
political system. See for instance: Vemon (1963), Glade (1968), Cordera and Tello (1981), Camp (1989), 
Maxfield (1990), Basanez (1991a) and Centeno (1994).
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with emphasis on stability. On the other hand, the ‘developmentalist coalition’, 
organised around the ministries controlling natural resources and in large state-owned 
enterprises and promoting re-distributive policies. There is a strong historical correlation 
between the relative influence o f these coalitions and the orientation o f the economic 
policy under each particular President.16
Economic policy in Mexico after the Revolution can be characterised as a continuous 
swing between stabilisation and re-distributive initiatives. The period known as 
‘stabilising development’ (1958-1970) was dominated by a rather conservative 
economic policy (see Table 3.1). The state used credit and monetary policy more for 
stabilisation purposes than for distributive goals. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
economic policy placed greater emphasis on economic expansion and social spending at 
the expense o f economic stability. As a response to a crisis o f political legitimacy, 
President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) changed profoundly the configuration o f  power 
between the policy coalitions, after thirty years o f domination by the financial coalition. 
The office o f the presidency and other ‘developmentalist’ agencies checked the 
influence o f this coalition in economic policy by changing personnel and increasing the 
economic role o f the state.17
President Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) in turn restrained the financial coalition through 
the creation o f the ministry o f Planning and Budgeting. This agency, under the close 
supervision o f the President, centralised the most important political functions in 
economic policy, namely planning and budgeting, and therefore effectively counter­
balanced the Ministry o f Finance (see Torres 1997). Supported by massive capital 
inflows from oil exports and international banks lending, Lopez Portillo sought to take 
Mexico into the developed world through what he called ‘la Administration de la 
abundancia’ (the management o f abundance).18 Nonetheless, exogenous shocks in 
international oil prices, interest rates rises and inconsistent economic policy decisions 
led to the collapse o f the peso in February 1982.
1(1 Maxfield (1990) provides an excellent historical account o f the relative influence of these two policy 
coalitions over time and the consequences for the state responses to trends in international finance.
17 President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) declared that the economic policy in Mexico was dictated from 




Term President Minister of Finance Governor of 
BdeM
Coalition
1934-1940 Lazaro Cardenas Eduardo Suarez Luis Montes de 
Oca
Developmentalist





1946-1952 Miguel Aleman Ramon Beteta Carlos Novoa Developmentalist





1958-1964 Adolfo Lopez 
Mateos
Antonio Ortiz Mena Rodrigo Gomez Financial
1964-1970 Gustavo Diaz 
Ordaz
Antonio Ortiz Mena Rodrigo Gomez Financial





1976-1982 Jose Lopez 
Portillo








1982-1988 Miguel de la 
Madrid
Jesus Silva Herzog; 
Gustavo Petricholi
Miguel Mancera Financial
1988-1994 Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari
Pedro Aspe Miguel Mancera Financial
1994- Ernesto Zedillo 
Ponce de Leon
Jaime Serra Puche; 






Since 1982, Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas favoured the financial coalition once 
again; the Ministry o f Finance and BdeM regained the control o f economic policy and 
stabilisation objectives came to the fore o f the state agenda. The next section presents 
this reconfiguration o f power between policy coalitions under President de la Madrid 
and shows how it placed reform-minded technocrats in key positions while straining the 
existing political institutions.
18 President Lopez Portillo meant by abundance the newly discovered oil reserves. The value of oil 
exports went from US $ 0.44 billions in 1976 to US $ 10.4 billions in 1980.
3.2 Political Change under de la Madrid, 1982-1988
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The semi-authoritarian nature o f the political institutions provided President de la 
Madrid and his economic team the required leeway for the implementation o f a 
‘draconian’ stabilisation programme (Roxborough 1989: 103). The financial coalition, 
according to Miguel Angel Centeno (1994: 122), advocated orthodox economic 
policies, not as a direct articulation o f social demands, but because they believed that 
those policies were the best options to tackle the national challenges. The technocrats 
framed most economic problems from a strategic and long run perspective neglecting 
short run political consequences. Policy decisions under this perspective, although 
economically rational, deteriorated the political climate and created increasing popular 
opposition that materialised into an effective challenge to the regime in the 1988 
presidential elections.
The Rise to Power of the Financial Coalition
The last important reconfiguration on the balance o f political power between policy 
coalitions took place during the 1980s and was triggered to a great extent by the 
economic crisis o f 1982. From a political perspective, the debt crisis represented more 
than purely financial imbalances: different coalitions competing for political power 
provided different views about the nature o f the problem and the alternative strategies to 
cope with it. President Lopez Portillo (1988: 1109) acknowledged him self that the 
nomination o f Miguel de la Madrid as the PRI’s presidential candidate responded to the 
nature o f  the challenge that the Mexican state would have to face in the following 
sexenio, which was essentially financial. The new elite, therefore, legitimated their rule 
by saying that the crisis facing Mexico in the early 1980s was financial (Centeno 1994: 
140).
President de la Madrid brought back the members o f the financial coalition, also known 
as the technocrats, to the most prominent positions o f the executive bureaucracy.19 The 
comeback o f this group was favoured by the increasing dependency o f the Mexican
14 According to various authors (Camp 1993; Centeno 1996; Golob 1997), the behaviour of individual 
political actors in the Mexican political system is constrained to a great extent by their membership to a 
particular policy coalition.
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economy on the international world order and the dominant policy culture at that time. 
The members o f the financial coalition adopted the postulates o f the new orthodoxy in 
economic thinking and shaped their policy agenda accordingly. Homogeneity o f  
personnel in terms o f academic backgrounds and professional careers ensured economic 
rationality as the major methodological filter through which the public problems were 
analysed and worked out for the next couple o f decades.
Another reason for the success o f this coalition was their superior administrative 
capabilities vis-a-vis other agencies and the increasing importance and power o f  their 
allies, the new financial bourgeoisie and the international financial community (Heredia 
1992: 271). Formulating a new development strategy became a top priority within the 
state and the technocrats had the best training for that task. Furthermore, the 
developmentalist coalition’s loss o f prestige favoured the financial coalition to 
consolidate its position within the bureaucracy.
The Mexican state under President de la Madrid launched a gradual reform o f the 
economy comprising trade liberalisation, privatisation and rationalisation o f  public 
finances. In 1986 Mexico became a member o f  the Generalised Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT), reducing substantially the level o f trade protection. Privatisation 
was introduced for the first time as an explicit and comprehensive programme. Finally, 
the adjustment o f public finances turned a primary deficit (revenues minus expenditure, 
excluding interest payments) o f  7.2 percent o f the GDP in 1982 into a surplus o f  8.1 
percent o f the GDP in 1988 (Volj and Draaisma 1993: 129).
The financial coalition advocated a monetarist approach to macroeconomic 
management, which means tight monetary policy, firm commitment to free exchange 
convertibility, fixed exchange rates, low taxation and limited regulation o f  financial 
markets (Maxfield 1990: 13).20 These policies greatly benefited domestic capital at the 
expense o f the middle class and workers. The political legitimacy o f the regime severely 
deteriorated under President de la Madrid, while the alliance between technocrats, large 
entrepreneurs and the new financial bourgeoisie strengthened (Frieden 1991: 221). In 
1987 Agustin Legorreta, President o f the CCE and former director o f BANAMEX,
20 At some points in history, technocrats have been known also as monetarists and Chicago boys.
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expressed openly the support o f the business elite to the state economic policy and its 
chief architect, Carlos Salinas (quoted by Centeno 1994: 13).
Strain on the Political Institutions
President Miguel de la Madrid inaugurated his sexenio with a strained relationship 
between the state and large business caused by his predecessor’s nationalisation o f the 
commercial banks. The inherited debt crisis and the need to regain investors' confidence 
dominated economic policy under his government. The economic plan, outlined in the 
Programme for Immediate Economic Reorganisation (PIRE), was based on a 
‘draconian’ reduction on public expending that placed the political system under 
increasing tension. The main constituents o f  the PRI (i.e. middle classes and workers) 
bore most o f the costs from the stabilisation programme. The limits imposed on wage 
increases were decisive in curbing inflation and were only feasible thanks to the 
corporatist structure o f labour in Mexico. By 1987 the wage share o f national income 
had declined to 26.6 percent as compared with 35.9 percent in 1982 (Torres 1997: 132).
However, one o f the striking features o f Mexican politics under President de la Madrid 
administration and its approach to the economic crisis was the way it displaced the 
CTM from the centre o f the political system. President de la Madrid de-emphasised the 
importance o f negotiation with organised labour as a central element in M exico’s 
political economy (Roxborough 1989: 105). Labour conflicts in the steel, electrical and 
telephone sectors were solved unilaterally by ‘unusually’ strict applications o f  the 
labour code and threats o f major layoffs (Kaufman 1990: 107). Although CTM leaders 
were unable to break formally with the dominant party, by 1985-1986 they began to 
express unprecedented sharp and public criticism of the administration policy.
President de la Madrid also checked democratic pressures during this period by making 
intensive use o f the PRI machinery. The organised labour movement, despite its 
tensions with the government, played a fundamental role in keeping labour militancy 
under tight control. In 1985 the PRI won all seven governorships contended, 289 out o f  
300 elected seats in the Congress and almost all 845 mayoral elections despite public 
scepticism, fraud allegations and violence. In fact, President Miguel de la Madrid told
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Roderic Camp in 1986 that Mexico was not ready for democracy (quoted by Torres 
1997: 132).
To make things worse, the austerity programme failed to restore economic growth and 
stabilise the economy, further alienating the system’s traditional bases o f  support. 
Exogenous events like the Mexico City earthquake in 1985 and the second fall in oil 
prices in 1986 combined with strong expenditure cuts, high foreign indebtedness and the 
stock market crash in 1987, delivered one o f the worst sexenios in terms o f economic 
performance. In 1987, a year before the presidential elections, the inflation recorded was 
131.8 percent, the highest ever in post-revolutionary Mexico (INEGI 1994: 960).
Merilee Grindle (1996: 48) identified a crisis o f political legitimacy for the second part 
o f de la Madrid presidential term. Over this period there was an increasing mobilisation 
o f social groups outside the traditional confines o f the PRI, where they were less 
susceptible to co-optation and control. The deterioration o f cohesiveness within the state 
elite that had helped maintain the political regime in power was reflected in defections 
from the long-standing support coalition. After Carlos Salinas was designated 
presidential successor, however, a substantial portion o f the PRI’s moderate and left 
wing broke away to support the populist electoral challenge launched by Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas— son o f President Lazaro Cardenas, one o f  the main architects o f  the Mexican 
political institutions (Kaufman 1990: 107). For Centeno (1994: 11), the selection o f the 
PRI’s presidential candidate for 1988 elections was the most critical point in the history 
o f the regime since the 1940s. The crisis o f legitimacy associated to the austerity 
measures o f  the stabilisation programme and the failure to deliver economic growth had 
weakened the regime to a historically unprecedented level.
Poor economic perfonnance, a weakening corporatist apparatus and internal divisions 
within the PRI produced the worst electoral results ever in presidential elections for the 
state-party (see Table 3.2). The results were so contested that the allegations o f electoral 
fraud by the new political force led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas sparkled massive popular 
mobilisations. The popular support for Cardenas shook the foundations o f the dominant 
party, which had routinely obtained majorities between 70 and 90 percent. Strong 
challenges to the legitimacy o f the regime followed the electoral disaster o f  July 1988. 
By the time Salinas took office on December 1st 1988, Juan Jose Hinojosa, a prominent
political columnist, asserted that ‘Salinas was the weakest President since the 1930s’ 
(quoted by Centeno 1994: 15). Merilee Grindle (1996: 61) believes that Presidents after 
1988 cannot count on the traditional bases o f support nor can they assume than the PRI 
can ensure their election. The unexpected dimension o f the political crisis exhibited by 
the 1988 election results had a substantial impact on the politics o f  reform under 
President Salinas, as shall be discussed in the next section.
Table 3.2
Presidential Election Results, 1952-1988
Year Candidate Party % votes
1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez PRI 74.31
Gonzalez Luna PAN 7.82
Other 17.87
1958 Adolfo Lopez Mateos PRI 90.43
Luis H. Alvarez PAN 9.42
Other 0.13
1964 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz PRI 88.82
Gonzalez Torres PAN 10.98
Other 0.20
1970 Luis Echeverria PRI 86.02
Gonzalez Morfin PAN 13.98
1976 Jose Lopez Portillo PRI 100
1982 Miguel de la Madrid PRI 70.9
Pablo E. Madero PAN 15.7
Other 8.9
1988 Carlos Salinas PRI 50.36
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas FDN 31.12
Manuel J. Clouthier PAN 17.07
Other 1.46
Source: Torres 1997: 142
3.3 Political Change under Salinas, 1988-1994
Carlos Salinas was the first President to face an effective electoral challenge in the last 
fifty years. Since Salinas, electoral competition has become a new feature o f  the 
Mexican political system. The PRI’s disappointing electoral performance in the 1988 
presidential elections made evident the need to restore popular support for the regime; 
and therefore, important changes to the political institutions and to the orientation o f  
state’s economic policy took place during Salinas’s sexenio.
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President Salinas made extensive and efficient use o f the state’s capacity to articulate 
new constituencies o f support under effective democratic competition. Reasserted 
presidentialism was instrumental for the economic reform (Grindle 1996: 92). His 
strategy to restore the capacity o f the Mexican state and to reassert his own authority 
had three major components: (1) restoring popular support for the regime by replacing 
the traditional corporatist organisations with state programmes o f social spending;21 (2) 
establishing an alliance with the domestic business elite and with international capital in 
order to lure capital back into de economy and secure financing for the PRI; and (3) 
assembling a coherent economic team able and ready to implement the structural 
transformation o f the economy.
Elections and Political Competition
According to George Philip (1998: 23), the current trend towards greater democracy in 
Mexico has been expressed mainly in terms o f more transparent and competitive 
electoral processes rather than in terms o f genuine institutional changes. New  
organisations22 that emerged during this period pushed for changes in the traditional 
modus operandi o f the political system and therefore the government adapted old 
institutional arrangements to accommodate increasing electoral competition without 
overturning the existing presidential regime or jeopardising the electoral advantages o f  
the PRI.23
President Salinas committed himself to clean elections mainly for two reasons. First, 
international capital pressed for democratic changes by tacitly conditioning their 
investments to clean elections and political stability. Second, doubtful electoral results 
in the 1988 presidential elections deteriorated the legitimacy o f the regime, and 
therefore clean elections intended to legitimise ex-post his government.
21 The arrest of Joaquin Hernandez, la Quina, the heretofore untouchable boss of the petroleum workers 
trade union, in combination with a showdown with Jongitud Barrios, the powerful head o f the national 
teachers union, were the most important blows to the popular corporatism upon which the old regime was 
heavy reliant.
22 The most important o f which is obviously the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). However 
several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political associations like: El Grupo San Angel, 
Alianza Civica, and Compromisos con la Nacion, also played a role.
23 It seems as if President Salinas had Lampedusa’s (1991) immortal words in his mind: “If we want 
things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”
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Politics in Mexico during Salinas’s sexenio were strongly influenced by the potential 
electoral challenge to the rule o f the PRI either from the newly founded left-wing PRD 
or the long-established right-wing PAN. For the first time, a President had to deal with 
the real possibility o f losing important elections and to negotiate with the opposition in 
the Congress. Between 1988 and 1991, the majority o f  the PRI in the Congress was not 
enough to make constitutional amendments. The distinction between the concepts o f  
state, government and party became meaningful. At the end o f 1993, the political 
system was far from despotic: political debate was more open than ever in both the press 
and the Congress; and opposition parties did effectively become government in three 
states (Baja California, Chihuahua and Guanajuato) for the first time in post­
revolutionary Mexico and in 96 municipalities (some o f  them state capitals). The PRI 
ceased to be a state party in many respects, although it remained the most powerful by 
far.
In July 1993 President Salinas sent an initiative to reform the Act for Electoral 
Processes. The reform proposed ceilings on party spending, greater media access, more 
opposition representation in the Senate and the creation o f  electoral tribunals {Financial 
Times, July 9th 1993).24 As a result o f the reform, the government handed the 
responsibility o f organising the electoral processes to the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE). Elections gained a great deal o f transparency and most o f the old practices o f  
electoral fraud were substantially reduced. The electoral reform, however, represented a 
calculated decision. Without reducing the extensive powers o f the executive, President 
Salinas could afford to concede opposition demands without endangering the PRI’s hold 
on power. He boosted his personal popularity and the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes o f 
foreign capital. The package o f political reforms gave a more democratic gloss to the 
country’s authoritarian image. The proposals were seen, according to the Financial 
Times (August 26th 1993), as an attempt by Salinas to fulfil promises to modernise 
Mexico politically.
However, according to the Economist (July 17th 1993), the opposition remained 
sceptical about the President’s will to equalise the electoral competition between 
political parties. The electoral reform came at the same time that the PRI’s candidate for
24 The reform was announced in July and approved by the PRI-dominated Congress in August 1993.
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governor to the politically strategic state o f Mexico won the elections by an 
overwhelming majority thanks to huge campaign spending. Elections became more 
transparent but not more equitable. In fact, President Zedillo acknowledged that the 
presidential elections in 1994 were unfair {La Jornada, August 28th 1998).
Salinas used extensively the institutional infrastructure o f the state to strengthen the 
electoral position o f the PRI, especially regarding the presidential elections. In October 
1993, a year before the elections, Salinas reached a pact with unions and businesses that 
called for big wage increases and tax cuts to take effect throughout 1994. Carlos 
Monsivais, a well-known left-wing intellectual, asserted that ‘the PRI hijacked public 
opinion’ (quoted by The Economist, August 6th 1994). The PRI, with seemingly 
unlimited sources o f finance, including plenty o f quiet assistance from government 
coffers and officials, showed it was the only party that people could count on to bestows 
largesse. Biased television coverage also played a big role.
President Salinas implemented an aggressive social policy where he mixed popular 
participation in public works and extensive financing. According to Jose Cordoba, chief 
o f staff o f the President, the state engineered a two tier social policy: it strengthened the 
existing social security network, on the one hand, and it put in place the National 
Programme o f Solidarity (PRONASOL), on the other. This was a non-bureaucratic 
programme o f community mobilisation to fight poverty ‘intended to establish a close 
link between the general policies o f structural change and the direct benefits for the 
communities, in order to lay groundwork for new social bases o f support o f  the reform 
process’ (Cordoba 1994: 266).
PRONASOL, run under the principle o f ‘help to those who help themselves’, provided 
services infrastructure to communities that otherwise would have waited years. 
Nowhere was Salinas’s personal ruling style clearer than in PRONASOL. In December 
1988 Salinas created the National Commission o f PRONASOL. General co-ordination 
and top decision-making in this commission was in the hands o f a board chaired by the 
President and integrated by selected ministers and agency directors. An executive 
director appointed directly by the President managed it. At the lowest level, 
democratically elected 'Comites de Solidaridad' represented the communities. 
Centralised decision-making and decentralised operation minimised the role o f the
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bureaucracy and maximised the efficiency o f the programme and the popularity o f  the 
President.
PRONASOL was a novel scheme o f political campaigning with a clear tendency to 
foster popular support for the PRI. The scheme had a strong content o f  political 
propaganda and effectively gained support for the government’s policy reform.25 
Solidaridad’s funds tended to be spent where the PRI faced a stronger challenge from 
the opposition.26 On the whole, spending tended to be concentrated in the countryside, 
where it is easier to foster political support in return for material benefits. By complying 
with what was offered, by reducing the time lag between the petition and the delivery, 
and by minimising corruption in the process, the government favoured the PRI to a great 
extent.
The victory o f  the PRI in the 1991 mid-term elections was the result o f these new bases 
o f support put in place by President Salinas through PRONASOL.27 With its over 
seventy thousand local offices, abundant resources and ubiquitous propaganda, this 
programme became the new apparatus o f political control. PRONASOL alienated the 
segments o f the population with lower incomes from the possible influence o f  
opposition political parties, linked them directly to the state apparatus, and eliminated 
any possible attempt to organise themselves into opposition groups. The result was a 
Schumpeterian democracy.28 Political competition, although increasingly conducted
25 Community participation is at the core of the programme with a double objective: it seeks on the one 
hand, to empower the communities to decide about their needs, and on the other, to create a network of 
political organisations that could be easily co-opted. Between December 1988 and November 1993, 
150,000 committees were set up by local communities. The results were very encouraging in terms of 
public works: 13.5 million people got access to clean water; 16 million to electricity; and 11.5 million to 
sewerage (Wood 1993).
20 Dresser (1991) presents a different view. In her view, the 1988 electoral setback had little impact on 
President Salinas’s social programme PRONASOL, which was a neopopulist solution to neoliberal 
problems rather than to electoral ones.
27 Despite strong opposition from the right-wing Partido de A ction Nacional (PAN) and the left-wing 
party Partido de la Revolution Democratica (PRD), the results o f the elections were a landslide for the 
PRI.
28 So long as the political competition takes place through elections, regardless of how imperfect it may 
be, there is democracy in the Schumpeterian sense. For Joseph Schumpeter (1996: 269), democracy ‘is 
that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’ Schumpeterian democracy is a 
procedural democracy that depends on ‘...a modus procedendi ... a recognised method by which to 
conduct the competitive struggle, and the electoral method is practically the only available for 
communities of any size’ (Schumpeter 1996: 270-271).
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through clear and transparent elections, remained largely unfair. Massive resources 
poured into PRONASOL and other government programmes clearly favoured the PRI. 
The institutional resources and organisational infrastructure o f the state were used by the 
PRI to win elections without resorting to outright ‘fraud’.
Business-government alliance and PRI financing
Financing to the PRI became a critical issue in the context o f stronger political 
opposition and elections scrutinised by an autonomous agency (i.e. the IFE). Oscar Vera 
(1991) argued that the comprehensive privatisation programme under President Salinas 
served the clear purpose o f building a support coalition among the domestic business 
elite whose capital repatriation was crucial for economic recovery and whose 
contributions were expected to secure financing for the PRI.
Favoured investors consolidated their financial and industrial conglomerates thanks to 
the privatisation o f large public firms. The programme was a great act o f  business 
engineering led by the Salinas’s government. The state strengthened some large 
business groups by transferring to them its share o f economic control on strategic 
sectors, like banking, telecommunications and mining (Garrido 1994: 167). These 
groups became successful players in the global economy and strong supporters o f the 
government and the PRI in the domestic political arena. Most o f  the investors favoured 
by the privatisation o f state-owned enterprises were linked to President Salinas in one 
way or another. Some o f them were members o f  the PRI’s Financing Commission 
during Salinas’s campaign for President in 1988. Among the most important were: 
Carlos Slim (TELMEX and CARSO); Roberto Gonzalez (BANORTE); Pablo Brener 
(MEXICANA); Carlos Peralta (IUSACELL); Fernando Senderos Mestre (DESC); 
Enrique Molina Sobrino (SAN LUIS); and Antonio Madero (Consorcio Industrial 
Escorpion) {Este Pais, January 1992).
At the same time, there was a reconfiguration in the alliance between the state and the 
business elite: stockbrokers strengthened their links and collaboration with the state 
relative to other groups from the business elite. Industrial groups suffered the effects o f  
an international slump and trading firms were severely hit by inflation, the only group 
that grew and developed over these years were the stock brokers (Mateos and Roman
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1993: 124). Traditional business groups, according to Grindle (1996: 35), lost their 
political influence and economic hegemony. The magazine Businessweek in an article 
titled Salinas’s Friends argued that the economic reform in Mexico was supported by a 
new generation o f entrepreneurs without financial antecedents but nurtured during the 
1980s in the stock exchange and with the explicit support o f the state (quoted in 
Proceso, July 28th 1991: 8).
Newcomers like Carlos Slim and Roberto Hernandez replaced the 300 families that after 
the revolution were in charge o f the most important business in the country.29 These two 
personal figures, for instance, whose capital was accumulated through operations in the 
stock exchange during the 1980s (Mateos and Roman 1993: 117), led the groups o f  
investors that acquired the two largest public enterprises sold to date, TELMEX and 
BANAMEX respectively. These new players joined some large industrialists and ex­
bankers to build a new economic elite that now controls banks, brokerage houses, 
insurance companies and most major business concerns in Mexico.
Towards the end o f Salinas’s sexenio, when the time came to prepare the presidential 
succession, Oscar Espinosa, head o f NAFIN, was appointed treasurer o f the PRI for the 
elections in 1994. His position as head o f the most important development bank 
provided him with important connections with the new Mexican business elite who was 
expected to make contributions to finance PRI’s electoral campaigns.
Members o f this new economic elite were involved in scandals regarding fund-raising 
for the PRI. The first event that brought to public light the close links between the 
business elite and the government was the dinner party organised by Antonio Ortiz 
Mena, former minister o f finance (1958-1970) and Genaro Borrego, President o f the 
PRI, on February 23rd 1993. At this dinner, attended by President Carlos Salinas, Genaro 
Borrego demanded a contribution o f $25 million dollars for the presidential campaign in 
1994 for each one o f the guests (La Jornada, August 27th 1998). The list o f guests at the
29 The Carso Group, the largest business group in Mexico, for instance, was founded by Carlos Slim from 
the profits on his stock market activities in the late 1970s and gradually incorporating big firms from 
industrial, merchant, and services sectors. The acquisition of TELMEX, however, turned this group 
instantly into one of the giants among the groups operating in the country (Garrido 1994: 168). Because 
of its size and economic importance and for the type of management practised by its new owners,
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dinner party included the richest businessmen in Mexico, who in most o f the cases had 
close ties with the government. Among the present were: Emilio Azacarraga 
(TELEVISA); Carlos Slim (TELMEX); Roberto Hernandez (BANAMEX); Lorenzo 
Zambrano (CEMEX); Bemando Garza (ALFA); Adrian Sada (SERFIN and VITRO); 
Claudio X. Gonzalez; Carlos Hank (HERMES); Angel Lozada; Alfonso de Garay; Jose 
Madariaga (PROBURSA); Eloy Vallina; Aurelio Lopez Rocha; Carlos Abedrop; 
Jeronimo Arango; Alberto Bailleres (PENOLES); Antonio del Valle; Manuel Espinoza 
Yglesias; Diego Gutierrez Cortina (GUTSA); Jorge Larrea; and Gilberto Borja (ICA) 
(Proceso, December 4th 1995).
According to the multiple accounts o f the event, most o f  the businessmen agreed to the 
requested contribution without major hesitations. Emilio Azacarraga’s statement was 
remarkable: ‘I have earned so much money during these years, that I commit m yself to 
provide a higher amount [than the requested $25 million dollars]’ {Proceso, December 
12th 1995). Porfirio Munoz Ledo, leader o f the PRD, said about the ‘infamous’ dinner: 
‘this does nothing but lay bare the obvious— the oligarchic nature o f the party and its 
collusion with the country’s great fortunes’ (quoted by the Financial Times, March 4th 
1993).
Subsequent scandals came to light, especially after the 1994 elections. On June 13th 
1995 the PRD presented documents revealing that Roberto Madrazo’s campaign 
spending for governor in the state o f Tabasco fairly exceeded the legal limits {Proceso, 
April 12th 1998). Roberto Madrazo spent almost $80 million dollars on his campaign for 
governor o f Tabasco, more than 50 times the legal limit and $30 million more than the 
official cost o f Zedillo’s presidential campaign that same year {La Jornada, August 27th 
1998).30
The PRI’s campaign financing for the 1994 presidential elections also became closely 
associated to fraud allegations, especially in the newly privatised banking sector. 
Personal and institutional contributions from businessmen currently facing fraud 
charges— Gerardo de Prevoisin, Carlos Cabal, Angel Rodriguez and Jorge Lankenau—
TELMEX has become a key element in the functioning of the present-day Mexican economy and has put 
the Carso Group at the head of the big national private groups (Garrido 1994: 168).
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became public {La Jornada, August 17th 1998). All o f them benefited from the 
government’s privatisation programme under President Salinas.
Gerardo de Prevoisin, executive director o f Aerovias de Mexico (AEROMEXICO) after 
its privatisation, was forced to resign in September 1994 under the charges o f  fraudulent 
management. He later disclosed documents with information regarding contributions up 
to $8 million dollars for the PRI’s presidential campaign in 1994. De Prevoisin argued 
that ‘the contributions were demanded by the ruling party to AEROMEXICO during the 
electoral campaign. Payments were made under the name o f AEROMEXICO with the 
acknowledgement o f the firm’s board o f directors, which include some top government 
officials. Furthermore top party officials instructed the method o f payment, {Proceso, 
February 2,,d 1996).
BANPAIS under the management o f Angel Rodriguez, financed part o f the PRI’s 
electoral campaign in 1994. Cash contributions amounted almost one million dollars; 
the bank paid for the rent o f one of the buildings used by the PRI’s finance committee; 
and ASEMEX, the group’s insurance company, paid the insurance policy for whole 
presidential campaign, with an estimated cost o f another one million dollars {La 
Jornada, August 28th 1998). Then, in July 1996, the Attorney General found out that 
Roberto Madrazo received money from Carlos Cabal, former owner o f Banco CREMI- 
UNION. Cabal deposited more than $4 million dollars into a trust fund managed by 
Madrazo himself {Proceso, April 12th 1998). Finally, Banca CONFIA, formerly owned 
by Jorge Lankenau who is currently facing fraud charges, managed the $80 million 
dollars o f Madrazo’s campaign through four different bank accounts {La Jornada, 
August 27th 1998).
The huge spending in electoral campaigns, besides being purely rent seeking and 
economically unproductive, illustrates how President Salinas’s used the state 
institutional resources to favour a small group o f businessmen in exchange for financial 
support for the PRI and economic backing for his reforms. The capital repatriation o f  
large domestic investors was an important component o f the massive capital inflows
As a matter of comparison, Bill Clinton spent $50 million dollars in his 1992 presidential campaign.
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financing the state and the current account deficit. The alliance between business and 
government was extremely beneficial for both parties, at least while it lasted.
Reasserted presidentialism and economic reform
Reasserted presidentialism was instrumental for the introduction o f the economic reform 
in Mexico. In this period, the presidency merged Salinas’s strong leadership with 
extensive institutional and financial resources— comprehensive decision-making power; 
subordinated legislative and judicial branches o f government; a non-accountable and 
clientelist bureaucracy; massive access to the media; networks o f collaboration with the 
business elite; mechanisms o f social control (Grindle 1996: 81-82). The excessive 
concentration o f political power in the President was barely touched by the political 
transformation that took place during this period. The new institutional arrangements 
accommodated the increasing electoral competition without reducing the President’s 
ability to impose his policy agenda. Despite the fact that many constituencies did not 
back Salinas at the elections, he captured the extensive power o f the Mexican 
presidency at the moment he took office. He was as powerful as any former Mexican 
President.
President Salinas was praised for his decisiveness during ‘his first one hundred days’ in 
office, when he used his decision-making authority to reassert his personal authority 
(Camp 1993: 143). Salinas’s impressive achievements during his sexenio relied 
crucially on his decisions during this period. Those decisions had the clear and 
unmistakable purpose to show who was in power.31 The message was primarily directed 
to the country’s most influential political actors rather than to the electorate. An 
extensive, decisive, and bold exercise o f presidential power proved crucial in creating 
the political environment required for economic restructuring. President Salinas also 
empowered Jose Cordoba, his chief o f staff, to exercise key executive assignments. 
Cordoba held a supra-ministerial position from which he reasserted the presidential 
control over the economic policy-making process. As a matter o f comparison and 
leaving ideological considerations aside, Presidents Echeverria and Salinas used
extensively the President’s power to strengthen their own leadership and imposing their 
programme o f government (Torres 1997: 144). In both cases, presidentialism was 
reasserted as a result o f lost o f legitimacy stemming from deep political crises, namely 
the 1968 student killing and the 1988 electoral crisis.
Another crucial element for the economic reform was the articulation o f  a coherent and 
highly qualified economic team. The weekly magazine the Economist (December 14th 
1991: 19) lauded the team assembled by President Salinas, as ‘probably the most 
economically literate group that has ever governed any country anywhere.’ The 
recruitment o f their members was especially important to preserve the coalition's 
homogeneity and cohesion. As Pedro Aspe, minister o f finance and one o f  the most 
prominent members o f this economic team, wrote:
‘Without well-trained politicians and economists ready to put their minds to 
work on the solution to very complex problems— and with the will and unity to 
take the necessary decisions— no modernisation programme could be successful. 
It is indispensable to have top-grade people who are also convinced o f the 
philosophy o f stabilisation and structural change in the areas o f budget control, 
domestic and international trade, privatisation, industrial regulation, social 
security, labour management, social development, taxation and financial policy’ 
(Aspe 1993: 56).
Leopoldo Solis, an UNAM professor and head o f the economic and social programming 
unit in the office o f the President in the early 1970s was a crucial link in the economic 
team assembled by Salinas. Solis shared common links at Yale University with Jaime 
Serra (minister o f industry and trade) and Ernesto Zedillo (minister o f  programming and 
budget); he met President Carlos Salinas and Manuel Camacho (Mexico City Major) 
during their student days at UNAM; and finally, he was related to Pedro Aspe (minister 
o f  finance) and Francisco Gil (deputy minister o f finance) through Miguel Mancera 
(governor o f BdeM) and Gustavo Petricholi (Mexico’s ambassador to the U.S.); both o f  
them studied with him at Yale University.
31 Many people agree with Rodolfo Junco, executive director of the newspaper El Norte, in his 
characterisation of President Salinas as ‘a man who knows the old ways as well as the new ones. He uses 
either depending on what he wants to accomplish’ (quoted by Wood 1993).
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Jose Cordoba (1994: 282), chief of the President’s staff and prominent member o f this 
team, illustrated the cohesion o f the economic team in the following passage: ‘...since 
1988, the economic cabinet has met over 200 times, or once a week on average, and is 
always chaired by the President himself. Evidence o f this effective teamwork is the 
more than 1,600 agreements that have been issued after these meetings, o f  which 95 
percent have already put into practice. Even more compelling evidence is the fact that 
no confidential discussion on economic matters has ever been leaked to the press.’
The members o f this team began their ascent in the bureaucracy at the time when the 
previous development strategy was perceived to have failed and new ideas and expertise 
became valuable political assets (Golob 1997: 98). As economic problems 
overshadowed all other issues during the 1980s, the influence o f the economic cabinet 
expanded (Camp 1993: 143). In fact, their main claim to power was their ability to 
introduce a structural transformation o f the economy. The disappointing performance o f  
the Mexican economy created some leeway for the introduction o f economic reform. 
Reformers were placed in positions o f extensive authority and technical analysis units 
became central to policy-making at all levels. According to Grindle (1996: 92-93), they 
were expected to be completely identified with neoliberal policies, have the skills and 
perspectives needed to support a market economy and a rational state, and be ready to 
confront those wedded to the old and discredited system. Carlos Salinas and all the 
members o f his economic team shared the policy culture o f the MFOs favouring 
economic liberalisation.
Under Salinas, the financial coalition achieved the hegemony within the state apparatus. 
The state itself was able to re-establish a working relationship with the most powerful 
fraction o f the business elite (Veltmeyer et. al. 1997: 144). Throughout President 
Salinas’s term this coalition remained well positioned within the Mexican state and no 
major conflict developed over economic policy despite the social costs o f  the measures. 
The control exerted by this coalition on the state apparatus, both geographically and 
functionally, does not have a parallel in recent presidential administrations (Waterbury 
1990: 301). Economic reform was possible thanks to a strong President with a clear 
agenda o f reform, supported by a coherent economic team, with new mechanisms o f  
social control and a reinvigorated alliance with the business elite.
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Conclusions
As a result o f the institutional framework that emerged after the revolution and 
consolidated during the 1940s, policy-making became almost completely dominated by 
the state. Voters and most social groups, with business organisations being the only 
notable exception, were controlled by the PRI’s corporatist structures. Elections were 
more a legitimising ritual than an effective mechanism o f political competition. 
Business groups were always close to the state, making sure their interests were taken 
into account. The state remained strong under the leadership o f the President and the 
management o f  a coherent and loyal bureaucracy.
The first signs o f political change started to appear in the late 1960s. However, the 
system remained viable without major changes until the 1980s. At his point, increasing 
social and political mobilisation outside the traditional political institutions forced the 
state apparatus to accept effective electoral competition. Two major events during this 
period exacerbated the political tensions: poor economic performance and the rise o f  the 
financial coalition to power. However, the political changes were mostly restricted to 
electoral politics, while leaving the hegemony o f the state in policy-making essentially 
untouched. The PRI was, perhaps, the institution that changed the most in order to face 
the continuous electoral challenges from the PRD and the PAN. The state, however, 
remained largely bureaucratic and autonomous with strong links to the PRI.
President Salinas’s strategy to cope with the increasing pressures for democratisation 
was to open up the electoral processes just enough to prevent the sort o f violent protests 
that would attract international attention, but without curtailing the powers o f the 
presidency that enabled him to implement the far-reaching economic reform. The 
ultimate goal was not assuring the party’s hegemony as much as providing the political 
stability required to carry out his socially costly economic reform (Torres 1997: 159). 
Salinas reinforced the patron-client relationships that traditionally linked the most 
successful Presidents to both economic elites and large popular groups. President 
Salinas, although increasingly willing to accept the authentic outcome o f elections, was 
actually more prepared to use the ‘meta-constitutional’ and extra-legal powers o f the 
presidency than several o f his predecessors (Philip 1998b). The result was a 
Schumpeterian democracy characterised by more transparent electoral processes but in
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which the government used its financial and organisational infrastructure extensively to 
favour the PRI. Elections were legal but not fair. The old-practices o f rigged ballots and 
unreliable voters’ records were eliminated and replaced for more sophisticated 
mechanisms to favour the PRI, like greater access to financial resources and mass media 
time.
M exico’s reform to the financial system took place in the middle o f this simultaneous 
political transformation. Greater electoral competition exacerbated the political business 
cycle observed in Mexico since President Echeverria. Since then, every sexenio closed 
with a financial crisis. The economic consequences o f  this simultaneous process o f  
financial reform and political transformation shall be discussed in chapter eight while 
discussing the financial crisis that followed the peso devaluation in December 1994.
This chapter introduced the argument o f state autonomy to show how the Mexican state 
under President Salinas engineered new bases o f support and adapted old institutional 
arrangements to accommodate increasing electoral competition without jeoparsiding the 
President's political leadership. Next chapter narrows down the discussion o f  state 
autonomy to the specific organisations and institutional arrangements involved in 
policy-making for the financial system.
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Chapter 4
Financial Policy in Mexico: 
A Historical Account
This chapter explores the link between state autonomy and financial policy in Mexico 
from a historical perspective.1 The purpose o f this chapter is to make a case for financial 
policy as a relevant area where state decisions can be explained using our analytical 
framework. The reasons why financial policy is especially important for the study o f  
decision making within the state are several. First, the capacity o f the state to govern 
depends to a great extent on its ability to finance itself. Second, the interest groups 
involved in the financial sector are among the wealthiest and better organised within the 
society and therefore represent an effective counterweight to the state. Third, the 
financial policy determines the long-term growth potential o f any economy inasmuch as 
it influences saving and investment decisions.
The cyclical economic crises observed in Mexico from 1976 to 1994 illustrate the 
importance o f the financial policy for the country’s economic performance. All the 
crises experienced during this period share two remarkable similarities linked to the 
political economy o f M exico’s financial system. First, all o f them took place towards 
the end o f  a presidential term. Second, each one o f them was ultimately caused by 
inconsistent financial policies. This chapter addresses the second element, namely the 
government decisions that triggered each crisis during this period. The link between the 
political calendar and the cyclical nature o f the economic crises shall be explored later 
in chapter eight while analysing the 1994 financial crisis.
Chapter one introduced our conceptual framework based on institutions and 
organisations. In that setting, history is essential to identify the constraints that
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determine the government’s decisions and structure the relationship between state and 
society at the same time. The historical account in this chapter intends to identify those 
constraints in order to outline the institutional framework underlying the financial 
reform under President Salinas. The scope o f the analysis, however, is restricted to the 
subset o f political institutions and organisations involved in financial policy-making 
only. External influence and domestic politics were analysed in greater depth in chapter 
two and three respectively. This chapter concentrates on the role o f interest groups and 
state organisations operating in the financial system.
This chapter is organised in four parts, each part dealing with a specific period in the 
history o f M exico’s financial policy. The first period (1925-1952) was characterised by 
the introduction o f a new institutional framework for the financial system. Banco de 
Mexico, business corporatism and development banking are institutions that were 
introduced during this period. The second period (1952-1982) was characterised by 
strong state intervention: interest rate ceilings, reserve requirements on banks’ deposits 
and selective credit controls.2 This period is divided into two sub-periods: in the first the 
framework worked well and the economy recorded high rates o f annual growth; in the 
second the same framework failed to cope with changing economic conditions and 
produced two economic crises. The third period (1982-1988) represents the first attempt 
o f financial liberalisation. The most important event during this period is the 
development o f  a parallel financial circuit around the Mexican Stock Exchange. Finally, 
the fourth period (1988-1994) represents the second attempt o f financial liberalisation. 
In this period the government removed all the controls on banking operations.
4.1 Setting up an Institutional Framework, 1925-1952
Mexican history during most o f the nineteenth century was dominated by continuous 
political conflicts leading to weak and unstable governments. The institutional 
framework in the economy produced badly specified and weakly enforced property
' For financial policy I mean all those government’s decisions concerning the regulation o f the financial 
system, the exchange rate regime and the sources of state financing (i.e. external borrowing, money 
printing, reserve requirements and securities’ emissions).
2 The programme of selective credit controls consisted of banks’ lending quotas to pre-specified sectors.
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rights leading to an environment of high uncertainty and poor economic performance.3 
However, President Porfirio Diaz (1877-1910) suppressed political conflicts towards the 
end o f the century and introduced economic institutions that promoted rapid growth.4 
During this period and for the first time in Mexican history there was an explicit attempt 
to introduce a ‘proper’ financial policy. In March 1897, Jose Ives de Limantour, 
minister o f finance under President Diaz, obtained the consent from the Congress to 
draft the General Act for Credit Institutions (Ley General de Instituciones de Credito, 
LGIC) (White 1992: 15).5 The financial system gained depth and strength thanks to 
foreign investment, which during this period poured in.
The Mexican Revolution during the 1910s, however, triggered a new round o f political 
conflicts with the corresponding uncertainty. The modest achievements in terms o f  
creating an institutional framework for the financial system under President Diaz were 
completely wiped out. President Venustiano Carranza (1917-1920), for instance, 
strongly opposed the banking organisations inherited from the Porfiriatob arguing that 
they were ‘antithetical’ to the principles o f the Mexican Revolution. Carranza 
confronted the banks even prior to his assumption o f power threatening to liquidate and 
seize all banks operating with insufficient metallic reserves (White 1992: 34). At the 
end, his hostile policies against bankers were largely ineffective but the financial system 
was severely weakened anyway.
3 For instance, according to Russell White (1992: 9), the most profitable business o f the financial sector 
during last century was the extension of loans to both, conservative and liberal governments. These loans 
to the government often empowered the financiers and merchants to extract important political-economic 
privileges. These privileges included high interest rates, import permits, fiscal exemptions, and temporary 
control o f state monopolies. Other example of this extraction of political and economic privileges from 
the state took place in 1881, when the state authorised a French-Egyptian company to establish the Banco 
Nacional de Mexico with several and special concessions. Among these privileges were: the right of 
issuing money and establishing branches throughout the country. In exchange the government obtained 
an annual credit line. This bank worked as the financial agent o f the government consolidating its 
position within the Mexican financial system (Moore 1963: 18; White 1992: 12).
4 President Diaz used extensively the coercive power of the state to repress opposition movements. 
Furthermore, the economic benefits produced by his policies were appropriated by a small elite and 
income distribution deteriorated rapidly during this period. The Mexican revolution was a response to his 
long-lasting presidency and harsh economic policies.
5 The commission was integrated by three lawyers, two financiers, and a representative from Banco de 
Londres.
0 Period o f Mexican history dominated by the Presidency of Porfirio Diaz from 1874 to 1910.
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A second attempt to reorganise the financial system took place in 1925 under President 
Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928). His government drafted a new LGIC, according to 
which the government through the Ministry o f Finance became in charge o f  inspecting 
and regulating the financial system (White 1992:38). Later on, that same year, the 
government drafted the Organic Act o f Banco de Mexico (Ley Organica del Banco de 
Mexico, LOBdeM). This was the other major act regulating the organisation o f the 
financial system. The LOBdeM (1995) regulates three important issues: the relationship 
between the central and commercial banks; the relationship between the central bank 
and other state agencies; and the money supply. These two acts provided the core o f the 
legal framework for the financial system during most o f the twentieth century.
Banco de Mexico (BdeM) and the Ministry of Finance
One o f the most important events in the modem history o f the Mexican financial system 
was the foundation o f the central bank (Banco de Mexico, BdeM) in 1925. The actual 
commitment to create BdeM came from the first annual convention o f the Asociacion de 
Banqueros de Mexico (Mexican Bankers Association, ABM) in 1924. Forty-one banks 
participated in this convention along with government representatives. Bankers and 
authorities discussed legal and practical problems facing the financial system and at the 
end, the state committed itself to the creation o f a central bank and a banking 
commission. Shortly after the convention, in January 1925, the LGIC was enacted 
regulating and reorganising the financial system.
The consolidation o f BdeM as one o f the core organisations o f the policy network for 
the sector took place only gradually. At the time o f its foundation, President Calles was 
trying to resolve disputes with international creditors (Maxfield 1993: 236). At first, it 
was intended to signal a firm commitment towards price stabilisation and conservative 
monetary management. However, the functions performed by BdeM in its early days 
were more akin to commercial banking than to central banking. Private bankers 
themselves owned an important part o f BdeM’s voting stock and therefore their interests 
circumscribed the bank’s operations in this early stage (Moore 1963: 52). Besides, 
BdeM did not have the monopoly o f money issue and private banks were not required to 
associate with it. The lack o f operational experience, financial resources and public
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confidence combined with economic recession and political instability delayed the 
consolidation o f BdeM as a central bank (White 1992: 39).
In 1932, however, the government reformed the LGIC in order to strengthen the 
position o f BdeM. The reform included restrictions on the commercial operations o f 
BdeM and new provisions to conduct central banking operations (White 1992: 44). The 
affiliation o f commercial banks to BdeM became compulsory and in just one year, the 
associated banks increased from 14 to 62. The reorganisation o f the monetary system 
between 1932 and 1940 provided BdeM with increasing control over financial policy. 
Since then, BdeM has provided the initiative and financial support for the creation and 
development o f new private organisations and for the stability and institutional 
development o f the system in general. William Glade (1968: 157) argues that BdeM is 
the organisation that best embodies the interests o f the financial system as a whole.
Despite the fact that the reform formally strengthened BdeM vis-a-vis commercial 
banks, the reform subordinated BdeM to the Ministry o f  Finance at the same time. The 
ministers o f finance crucially influenced the appointment o f BdeM's directors during 
this period (Maxfield 1993: 239-245). In the 1930s President Cardenas consulted 
Eduardo Suarez, minister o f finance (1934-1952), before appointing Luis Montes de 
Oca as head o f BdeM. Then in 1954, Antonio Carrillo Flores, minister o f  finance (1952- 
1958), played a decisive role in the designation o f Rodrigo Gomez as BdeM ’s director.
While Presidents and ministers o f finance wavered between the objectives o f  growth 
and stability, BdeM invariably took a stance in favour o f stability, which is the main 
precondition for a healthy financial system (Thompson 1979: 59). Financial policy, 
consequently, oscillated between these two major and sometimes conflicting objectives: 
stability and growth (Maxfield 1993: 231). According to the first objective, as stated by 
the LOBdeM (1995: 151) and the Act for the National Banking and Securities 
Commission (LCNBV 1995: 424), the first priority o f the financial policy is to secure 
the stability and development o f the financial system. Economic growth is fostered only 
indirectly through efficient saving and investment decisions. However, according to the 
second objective, as stated by the political constitution (CPEUM 1997), the 
government’s policy must be primarily concerned with economic development. Under
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this perspective, when stability and growth are in conflict, financial policy must favour 
the latter.
The Mexican state embodied an ideological contradiction. This ambiguity was rooted on 
its historical origins from the Revolution, on the one hand, and on its function o f  
promoting economic development, on the other (Hamilton 1982: 3; Basanez 1991a: 56). 
Populism and capitalism coexisted as ruling principles o f the state’s ideology, in what 
Miguel Basanez (1990a) called the ‘contradictory state’. Very often, financial policy 
was the result o f these ideological contradictions. In the 1920s, when stability was 
crucial to re-establish state credit-worthiness, the government founded BdeM and 
implemented ‘orthodox’ policies. Then in the 1930s, when economic expansion was 
necessary to engineer popular support for the regime, the state shifted the financial 
policy away from the relative orthodoxy o f the 1920s to an active promotion o f  
economic development. The minister o f finance, Eduardo Suarez, between 1934 and 
1946 originally advocated the 'heterodox' view. This view favoured state intervention in 
the financial markets in order to foster economic development. However, every time the 
government used financial policy with expansionist purposes a conflict developed 
between the Ministry o f Finance and BdeM. At all other times these two organisations 
worked in close collaboration promoting the development o f the financial system.
Commercial and Development Banks
Shortly after the revolution and as a result of a nationalist ideology, the government’s 
policy led to a process o f ‘Mexicanisation’ o f the financial system.7 The 1932 reform to 
the LGIC precluded the direct ownership o f foreigners in M exico’s banks. Domestic 
investors acquired the old and formerly foreign-owned large banks. However, after their 
departure, the share o f banking resources controlled by commercial banks dropped from 
61 percent in 1932 to 42 percent in 1934. State banks throughout the 1930s 
predominantly controlled most assets in the system. BdeM, for instance, controlled
7 Late in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, financial practices in Mexico were very 
similar to those in Europe since the financial system was dominated mainly by European immigrants. 
This foreign influence within the banking community was strengthened by new waves of immigrants 
after the Mexican revolution mainly refugees from Franco and Hitler in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
Nevertheless, the institutions created by this generation of immigrants and their children began to acquire 
Mexican identity over this period (Vernon 1963: 156).
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approximately 50 percent, other state banks handled an additional 10 to 20 percent, and 
the proportion controlled by private banks fluctuated around 35 percent (Hamilton 1982: 
203).
The reform to the LGIC in 1932 laid the foundations for the modem financial system in 
Mexico. Most o f the financial activity was structured around banks, both private and 
state-owned. However, throughout most o f this period the state controlled financial 
policy-making without much intervention from private bankers. Commercial banks 
were relatively small compared to BdeM and other state-owned banks in terms o f  assets 
and capital. Furthermore, private bankers and state officials were in many cases the 
same persons. For instance, President Aberlardo Rodriguez (1932-1934) was one o f the 
cofounders o f Banco Mexicano. Maximino Avila Camacho, governor o f Puebla under 
Cardenas and brother o f President Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946) controlled 
Banco de Comercio (BANCOMER) along with Manuel Espinoza Yglesias and William 
Jenkings. Manuel Gomez Morin, founder o f  the opposition party PAN, led the 
acquisition o f Banco de Londres y Mexico after the bank’s liquidity crisis in 1934. Luis 
Montes de Oca, minister o f finance (1927-1932) and BdeM’s director (1935-1940), 
founded Banco Intemacional along with Alfonso Cedillo. Eduardo Suarez, minister of 
finance (1935-1946), was President o f Banco Comercial Mexicano (COMERMEX), for 
several years and subsequently deputy-President until his death in 1976 (Hamilton 1982: 
131; White 1992: 46).
The ABM ’s annual convention dates from this period as well. It is one o f  the oldest and 
most important events in the calendar o f the financial system. At the beginning, it 
represented more a statement o f the government’s financial policy rather than an 
effective mechanism of policy co-ordination. It was organised by the ABM, but the 
minister o f finance actually chaired it. The Mexican President used to give the closing 
speech. According to John Thompson (1979: 57), the best statement o f  state economic 
policy was the annual speech by the minister o f finance at this convention.
Another major development for the financial system during this period was the 
introduction o f development banking as a parallel circuit to commercial banking. The 
explicit aim o f these banks was to assist the incipient domestic productive apparatus and 
to attend the financial needs o f peasants, small industrialists and local governments
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(Maxfield 1993: 237). Commercial banks serviced the large and well-established 
manufacturing firms but neglected the less-profitable and riskier sectors. Despite the 
fact that development banks did not have policy-making power as BdeM or the Ministry 
o f Finance they played a central role in the overall performance o f the financial system. 
The size o f their assets increased steadily over all this period; their share o f  the total 
grew from less than ten percent in 1935 to more than 25 percent in 1952 (NAFIN 1990: 
477). Besides, the economic sectors attended by development banking, usually 
neglected by commercial banking, were not only politically important, but they were 
also strategic for the development o f the whole economy.
Nacional Financiera (NAFIN), established in 1934, was the most important 
development bank in terms o f assets and connections with domestic banks and 
multilateral financial organisations. Other important banks created during this period 
were: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (BANCOMEXT), Banco Nacional de 
Credito Rural (BANRURAL) and Banco Nacional de Obras Publicas (BANOBRAS). 
The creation o f each bank was related to a particular set o f political and economic 
circumstances (Glade 1968: 121). Development banks were created to satisfy the credit 
needs o f politically significant sectors in a period o f institution building. Peasants and 
workers, for instance, two o f the benefited sectors with access to development finance 
through BANRURAL and Banco Obrero respectively, are two o f the three corporatist 
pillars o f the PRI.
Development banking, especially under President Cardenas, suffered from the 
conflicting goals o f securing bases o f popular support for the regime and gaining a 
profitable return on their assets. Development banks yielded to political pressures very 
often and their financial soundness was constantly at risk. The emphasis placed on 
financial efficiency vis-a-vis political oriented goals varied across banks. For instance, 
NAFINSA was a highly efficient and influential participant in the financial markets 
with low political input in their internal policies. BANRURAL, in contrast, was 
regarded as a highly politicised bank with problems o f  financial efficiency. According 
to Sylvia Maxfield (1993: 242) President Cardenas attempted to build a national 
political party supported by a wide base o f favoured agents through the provision o f  
credit. However, Presidents Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946) and Miguel Aleman
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(1946-1952) departed from the development conception o f President Cardenas and 
promoted industrialisation taking away financial resources from agriculture.
4.2 Financial Management, 1952-1982
Robert Bennett (1965) found that M exico’s financial markets at the beginning o f this 
period were small, non-diversified and unable to adopt a long-term perspective in their 
investment decisions. These characteristics motivated the state to participate directly in 
the management o f the financial system (Haggard and Lee 1993: 6). Financial policy 
was characterised, according to Danby (1996: 22-23), by four main features. First, the 
state exercised greater control over the financial system by extending and tightening the 
existing programme of selective credit controls. Second, the state financed its deficit 
increasingly through reserve requirements. Third, the state increased foreign borrowing. 
Fourth, the state introduced credit incentives on capital investment.
This period, also, represented the consolidation o f an institutional framework for the 
financial system along with a new configuration o f organisations. The formation o f  
financial groups was an important element in the process o f economic development in 
Mexico. Given the context o f a capitalist system, the state promoted the process o f  
private accumulation, which strengthened the political and economic position o f  large 
financial groups (Hamilton 1982: 287). Their influence became institutionalised into 
policy consultations. Financial groups were represented by corporatist associations 
responsible to articulate their demands. The three main organisations were the ABM for 
banks, the AMCB for stock brokerage houses (SBHs) and the AMIS for insurance 
companies. These organisations included consulting staff o f  economic and financial 
specialists to study and develop policy initiatives in collaboration with the authorities. 
Financial corporatism differed substantially from popular corporatism in the sense that 
the state could not exert any visible influence on their internal affairs and external 
positions. The organisational strength and the independent financial resources o f these 
associations secured them a great degree o f autonomy (Camp 1989: 228).
According to Celso Garrido and Enrique Quintana (1987: 109), the ABM became the 
most important link between bankers and public officials in BdeM and the Ministry o f  
Finance during the 1960s. Survey studies on the Mexican private sector’s own
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perception o f their political influence, found that bankers were regarded consistently as 
the most influential group (see Derossi 1971; Story 1986b). Antonio Ortiz Mena, 
minister o f finance (1958-1970), accepted that the bankers’ views on public policies 
were always taken into account (quoted by Camp 1989: 191). Every year representatives 
from the state and the large financial groups met at the ABM ’s annual convention to 
discuss the most urgent policy issues for the financial system. Actors from both sectors, 
private and public, presented their positions through public speeches, and immediately 
afterwards negotiation took place in the discussion tables. The connection between the 
ABM and the state was reinforced by informal personal links. For instance, between 
1928 and 1982, seven out o f the forty-eight Presidents o f  the ABM were men involved 
directly in politics and banking (Camp 1989: 84).
It is possible, however, to distinguish two sub-periods. In the first sub-period (1952- 
1970) the financial policy produced an efficient framework that fostered the 
development o f a domestic productive apparatus. In the second sub-period (1970-1982) 
these policies did not cope with the changing international context and produced a 
phenomenon known in the literature as ‘financial repression’ and ended up with the twin 
crises in 1976 and 1982.
The Golden Years, 1952-1970
In this period, the financial policy set up a stable financial system with strong and well- 
enforced institutions providing the required environment to boost the economy and 
develop the domestic productive apparatus. During these years, known as the 
‘stabilising development’ period, the Mexican economy recorded average annual growth 
rates near to seven percent, which were among the highest in the world, and average 
inflation rates o f  three percent (INEGI 1994: 401-402, 959). The performance o f  the 
Mexican economy during this period became to be known as the ‘Mexican miracle’ (see 
Carmona 1973).
During the 1950s and 1960s the state moderated the policy o f  direct economic 
promotion. Stabilisation considerations came to the fore o f the state agenda and the 
government shifted back to conservative financial policies. President Ruiz Cortines 
(1952-1958), for instance, brought down inflation, increased the authority o f the
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Ministry o f Finance and BdeM dramatically, reversed the loose fiscal policy o f  
President Miguel Aleman (1946-1952), took anticipatory devaluation in 1954 and raised 
reserve requirements to finance the public deficit (Haggard 1990: 176). Exchange and 
interest rates policies were rather conservative with emphasis on attracting foreign direct 
investment and the allocation o f credit was directed to priority public and private 
investments (Kaufman 1989: 110).
The financial authorities made extensive use o f selective credit controls and interest rate 
ceilings, essential features o f the post-revolutionary Mexican financial system, to 
preserve price stability more than to direct credit to strategic economic sectors (See 
Brothers and Solis 1966). The programme o f selective credit controls was carried out 
through four mechanisms: (1) development banks lending; (2) lending quotas to 
commercial banks; (3) preferential discount rates offered by BdeM to commercial banks 
lending to specific sectors; and (4) differential reserve requirements depending on the 
sectoral structure o f  the banks loan portfolio (Edwards 1995: 205). The government also 
created a series o f trust funds in order to control the allocation o f credit and the 
inflationary pressures from World War II. Selective credit controls were ‘heterodox’ 
because credit was allocated to productive investments in predetermined economic 
sectors, but at the same time, they were ‘orthodox’ since its major objective was to 
control inflation.8 Colin Danby (1996: 29) described very well the double nature o f the 
credit controls:
‘... the policy followed by the Mexican government was a sort o f  hybrid o f  the 
opposing sets o f policy recommendations termed ‘structuralist’ and ‘monetarist’ 
in Latin America: on the one hand, resources were aimed at eliminating supply 
constraints, on the other hand, overall credit expansion was limited. Mexican 
authorities sought to avoid the demand-augmented effects o f any credit 
expansion by targeting credit to desired uses, and severely constricting 
unchannelled credit, especially consumer credit.’
8 The ‘orthodox’ view of monetarism that advocated conservative monetary and credit policies in order to 
control inflation was advocated mainly by Rodrigo Gomez, director o f BdeM (1952-1970), and Antonio 
Ortiz Mena, minister o f finance (1958-1970).
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Parameters like reserve requirements were very often the result o f negotiations between 
financial authorities and commercial bankers rather than unilateral decisions o f  the state 
(Fitzgerald 1979; 1980). Credit controls, o f which reserve requirements are only one 
variation, had to be negotiated. Otherwise, they were ineffective without the bankers’ 
co-operation. Reserve requirements served mainly two purposes: secure financing for 
the state and conduct monetary policy. Printing money served both purposes as well, but 
at the expense o f  fostering inflation. Reserve requirements remained as a popular source 
o f state financing for a long time thanks to their non-inflationary bias. These policies 
were expected to provide an inexpensive and non-inflationary source o f financing for 
the state and the economy (Aspe 1993: 62). This framework worked well throughout 
this period, providing financing to the state while preserving macroeconomic stability 
and securing profitability to financial ventures.
At the end o f this period, most o f the studies on the Mexican financial system coincided 
that it was the best-developed in Latin America.9 Despite the fact that the financial 
system had a good performance, it was very vulnerable to potential surges in inflation or 
potential policy mistakes. The weaknesses o f the system were: (1) the development o f  
the financial system depended completely on the dynamism o f  the banking sector while 
the other non-banking agents remained stagnant; (2) the banking deposits were very 
liquid and Banco de Mexico (BdeM) was responsible from backing them, hindering the 
ability o f BdeM to conduct monetary policy; (3) the reserve requirements mainly used 
to finance the public deficit and to control the money supply required constant 
adjustments; and (4) the combination o f interest rate controls, a fixed exchange rate 
regime and free exchange convertibility. This combination was potentially explosive in 
a changing environment, both political and international, and left the government with a 
very narrow margin for policy errors.
The Tragic Years, 1970-1982
The policy o f financial controls, dominant in Latin America at the end o f the 1960s, was 
challenged by the view that liberalisation was essential to encourage growth. According 
to this approach, pioneered by Ronald McKinnon (1973) and Edward Shaw (1973), a
104
growth-conducive financial policy required free interest rates, low reserve requirements 
on bank deposits and sophisticated financial intermediaries, including stock exchanges 
(Edwards 1995: 201). The advocates o f  financial liberalisation argued that the state 
intervention in finance produces a phenomenon called ‘financial repression’, where the 
state maintains artificially low interest rates inducing an excess demand for credit. In 
this framework the state is drawn into the process o f  rationing financial resources 
among competing uses (Haggard and Lee 1993: 5). The consequences for efficiency are 
twofold: first, interest rates below market clearing level inhibit savings; second, the 
allocation o f credit is often imbued with political considerations.
The first wave o f  financial liberalisation in Latin America during the 1970s, took place 
in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina where governments deregulated interest rates; 
eliminated selective credit controls; reduced and harmonised reserve requirements on 
banks’ deposits; relaxed barriers to entry; encouraged securities markets and 
institutional investors; and created modem and efficient supervisory legislation 
(Edwards 1995: 208). The goal o f financial deregulation in most Latin American 
countries was to withdraw the state from directly participating in the allocation o f  credit 
and the setting o f interest rates. However, the outcomes from these policies in most o f  
these countries were very disappointing. Chile and Argentina, for instance, experienced 
the collapse o f their financial systems early in 1980s (see Diaz-Alejandro 1985).10
The Mexican government, in contrast, did not liberalise the financial system during this 
period and kept in place most o f  the controls introduced formerly. The major departure 
from the earlier period was the subordination o f the financial policy to the explicit goal 
o f  income redistribution and economic expansion. The political crisis o f 1968 forced the 
state to shift the emphasis on stability to a second place on the economic agenda. This 
period represented a return to the expansionist policies o f  the 1930s and 1940s. Foreign
9 See Brothers and Solis (1966), Goldsmith (1966), and Moore (1966).
10 In the case of Chile, the then recently privatised banks went on a lending spree thanks to the looser 
regulation. The boom in domestic credit led to an expansion on the money supply with the corresponding 
surge in inflation. Differentials between domestic and external interest rates promoted capital flight and 
exerted pressure on the exchange rate, which eventually collapsed. Most of the banks’ loan portfolios 
were denominated in dollars. The devaluation created a problem o f non-performing assets that forced the 
government to step in and bail out the whole banking system.
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lending was an important source o f financing and it was mainly directed to investment 
in the parastatal sector and to the newly created fideicom isosV
At the same time, the state displaced the private sector from the domestic credit markets 
and public investment replaced private investment. This situation became one o f  the 
focal points o f the conflict between the state and the private sector during the 1970s. 
The dissociation o f interests between the state and big business became increasingly 
evident as the state increased its stake on the economy. The break up between state and 
business increased the business’ propensity to switch from productive to speculative 
investments and capital flight when the first signs o f  potential macroeconomic 
instability appeared. In fact, these propensities hastened the economic crises in 1976 and 
1982.
In terms o f policy management, President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) weakened the 
position o f the Ministry o f  Finance and BdeM by replacing personnel, creating new  
organisations and changing consultation hierarchies (Maxfield 1993: 248). The office o f  
the presidency became the most important state agency in financial policy-making 
during his sexenio. Then, President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) created the ministry 
for programming and budgeting (SPP), which further weakened the Ministry o f  Finance. 
SPP became a very powerful state organisation regarding economic policy, it took over 
the capacity to decide upon budgetary allocation, formerly attributed to the Ministry o f  
Finance (see Torres 1997). Financial policy during these two sexenios was subordinated 
to the government’s spending policy, which was under complete control o f  SPP.
In the mid-1970s inflation surged as a result o f Echeverria’s expansionist fiscal and 
monetary policies. The financial system remained, nevertheless, under tight controls. 
The state relied increasingly on reserve requirements to finance higher public deficits 
(see Table 4.1). The exchange rate remained fixed and the government stuck to its 
policy o f  free exchange convertibility.12 A fixed exchange rate with free capital mobility 
means that domestic interest rates have to be aligned to those in the major financial
11 A jideicom iso  is a trust fund set up by the state to promote a specific activity or to channel financial 
funds to a specific constituency. The jideicom iso  is very similar to development banking.
12 A fixed exchange rate and free convertibility have always been considered as primary policy goals by 
the financial authorities (Ortiz 1984: 44; Maxfield 1990: 74)
106
centres. However, the state kept artificially high real interest rates on deposits to 
promote savings and the rising reserve requirements pushed up the real interest rates on 
loans. High interest rates were not a problem as long as inflation was low. Nevertheless, 
as soon as inflation speeded up and nominal interest rates were kept fixed, real interest 
rates became negative and the financial system lost depth. Negative real returns on 
savings motivated capital flight and non-productive investments like gold and real estate 
(Mansell 1995: 7; Aspe 1993: 62; Gonzalez 1993: 177). External borrowing palliated 
the problem temporally. The situation was non-sustainable and ended up with the peso 
devaluation on August 31 1976 after twenty-two years o f  a fixed parity to the dollar.
Table 4.1
Reserve Requirements, 1972-1976
Year Total Reserves Total Deposits Rate of Reserve
1972 55.0 122.6 44.9
1973 65.2 138.5 47.1
1974 84.9 164.6 51.6
1975 118.4 203.9 58.1
1976 141.5 223.3 63.4
Source: BdeM, Economic Indicators, (Various years). 
(1) Billions o f pesos
The peso devaluation made evident that economic circumstances had changed and that 
the prevailing framework was no longer adequate. In order to introduce more flexibility 
to the financial system, the state attempted to create a market for state securities.13 In 
1978 the government issued treasury bills (CETES) for the first time (Aspe 1993: 78). 
However, in the early years o f President Lopez Portillo the revenue from oil exports and 
abundant foreign lending palliated the need for financial liberalisation and the emission 
o f CETES remained relatively stagnant throughout this period.
Economic conditions, however, got worse once again towards the end o f President 
Lopez Portillo’s sexenio. In 1981, the U.S. Federal Reserve increased interest rates and 
oil prices plummeted. The rise on external interest rates and the fall in oil prices
13 When there is a developed market for government securities, state’s borrowing and interest rates are 
freely determined by market forces. Besides, monetary policy can be conducted more effectively through 
open market operations. An open market operation is when the central bank either buys or sells 
government securities in the open market in order to reduce or increase the money supply.
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produced a double squeeze on the public finances. External lending came to a halt in 
1982 and the exchange rate was under increasing pressure throughout the first months o f  
that year. Large domestic investors switched from productive to speculative investments 
and took their capital out o f  the country. Without access to new external lending, 
reduced revenues from oil exports, capital flight and substantially higher interest 
payments on the external debt, the financial crisis o f the state in 1982 was far more 
severe than in 1976. The only sources o f financing still available for the state were 
domestic credit and monetary expansion. The state was forced to complement the 
resources obtained through reserve requirements with increasing issues o f  state 
securities in the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV). The increasing issues o f  these 
securities fostered the process o f securitisation o f Mexican financial system that 
progressed steadily throughout the 1980s.
Moreover, the 1982 economic crisis made explicit the tensions between the state and the 
private sector. Shortly before the collapse o f the peso, in the XLVIII banking 
convention, the bankers discussed the government’s intervention in banking operations, 
whereas the state referred to banks’ social obligations (see White 1992). These subtle 
positions reflected a serious power struggle that was just beginning to become visible. 
Then after the peso devaluation President Lopez Portillo blamed the private commercial 
banks o f promoting speculative investments and capital flight for their own interest and 
at the expense o f the national interest (see Maxfield 1992). In a desperate move to 
control capital outflows Lopez Portillo nationalised the Mexican commercial banks and 
introduced exchange controls. The economic crisis broke the alliance between the state 
and the business elite temporarily. But the banks’ nationalisation strengthened the bases 
o f  popular support for the regime also only temporarily.14
However, the crisis provided the right juncture for policy-makers with ‘orthodox’ views 
regarding financial policy to take over the most important positions within the state. In 
the last months o f the sexenio a last clash developed over the expected role o f the 
recently nationalised commercial banks: Jesus Silva Herzog, minister o f  finance, 
supported a commercial and profit-oriented operation for the banks, on the one hand;
14 President de la Madrid reversed both trends: re-established the alliance with business and weakened the 
bases o f popular support.
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and Carlos Tello, BdeM’s director, advocated a stronger social role for the banks, on the 
other. President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) solved this dispute in favour o f  a 
more ‘orthodox’ and profit-oriented management for the banks signalling the financial 
policy for the next six years.
4.3 Financial ‘Securitisation’, 1982-1988
The 1980s was characterised by the increasing globalisation o f the financial markets. 
Two major trends fostered this process: securities operations replaced banking credit as 
the main instrument in the international financial markets, and banks operations were 
increasingly deregulated. The immediate outcome was the convergence towards 
universal banking, meaning that banks and SBHs offered similar financial services. The 
traditional boundary between commercial and investment banking was blurred. The debt 
crisis in the early 1980s triggered this process o f securitisation o f  funds to a great 
extent. Large corporations and governments were forced to finance themselves 
increasingly through the securities markets (Comercio Exterior, February 1991: 10). 
Falling income from traditional banking operations, increasing operation costs and 
rising systemic risk led bankers to engage in non-traditional operations for which they 
earned commissions and fees .15 The banks also increased their reliance on the securities 
markets to obtain financing and invest their own resources. At the same time, SBHs 
introduced new financial instruments that substituted traditional banking accounts. 
These trends showed some differences across regions. The integration o f  financial 
intermediaries into universal banks went further in Europe than in the US or Japan.
In Mexico, however, this period was dominated by the ‘securitisation’ o f  finance only. 
The deregulation o f banking operations was delayed to the next presidential 
administration. The transformation o f the Mexican financial system was a two-stage 
process. In the first one (1982-1988), the state policy promoted the securities market and 
strengthened the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV). In the second stage (1988-1994), the 
government removed all the controls on banks’ operations. The sequence o f  these two 
processes is crucial to understand the financial crisis resulting from the collapse o f the
15 Systemic risk refers to the possibility of a generalised run against the whole banking system deposits. 
This risk increased during the 1980s as a result of deregulation in banks operations.
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peso in December 1994 (see chapter eight). In 1982, in the midst o f a financial crisis and 
when the technocrats opportunity for consolidating their political power depended 
precisely on their ability to provide financing for the state, the development o f  the 
securities market became a policy priority.
Politics of the Financial Policy
In Mexico, President de la Madrid started his government laying the foundations for a 
new alliance with the business elite and international capital. The shadow o f  the 
unexpected nationalisation o f the commercial banks made this task especially difficult. 
However, President de la Madrid took decisive action in this direction: re-appointed 
Jesus Silva Herzog as minister o f finance and Miguel Mancera as BdeM ’s director, 
made compensation payments to ex-bankers according to the banks’ market value, and 
sold the non-banking concerns to their former owners (Maxfield 1992: 89, Vera 1991, 
Ramirez 1994). These measures facilitated the co-operation o f ex-bankers after the 
nationalisation and the re-negotiations o f the external debt with the international capital 
(Hamilton 1985: 166).
President de la Madrid appointed and empowered officials strongly committed to reform 
and liberalisation. These officials delivered a sophisticated, though ideologically biased, 
strategy to cope with the challenges and problems faced by the Mexican financial 
system at that time. Theoretical considerations and specific economic circumstances 
apart, political considerations were at work urging the deregulation o f the banks’ 
operations in the context o f a power struggle to preserve the control o f  the state. 
Important groups from state and society alike were against economic reform. President 
Echeverria and Lopez Portillo failed to implement fiscal reform and trade liberalisation 
respectively because o f opposition from large business.
Far from having a antagonistic position towards business, President de la Madrid 
actively assisted the reorganisation o f the private financial groups around the SBHs. For 
instance, the Legorreta family, former owners o f BANAMEX, remained influential
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actors.16 In the late 1980s, Agustin Legorreta controlled a brokerage house 
(INVERLAT) and an insurance company (Seguros America). His brother, Eduardo 
Legorreta, controlled OBSA, another brokerage house. VISA group, former owners o f  
Banca Serfln and current owners o f BANCOMER, centred their financial operations in 
the stock and bond markets through Valores Monterrey and the insurance company, 
Seguros Monterrey. After this brief nationalist interlude, the former private banks 
became again the main political representatives o f the private financial sector. 
Nonetheless, the leadership o f the financial sector diversified and modernised. 
Traditional families like Espinoza Yglesias, Legorreta and Trouyet although still 
important are sharing this leadership with other families (Garrido and Quintana 1987: 
122). Two o f the most important newcomers were Carlos Slim and Roberto Hernandez, 
both o f them accumulated their capital during the 1980s in the booming stock exchange.
The AMCB became the most important organisation articulating the policy interests o f 
the financial community. The CEMAI and the AMCB had a prominent presence in 
public affairs through their role in the CCE. The nomination o f Agustin F. Legorreta, 
who had very strong economic and political interest in both organisations, as President 
o f the CCE illustrated this new configuration o f power within the private sector. The 
AMCB, created in 1980, substituted the former ABM as the organisation representing 
the financial fraction within the CCE. In 1984 the AMCB requested the support o f the 
CCE to negotiate the coming reform to the financial legislation in which the notion o f  
specialised financial system was introduced.
State Financing and Government Securities
The government’s financial policy was constrained throughout this period by a double 
squeeze on its finances: higher interest payments, on the one hand, and lower revenues 
from oil exports, on the other. Without access to foreign lending, the only options 
available to the state were reserve requirements on banking deposits, securities issues in 
the stock market and monetary expansion. The elimination o f reserve requirements was 
not likely in this juncture, given the above-mentioned fiscal imbalances. During the
l& The Legorreta family acquired the control of Banco Inverlat as a result o f the privatisation process. 
However, they lost control o f this bank after the 1995 banking crisis when it went into severe financial
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1980s, reserve requirements up to 50 percent were common, and in some cases they 
went up to 100 percent on marginal requirements crowding out credit to the private 
sector (Coorey 1992: 38).17
The state issued increasing amounts o f  CETES throughout the 1980s fostering the 
development o f the market for state securities (see Table 4.2). The bonds market more 
than the equity market was highly favoured by these issues o f  CETES. At the same 
time, large private investors demanded more liquid and short term instruments, given 
the prevailing exchange rate volatility and high inflation (Katz 1990: 46). These 
instruments boosted SBHs operations and profitability. SBHs bought state securities and 
retailed them to the public as money market mutual funds.
Table 4.2
State securities Issues, * 1978-1988
Year CETES BONDES Other Total Total (2)
1978 2.0 — 0.8 2.8 1.8
1979 5.5 — 5.5 11.0 4.7
1980 20.1 — 5.2 25.3 7.6
1981 16.9 — -1.6 15.3 1.8
1982 176.5 — 13.3 189.8 11.5
1983 113.1 — 110.5 223.6 14.5
1984 314.3 — -5.6 308.7 12.3
1985 281.9 — 379.2 661.1 14.5
1986 1,725.7 — 893.3 2,619.0 20.6
1987 8,105.1 358.4 2,459.9 10,923.4 35.2
1988 6,362.0 15,360.4 694.5 22,416.9 45.8
Source: Katz 1990: 47.
(1) In Millions of Mex. pesos.
(2) As a percentage of the public deficit.
In addition to CETES and PETROBONOS,18 the state issued new securities towards the 
end o f  President de la Madrid’s sexenio in order to lengthen the maturity structure o f the 
public debt and secure financing for the state in a context o f  high macroeconomic 
instability. In 1986, PAGAFES, 28- to 365-day dollar-denominated bonds payable at a
difficulties.
17 100 percent marginal requirements meant that all deposits above a government-set level had to be put 
aside by commercial banks as reserves’ deposits in BdeM.
IK Three-year bonds with returns indexed to international oil prices, which were introduced almost 
simultaneously to CETES in 1977.
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fixed interest rate, were introduced for the first time in order to hedge investors against 
exchange rate volatility and attract foreign capital. Then in 1987 longer-term BONDES 
were introduced to gradually replace short-term CETES and reduce the uncertainty 
engendered by a debt with very short maturity structure. Finally in 1989, the 
introduction o f AJUSTABONOS19 and TESOBONOS20 completed the whole array o f  
public instruments issued to finance the state in the context o f high inflation and 
exchange rate volatility. The introduction and diversification o f public debt increased 
the volume and value o f transactions in the BMV becoming the major stimulus for its 
development.
The initial development o f the market for state securities allowed the state to finance its 
increasing deficit during the 1980s. The stock o f state securities traded in the BM V rose 
from $3.3 billion dollars in 1982 to $9.8 billion in 1988.2' In fact, the state relied more 
heavily on this source o f financing relative to monetary expansion and foreign lending, 
it increased from 11.5 percent o f the public deficit to 45.8 percent during the same 
period.
Development of the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV)
The nationalisation o f commercial banks, an unexpected but crucial event for the 
liberalisation o f the financial system, provided the right juncture to speed up the 
development o f the securities market while preserving the banking system under the old 
financial controls. As mentioned before, President de la Madrid sought to re-establish 
the policy collaboration with the large financial groups. De la Madrid sold the firms 
owned by the nationalised banks to their former owners, only three months after he took 
office (Basanez 1990: 96). Some large industrial concerns were among the sold firms 
but most importantly for the financial policy o f this period was the sale o f the SBHs; 
their sale was the first step to develop a parallel financial circuit free from state 
intervention (Maxfield 1992: 90; see also Marquez 1986).
,<J Three- to five-year bonds with returns indexed to the consumer price index.
20 One- to three-month bonds with returns indexed to the free exchange rate.
21 Calculated from Katz (1990: 47) for the stock of state securities and INEGI (1994: 1006) for the 
exchange rate.
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At the moment o f the nationalisation, SBHs were minor banks’ subsidiaries that could 
hardly be compared to the banks themselves in assets and capitalisation. Nonetheless, 
two institutional provisions furnished the conditions for the remarkable development of 
the SBHs and the BMV over this period (see Table 4.3). The first provision was the 
introduction o f an upper limit to state borrowing through reserve requirements. The 
second was the exclusion o f banks from operating in the BMV where an increasing 
share o f the public debt was traded (Basanez 1990: 98). Non-bank financing soared 
from one percent o f the GDP in 1980 to 7.4 percent in 1988 (Maxfield 1992: 98). The 
BMV experienced a period o f rapid expansion becoming one o f the best performing 
markets in the world by 1986 (Maxfield 1990: 157). The BMV became a very profitable 
business opportunity for ex-bankers and some new individuals who capitalised the 
political and economic juncture.
Table 4.3
Securities Market Development, 1982-1987
Securities trading 1982 1987
Value in billions of pesos 2.3 296.8
Volume in millions of shares 913 19,089
Source: Mateos and Roman 1993.
Furthermore, the unstable macroeconomic conditions during this period favoured the 
development o f the BMV. SBHs were the only financial organisations that could 
provide the instruments that investors demanded to hedge against inflation. In fact, the 
expansion o f secondary markets22 for CETES was a response to this increasing demand 
for liquid and short-term instruments (Sandoval 1994: 211). The recently nationalised 
banks lacked the flexibility to develop new products that could compete with the SBHs 
for new deposits. The BMV gained depth and became highly profitable at the same 
time. The increase in SBHs equity, from $52 million dollars in 1982 to $1.24 billion in 
1988, illustrates the outrageous capital accumulation and concentration that took place 
over this period (Gonzalez 1993: 187; INEGI 1994: 1006). Carlos Slim and Roberto 
Hernandez accumulated their personal fortunes in this period.
22 We refer by secondary markets to those markets where securities that have already been issued in the 
primary markets but have not reached their maturity date are traded.
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Throughout the 1980s the state-owned banks lost competitiveness vis-a-vis SBHs; the 
latter offered financial instruments more flexible and liquid and with higher returns.23 
Securities as a share o f  financial savings went from 13.4 percent in 1982 to 48.2 percent 
in 1989 (Comercio Exterior, February 1991: 15). During this period the booming SBHs 
increased substantially the volume o f their operations and became strongly capitalised, 
meanwhile the banks remained relatively stagnant in terms o f capitalisation and assets 
(see Table 4.4). The higher yields on mutual funds and investment societies pulled 
deposits away from still-regulated bank deposits. During the preceding eighteen months 
to the stock market crash in October 1987, the state delayed correcting a drift toward 
negative real interest rates causing a shift o f funds from bank deposits to portfolio 
investments in the BMV and a speculative boom.
Table 4.4










1980 1,323 100 — — —
1981 1,925 119 — — —
1982 3,263 154 53 5.6 94.4
1983 5,231 353 89 7.0 93.0
1984 8,749 1,049 128 11.0 89.0
1985 12,619 4,873 129 14.8 85.2
1986 23,017 17,175 568 24.0 76.0
1987 56,893 63,008 2,341 60.4 39.6
1988 50,679 137,077 5,249 40.2 59.8
1989 97,897 213,367 9,472 30.1 69.9
Source: Gonzalez 1993: 187 
(1) Millions of Mex. pesos
Towards the end o f President de la Madrid’s sexenio, the government partially 
privatised the banks by selling 34 percent of their equity through public offerings in the 
BMV. This move provided valuable resources to the state in a moment o f financial 
distress, but also set forth the stock market boom that went bust in October that year 
(International Reports 1990: 14). The index o f the BMV increased 600 percent in the 13
However, the banks, though operating under very restrictive regulation, remained profitable at the 
expense of retail banking users.
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months prior to the crash (Bienen and Waterbury 1989: 620). The stock market crash 
was a severe set back to the strategy based on the BMV for the transformation o f  the 
financial system. In fact, both the stock market crash and a massive new round o f  capital 
flight occurred within days o f the designation o f  Carlos Salinas as next President 









1980 22.95 29.8 27.94
1981 24.51 28.7 33.34
1982 57.18 98.8 57.86
1983 150.29 80.8 53.95
1984 185.19 59.2 49.32
1985 310.28 63.7 74.80
1986 637.87 105.7 105.98
1987 1 405.80 159.2 131.10
1988 2 289.58 51.6 51.47
1989 2 483.35 19.7 40.19
Source: Aspe 1993; and INEGI 1994
(1) Mex. pesos for US dollar quoted on the last day of the year for banking operations
(2) Yearly increase on the National Consumer Price Index (January to January)
(3) 3 months treasury bills (CETES)
Regarding stability, most o f the policies introduced under President de la Madrid were 
evidently insufficient to attain any degree o f stability for the financial system, less so for 
the rest o f the economy. Throughout most o f  his sexenio, the Mexican economy 
experienced a period o f rising inflation, negative real interest rates and the constant 
devaluation o f the peso (see Table 4.5). However, in December 1987 the government 
implemented a broad stabilisation plan that included both ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ 
policies. The programme was 'orthodox' because it was committed to restrictive fiscal 
and credits policies, and was ‘heterodox’ because it included crawling-peg exchange 
regime and income policies.24 Income policies were institutionalised into a three-party 
agreement, known as the Pacto o f Solidaridad Economica (PSE). The parties that signed 
the agreement were the government, the largest labour union, and the most important
24 The crawling-peg exchange rate regime means that the currency is devaluated daily at a pre-determined 
rate. Income policies refer to those agreements where business agree on price increases, workers agree on 
wage raises and the government agree on price increments for public services.
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business organisations (Edwards 1995: 39). This programme was largely successful. 
Inflation was brought down from 159 percent in 1987 to 51 percent in 1988.
The collapse o f the stock market in 1987 and the signing o f the PSE influenced the 
policy agenda o f the incoming President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). Financial policy 
clearly favoured price stability over economic expansion during all o f Salinas’s sexenio. 
Financial policy was also harnessed to the financial needs o f  the state and to the 
international trends in finance urging for further liberalisation.
4.4 Financial Liberalisation, 1988-1994
The international trend in the 1980s regarding financial liberalisation was the 
replacement o f the traditional mechanisms o f financial management (i.e. reserve 
requirements, selective credit controls and interest rate ceilings) by stronger capital 
requirements and more effective prudential regulation. Derived from the Basle 
Agreement signed in July 1988, the Bank for International Settlements introduced a 
minimum capital requirement— 8 percent o f banks’ risk weighted assets— for 
commercial banks operating in the member countries {Comercio Exterior, February 
1991: 11). The minimum capital requirement intended to provide stability and flexibility 
to the international banking system.
The specific financial circumstances o f the Mexican state during the 1980s, however, 
delayed the deregulation o f banking operations until 1989. The renegotiation o f the 
external debt and the proceeds from the privatisation programme reduced the pressure 
on the state finances. Healthier public finances and a deeper market for state securities 
created the right conditions for the elimination o f the reserve requirements. President 
Salinas decreased gradually the importance o f BdeM ’s credit for state funding, from 40 
percent in 1988 to virtually nil in 1991. By the end o f  President Salinas’s term, all 
domestic borrowing was done through the securities market; the value o f state securities 
outstanding at the end o f 1994 reached almost $50 billion dollars.25




One o f the most prominent features o f the politics o f economic policy-making under 
President Salinas was the concentration o f decision-making power in a small circle o f  
pro-market technocrats. This team was made up by a generation o f economists bom in 
the 1940s and early 1950s who studied abroad and entered the state at the same time. 
According to Stephanie Golob (1997: 108) the members o f this team sought political 
advancement and reached high levels in the bureaucracy, acted in teams and organised 
their political networks in informal ways that were congment with their advancement in 
a camarilla based system. Furthermore, cosmopolitan attitudes prevail among them, 
being skilled and confident negotiating partners with bankers, foreign states and MFOs. 
This team agreed on the need to reform both the private and the public sector and the 
desirability o f  a leaner, more efficient state. Top officials in the Ministry o f  Finance and 
BdeM under President Salinas were characterised by their ideological homogeneity that 
favours free market and conservative financial policies.
During the 1980s technical advice became increasingly important in decision making. 
Consequently, technocrats in staff areas and in the economic cabinet increased their 
influence. Information, analyses and options presented by staff officers, often imbued 
with ideological content, were increasingly decisive for financial policy-making as the 
1980s progressed (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 97-99). The team in the Ministry o f  
Finance designed and implemented the policies for some o f the most difficult problems 
facing the government when Salinas took office (i.e. tackling inflation, tax reform, 
external debt, public-sector deficits, the privatisation o f state enterprises and o f  course 
the implementation o f the financial reform).
Pedro Aspe, minister o f finance (1988-1994) and Guillermo Ortiz, deputy-minister o f  
finance (1988-1994), were the two major financial reformers, both with a clear 
background favouring liberalisation (see Table 4.6).26 Pedro Aspe was mainly involved 
with the stabilisation programme and external debt renegotiation while Guillermo Ortiz 
was responsible for the financial system reform including the banks' privatisation. Both
26 Guillermo Ortiz received a PhD degree in economics from Stanford University for his thesis “Capital 
Accumulation and Economic Growth: A Financial Perspective on Mexico.”
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o f them were part o f a generation that embodied a secular faith in economic and 
financial liberalisation. Pedro Aspe was somewhat o f  an ‘outsider’ to the inner circle o f  
friends and allies o f President Salinas. However, several o f his strengths (i.e. economic 
expertise, international connections and leadership abilities) earned him a place in 
President Salinas’s economic team. When international capital was still hesitant to trust 
Mexico again, Aspe’s personal abilities were crucial to gain their confidence (Golob 
1997: 127). The other key figure in the reform was Miguel Mancera Aguayo, governor 
o f the BdeM, who had strong links with Leopoldo Solis, one o f the most influential 
individuals in the state’s financial circuit (see chapter three). Mancera’s unwavering 
commitment to financial stability represented a safeguard against the constant 
temptation to boost the economy through looser monetary policies.
Table 4.6
Profile of Major Financial Reformers
Pedro Aspe Guillermo Ortiz
Position Minister of Finance Deputy-minister of Finance
Career ITAM, Ministry of Finance 
and Ministry of Programming
ITAM, Banco de Mexico, IMF 
and Ministry of Finance
Degree
(University)
PhD (MIT) PhD (Stanford)
Thesis International Transmission 
Mechanisms
Capital Accumulation and 
Economic Growth
Academic tutors Rudiger Dombusch Ronald I. McKinnon
Source: Camp 1995; Golob 1997; and Ortiz 1984.
President Salinas’s economic team argued that the current controls on the banking sector 
discouraged savings and produced an inefficient allocation o f credit (Aspe 1993: 62; 
Ortiz 1994: 41-55). Their ideas were influenced by academic work done early in the 
1970s by Ronald I. McKinnon (1973) and Edward S. Shaw (1973), who claimed that 
repressed financial systems in developing countries were hindering their own economic
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development.27 Aspe and Ortiz advocated financial liberalisation because it was 
consistent with their own beliefs, but also because the reform appealed to international 
capital and to the domestic financial elite. The deregulation o f banking operations in 
1989 illustrated how the interests o f the state and large financial groups were articulated 
into mutually beneficial policies.
The institutional links between the most prominent financiers and government officials 
were crucial for the introduction o f the reforms and for the day-to-day management o f  
the financial system. Permanent policy consultations and co-ordination took place 
between representatives from business organisations and the government commissions 
for the financial system. For instance, Juan Ignacio Gil, President o f the CNSF, used to 
meet once a week with executives from the Mexican Association o f  Insurance 
Institutions (AMIS) to discuss the policy initiatives for the insurance industry 
(Interview: Mexico City, September 1st 1995). The reform to the pension system created 
a new strand o f collaboration between the private and public sector regarding finance. 
The new framework for pension created two committees, one for supervision and other 
for consultations, where representatives from workers, business and financial 
organisations met every two months to discuss the state o f the system (Interview with 
Fernando Solis: Mexico City, September 1st 1995). BdeM had a consulting body also, 
known as the Advisory Management Council, where public officials and private 
executives were represented. The main function o f the council’s board was to provide a 
permanent institutional space to solve disputes over policy issues and to co-ordinate 
their actions. A similar body was created as a result o f  the reform in 1993 to the 
Securities Market Act, known as the Committee for the Securities Market 
Modernisation. The committee was constituted by state representatives from the 
Ministry o f Finance, BdeM and CNBV on the one side o f the government and by 
private representatives from the BMV and the AMCB on the side o f  the SBHs (Ortiz 
1994: 112).
Personal connections were also important to preserve the collaboration between the 
main actors in the financial system. Alonso Rios, chief economist at BANAMEX,
21 Ronald I. McKinnon was the academic tutor of Guillermo Ortiz while he was studying at Stanford 
University. Guillermo Ortiz was, in turn, the main official responsible of the financial policy within the
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provides an illustrative example o f this personal interlocking between public and private 
agents:
‘...the relationship between Pablo Aveleira, head o f division for social and 
economic studies o f BANAMEX and Miguel Mancera, head o f BdeM (1982- 
1997), dates back to their school days at the Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de 
Mexico (ITAM). They hold a monthly lunch in which authorities and financial 
executives meet in an informal atmosphere. Among the participants to these 
meetings are: Miguel de la Madrid, former President o f Mexico, Francisco Gil, 
deputy-minister o f finance, Ismael Maidon, executive from BdeM, Alberto 
Gomez, deputy-director o f BANAMEX and Roberto Hernandez, chairman o f  
BANAM EX’s board o f directors’ (Interview: Mexico City, September 14th 
1995).
Deregulation of banks operations
The programme o f financial reform under President Salinas was the most 
comprehensive set o f reforms implemented so far. Salinas’s programme started in 1989, 
when the government made fundamental amendments to the LGIC and concluded in 
1994, when the reform to the LOBdeM, which grants the autonomy to BdeM, was 
enacted. Jose Cordoba (1994: 252-253), chief o f staff under President Salinas, classified 
the financial reform during this period into two broad themes: deregulation o f banks’ 
operations and institutional changes. Regarding deregulation, the government 
eliminated the interest rate ceilings and the selective credit controls and substituted the 
reserve requirements by a ‘liquidity coefficient’.28 As regards institutional changes, the 
state reformed development banking (see chapter five), privatised the state-owned 
commercial banks (see chapter six) and granted full autonomy to BdeM (see chapter 
seven).
At the moment when the process o f banking deregulation was initiated, the most 
important feature o f the Mexican financial system was the existence o f two separate
Ministry of Finance.
28 The liquidity coefficient was a requirement for the commercial banks to hold a pre-specified amount of 
their assets in government securities. This requirement was also eliminated eventually.
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circuits. The first circuit was organised around the banking sector, which was over­
regulated and controlled by the state through direct ownership.29 The second circuit was 
organised around the BMV and SBHs, which was virtually free from state regulations 
and controlled by a new financial bourgeoisie integrated by ex-bankers and new stock 
brokers. Despite the crash in October 1987, the BMV was one o f the most profitable 
emerging markets again in 1991. By September 1992 the IPC (main index o f  the BMV) 
had increased 120 times its value since the banks nationalisation ten years earlier (The 
Economist, February 13th 1993). SBHs were financial enterprises relatively free o f state 
intervention; the banks, in sharp contrast, were extremely regulated. The unequal 
competition between SBHs and banks was crucial to reduce the importance o f  the banks 
as financial intermediaries. Yet it provided the rationale for deregulating banks’ 
operations.
In 1988, when the stabilisation programme seemed to control inflation, investors 
increased their demand for credit. However, the programme reduced the supply o f credit 
in order to contract aggregate demand at the same time. The result was the development 
o f  an informal credit market, where SBHs brokered bonds among large firms. In 
response to the lack o f competitiveness o f banking deposits, the authorities lifted 
controls on interest rates for banking deposits and on maturity terms in October 1988. 
More significantly, in November 1988 the authorities allowed the banks to offer similar 
accounts to those offered by the SBHs.30 These accounts were operated o ff the balance 
sheets and hence were not subject to the onerous reserve requirements for normal 
deposits (Danby 1996: 42). The banks started to compete successfully against SBHs by 
offering these instruments, which were bonds with a bank guarantee basically. 
Furthermore, banks were allowed to issue acceptances on their own account in order to 
finance their own lending (Katz 1990: 50). Not surprisingly, banks and their customers 
rapidly moved funds from traditional deposits to these banker’s acceptances. The
29 President de la Madrid interfered little with the operations of the commercial banks while under state’s 
ownership, apart from continuing to use high reserve requirements to finance fiscal deficits. Adolfo Rios, 
Chief Economist at BANAMEX, considered that “... despite the fact that bankers during that period were 
politicians, they were also officials well acquainted with the financial system and with independent 
positions regarding the state policy (Interview, Mexico City, 14/09/95).”
30 These decisions were taken by the outgoing government when Carlos Salinas was already elected- 
President. The fact that important decisions were not postponed until the new government was in office 
illustrate that financial liberalisation was an ongoing process in which both Presidents, de la Madrid and 
Salinas had the same stance.
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resulting competition between commercial banks and SBHs created an apparently 
ineluctable cascade o f reforms.
In January 1989, as the traditional deposit base dwindled and most o f  the banks’ 
operations were conducted off the balance sheet, the authorities scrapped first the 
selective credit controls and interest rate ceilings paid on deposits.31 Then, in April, the 
reserve requirement for all deposits was lowered to 30 percent and renamed a liquidity 
coefficient. The reserves could be invested in specified state securities (mainly CETES 
and BONDES), interest-bearing deposits in BdeM or cash deposits in BdeM ’s vaults 
(Danby 1996: 44). At this point, the old complex framework based on reserve 
requirements, selective credit controls and interest rate ceilings was almost completely 
abolished. The only element from this framework that remained in place was the 
liquidity coefficient on banks deposits. In December 1989 a modest pack o f  regulatory 
changes was also enacted; they were aimed to strengthen bank prudential regulation and 
supervision by giving greater power to the CNB, CNV and CNSF.32 Additional reforms 
in July 1990 established procedures for classifying overdue loans and for putting aside 
loan-loss reserves. Capital requirements as a percentage o f  risk-adjusted assets were also 
established at six percent and gradually increased until reaching 8 percent in 1993 (Ortiz 
1994: 61). Finally, in September 1991 the coefficient was also eliminated because banks 
were facing increasing difficulties to secure enough CETES or cash to meet the 
requirement (Danby 1996: 46).
Despite the deregulation o f banks operations the segmentation o f the financial markets 
did not decline.33 Financing through the securities market was an option for the state and 
large corporations but not for medium and small firms who remained dependent on the 
more expensive banking credit. In fact, only 200 companies could raise funds through 
the BMV at a cost up to 20 percent lower than banking credit (Maxfield 1990). Trading 
in state securities between 1988 and 1993 accounted for over 90 percent o f  the total
11 The lending quotas and the interest rates ceilings were calculated on banks deposits. However, as most 
o f the banks operations move off the balance sheet, away from traditional deposits and into bankers 
acceptances, these controls became increasingly irrelevant.
12 At this point, the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) was split into two: National 
Banking Commission (CNB) and the National Securities Commission (CNV).
Market segmentation is the feature of financial systems, where economic agents pay different interest 
rates.
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volume o f trading in the BMV (Coorey 1992: 39). The development o f the bond market 
far exceeded the development o f the equity market, which only accounted for slightly 
more than two percent o f total trading in the BMV (Mexico Company Handbook 1993: 
13). Only 190 firms were listed in the BMV in 1993 compared to 550 firms listed in the 
Sao Paulo stock exchange or to the much smaller in terms o f capitalisation, Peruvian 
stock exchange, that listed 233 firms (Holden 1995: 63).
Conclusions
The development o f the financial system in post-revolutionary Mexico can be divided 
into four different periods (see Table 4.7). Each period is characterised by a specific 
process driven by the government’s financial policy that has, in turn, oscillated between 
two major objectives: growth and stability. Those policies that favoured growth over 
stability were label as ‘heterodox’ whereas the policies that emphasised stability over 
growth were identified as ‘orthodox’. Every time policy-makers with 'orthodox' views 
dominate the state, financial policy pursue three goals: satisfy the financial needs o f the 
state, secure macroeconomic stability and provide profitable business opportunities to 
the large financial groups. The government’s financial policy and the businesses o f large 
financial groups were closely intertwined all the time. Financial groups conducted the 
day-to-day operation o f the financial system, while the government controlled 
regulation and policy-making (Camp 1989: 244).34 In this symbiotic relationship, the 
state induced the allocation o f credit according to its political concerns, whereas 
financial groups influenced policy decisions according to their economic ends. The large 
financial groups used their economic leverage to extract political and economic 
privileges from the state at certain historical junctures. The state, however, preserved its 
autonomy thanks to a strong and efficient policy network dominated by the Ministry o f  
Finance and BdeM.
Between 1952 and 1982, banks operations and monetary policy in Mexico were tightly 
regulated through interests rates ceilings, reserve requirements on banking deposits and
34 Isaac Katz reasserted that the political power of the large financial organisations stems from “...their 
control over money and their knowledge that an efficient economy depends on the financial system. 
Bankers know that the financial system is the most important sector in the economy (Interview, Mexico 
City, 13/09/1995).”
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selective credit controls. This framework worked well in Mexico during the stabilising 
development period when the economy grew at annual rates above six percent and 
annual inflation remained below five percent. Yet, once inflation accelerated in the 
1970s, and interest and exchange rates remained fixed, the financial system discouraged 
savings and promoted speculative investments and capital flight. This framework 
produced negative real interest rates and real exchange rate overvaluation that, in 
combination with higher external interest rates, fuelled devaluation expectations. The 
lack o f flexibility o f  this framework led to the first financial crisis in the history o f post­
revolutionary Mexico. The peso devaluation in August 1976 ended a twenty-two year 
period o f exchange rate stability (Aspe 1993: 68).
Table 4.7
Summary of Mexico’s Financial Policy, 1925-1994
Period Process Main Policies
1925-1952 Institutionalisation • Foundation o f BdeM
• Introduction o f development banking
• Creation o f business ‘corporativism’
1952-1982 Management • Introduction o f credit controls, reserve 
requirements on banks’ deposits and interest 
rates controls
• Introduction o f financial groups
1982-1988 Securitisation • Bank’s nationalisation
• Separation o f  banks and SBHs
• Development o f the securities markets
1988-1994 Liberalisation • Elimination o f financial controls
• Development banking reform
• Banks’ privatisation and reintroduction o f  
universal banking
• BdeM’s Autonomy
The first attempt to introduce flexibility to the system took place in 1978 when the 
government introduced CETES. Nonetheless, the oil boom and massive foreign lending 
delayed the need for further changes. Interest and exchanged rates remained fixed by 
BdeM. In 1982, however, external shocks on American interest rates and oil prices 
placed the state finances under intense stress once more. Inflation speeded up again, the 
financial system still lacked flexibility to adjust and therefore real interest rates became 
negative. A new wave o f capital flight developed and forced the government to devalue
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the peso in February 1982. This time the consequences o f the crisis were far more 
severe given the size o f external indebtedness. Servicing the accumulated external debt 
limited the growth possibilities o f the Mexican economy throughout most o f  the 1980s.
The transformation o f the financial system, although initiated as early as 1978, speeded 
up only after 1982, when President de la Madrid took office and empowered a group o f  
policy-makers with ‘orthodox’ views regarding the financial system. However, the lack 
of a developed market for state securities foreclosed the elimination o f  interest rate 
controls and reserve requirements. President de la Madrid’s economic team set itself the 
task to foster a market for government securities without removing the tight controls on 
banking operations. By the time de la Madrid left office, the financial system was 
characterised by the presence o f two parallel circuits: one o f them was organised around 
the banks, over-regulated and under the control o f the state; the other was organised 
around the SBHs, virtually free o f regulation and under the control o f the large financial 
groups. Financial operations were increasingly conducted through the stock exchange at 
the expense o f the banks.
President Salinas completed the process o f financial liberalisation as part o f  his agenda 
o f policy reform. When Salinas took office in 1982, the securities market was deep 
enough to provide stable and secure source of funds for the state. Also, the public deficit 
was under control. Consequently, the deregulation o f banks operations became the next 
important task for the state. In 1988, under better economic circumstances, the state 
liberalised the banks operations. The three most important decisions in this direction 
were deregulation o f interest rates; elimination o f the selective credit controls; and 
substitution o f the reserve requirements by a liquidity coefficient, eventually also 
abolished. Most o f the financial liberalisation took place in the late 1988 and early 1989, 
with some follow-up measures in subsequent years.
The transformation o f the financial system in Mexico during the 1980s illustrates how  
the financial needs o f the state influence the balance o f power between rival policy 
coalitions. The political influence o f the Ministry o f Finance and BdeM stems from their 
strategic function providing funding for the state. However, this influence has fluctuated 
over time depending on the personal agenda o f the President (see Maxfield 1990). 
During the period o f stabilising development, the Ministry o f Finance enjoyed a great
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degree o f autonomy because the Presidents placed great emphasis on stability. However, 
in the 1970s, political pressures shifted the emphasis on the President agenda towards 
income distribution, abridging the political leverage o f this organisation. The 
consolidation o f policy-makers with ‘orthodox’ views as the dominant group within the 
state in 1982 was favoured by the state’s financial distress resulting from the debt crisis. 
The transformation o f the financial system, initiated as a response to the economic crisis 
in 1976, became a top priority o f  the economic agenda o f  the state only after this group 
came to power. During the 1980s, the state’s main concern was to secure its own 
financing under very adverse external circumstances.
Finally, the deregulation o f banking operations, in combination with other important 
institutional changes (see chapters five, six and seven), transformed the financial sector. 
The old framework based on interest rate ceilings, legal reserve requirements and credit 
controls was completely replaced by a new framework centred on a new concept known 
as ‘universal banking’, where brokerage and banking services, among others, are 
provided by integrated financial groups. The financial system went from a highly 
regulated and very rigid system dominated by banks to a two-tier system emphasising 
market forces. In the new framework, where the compulsory sources o f finance for the 
state were eliminated, the investment climate became o f paramount importance. At 
present, the state has to comply with all the implicit policy demands from international 
capital and domestic business groups in order to secure financing for itself and for the 
economy. The reform to the financial system has somewhat institutionalised economic 
policy in Mexico.
The next three chapters are case studies where decisions regarding the financial system  
were part o f a broader political strategy to secure legitimacy for the regime and reassert 
the President's political leadership. Each one o f these chapters are intended to show how  
the simultaneous processes o f economic globalisation and political democratisation 
pushed President Salinas to change the institutional framework for the financial system  




This chapter shows how the reform o f development banking was mainly aimed at 
improving state capacity, on the one hand, and how the economic institutions that 
emerged from the reform failed to induce public and private organisations to behave 
efficiently. The state policy for development banking conformed to the ‘neoclassical’ 
postulates o f economic liberalisation. Development banking reform was, however, a 
special case because there was not an explicit attempt o f reform, yet the state policy for 
the sector changed its traditional role in the Mexican political economy fundamentally; 
development banking is one o f the institutional arrangements where economic and 
politics are more tightly interwoven. This case also introduces an additional element to 
the analysis: interest groups closely linked to development banking but outside the 
financial system, like small entrepreneurs, workers and peasants organisations, were 
also relegated from the decision making process.
There are already some studies about this institutional feature o f the Mexican political 
system. Blanca Heredia (1993) argues that each policy coalition within the state is 
aligned with different organised interest groups. Sylvia Maxfield (1990), in contrast, 
identifies two main competing coalitions: financial and developmentalist, already 
discussed in chapter three. This chapter argues that the limited influence o f non- 
financial interest groups in the reform o f development banking, despite having big 
stakes in the reform, was caused by the reconfiguration o f  power within the state in 
favour o f the financial coalition.
This chapter follows the structure set for all the case studies included in the second part 
o f  the thesis. The first part introduces the ideas underlying the reform. The second part 
presents a historical overview o f the economic and political significance o f development 
banking. The third part is a description o f the specific changes implemented under 
President Salinas. Finally, the fourth part is a discussion o f the outcomes from the 
reform in three specific areas: political control, competition and allocation o f credit.
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5.1. The Ideas
The reform to development banking had two different and essentially contradictory 
strands: the need to preserve organisations conducting directed lending with 
development purposes, on the one hand, and the need o f financial liberalisation, on the 
other. Expressed in a different way, the reform to development banking intended to 
preserve and liberalise organisations that were essentially designed to carry out state 
intervention. I argue that the inherent contradiction in this approach was the main cause 
o f the reform’s failure.
Development banking in Mexico was profoundly influenced by ‘keynesian’ ideas during 
the 1930s (Suarez 1994b: 42). The state under President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) 
promoted economic development very actively but more important, also created a 
financial circuit o f state development banks alternative to the private banking dominated 
system. Around this time, Joseph Schumpeter [1934] published ‘The Theory o f  
Economic Development’, a seminal study on the role o f the financial system on 
economic development. As a result, development banking was considered as the 
orthodoxy on the subject for very long time. Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), for 
instance, showed that successful late developers, including Germany and Japan, 
manipulated their financial system to achieve goals o f industrialisation.1
The pioneering work o f Joseph Schumpeter (1983) is build upon the premise that the 
main challenge in economic development is ‘detaching productive means (already 
employed somewhere) from the circular flow and allotting them to new combinations’ 
(Schumpeter 1983: 7 1).2 Innovation is the essence o f  development but in order to 
introduce new forms o f production it is necessary to destroy the old ones such that
1 South Korea, represent a more recent example of active state intervention in the financial system with 
development purposes. The state in South Korea relied heavily on financial policy tools to induce private 
investment in strategic sectors (see Sakong 1993). Consequently, financial policy strongly influenced 
K orea’s investment allocation, more so than the fiscal policy measures that were also used. The main 
instrument o f the monetary authorities was the policy loan, usually earmarked for certain sectors or even 
specific industries. The policy loans in most cases had preferential interest rates when compared with 
ordinary loans.
2 By circular flow, Schumpeter means the economic process by which existing resources, labour and 
capital, are employed in combinations to produce commodities for the consumption of labour and 
capital. Savings represent withdrawals from this cycle, whereas population growth and capital 
accumulation are influx to the cycle. These influx produce marginal growth but not economic 
development in the Schumpeterian sense.
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resources are freed and can be transferred from old to new uses. This is what 
Schumpeter calls ‘creative destruction’. However this process is not automatic since 
those who are usually willing to try new combinations are not the same as those who are 
actually employing the existing resources at a given time. A mechanism is, thus, 
required to shift resources from old combinations to new ones. Schumpeter (1983) 
stresses the role o f banks as institutions making possible this shift by creating a market 
for the existing resources. In this way banks ensure that resources are allocated to their 
most valuable uses by making possible the process o f creative destruction.
For Albert Hirschman (1958) development does not depend so much on finding optimal 
combinations for given resources but on having a financial system able to call forth and 
enlist for development purposes, resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or 
badly utilised. The state has a role to play in development as an entrepreneur. For Albert 
Hirschman (1958: 25), economic ‘backwardness is due to insufficient number and speed 
o f development decisions and to inadequate performance o f  development tasks.’ 
Therefore the fundamental problem o f development consists in inducing and directing 
individual action in certain direction.
According to Hirschman (1958), there is a process in which an initial decision in a 
specific economic sector creates imbalances in other interconnected sectors. These 
imbalances in turn call for further development decisions in order to re-establish 
equilibrium but by doing so they create new imbalances in some other sectors. 
Hirschman (1958) calls this process ‘imbalance growth’ and state initiatives usually 
enables a country to set out on this path by creating the initial imbalances. Development 
banks often unleash economic processes that bring to light shortcomings and 
bottlenecks in developing economies, inducing in this way new decisions aimed to 
overcome these overlooked deficiencies. The role o f development banking in this 
framework is thus to set forth this domino effect in which once the first action is taken 
then a institutionalised process o f decision making ensues inducing new development 
actions. The state has a very active role in this process o f imbalance growth by 
consciously initiating it or simply by securing that decision making takes place 
smoothly without major obstacles.
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The phenomenon o f ‘credit rationing’ is also directly relevant to the theoretical 
underpinnings o f development banking. The institutional function o f  development 
banking is to allocate credit at interest rates below clearing market levels, inducing an 
excess demand for credit and consequently drawing the state into the process o f  
rationing financial resources among competing uses (Haggard and Lee 1993: 5). In 
some cases the criteria used by development banking to allot credit are strongly imbued 
with political considerations and therefore economically inefficient. In order to improve 
the efficiency on the allocation process o f development banking funds, the reform 
intended to rely more heavily on the market while preserving their assisting nature for 
development. In a very simple microeconomic analysis, development banks under the 
new scheme are supposed to promote specific sectors or activities by supplying 
additional funds to the credit markets and therefore reduce equilibrium interest rates and 
increase credit availability to these sectors. This analysis relies on the neoclassical 
assumption o f  efficient and competitive financial markets. Commercial banks are drawn 
into the allocation o f development credit under competitive conditions and therefore are 
expected to conduct it more efficiently than development banks under political pressure.
5.2. An Overview
The reform of development banking under President Salinas responded to the 
convergence o f two major historical events that have been already analysed extensively 
in chapters two and three. These events were a trend towards financial liberalisation at 
the international level and the reconfiguration o f political power in favour o f the 
financial coalition. Instead o f  going back to these events, this part elaborates on the role 
that development banking has played in the Mexican political economy.
Origins
Development banking was an important strand in the institutional reconstruction o f the 
Mexican political system after the Revolution. President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924- 
1928), in a first stage of political and economic institutionalisation, made significant 
progress towards the reorganisation o f  the state. President Calles founded two o f the
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most important institutions o f the post-revolutionary Mexican state: the Partido  
Nacional Revolucionario (PNR)3 and Banco de Mexico (BdeM). Then, President Lazaro 
Cardenas (1934-1940), in a second state stage o f institution-building during the 1930s, 




Development Bank Acronyms Foundation Sectors
Banco Nacional de Credito Agricola / 
National Bank of Agricultural Credit
BANRURAL 1926 Agriculture
Banco Nacional de Obras y  Servicios 




Nacional Financiera / National Investment 
Bank
NAFIN 1933 Industry
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior / 
National Bank of External Trade
BANCOMEXT 1937 Foreign
trade
Source: Maxfield 1990: 62; and Ramirez 1986: 156.
Since then, the supply o f subsidised credit to promote industrialisation and agriculture 
has been an important mechanism o f economic promotion and political control. Using 
this simple and accepted notion, the state created similar organisations targeting 
different social groups and economic activities. Development banking proved to be a 
very useful idea to attend demands from very different interest groups. The creation o f  
other minor development banks like the Banco del Transporte (Transport Bank), Banco 
del Pequeno Comercio (BANPECO/Small Merchant’s Bank),5 and Banco del Ejercito
-'In 1929 the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) changed its name to Partido de la Revolucion 
Mexicana (PRM) and then in 1935 the name was changed again to Partido Revolucionario Institutional 
(PR1), the way it is known nowadays.
4Around the same time, similar financial organisations were created in the United States like the 
Reconstruction Finance Coiporation and the Federal Housing Authority providing an additional source of 
support to the newly created development banks in Mexico (Anderson 1968: 119).
5 BANPECO was restructured under the reform of development banking and changed its name to Banco 
de Comercio Interior (BNCI).
(BANEJERCITO/Armed Forces Bank) responded to demands from very specific groups 
within the society and the state.
Figure 5.1
Assets of the Mexican Financial System, 1935-1989
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The large size o f development banking is one o f the distinguishing features o f the 
Mexican financial system. From 1945 until 1955 development banks experienced a 
great expansion in terms o f their assets; their share in the system’s total assets increased 
from 15.3 percent in 1945 to 30.7 percent in 1955 (see Figure 5.1). At the same time 
that their financial significance increased so did their political importance. Development 
banks became organisations controlling large amounts o f resources and delivering 
subsidised credit to politically sensitive groups within society. However their relative 
importance remained relatively stagnant throughout the 1960s and 1970s, despite the 
fact that when the parastatal sector grew substantially again in the 1970s, development 
banks financed their expansion and their operational losses at the expense o f the private 
sector. In the 1980s development banking share of total assets in the financial system 
increased again reaching almost 40 percent in 1987 (NAFIN 1990: 477-488; Presidencia 
de la Republica 1995: 60-61).
Economics
Development banking is essentially an economic institution aimed to, as can be inferred 
from its label, promote economic development in a broad sense. Imperfections present








in the financial markets provided the economic rationale for development banking. A  
gap between social and private returns in specific economic activities meant that 
socially profitable investment projects were not undertaken because they were not 
privately profitable; development banks were created to bridge this gap. Private banks 
trying to maximise profits and minimise risks concentrated on large enterprises 
financing, rich borrowers and short-term loans; and left small firms, poor borrowers and 
medium- and long-term investment projects without enough access to credit. 
Development banking was expected to attend these segments o f  the market.6
In Mexico, development banks are powerful organisations used by the state to steer the 
economy. Their operations in three major economic sectors — finance, agriculture and 
industry—  were crucial in the early stages o f M exico’s economic development; they 
served tree main economic purposes: (1) promote industrialisation and agricultural 
production; (2) promote the development o f the financial system; and (3) secure 
alternative sources o f financing for the state.
Development banking was a key element in the early stages o f M exico’s 
industrialisation process. Back in the 1930s, as a result o f the agenda o f  the post­
revolutionary state, development banks extended credit to small and medium 
entrepreneurs. President Cardenas, for instance, created the Banco Nacional Obrero y  de 
Fomento Industrial (Workers and Industrial Promotion National Bank) in 1939 in order 
to foster grass-roots industrial and trade development (Anderson 1968: 123). 
Subsequently, in the 1940s, new groups o f entrepreneurs, organised in chambers like 
CANACINTRA, CONCANACO and CONCAMIN, sought the support o f  the state 
(Anderson 1968: 124). As a response, NAFIN, the largest development bank, expanded 
its financial activities to attend this emerging political clientele. NAFIN became not 
only a source o f  financing for large projects, investing in infrastructure and heavy 
industry, but also a strong promoter o f small and medium entrepreneurial initiatives 
during the 1950s and 1960s, when the Mexican drive towards industrialisation was at its
0 States in industrialised countries have also used development banks to direct credit to investment 
projects neglected by private banks because of their high risk, long term, and low private returns. Two 
notable examples are the Japan Development Bank and the German Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufau (see 
Alide 1994: 393). Their operations are very similar to those o f any other development bank, namely: 
providing access to long term financing closely linked to state objectives, complementing the private 
financial sector. The only major difference is that they are profitable.
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highest point. During this period NAFIN was a ‘supply-leading’ development bank (see 
Ramirez 1986).7 Development banks targeting industry, as opposed to those targeting 
agriculture, were relatively more successful boosting a rapid process o f  industrialisation 
while preserving financial soundness. Credits from these banks were still subsidised but 
their allocation was undertaken under quasi-commercial criteria.
In agriculture, one o f the most important political symbols that emerged from the 
Revolution was the agrarian reform. In the new semi-collective scheme o f production, 
the state was responsible to provide land to communities o f heretofore land-less 
peasants. However, in order to make these new units o f production economically viable, 
they required additional inputs like machinery and credit. A  whole array o f development 
banks were created to finance those small farmers working ejidos, plots distributed 
under the agrarian reform, who could not legally mortgage their land and thus had 
difficulty obtaining commercial financing (Danby 1996: 19). As early as 1926 the state 
under President Calles established the Banco Nacional de Credito Agricola 
(BANRURAL/National Bank o f Agrarian Credit) in order to support and control groups 
in rural areas.8 In 1935 Cardenas further boosted the agrarian reform with the creation o f  
the Banco de Credito Ejidal (BANJIDAL/Ejido Bank). However these banks have been 
always under continuous financial difficulties requiring continuous bailouts. In fact, 
they became one o f the most important the institutional mechanisms to manage the 
subsidy scheme for agriculture in Mexico.
Development banking played also a very important role in the promotion o f the 
financial system in general and the securities market in particular. NAFIN, the most 
important development bank in this respect, was created, among other things, to restore 
the banking system’s liquidity and to develop the securities market. NAFIN made 
possible the development o f new financieras (investment banks), private financial firms 
that emerged to meet the financial needs o f specific industrial sectors, by providing 
them with liquidity (Ramirez 1986: 83). According to Raymond Goldsmith (1966: 16)
7 Miguel Ramirez (1986) uses the term supply-leading  bank to describe the role o f NAFIN as guarantor 
for loans extended by third parties to small entrepreneurs. NAFIN was not the lender all the time, in some 
cases it just provided the collateral to make financially viable some investment projects that would not be 
otherwise.
x Banco Nacional de Credito Agricola changed its name to the current Banco Nacional de Credito Rural.
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NAFIN is ‘probably the most original contribution made by Mexico to the types o f  
financial institutions participating in financing economic development and promoting 
economic growth.’
The creation o f a securities market in Mexico was also to a great extent promoted by 
NAFIN. According to its Organic Act, NAFIN was responsible for the supervision and 
regulation o f the securities and long-term credit markets. But most significantly, as a 
participant, NAFIN own issues o f bonds were crucial to the development o f the 
incipient securities market in Mexico. These bonds, known as Certificados de 
Participation  were liquid; NAFIN was always ready to repurchase its outstanding 
securities at par value. Furthermore, NAFIN purchased securities issued by all sorts o f  
firms, both public and private, arranged for guaranteed loans, and acted as a large-scale 
industrial promotes. It guaranteed liquidity to the securities market by standing ready to 
repurchase them at par value (Danby 1996: 18). This excessive liquidity was 
instrumental for the securities market development but also led to situations o f  extreme 
volatility and speculation under macroeconomic instability like in the 1976 and 1982 
crises.
Another function o f development banks with important implications for the economy 
and the power o f the state, not extensively explored though, is their ability to raise funds 
for the state in international financial markets without involving the Ministry o f  
Finance. In the 1950s President Miguel Aleman (1952-1958) turned NAFIN into the 
sole financial agent for medium- and long-term foreign credits requiring government 
guarantee. NAFIN was also the only organisation authorised to handle issues o f state 
securities. Furthermore all public agencies and enterprises required to obtain NAFIN’s 
approval before borrowing abroad (Ramirez 1986: 73). Still late in the 1980s it was a 
key organisation to secure medium- and long-term loans from international agencies 
(Ramirez 1986: 56). Other cases in Latin America like CORFO in Chile and COFIDE in 
Peru illustrates how development banks are key state organisations to channel credit 
from international markets to the domestic economy (Alide 1994).9
‘’Development banking in Chile underwent a process of transformation similar to the one introduced in 
Mexico. From 1990, the Chilean government eliminated CORFO’s lst-floor operations arguing 
deficiencies in the allocation of credit by state agencies in combination with a greater development of 
commercial banks. CORFO is now restricted to act as a financial agent o f the state for long-term
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Loans to development banks have state guarantees and therefore are contracted at very 
similar interest rates than any other state loan. Yet the organisational infrastructure o f  
development banks increases the capacity o f the state to borrow in the international 
financial markets. There is, however, a distinction in the use o f external financing 
depending on the agency that places the debt in the international markets: the financing 
contracted abroad by the Ministry o f Finance is generally allocated to financing core 
activities o f the state such as health, education, infrastructure and current spending; in 
contrast, external funds borrowed by development banks are usually directed to capital 
spending through financing both state owned enterprises and private ventures. This 
distinction was blurred though, during the stabilising development period when NAFIN  
resources, along with the resources o f the banking system through reserve requirements, 
were directed to finance the public deficit; BdeM stopped being the most important 
source o f funding in an attempt to curve down inflation.
Politics
Charles W. Anderson (1968: 44) illustrated very well the multiple political nature o f  
development banking in Mexico. According to him, development banks have three 
essential political functions: management o f politically predetermined public credit 
policies; provision o f financial services to specific clienteles; and centres o f  power 
where managers carry out policies within a self-defined sphere o f competence. Despite 
the fact that development banks enjoy certain autonomy and have powerful clienteles, 
their most important political role is to carry out presidential policies. In a political 
system where political power is highly centralised in the President, state organisations 
have little autonomy to pursue their own individual agendas and social groups are 
unlikely to capture them. Yet, the political role o f development banks is far more 
complex than simply carrying out credit policies. As a consequence o f their financial 
activity and economic influence, development banks strengthen regime legitimacy and 
control and mobilise interest groups.
development projects, getting funds from international financial organisations like IBD and BIRD and 
then allocating them through commercial banks or other private financial firms (Alide 1994: 162-163).
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In the early stages o f economic reconstruction after the Revolution, these agencies were 
very useful to lay the foundations of a capitalist economy but also to fulfil fundamental 
demands o f the Revolution as in the case o f the agrarian reform; they were central to 
consolidate the legitimacy o f the post-revolutionary regime at the first level o f  political 
organisation.
Development banking is an administrative instrument o f political leadership o f  the state, 
‘a carrot and stick to bring about behaviour deemed appropriate to certain public 
purposes’ (Anderson 1968: 169). For instance, BANRURAL and BANJIDAL are 
organisations channelling the efforts o f small landholders toward an over-all agrarian 
policy; BANOBRAS is a bank enforcing compliance to national policy by local and 
municipal governments; and NAFIN serves to direct investment capital towards projects 
consistent with economic development. Jesus Villasenor (1991: 1173) argues, however, 
that development banking has been more effective to perform the tasks that the state 
demands but have failed to promote economic development.
Development banks are powerful organisations with the ability to influence the 
behaviour o f important economic and political organisations— e.g. commercial banks, 
local governments, associations of small and medium entrepreneurs and peasants’ 
organisations. For instance, development banks given their control over a substantial 
share o f  the financial resources have effectively counterbalanced the economic power o f  
the financial elite; they also exercise political control over their clienteles. In fact, 
according to Charles Anderson (1968: 168), the nature o f the relationship between 
development banks and their clienteles is more tutelary than responsive despite the 
political importance o f the clienteles.
The main sources o f political power o f development banking are the size o f  the financial 
resources they control and the terms and conditions under which they are prepared to 
lend. Nonetheless they also derive great influence from their continuous 
communication with key political and economic actors at the second and third level o f 
political organisation. Development banks provide an organisational space for the 
interaction between state and society where policy co-ordination and collaboration 
regarding capital accumulation can take place (Ramirez 1986).
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This organisational infrastructure for policy co-ordination is also very important at the 
third level; each bank has continuous communication with the set o f state organisations 
related both to the financial system and to the specific sector the bank is servicing. For 
instance, the minister o f agriculture, the minister o f the agrarian reform, the minister o f  
finance, the head o f BdeM, all have a seat in the board o f  directors o f  BANRURAL. 
This institutional feature places them at the core o f the power struggle between policy 
coalitions within the state. Development banking was consolidated under President 
Cardenas, a member o f the developmentalist coalition and therefore they represent to a 
great extent the policy preferences o f this coalition. However, when the financial 
coalition is dominant within the state their political influence is mediated by the 
continuous intervention o f the conservative BdeM.
President Cardenas, by changing the heads o f the Ministry o f Finance, the CNBV and 
BdeM, empowered a group o f economic advisers advocating Keynesian policies (Suarez 
1994: 41). A conflict between this new group and the conservative economists from 
BdeM emerged as a consequence o f this cabinet reshuffle that has continued to the 
present day (Anderson 1968: 121; see also Maxfield 1990).'° The dual nature, political 
and economic, o f development banking made it a normal arena o f conflict between these 
two groups. The financial nature o f development banking involves BdeM advising 
conservative policies regarding the allocation o f credit, on the one hand; and the 
parastatal nature o f the banks involves agencies like the ministry o f National Properties, 
the ministry o f Agriculture, the ministry o f  Fisheries, where economic advisors advocate 
stronger involvement o f the state to allocate credit to targeted groups, on the other. 
Development banking has been historically at the core o f the political struggle for the 
control o f the state between the developmentalist and financial coalitions.
10Maxfield (1990) explains swings in economic policy in terms of the conflict between two policy 
coalitions, one advocating neoliberal type of policies and centred on BdeM and another supporting 
Keynesian policies centred on the Ministry of National Properties.
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5.3. The Reform
The reform to development banking under President Salinas was made up o f three main 
changes: (1) specialisation o f development banks in second-floor operations;11 (2) 
reduction on state funding for these banks; and (3) replace the public for the private 
sector as the main recipient o f development funds. In contrast to other economic reforms 
where changes were swift and radical, the reform to development banking took place 
only gradually with marginal changes to the existing institutional framework. Second- 
floor operations, decreasing credit subsidies and increasing financing to the private 
sector were trends already present in development banking prior to the reform. The 
merger between trust funds and large development banks, the privatisation o f  parastatal 
enterprises and the rationalisation o f public finances were all decisions made in the 
context o f  economic transformation that, nevertheless, impinged upon the new scheme 
o f  development banking.
President Salinas and his inner circle o f economic advisers established the general 
guidelines for the reform along with those for the structural transformation o f  the 
economy. However, in this case, the gradual nature o f the changes allowed for greater 
resistance to the reform from some o f the development banks, on the one hand; and 
required the co-operation from private bankers, on the other. For instance, smaller banks 
like BANRURAL and BNCI opposed the reform and defended their ‘first-floor’ 
operations and their programmes o f guarantees (Maydon 1994: 169). Private financial 
groups, meanwhile, conditioned their participation in the new scheme on a minimum o f  
profitability on the allocation o f development banking credit (Maydon 1994: 150). Next 
section shows how the resistance from some development banks and the lack o f co­
operation from private bankers left development funds unallocated.
11 Second-Jloor banking means that banks do not operate at the level o f retail operations. On the passive 
side o f their operations, means that development banks typically raise funds by issuing securities in 
domestic and international financial markets and by contracting large loans with international financial 
organisations. On the active side, means that development banks do not allocate credit directly to the final 
boirower but to other financial firms who have already extended credits and need additional funds to 
continue lending.
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Shift to Second-floor Banking
Development banks, as any other financial firm, have passive (funding) and active 
(lending) operations. On the side of passive operations, the most important are: get 
direct budgetary allocations, borrow from international financial organisations, and 
issue their own securities. On the side o f the active operations, they provide medium- 
and long-term loans, rediscount loans from other financial firms, and provide guarantees 
and collateral for third parties. The reforms to development banking changed their 
moclus operandi from first-floor to second-floor operations - regarding their active 
operations (see Figure 5.2).12 Second-floor operations consist mainly on rediscounting 
commercial banks loans and contract funding through securities issues in financial 
markets, both international and domestic. Development banks reduced their first-floor 
operations, i.e. stopped choosing winners and restricted themselves to increase the 
liquidity (and consequently reduce interest rates) for loans to specific sectors.
Figure 5.2






Source: Ortiz 1994: 152
The concrete actions taken in this direction were: merging trust funds with development 
banks, closing down or merging specialised first-floor banks, and gradually eliminating 
the first-floor operations from major development banks. The closure o f BANPESCA 
illustrates the elimination of specialised first-floor development banks and their
12 Regarding their funding, Mexican development banks have never operated on the first-floor, that is to 
say they have not taken deposits from the public (Danby 1996: 19). Most of the Mexican development 
banks have funded themselves from foreign borrowing, issuing bonds in the domestic market, and
budgetary transfers.
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replacement by programmes and trust funds handled by major development banks. In 
the same line, the merger o f BANCOMEXT with FOMEX, the largest second-floor 
bank and the merger o f NAFIN with industrial promotion funds like FONEI and 
FOGAIN, were directed to consolidate these organisations as second-floor banks 
(Maydon 1994: 56). BdeM used to be the most important second-floor development 
bank in Mexico through its management o f trust funds and development programmes. 
However with the refonn, BdeM lost its stake in this sector by transferring the control 
o f  trust funds to NAFIN, BANCOMEXT and BANOBRAS mainly. Yet BdeM keeps its 
prominent position in the design o f development baking credit policy.13
At present, development banks financial activity is concentrated on rediscounting loans 
extended by commercial banks and Asociaciones de Credito (Credit Associations)14 to 
specific clients like small farmers, small- and medium-industrial and merchant firms, 
and exporters; they supply additional funds to commercial banks lending to those 
sectors where investments have long-term maturity and offer low returns combined with 
high risk, development banks changed fundamentally the way they perform their 
operations. The reform transformed development banks from active lenders to passive 
wholesale suppliers o f funds to the actual lenders, e.g. commercial banks and 
Asociaciones de Credito. Development banks, however, set the criteria to determine 
what sectors are liable to be rediscounted and then commercial banks actually extend 
the loans under this new scheme.15
An increasing specialisation o f development banks in second-floor operations was 
expected to improve the allocation o f credit and eliminate the need o f  state subsidies. 
Second-floor banking means that development banks use the infrastructure o f  
commercial banks, supposedly with better risk management systems and operating 
under market conditions, to allocate development funds more efficiently. At the same 
time, development banks can use the credit rating o f the state to channel funds, raised in 
international markets, into domestic credit markets and hence reduce interest rates
l3The Governor of BdeM has a seat in every development bank Board of Directors.
14 Asociaciones de Credito are small organisations integrated by small entrepreneurs in the same line of 
business with the explicit purpose of borrowing from development banks.
15 BANRURAL is the only major exemption to this scheme since it still keeps its network o f  branches 
and extends credits directly to small landholders.
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charged on loans to specific sectors. This trend towards second-floor development 
banking is present all over Latin America, large financial corporations controlled by the 
state like CORFO in Chile, COFIDE in Peru and NAFIN in Mexico are all reducing 
their participation in the direct allocation o f credit (see Alide 1994). NAFIN, for 
instance, allocated 72 percent o f its loans through commercial banks in 1992 (Aspe 
1994: 1046).
Declining Budgetary Funding
A  central part in the economic transformation promoted by President Salinas and his 
economic team was the rationalisation o f  public finances. The scheme o f  state subsidies 
was radically reformed in order to improve its transparency and efficiency. Most o f  the 
subsidies were managed by a single programme, namely the Programa Nacional de 
Solidaridad (PRONASOL/National Programme o f Solidarity). Financial subsidies were 
among those targeted for cuts back and therefore the Ministry o f Finance cut down the 
budgetary allocations to those banks operating with financial losses. The gradual 
elimination o f state subsidies to development banks was central on the new model o f  
economic development with a downsized state. Regardless o f the political significance 
o f this measure, that shall be discussed later, it had important implications for the cost 
and availability o f credit to those sectors considered as o f public interest. Besides, 
development banks were no longer essential organisations in the new scheme o f state 
subsidies.16
Declining budgetary funding forced development banks to become self-financing 
organisations, and consequently to eliminate all kinds o f  transfers to their clienteles. 
Banks in the first cluster, dealing with sophisticated clienteles, are already independent 
o f budgetary allocations. However, banks in the second cluster, especially BANRURAL 
and BNCI, attending clienteles in more traditional economic sectors, have loan 
portfolios with problems o f non-performing assets; political pressures force them to 
extend credits with very low probabilities o f being repaid. At present, these two banks
l6At this point, BANRURAL and some other trust funds are still deficit organisations, relying on 
budgetary allocations for their operation. However, they are supposed to move gradually towards 
financial independence by eliminating subsidies to interest rates and improving the re-payment of their 
loans.
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still rely on budgetary allocations for their operation. However, they are also expected to 
improve their loan-recoverability ratio and eventually become self-financing 
organisations. The challenge they face at this point is to change their lending policies, 
highly sensitive to political pressures, and the financial culture o f  their clienteles used to 
the subsidiary role o f the state.
The elimination o f state subsidies, means that the interest rate charged on the funds 
supplied by development banks cannot be lower than the financial cost o f  raising those 
funds plus the administrative costs o f the banks. This interest rate is, however, different 
to the one charged to the final borrowers because commissions and fees o f  commercial 
banks have to be added on top. Furthermore if  the credit programme is also funded with 
commercial banks funds, which are usually more expensive, then the average cost o f the 
pool o f  funds available in the programme is higher than the original cost o f  the funds 
provided by development banks only. In sum, interest rates charged on loans under 
programmes sponsored by development banks are the weighted average o f  the pre­
determined interest rate on the funds provided by development banks and the marked- 
determined interest rate on the commercial banks’ own funds (Maydon 1994: 184). 
Development banks have no longer control on the interest rate charged on the loans 
extended under their own programmes.
Increasing Private Sector Financing
The third major component o f  the reform was the redefinition o f the sectors to be 
sponsored by development banking: the private sector replaced the public sector as the 
main recipient o f development funds, and new criteria were introduced for the selection 
o f  beneficiaries within the private sector, specifically: (1) potential for growth and 
expansion; and (2) potential contribution to national development. Micro, small and 
medium firms regardless o f  their activities fell under the first category, whereas 
infrastructure and export projects fell in the second category.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the credit from development banks was mainly directed to 
finance parastatal enterprises. This was a common trend all over Latin America where 
development banks experienced patrimonial losses because o f  political pressures to ease 
o ff their loan re-payment requirements. Transfers between agencies within the state
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were the result o f their relative influence rather than operational efficiency or financial 
transparency. Development banks allocated most of their funds to parastatal enteiprises 
providing services, employment and exploiting natural resources. However, as a 
consequence o f the privatisation programme the relative economic importance o f the 
parastatal sector decreased and hence its financial requirements; privatisation meant a 
fundamental transformation of development banking. A shrinking parastatal sector 
forced development banks to redirect their credit towards the private sector (see Figure 
5.3). In this respect development banking reform was essentially linked to the 
privatisation programme of the state.
Figure 5.3















Source: Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 64
The share o f total financing going to the private sector rose from 38.2 percent in 1988 to 
57.2 percent in 1994 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 64). Despite the steady decline 
in development banks financing between 1987 and 1991 to both public and private 
sectors, in the second half o f President Salinas’s term, between 1991 and 1994, this 
figure increased more than the original decline and by the end of the period reached an 
all-time high. It is remarkable that, in 1994, a year of presidential elections, 
development banks financing had its major increase in the last ten years.




From the intended changes described in the last section it is possible to draw some 
conclusions on the relevant actors for economic reform under President Salinas. The 
content o f the reform conformed to the guidelines o f the programme o f  structural 
transformation advocated by the financial coalition. This reform aimed to introduce 
market forces to the allocation o f the large amount o f resources handled by development 
banks. Extending and reinforcing the general goal o f  transforming the Mexican 
economy into an increasingly market economy.
However, the reform to development banking delivered many unforeseen outcomes and, 
at the end, some changes had to be reversed. The outcomes, despite o f being far from 
those intended, transformed development banking in a fundamental way. From these 
observed outcomes, to be discussed next, it is possible to draw some conclusions on the 
failure o f the reform to induce efficient economic behaviour.
State Politics
The outcomes o f the reform at the third level, can be broadly grouped into two: (1) 
reconfiguration o f political power between policy coalitions within the state; and (2) the 
undermining o f development banking as an institutional mechanism for political 
control. The reform to development banking along with the reform to BdeM are 
arguably the changes with most important consequences for the reconfiguration o f  
power within the state. However, in the case o f development banking did not receive 
much public attention.
President Salinas reduced the economic and consequently their political significance o f  
those banks where the political input is stronger. These banks had been important 
mechanisms to secure the popular support for the regime. However, in President 
Salinas’s strategy they were replaced by PRONASOL under the direct control o f the 
executive. The appointment o f Oscar Espinoza as head o f NAFIN, regardless o f his 
links to the strongest contender for the presidency in opposition to Salinas, Alfredo del
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Mazo, is somewhat puzzling.17 However, Espinoza shared the President’s views on 
economic policy despite the fact that they were members o f  different camarillas. 
President Salinas continuous attempts to form alliances with rival political groups 
sharing similar economic policies may explain why he did leave the most important 
position o f development banking in the hands o f a political rival.
The state abandoned the use o f development banking as an instrument for political 
control. By turning development banks into second-floor banks, they became alienated 
from their traditional clienteles.18 However, the government still used development 
banks with expansionist purposes during the year prior to the presidential elections. 
Development credit jumped from 16.1 percent o f the GDP in 1993 to 24.7 percent the 
year after (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 61). In 1993, the government removed the 
balance o f these banks from the public accounts and therefore this increase went 
unnoticed at that time.
At present, retail banking is completely controlled by commercial banks and other 
minor organisations; they have taken over the role, formerly performed by development 
banks, o f intermediaries between interest groups and the state. As long as there is 
preferential resources to be allocated there is potential for clientelist relationships. In the 
new scheme commercial banks have strengthened their political and economic position 
within the Mexican political economy. Development banks used to provide the 
institutional space where their clienteles, usually influential societal groups like non­
elite entrepreneurs or peasants, would interact with the state. However, the reform 
reduced this space o f co-ordination between the state and non-financial interest groups.
There are already some signals o f discomfort with the new institutional arrangement. 
For instance, CANACINTRA, an organisation grouping small and medium 
entrepreneurs, demanded that development banks and not commercial banks should 
assess the financial viability o f the investment projects, arguing that development banks
17Oscar Espinoza, himself, acknowledges that he was not expecting to be called to collaborate with the 
new President Carlos Salinas given his links to Alfredo del Mazo (La Jornada, June 25th 1995).
lsThe only major exception is BANRURAL that still has its own network o f branches through which it 
allocates most o f the credit to small farmers.
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have a long term horizon whereas commercial banks having shorter term horizons 
demand immediate benefits from investments (El Econom ista, February 14th 1997).19
Structure of Development Banking
Prior to the reform it was possible to distinguish three different clusters o f  development 
banks in Mexico. The first cluster comprises NAFIN, BANCOMEXT and 
BANOBRAS. These banks attend a sophisticated clientele that in some cases is also 
served by commercial banks, operate on the basis o f responsible banking and financial 
soundness, have a centralised administration, and are relatively free o f  corruption 
problems. The second cluster includes BANRURAL, BANPECO and BANPESCA.20 
These banks supply credit to socially and politically sensitive sectors with limited 
access to other sources o f financing, rely to a great extent on budgetary allocations for 
their operation, have a decentralised administration, and operate a high volume o f small 
transactions and face problems o f corruption. Finally, the third cluster is made up o f  
fideicom isos  (trust funds) that perform the same function o f  development banking but 
with simplified organisational structures. They manage large funds for very specific 
projects and activities in which the state has a special interest (see Table 5.2). The 
specificity in the destination o f these funds makes them politically and economically 
significant.
Trust funds were created to secure credit to strategic economic projects or to politically 
well-organised groups. The most important at present are: Fondo Bancario de  
Proteccion al Ahorro  (FOB APRO A/Banking Fund for Savings Protection), 
Fideicom isos Instituidos en Relacion a la Agricultura  (FIRA/Trust Fund Instituted 
Regarding Agriculture), Fondo Operativo y  de Financiamiento a la Vivienda 
(FOVI/Operational Fund for Housing Financing), Fideicom iso p a ra  el D esarro llo  
Com ercial (FIDEC/ Trust Fund for Trade Development) and Fondo N acional de  
Fomento al Turismo (FONATUR/National Fund for Tourism Promotion).
1‘'Other organisations like CONACEX also demanded that BANCOMEXT should operate in the first 
floor in order to expand the number of exporting firms with access to the bank’s financing (La Jornada, 
March 30th 1995).
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Programa de Apoyo Integral a la Industria Mediana y  
Pequefia
Fondo de Garantia y  Fomento a la Industria Mediana y  
Pequefia
Fondo de Fomento Industrial
Fideicomiso de Conjuntos, Parques, Ciudades Industrials y
Centros Comerciales
Fondo Nacional de Estudios y  Proyectos
Fondo de Informacion y  Documentacidn para la Industria
Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo
Fondo de Fomento y  Garantia para el Consumo de los
Trabajadores
Fondo Nacional de Fomento Ejidal
Fondo Nacional para el Fomento de las Artesanias






Fideicomiso para Credito en Areas de Riego y  Temporal
Fideicomiso de Riezgo Compartido
Fideicomiso Fondo Ganadero
Fondo para Obras de Infraestructura Rural
Fondo del Programa de Descentralizacion de las
Explotaciones Lecheras del D.F.
BANOBRAS FOMUN Fondo Fiduciario Federal de Fomento Municipal
Source: M ercado de Valores, October 5th 1987.
This structure remained essentially unchanged with one important exception; most o f  
the funds and trust funds in the third cluster merged with the banks in the first cluster, 
i.e. NAFIN, BANCOMEXT and BANOBRAS. The banks in this major cluster, the only 
financially significant ones after the reform, concentrated on second-floor operations 
mainly, remained relatively isolated from political pressures and relatively financially 
sound despite the crisis in December 1995. The second cluster— BANRURAL and 
BNCI— continued their first-floor operations, facing problems o f non-performing assets 
and subject to strong political pressures from their clienteles. At this point 
BANCOMEXT has greater dynamism than NAFIN, extending a larger amount o f funds 
in the form o f new loans. Nevertheless NAFIN is still the largest development bank in 
terms o f assets and size o f loan portfolio.
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As recent as 1987 development banks financing was larger than commercial banks 
financing. However, as a result o f the reform, the relative financial importance o f  
development banking decreased steadily and by 1991 its share o f total assets o f  the 
system was barely 19.6 percent, the lowest in the last fifty years. In contrast, 
commercial banking increased its size very rapidly leading to a substantial change in the 
structure o f the Mexican financial system. This lending boom was sparked by financial 
liberalisation and banks’ privatisation. In 1991, the share o f total financing allocated by 
development banks was only 21.9 percent (see Figure 5.4). Afterwards it partially 
recuperated and reached 26.7 percent o f the total in 1995 (Presidencia de la Republica 
1995: 62).
Figure 5.4
Assets of the Mexican Financial System, 1985-1995
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Source: Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 62
Along with the change in the relative importance o f  development vis-a-vis commercial 
banks, the relationship between them also changed dramatically because o f the 
introduction o f second-floor banking. Development banks are supposed to induce 
commercial banks to channel credit to priority sectors. However, their position to do so 
is jeopardised by the new scheme in which they depend on a concentrated commercial 
banking sector.21 The control o f development banking resources is concentrated in 
NAFIN, BANCOMEXT and BANOBRAS in the same fashion that the allocation o f  
credit is concentrated in BANAMEX, BANCOMER and Banca Serfin. Fees and
2‘In order to avoid the concentration of development banks funds in a few commercial banks some 
ceilings were introduced according to Carlos Sales, head of NAFIN {El Economista, March 6th 1997).
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commissions for rediscounting credits with development banks are supposed to be 
determined by market forces.
However, the fact that there are only a small number o f relevant banks operating in this 
segment poses a serious doubt on this contention. It is more likely that the spread on the 
interest rate, along with fees and commissions are determined by the bargaining power 
o f the banks. The co-operation between them has not been, nevertheless, smooth and 
completely effective. In 1995, commercial banks allocated their resources first, leaving 
development banking funds unallocated. The relationship between development and 
commercial banks is still dominated by mistrust and continuous tension despite the 
continuous efforts to improve this relationship and to create new business opportunities 
for the private financial groups.22
Early in the 1990s when consumer credit was so profitable it was difficult and very 
costly to induce commercial banks to participate in development credit programmes. 
This situation was aggravated by the banking crisis that followed the December 1994 
devaluation in which commercial banks were more concerned to capitalise themselves 
than to allocate development banks funds. This problem illustrated the potential 
problem to development banks that arises from relying completely on other financial 
firms for the allocation o f their own funds. For instance, BANCOMEXT did not allocate 
the entire amount o f  funds it had planned in 1996 and therefore towards the end o f the 
year restarted its first-floor operations in 1996 to allocate its own funds. BANCOMEXT  
also decided to increase its stake in the loans risk from 50 to 70 percent in order to 
further induce commercial banks to give away loans {El Economista, November 7th
1996).
Economic and Operational Efficiency
Under the managerial perspective, the reform o f development banking was intended to 
bring about: reduced fiscal transfers, increased efficiency and better selective criteria in
22 Commercial banks protested when FIRA demanded, before paying guarantees, to try all the 
possibilities to re-negotiate the debt in order to avoid the further accumulation of non-performing assets 
(Maydon 1994: 168). Carlos Sales, the newly appointed chief executive officer o f NAFIN, called for the 
solution to differences between development and commercial banks in the context o f the new scheme of 
co-operation (El Economista , March 10th 1997).
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the allocation o f  credit (Maydon 1994: 14). The group pressing for responsible banking 
also stressed the need to insulate the process o f credit allocation from political pressures 
and place technical and economic considerations at the top. In the same line o f structural 
adjustment policies, the major guideline for the reform was less state intervention in the 
allocation o f credit to those sectors regarded as o f  public interest. The attempt to 
eliminate fiscal transfers to development banks meant the triumph o f  responsible 
banking over the subsidiary role of the state. However in practice this was not always 
the case. In fact, by 1996 after a few years o f gradual reductions, budgetary allocations 
to development banks increased by 85 percent in real terms respect a year before. The 
banks most benefited were BANRURAL with 27 percent, FIRA with 22 percent, 
FONHAPO with 25 percent and FOVI with 12 percent {El Economista, February 12th
1997). Furthermore, NAFIN was the only bank that improved its profitability over 
capital from 1988 to 1992 (see Table 5.3); and not even in this case it is possible to 
claim an increase in operational efficiency. Gilberto Boija, head o f NAFIN, declared 
that 50 percent o f  the 470 000 loans extended by the bank between 1988 and 1994 were 
not financially sound {El Economista, September 13th 1996).
Table 5.3
Development Banks Profitability (1)
Bank 1988 1992




Source: Ortiz 1994: 159 
(1) Profits / capital
Nevertheless, credit markets in Mexico are still far from being competitive. Almost 50 
percent o f  the total assets and total branches o f the banking system are controlled by the 
two major commercial banks. By handing to commercial banks the final responsibility 
of allocating credit, the state officials implicitly assumed that commercial banks were 
essentially more efficient than development banks. They grounded this assumption on 
theoretical claims that the market delivers more efficient outcomes. However, the lack 
o f empirical evidence supporting these claims is noteworthy. Profitability and 
operational efficiency in NAFIN and BANCOMEXT has been historically as high as 
that o f any large commercial bank. In fact, the banking crisis in 1995 made evident the
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opposite, commercial banks lending policies were defective with catastrophic 
consequences for the system.
Commercial banks were not more efficient necessarily than development banks and 
second-floor operations did not eliminate the problems o f  corruption associated to 
political pressures either. There was a case o f corruption in the allocation o f  
rediscounted credit from NAFIN by three credit unions. Gilberto Borja, head o f the 
bank, attributed the cause o f the problem to NAFIN’s by-laws that allowed a great 
degree o f discretion in the behaviour o f its executives. Without blaming Oscar Espinoza, 
former head o f the bank, he disapproved the way credit was allocated under his 
administration (La Jornada, July 5th 1995). In the haste to allocate credit in 1994, the 
year o f presidential elections, NAFIN did not create controls to rediscount the credits on 
a solid basis. Financial groups like Grupo Havre were also involved in cases o f  
corruption related to the allocation o f development banks funds. Other banks— Banco 
Union and Banpais— although not directly related with development banking funds, 
were also involved in cases o f corruption. In sum, second-floor banking did not 
eliminate the problem o f corruption neither improved the allocation o f development 
banks funds.
An essential element in finance is uncertainty. In every loan there is an implicit risk o f  
not being re-paid. This type o f risk has traditionally kept commercial banks away from 
extending credit to small entrepreneurs and therefore development banks stepped in to 
cover that segment o f the market. Under the new scheme, risk is shared between 
commercial and development banks though allocation is mostly in the hands o f  
commercial banks. Then the original problem has reappeared, though under different 
circumstances. Commercial banks will not lend to those sectors that they still find too 
risky despite o f sharing the risk with development banks. Risk adjusted profitability in 
operations with development banks’ programmes has to be as least as high as that in any 
other business o f commercial banks. Under this new scheme, some sectors are having 
reduced access to credit because o f a lack o f interest by commercial banks whereas other 
more attractive sectors offering better returns have improved their access to credit.
In the end the reform o f development banking did not succeed in placing economic 
considerations at the top and remained highly influenced by the electoral cycle despite
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continuous attempts to insulate it from political factors. In 1994, the election year, the 
increase in development banking credit was the highest in the last 10 years. This time 
the main recipient was the private sector. In the midst o f  a haste to allocate this 
increased financing, development banks, especially NAFIN as latter became evident, 
overlooked responsible banking and sound financial practices.
Summary
The reform of development banking in Mexico supports the claim that the state behaves 
strategically as an organisation with well-defined objectives. In the context o f  a severe 
economic crisis and with the society demanding bold economic measures, the state 
came out with a whole new development strategy based on a market economy. By 
introducing market elements to the allocation o f development credit, the state intended 
to advance its goal o f transforming the Mexican economy into an economy increasingly 
market oriented. Development banks were not eliminated but their operations are now 
not only mediated by the market but also narrower in their scope.
Structural adjustment policies urging for a greater reliance on market forces and less 
state intervention triggered the debate on the role o f development banking in a 
liberalised economy. In the new scheme o f reduced state involvement in the economy, 
development banking became an awkward issue for the state. The state acknowledges 
that in the absence o f these organisations, imperfections in the financial markets may 
leave important groups and regions short o f credit. However, development banking is 
subject to political pressure distorting the financial activity o f these organisations. The 
debate revolved around two main positions: responsible banking and financial 
soundness vis-a-vis greater access to subsidised credit for those groups unattended by 
the financial system.
The reorganisation o f development banking entailed changes in three areas mainly: (1) 
redefinition o f development banks modus opemndi; (2) rationalisation o f state funding 
for these banks; and (3) redefinition o f economic sectors or activities that required the 
assistance from development banking (Alide 1994: 212). However, at the end, the 
reform lacked a clear direction as to where the state wanted to take it in the new context 
of an increasingly liberalised economy despite the strong leadership o f  President
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Salinas. Introducing market elements to one o f  the symbols o f state intervention in the 
economy would signal the commitment and determination o f the state to transform the 
Mexican economy. However the state could not afford to neglect the political dimension 
o f the reform.23 The allocation o f subsidised credit has always been a major mechanism  
o f state control over the society (Villasenor 1991: 1172). It creates networks o f  
collaboration between groups within the society and the state who profit from the 
existing scheme and therefore have a vested interest to preserve it. The dual nature o f  
development banking involving economics and politics jeopardised the attempt to 
improve its economic efficiency by using market mechanisms.
The outcomes o f the reform o f development banking were very mild compared to other 
reforms to the financial sector. The structure existing prior to the reform o f  a two-tier 
development banking system remained essentially the same after the reform. By 1995 
some development banks had to go back to their first-floor operations in order to 
allocate their own resources since the schemes intended to induce commercial banks to 
participate in the allocation o f development banks funds did not work. Scandals o f  
corruption in Nacional Financial, supposedly the bank less susceptible to this type o f  
problems, showed that the reform did not isolated the banks from political pressures. 
Despite that increasing funds are allocated to the private sector, the public sector is still 
very significant as a recipient o f these funds. The elimination o f subsidies went down 
but not significantly and by 1996 the budgetary allocations to some banks increased 
again. Banks like NAFIN and BANCOMEXT were operating without budgetary
23The underlying concept of development banking is as much about political values like social justice and 
equality as it is about economic efficiency. Development banking in the form of fiscal transfers through 
subsidised credit from the whole society to specific groups is a political issue as much as it is economic.
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allocations even prior to the reform, and the banks that were dependent on them are still 




Among all the reforms to the financial system implemented under President Salinas, the 
privatisation o f the commercial banks is the most representative case o f  a state- 
engineered change. The state deployed its institutional capacity to bring about swift and 
fundamental change to, arguably, the most important sector in the Mexican political 
economy. This reform was pivotal to move forward the economic and political agenda 
of President Salinas for two main reasons. First, the privatisation improved the 
investment climate in Mexico more than any other single policy — capital inflows sky­
rocketed during the second part o f the sexenio, economic growth, though slow, was 
regained and inflation was brought down. Second, the privatisation consolidated 
Salinas’s political and economic leadership by securing the support o f  the business elite 
and providing liquidity to finance the social spending programme that, in turn, secured 
grass-roots support.
Part o f the more general financial reform, the banks' privatisation changed 
fundamentally the configuration o f the Mexican financial system. It is not possible, 
however, to show on theoretical or empirical grounds that the transfer o f  banks 
ownership improved the internal efficiency o f the banks or the stability o f  the financial 
system. As the 1994 crisis served to establish, the Mexican banks' privatisation was not 
primarily intended to ensure the stability o f  the financial system. Furthermore, new 
financial practices and universal banking, both outcomes o f  the privatisation, were 
instrumental in triggering the current banking crisis. This chapter looks at the political 
economy o f the privatisation process and the resulting institutional changes in order to 
explain the inefficient behaviour o f the economic agents preceding the crisis.
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There is a vast literature that tries to identify the main drives behind the privatisation 
programmes implemented all over the world since the late 1970s.1 Most o f  these studies 
agree on three very clear economic goals pursued by any privatisation programme, 
namely: increase economic efficiency, reduce public deficits and improve the 
investment climate. Likewise, there are several political studies o f  privatisation as a 
public policy.2 At a political level, any privatisation programme causes a massive 
redistribution o f wealth and power, and therefore has important implications for the 
political behaviour o f the state and interest groups. In the Mexican case, political 
considerations outweighed economic goals in the decision to privatise the banks, as I 
shall argue in the third and fourth sections.
This chapter is organised according to the structure already discussed. The first section 
is a review o f the dominant ideas on ownership and privatisation. The second section 
addresses the political and economic circumstances that surrounded the banks’ 
privatisation. The third section analyses the implementation o f this decision in order to 
illustrate the capacity the state to bring about institutional change. Finally, the fourth 
section presents a retrospective analysis o f  the decision in order to assess the economic 
consequences o f the privatisation.
6.1. The Ideas
This section is concentrated on the dominant ideas underlying the widespread trend 
towards privatisation. They are grouped into two main categories: ownership and 
economic efficiency and public finances. I assume that the basic principles o f  these 
arguments apply to the case o f  the banks, and therefore they are presented at a very 
abstract level. The discussion about the specific conditions o f the Mexican banks’ 
privatisation is left for subsequent sections. The discussion, however, acknowledges the 
fact that the financial system usually has a strategic role in the process o f  capital 
accumulation and is especially sensitive to imperfections. The analysis uses the notions
1 See, for instance, Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Bienen and Waterbury 1989; Van De Walle 1989; 
Suleiman and Waterbury 1990; Starr 1990; Glade 1991; Lieberman 1993; Castelar-Pinheiro and 
Schneider 1994; Gil 1994; Jameson 1994; Manzetti 1994; and Holden and Rajapatirana 1995.
2 In this case, see Schneider 1989; Schneider 1990; Waterbury 1990; Vera 1991; Lieberman 1993; 
Mateos and Roman 1993; Ramirez 1994.
158
o f market imperfections, asymmetric information and economies o f scale in order to 
assess the economic pertinence of the privatisation o f the banking sector. Private 
ownership in the context o f increasing financial integration has additional effects on 
capital flight, speculative investment and assets performance.
Ownership and Economic Efficiency
In an ideal world, where markets are o f  the type described by the perfect competition 
paradigm, it does not matter who owns the productive assets. Unfortunately markets, 
especially in developing economies, are better described by imperfect competition, 
information asymmetries and economies o f scale. Under these conditions, who own the 
assets does matter for goals o f efficiency and equality. Public ownership is considered to 
be the best option in the presence of market imperfections that cannot be removed by 
pure regulation. These imperfections are reputedly more common in the early stages o f  
development. However, as economies develop, competition increases, economic 
institutions become stronger and, therefore, the need for state-owned enterprise 
decreases.
The literature o f industrial organisation and new political economy argues that public 
ownership introduces additional distortions to the markets (Jones 1982; Van de Walle 
1989). Likewise, the literature o f mainstream economics has developed many arguments 
in favour of privatising state-owned companies. As regards efficient behaviour, they 
argue that the political process, through which top executives at public enterprises are 
appointed, distort management incentives, induce inefficient decisions and corrupts the 
character o f public enterprise.
John Vickers and George Yarrow (1988) produced the most important and 
comprehensive economic study of privatisation. They approached the issue o f  
ownership through the notion o f the agency problem.3 In this framework, the internal 
efficiency o f the firm and the industry depends on the incentive structure. This structure 
is determined, in turn, by ownership, degree o f competition within the industry and the
•' Fundamentally, what this concept says is that owners (principal) and managers (agent) are different 
players and therefore have different sets of objectives and information. The principal wants to induce the 
agent through an incentive structure such that agents’ actions favour principals’ objectives.
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existing regulation. Privatisation, understood as a change in ownership, means a shift in 
the owners’ objectives and, consequently, on the incentive structure for the managers. 
Changes in ownership lead to different managerial behaviour and company 
performance. However, the effects o f privatisation upon efficiency cannot be assessed in 
isolation from the competitive structure o f the industry and the regulatory constraints. 
At this level o f abstraction, all that can be said is that efficiency depends on a complex 
set o f interactions among factors that include: type o f ownership, market structure and 
institutional framework (Vickers and Yarrow 1988: 44).
Public Finances
Privatisation is often encouraged on the basis o f a more efficient management o f the 
state and the economy. According to this line o f arguments, privatisation programmes 
release financial and human resources for alternative uses, reduce the pressure on the 
state finances and improve economic management. Public deficits are often a source o f  
economic instability. According to ‘monetarist’ thinking, running public deficits 
systematically will eventually require an increase on the money supply with a 
corresponding rise on inflation (Sargent and Wallace 1981). Through privatisation, the 
state improves the public finances in two ways. First, the state reduces the flow o f  
interest payments in the future by using the proceeds from the sales to pay o ff debt and, 
as a result, secures permanent benefits. Second, The state reduces public spending by 
writing o ff the subsidies accounts o f inefficient public enterprises from the budget.
The macroeconomic effects o f privatisation programmes have been vastly more studied 
than the microeconomic relationship between efficiency and ownership.4 Most o f  these 
studies assert that public deficits were the major drive for privatisation in developing 
countries. Preoccupied with economic stabilisation, policy makers were more concerned 
with the proceeds from the sale o f public enterprises than with the uncertain efficiency 
improvements to be attained at some time in the future (Van De Walle 1989, Manzetti 
1994).
4 See Bienen and Waterbury 1989; Van De Walle 1989; Starr 1990; Glade 1991; Barnes 1994; Castelar- 
Pinheiro and Schneider 1994; Manzetti 1994; Jameson 1994.
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Politicians have short time horizons and thus have strong incentives to maximise 
immediate receipts (Castelar-Pinheiro and Schneider 1994). However, some authors 
also argue that privatisation does not help to reduce the public deficit (Waterbury 1990; 
1994). In theory, privatisation has a positive effect on public finances only in the case 
that it improves economic efficiency, otherwise the simple exchange o f  assets only 
foreclose a future stream o f income. Furthermore, the evidence shows that revenues 
from privatisation did not come at the right time and in the right magnitude to contribute 
much to fiscal adjustment in Chile, Mexico and Brazil (Castelar-Pinheiro and Schneider 
1994). Dionisio Meade, Managing Director o f Banco Mexicano (1988-1991), believes 
that the decision to privatise the commercial banks was unrelated to macroeconomic 
considerations (Interview: Mexico City, January 22nd 1998). The state did not intend to 
solve the problem of the increasing current account deficit with this action. 
Notwithstanding, privatisation remained valuable to political leaders as a credible signal 
o f the state’s commitment for economic stability. The privatisation was more a decision 
o f political economy.
6.2. The Context
The level o f  abstraction o f  the theoretical arguments presented above forecloses any 
conclusion on the economic pertinence o f the specific decision to privatise the Mexican 
banks. This section, however, addresses the concrete circumstances under which the 
decision was taken. I argue that the issue o f commercial banks’ ownership was 
ultimately political. The argument is presented in two parts: how political events 
surrounded the nationalisation o f the banks in 1982, and less than ten years later, also 
their privatisation; and how the financial performance o f  the banks under state 
ownership do not endorse the need for their privatisation. The privatisation o f  
commercial banks conforms the original claim that international policy trends and 
domestic politics brought about policy change under President Salinas.
The Politics of the Banks Nationalisation
The nationalisation o f the commercial banks back in 1982 was the response o f President 
Lopez Portillo to the lack o f co-operation from the business elite to overcome the 
increasing financial difficulties o f the state. According to Sylvia Maxfield (1990: 1),
1 6 1
‘the bank nationalisation was the most dramatic move against the Mexican private 
sector since M exico’s 1938 oil nationalisation’.5 However, less than ten years later, 
President Salinas reversed this, once considered, popular decision without major 
political opposition. This swing in state policy illustrates very clearly the role o f  
coalition politics in policy change. The nationalisation, first, and the privatisation, only 
ten years later, correspond to the shift in the balance o f power between policy coalitions 
within the state.
President Lopez Portillo can be identified with the developmentalist coalition, especially 
towards the end o f his term, when the nationalisation o f the banks took place. Some 
members o f the financial coalition, who disagreed with the decision resigned as a 
consequence o f the power struggle taking place within the state, including: Miguel 
Mancera, governor o f BdeM and Adrian Lajous, head o f  BANCOMEXT. Carlos Tello, 
the main promoter o f the nationalisation, took the position as governor o f  BdeM. During 
the last months o f President Lopez Portillo’s term a clash developed between Carlos 
Tello in BdeM and Jesus Silva Herzog in the Ministry o f  Finance. They represented two 
alternative coalitions with conflicting positions regarding state economic policy. The 
ideological dispute materialised in the new role to be played by the state-owned banks 
in the economic development. Jesus Silva Herzog supported orthodox management for 
the banks, whereas Carlos Tello advocated a stronger social role for the banks. The 
outgoing President Lopez Portillo, endorsed Carlos Tello; and the incoming President 
de la Madrid supported Jesus Silva Herzog.
When President de la Madrid took office, he solved this dispute in favour o f  a more 
orthodox and profit oriented philosophy for the banks; this view persisted until their 
privatisation early in the 1990s. The economic project advocated by the coalition 
centring on Carlos Tello was discontinued as a result o f  the financial coalition take-over. 
Back in 1982, at the moment o f the commercial banks nationalisation, this coalition had 
already strategic positions in the executive bureaucracy. In fact, the limited reach o f  this
5 Despite the initial statements against the decision, the response o f the financial elite was very mild. One 
possible explanation is that the financial situation o f the banks was very precarious at the moment o f their 
nationalisation. At the moment o f the devaluation in February 1982, commercial banks had large amounts 
o f dollar-denominated debt in their balances; state intervention was just a matter o f time. The banks 
nationalisation can be interpreted as a bailout o f the sector.
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decision is explained to a great extent by the opposition o f Jesus Silva Herzog, minister 
o f finance (1982-1986) (see Maxfield 1992). The President designated ex-state officials 
with financial experience as chief executive officers o f the larger banks in the system. 
Most o f these officials were trained at BdeM or NAFIN; former ministers o f  finance, 
Antonio Carrillo Flores (1952-1958), David Ibarra Munoz (1977-1982) were appointed 
as chief executive officers o f BANCOMER, BANAMEX respectively and Jose Juan de 
Olloqui, also with financial experience, was entrusted Banca Serfin (Hamilton 1985: 
163).
President de la Madrid, member o f the financial coalition, consolidated the new 
configuration o f power dominated by technocrats positioned in the financial division o f  
the executive bureaucracy, ministry o f Budget and Planning, Ministry o f  Finance and 
BdeM. The points at the top o f this agenda were economic stabilisation and structural 
change, including privatisation, deregulation and opening-up domestic markets to 
foreign competition. In 1982, President de la Madrid re-appointed Jesus Silva Herzog as 
minister o f finance and Miguel Mancera as governor o f BdeM in order to move forward 
the negotiations and policy co-operation with the ex-bankers and international capital 
(Hamilton 1985: 166).
The Politics of the Banks Privatisation
The banks’ privatisation was a state engineered change motivated by the new 
international consensus and implemented by President Salinas’s economic team. There 
are two essential political elements in the Mexican banks’ privatisation: (1) the 
economic agenda for liberalisation; and (2) the political control o f the financial coalition 
over the state. International policy networks o f the type described in chapter two share a 
common background all over the world; are very well interconnected and 
communicated; and consequently are very aware o f the changes and trends occurring in 
the international context at any time (see Ikenberry 1990). Their decisions not only 
respond to domestic forces but also they copy successful policies implemented in other 
countries largely. Those that capture the attention and recognition o f global investors 
secure an important source o f funds to finance the development o f their countries and 
strengthen their political positions.
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In Mexico, most top state officials in the finance division o f the executive bureaucracy 
at the moment o f the banks’ privatisation were trained in major US universities which 
endorse analytical developments in favour o f economic liberalisation. Some o f  them 
worked for international financial organisations such as Guillermo Ortiz, deputy 
minister o f finance (1988-1994) and person responsible for the banks’ privatisation; he 
also worked for the IMF from 1984 to 1988 (Diccionario Biografico de la 
Administracion Publica 1992: 273). It is easy to understand why these state officials 
were strong advocates for economic liberalisation and privatisation. The case o f  the 
banks’ privatisation was a matter o f economic, political and ideological consistency o f  
the Mexican policy elite. Guillermo Barnes asserted that having state-owned 
commercial banks was inconsistent in a general equilibrium perspective under an 
integrated economy (Interview: Mexico City, February 9th 1998).
In the case o f the banks’ privatisation only political actors at the top level o f  the state 
hierarchy ever got involved in the process. The only political opposition to the banks’ 
privatisation came from senators o f the left wing Partido de la Revolution Democratica 
(PRD), Ifigenia Martinez and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, who accused the state o f  
‘...fighting openly and without pretence for its true constituents— the financial group’ 
(International Reports 1991: 7). It remains true that some political capital had to be 
spent in order to carry the banks’ privatisation through. The PRI, for the first time in its 
history, did not have the required majority to change the constitution and therefore 
formed a coalition with the Partido Action N ational (PAN). However, not a single 
public demonstration against the decision was mounted. Peak labour organisations 
reserved their organisational efforts for policies relating more directly to their interests. 
The banks’ privatisation was not a politically costly decision that, nevertheless, paid 
important political and economic dividends for the state.
Banks Financial Performance, 1982-1990
The economic basis o f the privatisation is very weak at best in the concrete case o f the 
Mexican commercial banks; the empirical evidence is not conclusive as regards to the 
relationship between internal efficiency and ownership. For instance, Carlos Tello, the 
main architect o f  the banks’ nationalisation, admitted that simply changing ownership 
did not guarantee that their operations, practices and uses would change (Maxfield
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1992: 86). In like manner, eight years latter, the main promoters o f the privatisation did 
not raise the issue o f banks internal efficiency as a major motivating factor. In fact, 
Pedro Aspe (1990: 18), minister o f finance (1988-1994), stated that the banks were not 
on sale because they were financially troubled; they were on sale because it was not 
acceptable to have resources o f the state in the form o f banks capital when there were 
pressing needs in Mexican society.
The banks’ profitability while under public ownership was remarkable despite the shock 
o f the nationalisation, strong competition from the SBHs, macroeconomic difficulties 
and the departure o f many senior management teams (Hanley et. al. 1991: 3). The 
internal efficiency o f the banks measured by the ratio profits/income improved 
substantially while the banks were publicly owned (see Table 6.1). Moreover, steady 
earnings recovery and absence of dividend payoffs bolstered their capitalisation. The 
financial strength o f the banks based on a sustained increase in capital to risky assets 
ratios was in line with the international standards set by the Basle agreement. Banks 
remained outside the public sector budget and were allowed to reinvest profits; the state 
capitalised dividends in order to strengthen the financial position o f  the banks (Danby 
1996: 40). In addition, though partly because o f a concentration o f lending to state- 
owned borrowers, domestic asset quality improved sharply as well.
Isaac Katz, an expert on Mexico’s financial system, pointed out that the banks 
profitability was linked, at least to certain extent, to limited competition in the retail 
banking business (Interview: Mexico City, September 13th 1995). The high spread 
between active and passive interest rates was the result o f both limited competition and 
the nature o f retail banking itself. Whatever the cause, the result was a stable and 
specialised banking system with efficient and profitable banks while under public 
ownership. Despite the good performance o f the banks with respect to retail banking 
operations, they lost competitiveness in the area o f corporate finance. Institutional 
constraints on the type o f financial services banks could provide in combination with a 
context o f high inflation left them disadvantaged vis-a-vis stock brokerage houses 
(SBHs) to compete for the large corporate clients. A phenomenon o f securitisation at the 
level o f corporate finance took place during this period. Banks credit stopped being the 
most important source o f financing for the private sector.
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Table 6.1
Financial Indicators of the Nationalised Banking System: 1982-1993
R a tio s(l) 1982 1984 1988 1991 1993
Profits / Income 1.86 2.24 4.92 5.49 7.83
Profits / Capital 21.61 40.23 49.81 32.54 34.11
Capital / Assets 2.01 1.65 3.73 3.06 4.20




From a managerial perspective the banks did not have the required flexibility to cope 
with the challenges o f international finance. According to Dionisio Meade, executive at 
Banco Mexicano, the banks under public ownership operated under exceedingly rigid 
management schemes, which hindered the efficient and aggressive decision-making 
already present in other parts o f the world (Interview: Mexico City, January 22nd 1998). 
The following figures illustrate the relative stagnation o f the banking sector: during 10 
years o f banks public ownership only forty new branches were opened; the number o f  
accounts went down from 32 million at the moment o f the nationalisation to 21 million 
ten years latter (CNBV 1994: 7); financing by selling equity or commercial paper was as 
much as 20 percent less expensive than through the banking system; total banks deposits 
fell from 25 percent o f the GDP in 1980 to 15 percent in 1988; banking credit accounted 
for 70 percent o f total financing in 1982 and by 1987 they accounted only for 40 percent 
(Maxfield 1992: 98-100).
In sum, President Salinas was not mainly interested in the banks internal efficiency 
when he decided to privatise them. Salinas intended to attract new investment in order 
to expand banking services and to incorporate them into new financial conglomerates 
that could provide financial services both for retail and corporate segments. In 1987 
President de la Madrid took a first step towards the eventual re-privatisation by selling 
shares worth a third o f the banks’ value, which helped to capitalise these institutions. 
The SBHs undertook the sale o f these shares to the public, and acquired many o f  them 
themselves paving the road for their eventual acquisition (Danby 1996: 43).
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6.3. The Reform
It is possible to distinguish the decision-making stage from the implementation stage o f  
the policy-making process. The former is induced by external pressures to secure good 
investment conditions for international capital and by legitimacy requirements in the 
form o f popular support. In the Mexican institutional context, the President is the actor 
that usually mediates these pressures and translates them into policy decisions. The 
implementation stage, by contrast, is shaped more by practical and administrative 
considerations in which state and business organisations are the relevant actors.6 Usually 
the interaction between state and interest groups takes place at this stage o f  the policy 
process; the interaction between the bureaucracy and the private sector is crucial for the 
final outcomes o f the policies.
In the specific case o f the banks’ privatisation, the implementation process is illustrative 
of the main factors behind the decision and the corresponding outcomes. The following 
two sections o f this chapter provide some facts on the implementation and the outcomes 
that followed the banks’ privatisation under President Salinas. In the present section 
issues o f  timing, the special Comite de Desincorporacion Bancaria (CDB/Banking 
Divestiture Committee) and sale mechanisms will be analysed. Then, in the last section, 
some direct consequences o f the banks’ privatisation will be addressed: public debt 
reduction, universal banking, market structure and new configuration o f  the private 
sector.
Timing
On May 2nd 1990 President Salinas sent to the Congress the initiative for amendments 
to Articles 28 and 123 o f the Constitution; required to privatise the banks. This decision, 
though anticipated, was not expected before the midterm congressional elections in July 
1991 (International Reports 1990: 12).7 The timing o f the decision was exclusively
0 For the implementation of state policies regarding the financial system in Mexico see the discussion 
presented in chapter five.
7 According to Dionisio Meade, Managing Director of Banco Mexicano (1988-1991), the decision to 
privatise the banks was completely unexpected, “...the issue o f the privatisation was not under discussion; 
nobody was taking about it. Only the President had it in mind (Interview, Mexico City, 22/01/1998).”
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driven by three major considerations: (1) the electoral calendar;8 (2) the economic 
reform schedule; and (3) the expected proceeds from the sale. The timing was not driven 
by considerations regarding banks internal efficiency or the financial system stability; it 
would not have made any difference when the decision was taken and implemented. 
However, there were important issues o f timing relating to the congressional elections, 
the economic reform, and the expected revenues from the sale o f the banks.
Under the shadow o f the disputed results in the 1988 presidential elections, President 
Salinas was determined to legitimise the regime in the 1991 congressional elections 
(Centeno 1994). Under effective electoral competition, economic growth and price 
stability became very sensitive issues in the public opinion and their trends were 
expected to influence the voting preferences. President Salinas and his economic team 
intended to have the programme of economic reform well underway before the elections 
in July 1991 in order to attract enough capital to boost the economy and hence secure 
popular support (International Reports 1990: 12). Despite the fact that the banks’ 
privatisation is a politically sensitive issue, the banks’ privatisation did not lead to any 
major public debate. At the end, the privatisation substantially improved M exico’s 
economic perspectives; some signs o f economic recovery started to become visible. In 
1990 most o f the macroeconomic indicators showed a noticeable improvement. 
Economic growth was 4.4 percent, the highest since 1981; the inflation rate was 26.6 
percent, down from 114.2 percent in 1988 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 41); and 
employment increased by 7.4 percent in 1990 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 27). 
The electoral triumph o f the PRI in the 1991 congressional elections made evident the 
feel good factor among investors and voters.
Maximising expected proceeds from the sale were another major consideration. Its 
importance was twofold: in terms o f public finances, massive resources were still 
required to relieve the debt burden, on the one hand; and a boost in the economy was 
expected to result from the capital inflows associated with better economic perspectives, 
on the other. This would compensate for the recessive pressures o f  a restrictive 
monetary policy, part o f the stabilisation programme underway. In this context, the right
8 An alternative view states that the timing of the decision was not influenced by electoral considerations; 
it just responded to the fact that President Salinas had already consolidated his political power to
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time to sell the banks came with the improving macroeconomic conditions generated 
from the external debt restructuring. Selling the banks within a period o f almost two 
years after the signing o f a debt relief agreement cashed in on the rapidly improving 
economic outlook (Volj and Draaisma 1993: 130).
It is clear that privatisation conditions are directly related to the general performance o f  
the economy (Barnes 1994: 238). In Mexico the privatisation and the macroeconomic 
stabilisation programmes were well underway before the sale o f the banks. For instance, 
the parastatal sector had 1,155 entities in 1982 and by 1991 this figure was only 239 
(Aspe 1993: 216). By sequencing and packaging reform policies properly, the 
programme became self-reinforcing. For instance, linking privatisation to the simple 
and popular goal o f deficit reduction, the state generated popular support for both 
policies (Castelar-Pinheiro and Schneider 1994). Furthermore, valuable experience was 
gained as the reform was implemented. In the privatisation programme the smaller 
enterprises were sold first in order to avoid any costly mistake due to lack o f experience. 
The sale o f larger enterprises did not take place before 1989.
Following a similar logic and taking advantage o f the accumulated experience, the 
privatisation programme o f the banks started by selling the smaller banks. In this way 
the expectations o f the financial community heated up for what was regarded as an 
unprecedented and unique opportunity to get a bank. In the substantially improved 
economic context, the banks were sold at more than twice their originally estimated 
price. Obviously there was no shortage o f capital among the financial community and 
the final revenues from the sale o f the 18 banks were $12.9 billion dollars. As it is now 
clear, this timing was an example o f perfect policy engineering. It avoided any political 
opposition to the decision at any level o f political organisation; contributed to the 
political victory o f the PRI in the 1991 congressional elections; yielded huge revenues 
to the state; and further improved the investment climate.
implement a decision o f this nature (Dionisio Meade, Interview, Mexico City, 22/01/1998).
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Banking Divestiture Committee (CDB)
At the onset o f the privatisation process it was acknowledged that its success would 
depend to a great extent on its credibility and transparency (Barnes 1994: 238). In order 
to attain this goal, the process was centralised, first, by the advisory staff o f  the minister 
o f finance and, subsequently, by a special unit also within the Ministry o f Finance. This 
unit was responsible for organising and co-ordinating all divestiture operations 
regardless o f the sector in which the enterprises operated. The banks’ privatisation was, 
however, the only case not carried over by this unit. The Ministry o f Finance created a 
new committee, headed by the deputy minister Guillermo Ortiz. The fact that a special 
committee handled the banks’ privatisation isolated the process from any possible 
interference from groups outside the Ministry o f Finance. Furthermore, it minimised the 
possibility o f corruption and mismanagement during the process.9 The Economist 
(March 9th 1991) characterised the scheme for selling the banks as transparent and likely 
to prevent ‘string-pulling, favour-swapping and pre-arranged deals’ despite the 
government’s tradition of corruption.
The composition o f the CDB is interesting as it further signals the dominance o f the 
financial coalition. The CDB was integrated, with the exception o f two private sector 
representatives, by public officials from the financial division o f the executive 
bureaucracy exclusively (see Table 6.2). As members o f the financial coalition they 
share similar academic backgrounds and professional careers making their co-ordination 
very effective.
Responsibilities o f the CDB were: (1) to establish general criteria for the process and 
formulate a specific strategy for the sale o f each bank; (2) ensure the transparency o f  the 
process through continuous communication with the public at large; (3) hire external 
advisors and benefit from their international experience (Bames 1994: 246). But more 
important, the CDB was responsible for certifying the managerial skills o f  the potential 
buyers and to determine the winners in case o f  technical draw. The CDB took 
significant decisions for the future stability o f the banking system on these matters. For
9 According to Dionisio Meade, not even the banks directors were consulted regarding the convenience of 
the privatisation (Interview, Mexico City, 22/01/1998).
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instance in the case o f Banpais, which is under state management at present because o f  
corruption, the CDB authorised the merger o f two investment groups just two weeks 
before the date o f the auction; the group represented by Angel Rodriguez did not 
participate in the financial assessment o f the bank (Ortiz 1994: 271). Notwithstanding, it 
obtained the control o f the bank after internal disputes within the other investment 
group. A similar case occurred with Banco Union when a technical draw took place and 
the CDB decided to sell the bank to an investment group without financial experience. 
Banco Union is also under state management for corruption.
Table 6.2
Banking Divestiture Committee
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Source: Ortiz 1994: 224; and Diccionario Biografico de la Administration Publica 1992.
Guillermo Barnes, chief o f staff o f the deputy-minister o f finance (1989-1992), 
conceded that it was not possible to discriminate between good and bad investment 
groups (interview: Mexico City, February 9th 1998). The evidence suggests that the
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CDB was unable to assess the management qualifications o f  the investment groups that 
acquired the control o f the banks with important consequences for the present instability 
o f the banking sector.
Sale Mechanism
The selection o f the sale mechanism was a major determinant for the final outcomes o f  
the banks’ privatisation process. However, it is also one that has barely been addressed. 
The decision on that mechanism posed an economic dilemma to' the state. This dilemma 
was between diversified ownership and deeper equity markets by selling the banks 
through stock flotations in the BMV vis-a-vis obtaining the highest possible price for 
the banks and being able to discriminate among the possible bidders by selling them 
through direct auctions. At the end, the CDB decided to sell the banks through direct 
auctions instead o f public offerings in the equity market. Table 6.3 presents the largest 
cases o f privatisation through, both public offerings and direct auctions.
Table 6.3
Privatisation by Sale Mechanism
Public Offerings Direct Auctions
Company Country Year Value
(1)
Company Country Year Value
(1)
NTT Japan 1986 12.4 Procordia Sweden 1989 3.8
BP Britain 1987 9.5 BANAMEX Mexico 1991 3.2
British Gas Britain 1986 7.8 Gas del Estado Argentina 1992 3.2
BT Britain 1984 4.9 BANCOMER Mexico 1991 2.6
British Steel Britain 1988 4.5 Telecom New Zealand 1990 2.5
Scottish Power Britain 1991 3.7 CANTV Venezuela 1991 1.9
YPF Argentina 1993 3.0 TELMEX Mexico 1990 1.8
National Power Britain 1991 2.3 Usiminas Brazil 1991 1.5
TELMEX Mexico 1991 2.2 Nacobre Mexico 1988 1.4
ENTel Argentina 1990 1.3
Source: The Economist, August 21st 1993 
Sbillion dollars
This decision responded both to practical considerations and to the economic and 
political priorities o f the state. The sale through stock flotations implied practical 
difficulties. One o f the most important was the under-capitalisation o f  the equity market 
in Mexico. This market is shallow and underdeveloped specially compared to the
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market value o f the whole banking system. The capitalisation o f  the equity sector o f the 
Mexican stock exchange at the end o f 1989 was only $24 billion dollars and the 
valuation o f the 15 Mexican banks traded in the stock exchange was a significant $7 
billion (Hanley 1991 et. ah: 19).10 However, selling the banks through public offerings 
in the equity market would have enhanced important stated objectives such as financial 
system development and ownership diversification. When the banks were partially 
privatised in 1987 though this mechanism, the stocks exchange gained depth and 
liquidity, although not stability. In contrast, in 1991 the banks’ privatisation did not 
make any significant contribution to the development o f the securities markets in 
Mexico.
Regarding ownership diversification, or ownership democratisation as it was called by 
state officials, much was achieved; at the end o f  the privatisation, the number o f  
investors with stakes in the banks, more than 130 000, was substantially higher than the 
pre-nationalisation case, when only 8 000 investors owned 59 banks (Aspe 1992: 785). 
Nevertheless, the number is still very small compared to the number that could have 
been attained if  the sale mechanism would have been stock flotations. Jamaica and Chile 
privatised their banking systems using this sale mechanism in which both public at large 
and institutional investors participated (Zank 1991: 57). These cases, along with the 
privatisation programme in the UK, also done mainly through stock flotation, became to 
be known as ‘popular capitalism’ for the large number o f investors with share-holdings 
in the newly privatised financial firms. In this way, ownership democratisation 
eliminated any possible popular opposition to the programme ensuring its political 
success (Zank 1991: 57). In Mexico, however, the institutional arrangements o f  the 
political system make popular support for these decisions non-essential.
An additional consideration for selecting direct auctions over stock flotation was the 
possibility to clearly identify the investment groups with controlling stakes in the banks 
(Dionisio Meade, Interview, Mexico City, January 22nd 1998). This served the double 
purpose o f discriminating among potential bidders according to their managerial skills 
and financial experience, on the one hand, and making possible an alliance with those
10 The valuation was calculated from the quoted value in the market for the Certificados de Aportacion 
Patrimonial (CAPs/Certificates of Patrimonial Contribution). CAPs were shares o f state-owned banks
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winning the auctions, on the other. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the state failed to 
identify the best investment groups and some banks fell into the control o f  either 
inexperienced or corrupt managers.11 In terms o f the alliance with the new owners o f  the 
banks, the bidding process opened a communication channel between public officials at 
the Ministry o f Finance and the most prominent investors o f the private sector. There 
were several meetings with stock brokers and major industrialists held in order to 
establish the value o f the banks prior to the date o f the auctions (Ortiz 1994: 343).
Table 6.4
Shares Valuation of Selected Mexican Banks: 1990(1)




Comermex (Inverlat) 5.9 1.58
Intemacional 6.8 1.42
Mexicano 8.0 1.10
Composite (Five banks) 6.8 1.57
Source: Hanley et al 1991:25
(1) Valuation made in 1990 based on the latest twelve months available
The final, but also the most important consideration for selling the banks through direct 
auctions was the maximisation o f revenues from the banks' privatisation. According to 
Dionisio Meade, the sale o f the banks was purely decided on the price (Interview, 
Mexico City, January 22nd 1998). The Ministry o f Finance estimated the value o f the 
state share-holdings in the banking system somewhere around $4.4 billion dollars 
(International Reports 1990: 9). At the beginning o f the process, early in 1991, analysts 
were projecting the prices for the banks to be along the standard valuation parameters at 
which the shares o f  the Mexican banks (CAPs) were traded. These valuation parameters 
were price/eamings multiples o f 6 to 7 times and price/book ratios o f about 1.5 times 
(see Table 6.4). The anticipated prices through stock flotations in the equity markets 
were close to those prices at which the shares were already traded. Had this sale
susceptible of acquisition by private investors up to one third of the total bank’s equity.
11 Two of the banks that eventually felt into financial or corruption problems were sold to investors 
without financial experience. Angel Rodriguez, for instance, used the acquisition of Banpais as a signal 
o f his creditworthiness and hence have access to other lines of business; and Carlos Cabal, was virtually 
unknown in the financial circles in Mexico (Dionisio Meade, Interview, Mexico City, 22/01/1998).
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mechanism been chosen, with valuations between 1.5 and 2 times book value, the state 
would have received between $6 billion dollars and $8 billion for its stake in the 
banking system.
Table 6.5
Revenues and Prices from the Banks’ Privatisation
Banks Percentage
sold
Price (1) Price / Book 
value
Multibanco Mercantil de Mexico 77.19% 611.20 2.66
Banpais 100.00% 544.99 3.02
Banca Cremi 66.70% 748.29 3.40
Banca Confia 78.68% 892.26 3.73
Banco de Oriente 66.00% 223.22 4.04
Banco de Credito y Servicios 100.00% 425.13 2.60
Banco Nacional de Mexico 70.72% 9,744.98 2.62
Bancomer 56.00% 8,564.21 2.99
Banco BCH 100.00% 878.36 2.67
Banca Serfin 51.00% 2,827.80 2.69
Multibanco Comermex 66.54% 2,706.01 3.73
Banco Mexicano Somex 81.62% 1,876.53 3.31
Banco del Atlantico 68.48% 1,469.16 5.33
Banca Promex 66.00% 1,074.47 4.25
Banoro 66.03% 1,137.81 3.95
Banco Mercantil del Norte 66.00% 1,775.78 4.25
Banco Intemacional 51.00% 1,486.92 2.95
Banco del Centro 66.31% 869.38 4.65
Total 37,856.45
Source: Barnes 1994: 249-250 
(1) Millions of pesos
Nevertheless, the dynamics unleashed by a sale through direct auctions led to a 
weighted price/book value o f 3.08 and total revenues o f  $13.5 billion dollars (Barnes 
1994: 247). The financial community perceived as a unique and historic opportunity to 
control a bank in the clearly under-banked Mexican financial system. Price premiums 
paid in the bank auctions reflected confidence in the Mexican process o f  privatisation 
and recognition o f  potential growth for the banking services (Jameson 1994: 126). Since 
the very first auction high prices were paid for the banks. Jose Madariaga initiated the 
rally by buying Multibanco Mercantil de Mexico at 2.66 times the book value (Ortiz 
1994: 241). In order to increase the competition by attracting more bidders for the larger 
banks (BANAMEX, BANCOMER and SERFIN) the initial auction was limited to a 
controlling equity stake complemented with the option for the winning group to buy the
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remaining share-holdings from the state (Ortiz 1994: 282). In fact, the revenues from the 
sale o f these two banks accounted for almost half o f total revenues (see Table 6.5).
6.4. The Outcomes
On August 13 1990 at the VI National Banking Convention the minister o f  finance 
Pedro Aspe announced the rules and the official objectives for the banks’ privatisation. 
These stated objectives were the following (Aspe 1990: 20-21, Ortiz 1994: 216-217): 
(1) create a more efficient and competitive financial system; (2) ensure diversified 
participation in banks ownership to promote investment in the financial sector and 
prevent ownership concentration; (3) ensure high ethical standards and competence o f  
bank management and obtain adequate capitalisation levels; (4) ensure Mexican 
nationals control o f the banking system without excluding foreign involvement; (5) 
promote decentralisation and regional participation in the banking institutions; (6) 
obtain a fair price for the banks; (7) promote a balanced financial system; (8) promote 
fair and healthy financial and banking practices. This list includes only those stated 
objectives related to the financial system but has to be complemented with the 
undeclared motivations o f the agents contending for political power and economic rents. 
The purpose o f  this section is to disclose the real forces leading to the Mexican banks' 
privatisation.
On July 16th 1992, President Salinas met with representatives o f  the more than 130000 
investors that acquired a stake in the banks. In that meeting, he assessed the process and 
concluded that it was a success in every respect. The sale through public auctions was 
transparent and honest, based on a strict observance o f the law. The interests o f the 
nation were preserved at all time, raising revenues o f  $13.5 billion dollars translated 
into permanent benefits by writing off public debt. The banks ownership became 
democratised, by increasing the number o f stockholders from 8 000 in 1982 to 130 000 
after the privatisation, geographically decentralised, and preserved under Mexican 
nationals (Aspe 1992: 784-786; Salinas 1992: 782-784).
These facts are impressive but barely related to the efficiency and stability o f the new 
configuration o f  the financial system that emerged as a result o f the banks’ privatisation. 
This section outlines the major economic, financial and political outcomes o f this
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policy. Former sections argued that this decision was consistent with the wider 
economic agenda o f President Salinas. In addition, the privatisation was effective to 
consolidate his political leadership by releasing fiscal resources for social expenditure, 
securing an alliance with the new business elite and boosting the economy thanks to 
large capital inflows. Last but not least, the banks’ privatisation radically changed the 
configuration o f the Mexican financial system with important institutional implications 
for the long term growth and stability o f the economy.
State Financing and Capital Inflows
The Mexican banks’ privatisation was a clear economic success at least in two 
dimensions. In the first place all the banks were sold at higher prices than predicted 
which translated into healthier public finances. And secondly, the investment climate 
improved in line with the Mexican economic outlook attracting massive capital inflows. 
The proceeds obtained from the sale o f the banks were fully directed to write o ff  internal 
debt, which as a percentage o f  GDP was reduced from 24.4 in December 1990 to 17 
percent in December 1991 (Barnes 1994: 248). By doing this, the one-off revenue from 
the privatisation was translated into a permanent reduction in interest payments. The 
reduction came from two sources: the amount o f outstanding debt for which interest 
payments had to be made was substantially less, on the one hand; and the interest rates 
also decreased as a result o f the government’s reduced borrowing requirements, on the 
other.
Despite the fact that the public deficit was no longer a problem for economic 
stabilisation, the high prices paid for the banks reduced significantly the public sector 
debt burden releasing fiscal resources for social expenditure. In this way 
macroeconomic improvements were translated into social programmes which was a 
major component o f the political strategy o f the financial coalition. In fact, it paid 
extraordinary dividends in the 1991 and 1994 federal elections when the PRI 
recuperated its political hegemony and the bases o f  popular support were fully restored.
On another front, the banks’ privatisation also contributed to boost the economy for the 
second part o f President Salinas’s term. However, the boost did not come from the 
capital paid for the banks, instead it came from better economic conditions and
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increasing confidence from international capital.12 The changes to the financial system 
contributed to restoring positive capital flows for the first time since the 1982 crisis 
(Jameson 1994: 126-128). At the same time that flight capital was repatriated in order to 
buy the banks and other large public enterprises. Mexico re-entered the voluntary 
international financial markets thanks to the improved investment climate. In fact, the 
newly privatised banks faced a favourable moment in which the Mexican blue chip 
companies were returning to the international capital markets. The largest banks placed 
new issues o f  debt and equity in these markets in order to bring capital adequacy in line 
with international standards. Nevertheless, the margins achieved in those issues were 
still very high: BANAMEX’s Euromarket issue in the spring o f 1993 was priced 350 
basis points over US Treasuries; and a latter placement o f GF BANCOMER achieved a 
slightly narrower margin o f 282 basis points over US Treasuries (The banker, August 
1993: 52).
However, it was not only Mexican companies going to the international capital markets 
that brought massive capital inflows but, more significant, foreign investors were 
coming to the BMV. Foreign investment in the stock exchange increased from $2.9 
billion dollars in 1991 to $10.7 billion in 1994 {Mercado de Valores, August 1994: 67). 
As a further side effect o f these capital inflows the Mexican currency was kept 
overvalued leading to a consumption boom that also contributed to the electoral success 
o f the PRI in the presidential elections in 1994.
New Alliance for Economic Management
As mentioned before, the privatisation programme as a whole was a great act o f state 
engineered change. This programme meant a deep transformation on the Mexican 
political economy. In this context, the banks’ privatisation further activated the alliance 
between the economic elite and the financial coalition, which has been a permanent 
feature o f Mexican political system, sometimes active and sometimes latent. The state, 
controlled by the technocrats, needed the support o f large business for the whole 
programme o f economic transformation. Their co-operation was essential to control
12 Officials in the Ministry of Finance were aware that much of the capital to buy the banks were credits 
from the banks themselves. They were not very careful with the sources o f the capital (Guillermo Barnes,
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inflation, bring back flight capital to buy the public enterprises, and increase the 
productive capacity o f the economy in the context o f free trade. In exchange, the state 
restricted itself to act as ‘watchdog’ leaving the management o f the economy to the 
economic elite (Garrido 1994: 167).
The banks’ privatisation alone transferred the control o f $160 billion dollars in banking 
assets to 18 investment groups (CNBV 1994a: 16). Rodolfo de la Torre, researcher at 
IT AM, pointed out that ‘bank ownership has been pulverised, but this has not 
necessarily produced a democratisation o f control in the financial sector’ (quoted by 
Business Mexico, January 1995). At the end o f 1993, the assets o f the industrial groups 
and the banks where the same principal shareholder dominate added up to $258 billion 
dollars, equivalent to 61.5 percent o f  the GDP in that year. According to Miguel 
Ramirez (1994: 34) this concentration o f political and economic power in a relatively 
small and close group poses serious questions about M exico’s future stability and 
development.
It is suggested by Ben R. Schneider (1989) that the ruling coalition within the state, by 
privatising public enterprises gave up some political power to the economic elite, 
changing the existing balance o f power between the public and the private sector. In the 
case o f the banking system this is only partially true. Commercial banks were managed 
as a business concern in which patronage networks at the political level never developed 
while under public ownership. Furthermore, internal decision making within the banks 
was very much privatised. In fact, the autonomy in the internal operation o f the banks 
was further enhanced with the elimination o f the under-ministry for banking in June 
1986 (International Reports 1990: 3). The political constraints on the operation o f  
market forces were kept to a minimum (Glade 1989). For instance, in the case of  
BANAMEX, David Ibarra, Fernando Solana and Antonio Ortiz Mena as chief 
executives always acted in the best interest o f the bank despite their having political 
backgrounds (Alonso Rios, Interview, Mexico City, 14/09/1995). Regarding the 
allocation o f credit, it was not directed, as originally intended, to politically sensitive 
sectors such as housing and agriculture (Marquez 1986). On top o f all o f  these
Interview, Mexico City, 09/02/1998).
179
considerations, the banks came under mixed ownership in 1987, which further limited 
any possible discretionary management with political ends.
However, the banks’ privatisation changed the balance o f power between the state and 
the business elite to the extent that new industrial-financial groups consolidated and 
concentrated the control o f the financial system and some strategic economic sectors. 
The separation o f concerns and ownership between banking and industry was not 
achieved despite the fact that it was a major strategic objective at the onset o f the 
privatisation. With the exception o f BANAMEX, the other major banks were acquired 
by investment groups with majority stakes in leading industrial and services 
corporations (see Table 6.6).13
Table 6.6
New Industrial-financial groups
Groups Chairman Financial division Industrial division
BANACCI Roberto Hernandez Banamex-Accival Telecommunications
VISA Eugenio Garza Lagiiera Bancomer Beer
VITRO Adrian Sada Gonzalez Serfm-Obsa Glass
DESC Fernando Senderos Mexicano-Invermexico Conglomerate
PRIME Antonio del Valle Prime Beer
CARSO Carlos Slim Helu Inbursa Conglomerate
HERMES Carlos Hank Rhon Interacciones Car manufacturing
Source: Garrido 1994
The five largest banks alone controlled 67 percent o f the banking system’s total assets in 
December 1994 (CNBV 1995). This trend was further enhanced when the state 
authorised new banking licenses to those important new industrial groups that were 
originally excluded from the purchase o f a bank. This was the case o f  Carlos Slim ’s 
Grupo Carso and Carlos Hank Rhon’s Grupo Hermes (Garrido 1994). The already 
alarming concentration o f economic power in a few groups was strengthened with the 
banks’ privatisation, consolidating, in this way, the alliance o f the economic elite with 
the financial coalition. The economic elite is a close and compact group with perfectly 




Corruption scandals further support the view that the economic goals o f  the banks’ 
privatisation were subordinated to political and personal ambitions. According to Felipe 
Diaz Garza (quoted by Proceso, December 12th 1995), as soon as the privatisation was 
announced, Raul Salinas, the President’s brother, went to Monterrey in order to 
persuade investors to participate in the banks’ privatisation. At the end o f  the process, 
four banks were under the control o f  investors from Monterrey. These four banks 
represented 41.8 percent o f the total assets o f  the system. Eugenio Garza Lagiiera 
(VISA) acquired BANCOMER; Ricardo Margain Berlanga bought Banco de Oriente; 
Jorge Lankenau acquired Banca CONFIA; and Adrian Sada purchased SERFIN. Once 
their new owners ran the banks, Raul Salinas received large credits from them. In 
August 1992, SERFIN extended him a loan for half million dollars to buy and refurbish 
a country house in the Barrio Antiguo o f  Monterrey; and BANCOMER extended a loan 
for $2.5 million dollars to buy a house in Colonia Obispado {Proceso, December 12th 
1995).
Cross lending between bankers also became a common practice. According to The 
Times (July 24th 1998) Angel Rodriguez (BANAPAIS) lent to Jorge Lankenau 
(CONFIA) and to Carlos Cabal (CREMI-UNION). All o f them are facing criminal 
charges for corruption. Jorge Lankenau and Carlos Cabal also received loans from each 
other’s banks {La Jornada, August 28th 1998). By the end o f 1998, the CNBV had 
brought to trial under criminal charges 162 bank executives and employees {El 
Excelsior, September 14th 1998). Among them, the Presidents o f five financial groups: 
Eduardo Mariscal (HAVRE); Carlos Cabal (UNION); Angel Rodriguez (BANPAIS); 
Marcelo Margain (BANORTE); and Jorge Lankenau (CONFIA).
Some o f the scandals involved bankers linked to important members o f the political 
elite. For instance, Oscar Espinoza Villareal, the PRI’s treasurer and Jose Angel Gurria, 
the PRI’s director for international affairs, were involved in the financial scandal o f
13 Nonetheless GF BANACCI is also developing its industrial branch by starting a telecommunications 
company.
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Grupo Financiero HAVRE. Both o f them authorised credit lines to the group while in 
NAFIN and BANCOMEXT respectively {Proceso, February 5th 1996).
On March 3rd 1995 authorities from the CNVB and CNSF took over the management o f 
ASEMEX, the largest non-life insurance company in Latin America, and its parent bank 
BANPAIS, amid allegations o f irregularities {World Corporate Insurance Reports, 
March 10"' 1995).14 According to The Times (July 24th 1998), Angel Rodriguez, former 
President o f BANPAIS, lent himself and his family $400 million dollars, which they 
never paid back, leaving the state to buy their debts. In response to the charges brought 
up by the financial authorities, Angel Rodriguez, declared publicly that officials in 
BdeM and the CNBV were aware o f the loans he received from its own bank. In fact 
they authorised a loan o f $250 million dollars in order to buy ASEMEX from the 
government (quoted by La Jornada, August 28th 1998).15
Angel Rodriguez had close links to the political elite in Mexico: Guillermo Ortiz, 
deputy minister o f  finance (1988-1994), used to advise him on a ‘friendly basis’ on the 
management o f BANPAIS. Both travelled together to New York in order to promote the 
economic plan o f President Salinas where he met with Pedro Aspe and Guillermo Ortiz 
and signed a memo o f understanding on the management o f BANPAIS {La Jornada, 
August 28th 1998). His father Isidoro Rodriguez, known as the ‘transport czar’, 
participated in the PRI’s presidential campaigns, providing transport, since 1958 when 
the candidate was Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-1964). Angel Rodriguez argued that it 
was not corruption or mismanagement that caused the legal action taken against him but 
‘personal differences’ with Eduardo Fernandez, President o f the CNBV (quoted in La 
Jornada, August 28th 1998). Rodriguez ignored Guillermo Ortiz and Eduardo 
Fernandez’s recommendations to appoint Juan Diaz Canedo as executive director o f  
Grupo Financiero ASEMEX-BANPAIS and to include Adolfo Lagos in the group o f  
investors owning the bank.
14 Angel Rodriguez, the President o f the financial group, made no comment and left the country three 
hours latter.
15 The CNBV, in response to “El Divino” high profile defence campaign, paid for some advertisements in 
the national press saying that Angel Rodriguez, his father, and other BANPAIS executives received $900 
million dollars in loans from the bank {The Times, July 24lh 1998).
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Another major case o f corruption was Carlos Cabal’s mismanagement o f  Grupo 
Financiero CREMI-UNION. The government took over the management o f this 
financial group on September 5th 1995 because o f illegal operations and under­
capitalisation {La Jornada, November l l Ih 1998). Carlos Cabal Peniche was business 
partner with Federico de la Madrid, son o f former President Miguel de la Madrid. When 
Cabal participated in the auction for UNION, he represented more than 250 
businessmen and politicians. Among them were: Jorge Salomon Azar, former governor 
o f Campeche; Mario Trujillo, former governor o f Tabasco, David Gustavo Gutierrez 
former governor o f Quintana Roo; and Salvador Neme Castillo former governor o f  
Tabasco; and Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido former governor o f Chiapas and former 
minister o f Government {La Jornada, November 11th 1998). According to Aristides 
Prats Salazar, ex-board member o f Banco UNION, Carlos Cabal openly accepted that 
making contributions to the presidential campaign was a ‘political investment’ (quoted 
by La Jornada, August 27th 1998).
None o f the supposed checks on the banks’ management — board o f directors, external 
auditors and the CNBV—  spotted the illegal operations at the time. This is an 
institutional problem that may go even further into the very nature o f M exico’s business 
and political culture. Most o f the members from the board o f directors in the banks 
under government management because o f corruption claimed that the chairman misled 
them. However, these same members were also involved in loans without the required 
guarantees, paying lower than market-interest rates and soft repayment conditions {El 
Economista, September 25th 1997). In any o f the cases o f  financial scandal, external 
auditors, required once a year to conduct thorough inspections to banks’ operations, 
detected the illegal operations going on. They claim that if  they issue any 
recommendations against the management, they are either fired or replaced by another 
firm.
Universal Banking
Apart from the economic and political dimensions o f the banks’ privatisation, there is 
the obvious, and no less important, financial dimension itself. The privatisation changed 
the configuration o f the Mexican financial system with important implications for the 
1995 banking crisis and the long-term performance o f the economy. The most important
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provisions in this direction were mainly three: (1) the introduction o f universal banking 
in the form o f financial groups;16 (2) the separation o f ownership between financial 
groups and other business concerns; and (3) exclusive control o f the financial groups by 
Mexican nationals.17
Of these three provisions, the introduction o f universal banking has ever more important 
efficiency implications for the Mexican financial system. This is also the only one that 
has remained unchanged. Universal banking is supposed to increase the competitiveness 
of the financial system through the supply o f complementary financial products and 
services by the same firm. According to Juan Ignacio Gil, Head o f the CNSF, the banks’ 
privatisation provided a business opportunity for the insurance companies integrated to 
financial groups (Interview, Mexico City, September 1st 1995). Insurance companies 
and other financial firms could access new clients by using branch network o f  the 
privatised banks. In fact, banking, stock brokerage and insurance under the same 
ownership is the existing configuration in most European countries, and was the 
configuration that existed in Mexico prior to the banks' nationalisation. However, most 
countries with universal banking built their system around the banks. In contrast, 
Mexico, as a result o f the privatisation, universal banking emerged from SBHs buying 
commercial banks. Despite the fact that banks were far more important than SBH s,18 the 
brokerage culture prevailed in the new financial groups with obvious consequences for 
their business strategies. Lending was far more aggressive than it would have been 
otherwise under traditional banking practices. Stockbrokers are acknowledged more 
prone to risk-taking than are bankers.
Between 1982 and 1991, when the banks were under public ownership, SBHs and banks 
competed for the segment o f corporate finance through products that were close
16 Commercial banks cannot own a SBH or vice-versa but both can be owned by a financial holding 
company.
17 The equity structure for the banks proposed by the state after the privatisation in order to 
institutionalise the new configuration was divided into three types of shares. “A” shares (minimum 51 
percent) available to domestic individuals and state agencies only; “B” shares (maximum 49 percent) 
available to any domestic entity; and “C” shares (maximum 30 percent) eligible for sale to foreigners 
(Hanley et. al. 1991: 15-18). However, this structure was substantially altered as a consequence o f the 
banking crisis in 1995.
18 For instance, ACCIVAL, who bought Banamex, has only 31 thousand employees compared to 330 
thousand of Banamex.
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substitutes. Retail banking, however, remained under complete control from the banks. 
This segment is not only highly profitable, but also complementary to other segments o f  
the financial business; the banks’ network o f branches can be used to sell securities and 
insurance products to the public. The publicly owned banks were relatively protected at 
this level from any kind o f competition and therefore financial groups were eager to 
include this profitable and extremely usefiil segment o f the industry within their 
operations.
In fact, analysts anticipated at the onset o f the privatisation process that the most likely 
bidders for the banks were the owners o f the recently created financial groups 
(International Reports 1990: 9-10). As expected, 13 out o f  18 banks were sold to 
financial groups centred on SBHs, which also reflects the personal fortunes accumulated 
in the stock exchange during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the owners o f  these financial 
groups also have important equity stakes in other major business concerns. Therefore, as 
mentioned above, important links between financial groups and industrial firms were 
established despite the fact that only individuals could bid for the banks. These links 
increase the routes by which financial instability is transmitted and magnified to the real 
sector o f the economy (see Jameson 1994). Furthermore, the incentive structure they 
create is conducive to vicious financial practices. In fact, in the cases o f  corruption o f  
Banco UNION and BANPAIS there were conflicts o f interest between the financial 
group and the other business concerns o f the same owners.
Market structure and degree of competition
Last but not least, the privatisation o f the commercial banks had important implications 
upon the market structure and the degree o f competition in the Mexican financial 
system. The banks’ privatisation did not substantially increase the degree o f  
competition, although this was an explicit purpose o f the state. Early in the 1990s it was 
expected that a more competitive financial system would arise from existing forces 
rather than from the privatisation o f the banks themselves (Hanley et. al. 1991: 22). At 
that time there were already important forces shaping the competitive environment for 
the coming years: the competition between SBHs and banks at the level o f  corporate 
finance, and strategic decisions adopted by the banks to face this type o f  competition. 
Sophisticated information technology, training, and product development already
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existed in Mexico prior to privatisation (Hanley et. al. 1991: 22). However, these 
competitive trends contrast sharply with the high prices paid for the banks that can only 
be explained by expected profits above competitive levels. Banks profits during the 
years immediately after the privatisation were still higher relative to those in Canada 
and the US, notwithstanding their high operation costs. Furthermore, the privatisation 
produced non-competitive pricing in which the interest rate spread has widened 
considerably (McComb et. al. 1994).19
An additional element that constrained competition just after the banks’ privatisation 
was protection against foreign financial firms. Since the beginning o f the banking 
divestiture process the state assured potential buyers that the domestic financial system  
was to be opened to foreign investment only gradually (Ortiz 1990: 44). According to 
Isaac Katz, the prices paid for the banks were very high because the bidders expected 
the system to remain protected from external competition, and therefore could earn extra 
economic rents (interview: Mexico City, September 13th 1995). Foreign banks barred 
from owning more than 30 percent o f any bank, were not interested in entering the 
Mexican market, with the notable exceptions, according to the Economist (March 9th 
1991), o f  Societe Generale and BNP from France and Banco Santander o f  Spain. 
Furthermore, according to Isaac Katz, the liberalisation scheme negotiated under 
NAFTA was very restricted and mainly intended to protect the market share o f  the three 
largest banks, namely BANAMEX, BANCOMER and SERFIN (Interview, Mexico 
City, 13/09/1995).20
This situation, however, changed radically after the banking crisis in 1995, when the 
Ministry o f Finance removed most o f the constraints on foreign investment in the 
banking sector. The original limit o f 30 percent foreign participation in the groups’ 
equity was removed as a consequence o f this crisis; some banks, smaller and medium  
only, were allowed to be under complete foreign control completely in order to improve 
their capitalisation levels. This is the case o f GF Probursa acquired by the Spanish bank
19 The interest rate spread is the difference between the interest rate the banks pay for the deposits they 
receive.
20 In the original liberalisation scheme, total operations o f foreign banks could not exceed eight percent of 
the total capitalisation of the system, and any single bank can exceed 1.5 percent before the year 2000. 
However, this scheme was radically changed as a consequence of the banking crisis ensuing the peso 
devaluation in December 1994.
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Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and GF Inverlat now controlled by Bank o f Nova Scotia from 
Canada. Despite the arrival o f these foreign banks is an additional source o f 
competition, the market for banking services is still dominated by the three largest 
financial groups: BANACCI, GF BANCOMER and GF Serfin. In June 1995 the banks 
o f these three financial groups controlled half o f the total assets o f the banking system, 
slightly more than half o f total income and almost half o f  the total branches (CNBV  
1995). The market structure, characterised by high concentration, did not change as a 
result o f the banks' privatisation.
Nevertheless, the degree o f competition does not only depend on the observable 
structure o f the market. Institutional arrangements like anti-trust legislation or barriers 
to entry also determine the banks’ competitive behaviour. In the case o f  anti-trust 
legislation the experienced was mixed after the privatisation. The government 
introduced a comprehensive act to regulate competition. However, collusive behaviour 
was only mildly penalised, if  at all. Although Santiago Levy, President o f  the 
Commission for Competition, found that some o f  the largest financial groups, including 
BANCOMER and SERFIN, manipulated the auctions o f CETES, he imposed fines o f  
just $60,000 dollars (The Economist, July 9th 1994).
Barriers to entry into the relevant business segments were also significant (McComb et. 
al. 1994). Under the 1990 LGIC the state introduced the possibility o f issuing new 
banking licences subject to a minimum capital requirement o f 0.5 percent to the 
system’s total, at that time $17.6 million dollars (Hanley et. al. 1991: 18). The size o f  
this capital requirement is an important barrier to entry, especially compared to the $8 
million dollars required in Canada or the $5 million in the US. However, recently, new 
banks in Mexico have typically capitalised at levels in the $40 million dollars range. 
Thus, while minimum regulatory capital requirements are relatively high in Mexico, 
market conditions require de facto  capitalisation well above that level (McComb et. al. 
1994). In sum, the degree o f competition is still very low and the market concentration 
is still very high in the Mexican financial system. However, the changes to the market 
structure and the increase in the degree o f competition are more related to the responses 
to the 1995 banking crisis than to the banks’ privatisation itself.
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As a result o f  the lack o f competition interest rates spread rose from average o f  around 
6.5 percent in 1991 to 8 percent in 1993. Though inflation fell to 8 percent in 1993, 
borrowers are paying, according to the Economist (January 29th 1994), 30 percent on 
mortgages or car loans, 40 percent on credit cards and around 25 percent for business 
loans. In Mexico, banks made easy money just by arbitrating the differential between 
American and Mexican interest rates. Banks borrowed cheap abroad at low interest rates 
and lent expensive in Mexico at high interest rates. Their only risk, which they judged to 
be remote, was a devaluation o f the peso.
Summary
Economic problems became the most sensitive political issue at the beginning o f the 
1980s. In this context, the financial coalition centred on the financial division o f the 
executive took control o f the Mexican state. In order to consolidate their dominant 
position they launched a far-reaching programme o f economic transformation. The 
financial reform altogether with the banks’ privatisation was an essential part o f this 
wider strategy o f structural adjustment. By privatising the banks, the state, commanded 
by the financial coalition, improved the investment climate and brought back massive 
capital inflows that translated into good economic performance and consolidated their 
dominant position within the Mexican political system. At the economic level, universal 
banking, new financial practices and a new configuration o f the private sector are direct 
consequences o f  the banks' privatisation. These outcomes changed essentially the 
institutional framework o f the economy with strong implications for the stability o f the 
financial system as shall be discussed in chapter eight.
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Chapter 7
Banco de Mexico’s Autonomy
This chapter uses the case o f the reform to the legal status o f  Banco de Mexico (BdeM ),1 
to show how the state’s strategy to rebuild the bases o f popular support for the regime 
was shaped by the new international consensus on economic policy, on the one hand, 
and the Mexican political institutions, on the other. International trends in economic 
policy were incorporated to M exico’s development strategy in order to increase capital 
inflows and secure financing to the state. Late in the 1980s and early 1990s, Central 
Bank Autonomy (CBA) ranked very high in the new international economic consensus 
and the change to the legal status o f BdeM in 1993 responded to this trend. In fact, this 
reform was motivated more by the need to improve investment conditions and not so 
much by the goal o f achieving price stability in the long run, as it is claimed by 
economic theory.2 Capital inflows, increasingly guided by signals o f  future 
macroeconomic stability, were critical for the success o f the economic transformation 
pursued by the state under President Carlos Salinas.
This chapter is also organised according to the standard four-section format set at the 
beginning o f the thesis for the case studies: ideas, context, reform and outcomes. The 
first section introduces the theoretical and institutional issues o f CBA. The second 
section shows how changes to BdeM’s relative autonomy have been historically related 
to the financial requirements o f the state. This section also introduces the international 
context in which the reform to central banking gained momentum. The third section 
discusses the links o f the financial coalition with BdeM, the upcoming presidential relay 
in 1994 and the end-of-sexenio economic scenario. Inflation and public finances
1 The reform to the legal status o f BdeM comprised changes to Articles 28, 73 and 123 of the 
Constitution and the issue of a new Organic Law for BdeM. The reform to the Constitution was published 
in the Official Newspaper of the Federation on August 20th 1993 and the new Organic Law of BdeM was 
enacted in April 1st 1994.
2 Price stability in the long run is obviously an important component of the investment climate. However, 
it is more relevant for long-term investment. In the case o f Mexico, we argue that the state was more 
concerned with portfolio investment, i.e. short-run investment in the securities market, for which is more 
important the current rate of inflation and policy signals.
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indicators were under control, but problems in the balance o f payments were increasing 
the risk o f  a major economic disruption towards the end o f President Salinas’s term. 
Finally, the fourth section illustrates how the main changes brought about by the reform 
did not alter the modus operandi o f BdeM in any fundamental way, but they did 
contribute to improve international capital perception o f M exico’s economic prospects.
7.1 The Ideas
The inflationary experience from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, when the world for the 
first time in a peaceful period adopted fiat money,3 brought to the attention o f  policy 
makers the relationship between CBA and inflation. The view developed that where 
central banks were less susceptible to state pressure they delivered sounder monetary 
policy and therefore lower inflation (Bowles and White 1994: 236; Capie, Goodhart, 
Fischer and Schnadt 1994: 55). Under this perspective policy makers intended to bring 
about price stability by granting greater autonomy to their central banks as a mean o f  
insulating monetary policy-making from the short run interests o f the state (Alberti 
1995:475).
Price Stability: The Theory
During the 1980s one o f the main theoretical debates in economics was about the role o f  
monetary policy embedded in the Philips curve, i.e. a presumed trade-off between 
inflation and employment in the short run bestow on monetary policy the capacity to 
influence the level o f economic activity. At present there is a clear and well-established 
relationship between surprise inflation and short-term growth and it is commonly agreed 
that monetary policy can be used to stabilise the business cycle when it cannot be 
anticipated by the economic agents. However, a new problem, known in the economic 
literature as ‘time inconsistency’, arises when the state handles monetary policy.4 In this
' Fiat money was the result o f the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system when the gold standard was 
abandoned, and consequently money stopped being backed by gold reserves. Since then, economic 
agents hold money because it is a generalised accepted medium o f exchange.
4 Dynamic inconsistency or time consistency problem is the discrepancy between the optimal policies that 
a policy authority would announce if its announcements were believed by the public, and the policies the 
authority would carry out once the public had acted on the basis of these expectations (Fischer 1991: 
287).
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case, economic agents know that the state has the incentive to deviate from pre­
announced monetary policy leading to inefficient outcomes characterised by higher 
interest rates.
In order to eliminate the uncertainty produced by this continuous incentive to deviate 
from pre-announced policies, two alternatives were considered: fixed rules and greater 
autonomy o f the central bank. Fixed monetary rules means that the state and the central 
bank have to give up the possibility o f using monetary policy with stabilisation purposes 
when unexpected shocks occur; and therefore it was rejected. As an alternative, some 
authors proposed appointing a conservative governor to the central bank, who is more 
averse to inflation than the state, in order to retain flexibility in monetary policy and 
deal with the inflationary bias o f discretionary policy at the same time (R ogoff 1985; 
Grilli, Maschiandaro and Tabellini 1991; Alesina and Summers 1993).5 By delegating 
monetary policy to those who value more price stability, policy makers can guarantee 
conservative decisions regarding money supply and interest rates improving their own 
welfare.
Officials at the central bank shape their policy preferences in a very different way to 
their counterparts in state. In terms o f backgrounds, central bank’s officials have 
training usually in economics or in related fields whereas state officials have much more 
diversified backgrounds. Therefore it is easier for the officials at the central bank to 
support price stability as an institutional goal. In the case o f politicians, they are usually 
motivated by their desire to keep power and advance their own political preferences 
making very difficult to have coherent institutional goals. This explains why central 
banks have unified positions compared to those multiple positions almost always 
present in state (Alberti 1995: 478).
Another reason why the central bank tends to favour price stability more than the state is 
the length o f their planning horizon. States have short run objectives, usually 
determined by the electoral cycle, and therefore use monetary policy either to attend the 
demands o f important interest groups or to boost the economy just before the elections.
5 The inflationary bias of discretionary policy refers to the benefits o f surprise inflation in terms o f the 
stabilisation power of monetary policy over the business cycle.
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Among the most common uses o f credit expansions are: bailing out insolvent firms, 
financing development projects, or simply keeping interest rates artificially low. Central 
banks in contrast have long run objectives making their decisions usually guided by the 
natural business cycles o f any market economy. Officials at the central bank are mainly 
concerned with price stability and the efficiency o f the financial system (Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapti 1992: 354; Alberti 1995: 477).
Politicians often try to influence central bank decisions in order to get re-elected or 
advance their own economic and political agendas (Alberti 1995: 478). Financing the 
public deficit is usually the most important locus o f conflict between the central bank 
and the state. An autonomous central bank is expected to reduce the public deficit by 
forcing the state to meet its own budgetary constraints (Persson and Tabellini 1990; 
Alberti 1995: 480). It is important to mention that developed more than developing 
countries tried to exploit this trade-off between inflation and unemployment during the 
1970s.6 In the case o f developing countries the inflationary bias o f monetary policy was 
caused more by the continuous ‘monetisation’ o f the budget deficit than by the attempt 
to stabilise the business cycle (Fry, Goodhart and Almeida 1996: 27; Lippi 1997).7
Price Stability: The Evidence
The empirical evidence for the relationship between CBA and lower inflation is by no 
means conclusively mainly due to a measurement problem. Real autonomy, the relevant 
variable in the analysis, cannot be objectively measured and therefore is proxied by 
legal or statutory autonomy (Bowles and White 1994: 238). The usual method is by 
constructing indexes from legal provisions regarding methods o f appointing and 
dismissing top bank officials, length o f their tenure and limits on financing to the state 
(Alesina and Summers 1993).8 However, these indexes are good proxies for real 
autonomy only in the case o f industrialised countries where the rule o f law is stronger.
6 Simple bi-variate regressions, cross section and pooled time-series indicate negative relationships 
between inflation and growth in the long and short run for 44 developing countries. The empirical 
evidence shows that there is no trade-off between inflation and economic growth in developing countries, 
not even in the short run (Fry, Goodhart and Almeida 1996: 13).
7 States in OECD countries borrow 3 percent o f their total financial requirements from their Central 
Banks compared to 45 percent for states in developing countries (Fry, Goodhart and Almeida 1996: 28).
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In developing countries, in contrast, these indexes fail to take into account informal 
mechanisms that also constrain the degree o f CBA. Alternative measures include: 
governor turnover and self-perceptions o f bank officials regarding their own autonomy 
(Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; Cukierman 1992).9 Yet, these proxies can only be 
used as a proxy for CBA in a very restricted sense since the notion o f  autonomy 
embodies a wider set o f institutional provisions.
According to the indexes provided by Cukierman (1992) some o f the countries with the 
highest average rate o f inflation during the 1980s like Argentina, Peru and Nicaragua 
have ratings o f  legal autonomy above the median. Nonetheless, countries such as 
Panama, Japan and Belgium, with very low rates o f inflation, are ranked in the lowest 
quartile o f  legal CBA (see Table 7.1). These observations suggest that greater legal 
CBA is neither necessary nor sufficient to secure low inflation.
Table 7.1
Central Bank Autonomy and Inflation in the 1980s
Country LA(1) GT(2) Inf.(3) Country LA(1) GT(2) Inf. (3)
Switzerland 0.68 0.13 3 India 0.33 0.33 9
West Germany 0.66 0.10 3 Indonesia 0.32 NA 10
Austria 0.58 NA 4 Britain 0.31 0.10 7
Egypt 0.53 0.31 17 Zambia 0.31 0.38 28
Greece 0.51 0.18 19 Australia 0.31 NA 8
Chile 0.49 0.45 21 China 0.29 0.34 8
Tanzania 0.48 0.13 31 Romania 0.29 0.20 4
Ethiopia 0.47 0.20 4 Ghana 0.28 0.28 44
Denmark 0.47 0.05 7 France 0.28 0.15 7
Canada 0.46 0.10 6 Western Samoa 0.28 NA 8
Bahamas 0.45 0.19 6 Sweden 0.27 0.15 8
Malta 0.45 0.28 3 Singapore 0.27 0.37 3
Kenya 0.44 0.17 11 Finland 0.27 0.13 7
Argentina 0.44 0.93 319 New Zealand 0.27 0.15 12
United States 0.51 0.13 5 South Africa 0.30 0.10 15
8 Legal autonomy is negatively related to growth but the coefficient is not significant (Cukierman, 
Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb 1993).
9 That paper found that governor turnover rates are positively related to levels o f inflation in developing 
countries, though not in industrialised countries. However in a latter paper, they found for a cross-section 
of countries including industrialised and developing countries that Central Bank governor turnover is 




Country LA(1) GT(2) Inf.(3) Country LA(1) GT(2) Inf.(3)
Turkey 0.44 0.40 50 Thailand 0.26 0.20 6
Peru 0.43 0.33 194 Brazil 0.26 NA 230
Israel 0.42 0.14 105 Nepal 0.25 NA 11
Costa Rica 0.42 0.58 25 Bolivia 0.25 NA 230
Netherlands 0.42 0.05 3 Hungary 0.24 0.18 9
Philippines 0.42 0.13 14 Zimbabwe 0.23 0.15 13
Nicaragua 0.42 NA 258 South Korea 0.23 0.43 8
Honduras 0.41 0.13 7 Italy 0.22 0.08 11
Zaire 0.41 0.23 58 Uruguay 0.22 0.48 56
Barbados 0.40 0.11 7 Spain 0.21 0.20 10
Ireland 0.39 0.15 9 Pakistan 0.19 NA 7
Venezuela 0.37 0.30 21 Belgium 0.19 0.13 5
Uganda 0.37 0.34 105 Qatar 0.18 NA 4
Luxembourg 0.37 0.08 5 Morocco 0.16 NA 8
Botswana 0.36 0.41 11 Japan 0.16 0.20 3
Iceland 0.36 0.03 38 Panama 0.16 NA 3
Mexico 0.36 0.15 65 Norway 0.14 0.08 8
Malaysia 0.34 0.13 4 Yugoslavia 0.13 0.23 108
Nigeria 0.33 0.19 19 Poland 0.10 NA 43
Source: Cukierman (1992: 381)
(1) LA is an index constructed to measure central bank autonomy using variables on governor 
appointment, objectives, limitations on lending and policy formulations. The range o f the index goes 
from zero (minimal autonomy) to one (maximum autonomy).
(2) GT is a proxy for real autonomy and measures the average number o f changes per annum o f central 
bank governor
(3) Inflation is measured as the yearly geometric average during the 1980s 
NA: not available
From these same indexes it can also be seen that inflationary performance was relatively 
homogenous and good for developed countries, in sharp contrast, with the performance 
o f developing countries that was very poor in general and fairly uneven (see Table 7.2). 
The mean o f the average inflation rate for developing countries over the 1980s was 
substantially higher than that for developed countries. Latin American countries as a 
separate group have a less homogenous inflationary performance and far worse on 
average than developing countries as a group. As regards legal autonomy, there are no 
substantial differences between these three groups o f countries; central banks in Latin 
American countries have on average the same degree o f  legal autonomy as central banks 
in developed countries. Furthermore developing countries are slightly more 
homogenous regarding the legal status o f their central banks compared to developed
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countries. However, the expected relationship between central bank legal autonomy and 
inflation has the right sign for the case o f developed countries only.10
Table 7.2
Statistics for Central Bank Autonomy and Inflation
Variable Statistics Developed Developing Latin American
countries countries countries
Mean 8.05 48.22 119.00
Inflation (Inf) Variance 12.50 5803.15 13683.36
Std Dev 7.35 76.18 116.98
Mean 0.36 0.33 0.35
Legal Autonomy Variance 0.15 0.01 0.01
(LA) Std Dev 0.16 0.11 0.10
Cov (Inf,LA) -0.21 0.76 1.11
Mean 0.12 0.28 0.40
Governor Turnover Variance 0.002 0.03 0.06
(GT) Std Dev 0.05 0.16 0.25
Cov(Inf,GT) -0.12 5.37 15.76
Source: Calculated from Cukierman (1992) 
LA: Legal Autonomy 
GT: Governor Turnover
In order to capture the effect o f informal arrangements on the degree o f  CBA, some 
studies have used governor turnover as a proxy for real autonomy (Cukierman, Webb 
and Neyapti 1992; Cukierman 1992). In this case, the results are more consistent with 
the theoretical claim o f greater CBA bringing along lower inflation. Latin American 
countries have on average substantially higher governor turnover rates than the rest o f  
developing countries and than developed countries revealing the relative lack o f  
autonomy o f their central banks. However high turnover may also mean that the central 
bank governor is not coping with the task o f achieving price stability more than 
opposing to the state policies, especially in the context o f high inflation as it was the 
case for Latin America during the 1980s (Cukierman 1992: 392). If this is the case then 
this information is not sufficient to establish a causal relationship for developing 
countries between CBA and lower inflation. These observations are consistent with the
10 It is very important to note that the statistics presented in Table no. 2 are only descriptive and therefore 
they cannot be taken as evidence that there is not a casual relationship between inflation and CBA. 
However they serve to establish the contrast between a fairly heterogeneous inflationary performance 
among group o f countries, developed and developing, and a somewhat more homogenous situation 
regarding legal status o f Central Banks among countries.
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results obtained from Cukierman’s (1992: 419) regression analysis in which legal 
autonomy does not have significant explanatory value on inflation performance. Also 
real autonomy as measured by governor turnover is positively related to inflation in 
developing countries. And finally legal autonomy is a reasonable good proxy for actual 
CBA in developed but not developing countries.
As it is evident from the results presented above there is an important gap between 
developed and developing countries when trying to establish the relationship between 
CBA and inflation on empirical grounds. In the case o f  industrial economies this 
relationship is somewhat better established (Grilli, Maschiandaro and Tabellini 1991; 
Cukierman 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993; Havrilesky and Granato 1993).“ 
However, the same relationship is still not well established for developing countries.
The Political Economy of CBA
The literature has a different type of explanation to CBA based on arguments o f political 
economy. According to Sylvia Maxfield (1997: 4) ‘politicians use central bank 
autonomy to try to signal their creditworthiness to potential investors. The more global 
financial markets become, the more politicians must concern themselves with signalling 
investors.’ In this context, the importance CBA is not so much about bringing inflation 
down but about the confidence that central bank inspires to the financial community, 
both international and domestic. This confidence rests upon the expertise and non- 
partisanship o f the bank staff, able to deliver high quality and impartial analysis o f the 
country’s economic situation (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 26). Under this 
approach CBA is used as a ‘partial commitment device’ intended to achieve greater 
credibility, reduce inflationary expectations and lower interest rates along with wage 
demands (Eijffmger and De Haan 1996: 41). Despite the fact that the relationship 
between CBA and lower inflation is not well established for developing countries, 
international capital perceives CBA as a desirable institutional feature in any country 
seeking to attract foreign investment. Furthermore, as financial systems have become
11 Grilli, Maschiandaro and Tabellini (1991) constructed a detailed and homogenous set o f indexes of 
CBA for a group o f European countries plus the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand. They found a significant negative relationship between some of their indices and average 
inflation in some periods.
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more sophisticated and more globally integrated monetary policy has gradually lost its 
power to stir the economy even in the short run. States are less interested in preserving 
control o f an increasingly less effective monetary policy and therefore are willing to 
give up such control in exchange o f a favourable rating from the financial community.
International investors are seeking certainty and higher returns in emerging economies 
and since they have little access to local information and risks on returns are relatively 
high they look for signals that domestic states will stick to sound economic policy in the 
future. Depending on the type o f investment the importance o f  signalling also varies. 
For instance direct investment is not very sensitive to signals on macroeconomic policy  
because it is long term, expected returns depends more on sectoral policies, investors 
usually have good access to local information. Besides investors try to influence 
decisions by lobbing more than by leaving the country since this type o f  investment is 
relatively fixed. In contrast, financial investment in state securities is highly responsive 
to these signals because its expected returns depends on macroeconomic policy, 
investors do not have great access to local information, and they try to influence policy­
making by leaving the country since this investment is relatively liquid (Maxfield 1997: 
39). It is evident then that the importance o f signalling is closely related to the nature o f  
foreign investment. The more it is concentrated in securities, especially from the state, 
the more important is to provide a good investment climate.
International investors search for emerging economies with macroeconomic stability 
aware that it requires sound and consistent fiscal and monetary policies. Having an 
autonomous central bank means that each one these two policies are controlled by 
different organisations. In this case is expected that they will be most probably used for 
the purposes they are more suitable to serve, i.e. monetary policy for price stability and 
fiscal policy for economic efficiency and income re-distribution (Alberti 1995: 480). 
However even the most autonomous central bank is still constrained by prior choices o f  
fiscal stance and exchange rate regime (Fry, Goodhart and Almeida 1996: 27).12 
Communication and co-ordination between the bank and the state is still very important 
otherwise there is a risk that the monetary and the fiscal authorities will compete against
12 Inflation is caused ultimately by fiscal imbalances that at certain point have to be financed by monetary 
expansion (Sargent and Wallace 1981).
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each other leading to an undesirable outcome with high budget deficit and high interest 
rates (Doyle and Weale 1994: 76).
Paul Volcker, former chairman o f the Federal Reserve Board, described the role o f  
central bankers as gatekeepers o f growth in the following terms: ‘the function o f the 
central bank is to set limits, to set a framework— which other people may not like— that 
provides an environment in which growth and stability may be achieved in the interest 
o f the economy as a whole’ (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 14). Alternatively, 
as a member o f the Federal Reserve Board o f  governors put it: ‘it is the role o f the 
central banker to take away the punch bowl, just when the party is getting going’ 
(Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 14; Capie, Goodhart, Fischer and Schnadt 1992: 
60). In order to preserve price stability, central banks are expected to implement 
deflationary policies in the face o f an expansionist impulse. Deflationary policies 
leading to higher interest rates have important distributive consequences in favour o f  
creditors, usually richer people who are holders o f  financial assets and against debtors, 
usually poorer people more dependent on credit for its own consumption. Therefore the 
politics o f CBA is not only about price stability but also about who benefits from such 
price stability. Poor, small-scale, indebted farmers are likely to be most opposed to 
deflationary policies, the rich retired, large holders o f financial assets are likely to be the 
most supportive. This configuration o f opponents and supporters to CBA can be 
translated to the spectrum o f political parties, where parties on the left are expected to 
oppose such measure and parties on the right to support it (Capie, Goodhart, Fischer and 
Schnadt 1994: 60). However with increasing capital mobility and financial markets 
usually suspicious o f left-wing states, such prospective states might even have the 
incentive to allocate the control o f inflation to an autonomous agency in order to secure 
financial inflows for their economies to grow and develop.
Central banks are important in the process o f development when a country strengthens 
its financial and economic relations with the rest o f the world (Volcker, Mancera and 
Godeaux 1991: 84). Granting greater autonomy to them represent one o f the most 
important signals to obtain investors confidence given the institutional features o f  
central banks. They more than any other state agency share a common policy culture 
with international capital enhancing communication and collaboration. Central bank’s 
top officials in industrialised countries are important members o f  international capital.
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They have a very active role in shaping the world political economy by controlling 
monetary policy in their own countries and by participating in the decision making 
process o f organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Top officials o f  
central banks from smaller countries are in continuous communication with their 
counterparts in industrialised countries (see Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991).
In this context greater real autonomy is expected to bring along greater 
institutionalisation o f central banks which means that their operations are expected to 
conform their own scale o f values more along with the standards o f international capital 
than with the objectives o f specific domestic interest groups. International investors 
believe than their ability to influence policy and keep it on a stable, consistent course is 
greater the more autonomous is the central bank. Securing in this fashion an 
environment in which expected returns from investment are more certain and can be 
more easily calculated.
Legal vs. Real Autonomy
Sketching the distinction between legal and real autonomy helps to frame the discussion 
o f the reform to the legal status o f BdeM. By real autonomy it is usually understood the 
ability o f the central bank to change the key operational instrument in monetary policy 
without consultation or challenge from the state (Capie, Goodhart, Fischer and Schnadt 
1994: 50). The state grants this capability to central banks through statutory 
arrangements in most o f the cases. However, as already shown the actual practice 
deviate very often from the law, especially in the case o f countries with weak 
institutional frameworks (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992: 355). Legal autonomy is 
not necessarily real autonomy at the same time that formal lack o f autonomy, does not 
mean that the central bank is not influential and does not enjoys certain degree o f  real 
autonomy either.13 The law, in general, is incomplete in the sense that it cannot regulate
For instance, the Bank of England, formally subordinated to the Treasury, is one o f the most influential 
Central Banks in the world thanks to its long tradition and excellent research department. The Bank of 
England was created in 1694 in order to finance the war against France at that time,. The history of 
Central Banking in general is closely associated to the history o f the Bank o f England. In this case the 
formal relationship o f subordination have not prevented conflicts between the Bank o f England and the 
government. However the degree of real autonomy have varied over time depending on economic 
conditions and on the personality of the governor. The case o f the Bank of England illustrates how, even 
in industrialised countries, there is a big gap between formal and real autonomy. Also suggests that there
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all the potential situations and therefore leaves some voids that have to be filled by 
tradition or political power.
For real autonomy is usually understood those informal arrangements through which the 
central bank influences the state’s decisions on monetary policy. The sources o f  this 
autonomy can be divided into two different categories: (1) conditions in the financial 
markets, both domestic and international, existing at a given point in time; (2) personal 
characteristics o f the central bank’s top officials. Among the most important 
determinants comprised in the first category are: the liquidity in international capital 
markets, size o f the domestic market for state bonds and the level o f  outstanding public 
debt (Cukierman 1992: 448). The second category includes: the prestige and 
personality o f  top officials running the bank, the quality o f  the banks research 
department, and the fact o f having personnel and senior officials career oriented 
(Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 65; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992: 355).
Decisions about monetary policy have important consequences for economic stability 
and income distribution and therefore they are expected to be accountable to the society 
at large. However by granting greater autonomy to an organisation managed by officials 
that have not been democratically elected creates a problem o f accountability, namely: 
how to reconcile greater autonomy to an organisation isolated from the democratic 
process with the need o f preserving it accountable to the rest o f  the society. Yet 
insulation from political pressures does not mean that central banks are completely 
alienated from political processes. In fact one source o f influence and real autonomy is 
their ability to be close to the political process but not part o f it. To the extent central 
banks are sensitive and aware o f the general social, political and economic contexts 
within which monetary policy is conducted, they enjoy greater real autonomy. As Jean 
Godeaux, former governor o f the National Bank o f Belgium, clearly put it: ‘the 
influence and autonomy o f the central bank do not rest upon legal arrangements but on 
public opinion’ (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 76). Being accountable to the 
greater interest o f  the society as a whole without giving up to influences from particular 
interest groups make central banks more influential and autonomous. In fact, legal
are more important determinants, other than legal provisions, o f the degree o f real autonomy enjoyed by 
a Central Bank (Doyle and Weale 1994: 63).
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autonomy can always be taken away from the central bank when the Congress perceives 
that the bank is not pursuing the best interest o f the society as a whole.
In sum, real autonomy is the relevant variable to control inflation, whereas legal 
autonomy, in the specific case o f developing countries, is relevant only to signal 
commitment to consistent macroeconomic policies in the future. Based on the 
distinction between real and legal autonomy, I argue that the legal reform to BdeM was 
intended as a signal of future macroeconomic stability to foreign investors rather than as 
a real institutional change to avoid future upsurges in inflation.
7.2 The Context
This section shows from a historical perspective how BdeM’s real autonomy has not 
necessarily followed from statutory reforms, or vice-versa. In the case o f  BdeM, real 
autonomy has been historically determined by the conditions in the financial system, the 
organisational culture o f the bank and the personal characteristics o f  the bank’s top 
officials. This section also introduces the international events that led to the generalised 
trend towards greater CBA all over the world, namely: institutional changes in the 
international monetary system; financial integration; and stabilisation programmes in 
Latin American countries.
Historical Overview
Throughout the history o f BdeM, since it was created in 1925, the bank’s real autonomy 
has been determined by the state’s responses to domestic problems mediated by the 
prevailing conditions in the international financial markets. Central banks, in general, 
have enjoyed a greater degree o f independence at times when domestic economies are 
heavily dependent on foreign capital inflows and therefore the leverage o f international 
creditors and their domestic allies rises relative to other policy coalitions (Maxfield 
1997: 33). BdeM has enjoyed different degrees o f real autonomy throughout its history 
depending on financial needs o f the state.
The state founded BdeM in the 1920s, when it was almost bankrupt and needed very 
badly to re-negotiate new loans with foreign banks. Then in the 1930s and 1940s, when
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the international financial markets were in chaos and therefore could not provide 
financing to countries like Mexico, the financial coalition was less influential and BdeM  
was less autonomous. This situation was reversed during the 1950s and the 1960s, when 
multilateral lending was the most important source o f development financing; the 
relative strength o f BdeM improved vis-a-vis other organisations within the state. 
However, in the 1970s, excess global liquidity made redundant the links o f BdeM with 
international capital and, consequently, eroded the influence o f the financial coalition 
(Maxfield 1997: 33). Finally, the debt crisis in the 1980s altered once again the balance 
of power between policy coalitions; early in the 1980s, Mexico did not have access to 
the international financial markets but towards the end o f the decade it became a major 
recipient o f capital inflows bringing back the financiers to prominence.
The need to consolidate BdeM as a central bank made the issue o f autonomy to be 
addressed only in the Ley Organica del BdeM (LOBdeM/Organic Act o f  BdeM) but 
never in practice. When BdeM was created in 1925, autonomy was explicitly stated as a 
desirable characteristic o f the new central bank along with limited regulation, and 
limited state intervention on the bank’s internal affairs (Gonzalez 1997: 9). In the 
LOBdeM of 1925 there were already some limits to BdeM’s financing to the state. 
However, the Ministry o f Finance kept the right to veto any resolution o f the bank’s 
board o f governors whenever they were considered to affect the economic equilibrium 
o f the country (Gonzalez 1997: 12). Since then, the state has had an active role in the 
board’s resolutions; the minister o f finance is a member o f this board. Then again in 
1932, the stated purpose o f the reform to LOBdeM was to secure greater autonomy from 
the state (Borja 1996: 101). However, important issues like the appointment o f  the 
governor and the right o f the minister o f  finance to veto the board’s decisions remained 
intact.
The reform to the LOBdeM in 1938 made the minister o f finance head o f the board o f  
governors and consolidated the subordination o f BdeM to the President.14 External and 
internal conditions reduced the autonomy o f the bank: international financial markets 
were closed to Mexico as a response to the 1938 nationalisation o f the oil industry;
202
political pressures to raise state spending directed to build up popular support for the 
incipient post-revolutionary regime; and constraints on tax collection from a system 
with high costs and a reduced base o f taxpayers. The major concern o f the state at that 
time was institution building, and therefore the political cost o f taxing in combination 
with the pressure for greater spending forced the state to look for alternative sources o f  
funding. In addition, international financial markets were just recuperating from the 
great depression in the late 1920s and foreign investment was not interested in Mexico 
because o f the nationalisation o f the oil industry in 1938. The only option open was 
domestic credit and seigniorage.13 Dividends from BdeM’s operations, mainly from 
seigniorage, go to finance the state since 1942 (Borja 1996: 113).
During the 1950s and 1960s the circumstances faced by the country were very different 
to those in the preceding decades. At a domestic level, the political hegemony o f  the 
PRI was already consolidated and at an international level, there was a steep rise on 
development lending from the recently founded Multilateral Financial Organisations 
(MFOs). Furthermore difficulties in the balance o f payments in 1954, early in President 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’ term, brought to the attention o f politicians the importance o f  
capital inflows (Maxfield 1997: 95). The nature o f the relationship between BdeM and 
the President changed radically in the 1950s, although no major change to its legal 
status was made. For instance, the governor turnover fell sharply; Rodrigo Gomez was 
the only governor o f BdeM throughout this period.
During this period, known as stabilising development, fiscal policy was conservative 
and reliance on credit from BdeM was not excessive despite the fact there were no legal 
limits on state financing. BdeM influenced expenditure decisions on state programmes 
in co-ordination with the Ministry o f Finance, although the bank had no legal role in 
shaping the budget and was not legally autonomous (Maxfield 1997: 98). The alliances 
of BdeM with the Ministry o f Finance, on the one hand; and with the IMF, on the other, 
were the two pillars o f the bank’s autonomy. Antonio Ortiz Mena at the Ministry o f
14 The Ministry of Finance plays a crucial role in the relationship between BdeM and the rest o f the state. 
We use hereinafter the figure of the President to represent the state and the Ministry o f Finance as the 
agent o f the state for the specific relationship with BdeM.
15 Seigniorage is an optimal source of government revenue if there is widespread tax evasion or in the 
presence of large tax collection costs (Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 1990: 553).
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Finance and Rodrigo Gomez at BdeM had a virtual monopoly on major economic 
policy decisions. This alliance had the institutional support o f the IMF.16
Further changes in domestic and external circumstances during the 1970s brought about 
a new swing in the relationship between BdeM and the President. During this decade the 
state had major access to international capital; increasing oil export revenues associated 
with rising oil prices, and new loans associated to excess liquidity in the international 
financial markets flooded the Mexican economy with capital inflows. The importance o f  
sound macroeconomic policies usually heralded by an autonomous central bank fell 
sharply mainly due to the state’s easy access to foreign loans. International capital did 
not sanction sound economic policies anymore. At the same time and on the domestic 
side, the political system faced a legitimisation crisis sparkled by a left-wing challenge 
to the PRI (Maxfield 1997: 98). Despite the relative abundance o f foreign capital there 
were strong pressures for expansionist fiscal and monetary policies. In this context, the 
state took away the autonomy the bank enjoyed in the preceding decades in order to 
secure greater control over BdeM’s credit.
During this period, the state forced BdeM to undertake various types o f quasi-fiscal 
operations.17 These operations were illustrative o f the reduced BdeM ’s real autonomy 
since they meant state guidelines guiding banks operations. Conflicting policy 
standpoints between the President and the governor o f BdeM were common, first 
between President Echeverria and governor Fernandez Hurtado, and then between 
President Lopez Portillo and governor Romero Kolbeck (Maxfield 1997: 101). In all 
these conflicts, the President subdued the governor. Once more during the 1970s, the 
real autonomy o f BdeM decreased substantially despite the fact that there were no major 
statutory changes and it was completely disassociated from the legal status o f the bank.
The debt crisis in the 1980s represented the end o f the 1970s’ lending bonanza and 
brought back to the attention o f politicians the urgent need o f  international
10 Antonio Ortiz Mena once said: “...we go to the IMF to make us do what we know we have to do... this 
help us to control public opinion (Maxfield 1997: 95).
17 Quasi-fiscal activities are state operations directly financed by the Central Bank and consequently not 
registered on the public accounts. It was very common for BdeM to extend subsidised credit to 
agriculture, exports projects, and other development banks. The mechanisms were very much alike to
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creditworthiness (Maxfield 1997: 102). A new reform to the LOBdeM in 1985 
eliminated the minister o f finance’s right to veto any important decision o f  BdeM; tough 
it was never exercised (Borja 1996: 54). In apparent contradiction, this same reform 
introduced explicitly the obligation o f the bank to act in conformity with the monetary 
and credit policies dictated by the Ministry o f Finance (Borja 1996: 102). This change 
came after a decade in which the bank was especially subservient to the President’s 
policies and preceded a period in which BdeM gained autonomy steadily.
Towards the end o f 1982 the investment climate had severely deteriorated and the 
country faced strong balance o f payments difficulties. This context altered once more 
the relationship between BdeM and the Ministry o f  Finance. The change o f  presidential 
administration in combination with a severe economic crisis initiated a process in which 
BdeM gradually gained greater real autonomy. One o f the first moves o f  incoming 
President Miguel de la Madrid was to re-appoint conservative banker Miguel Mancera 
as governor o f BdeM. Also in 1982 the state ceased to receive the dividends from 
BdeM’s operations, these went into investment funds within the bank.
Mexico became a big recipient o f foreign investment once again in the late 1980s, 
although under very different circumstances. Now, increasing capital mobility turned 
investors’ perception on M exico’s economic outlook a major concern for policy makers. 
Among the state policies intending to secure a good investment climate, the reform to 
the legal status o f  BdeM was prominent. BdeM achieved a great deal o f  real autonomy 
long before the reform o f its legal status took place. In fact three years before the 
reform, in 1990, Paul Volcker former chairman o f the Federal Reserve Board reported:
‘... [BdeM] is not independent in a formal, legal sense. But I think that I can 
report to you without fear o f contradiction that BdeM and Mr. Mancera have a 
great deal o f influence, not just in monetary policy but in the economic policy o f  
Mexico, generally. They are independent in a functional sense, and everybody 
knows it. That is a very considerable asset in my opinion to the state o f  Mexico 
in dealing with the rest o f the world, because there is a certain inherited
those of development baking: directed lending to pre-specified sectors, explicit or implicit deposit 
insurance, and exchange rate subsidies.
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confidence and trust in dealing with the central bank that frankly may not apply
in the same degree to the rest o f Mexico’ (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991:
33).
It is evident from this section that formal reforms to the legal status o f BdeM are usually 
disassociated to changes in the bank’s real autonomy. The last reform in 1993 is not an 
exception and before it took place BdeM already enjoyed a great deal o f  real autonomy, 
being very influential not only over monetary policy but also over economic policy in 
general. Furthermore, as shall be discussed below, it did not prevented the strong input 
from the President in 1994, an elections year, when monetary policy succumbed to 
political pressures and was rather loose.
International Trends
I have argued throughout the thesis that the dominant policy paradigm at international 
level is a major factor influencing the behaviour o f the state; in the particular case o f  this 
chapter, the relationship between the President and the central bank. The costs and 
benefits o f different economic strategies depend very much on international conditions. 
For instance, in the 1930s, a global depression reduced the expected payoff o f  an 
economic strategy o f  greater integration at the same time o f reducing the expected cost 
o f a domestic-oriented economic strategy. In this period inward development strategies 
associated with ‘structuralism’ like Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) in Latin 
America flourished. Then, in the late 1980s, the reverse is the case, increasing financial 
globalisation has raised the payoff o f economic integration and the costs o f  inward 
economic strategies. Therefore export promotion strategies and structural adjustment 
programmes associated with a neoliberal ideology are highly in vogue.
CBA is determined to a great extent by the international context where trends towards 
state control or market liberalism have alternated over time since early last century 
(Capie, Goodhart, Fischer and Schnadt 1994: 51). The revolution o f the market is by no 
means negligible to understand the current trend towards CBA around the world. This 
revolution has its origins in the convergence o f two major events: a global crisis o f  
governance triggered to a great extent by the 1980s debt crisis, and the resurgence o f  
neo-classical orthodoxy (see chapter two). In this international setting, the scope o f
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economic activities susceptible o f state control has become increasingly narrower 
(Bowles and White 1994: 242). The generalised move towards greater CBA is 
consistent with the main postulates o f this new orthodoxy, leaving monetary policy out 
o f the state’s sphere of control.
The 1993 reform to the legal status o f BdeM took place in the midst o f a worldwide 
trend in which states, from both developed and developing countries, were granting 
greater autonomy to their central banks. States in countries as diverse as Chile, France 
and New Zealand enhanced the statutory autonomy o f their central banks in the last ten 
years. Since 1989 twenty five countries have upgraded the legal independence o f  their 
central banks, which is remarkable when contrasted with the few changes that occurred 
in the previous forty years (Lippi 1997: 1; Maxfield 1997: 3). CBA has been an issue 
ranking high in the economic agenda o f countries all over the world in this period. This 
widespread interest is associated mainly to three set o f events: (1) institutional changes 
at an international level; (2) the globalisation o f financial markets; and (3) the 
introduction o f costly stabilisation programmes in Latin America.
The most important institutional changes moving forward CBA in the agenda o f  
domestic states were: (1) the breakdown o f institutions designed to safeguard price 
stability, namely: Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System; (2) the clause 
included in the Maastricht Treaty requiring an autonomous central bank as a pre­
condition for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); (3) the search 
for institutional arrangements to prevent future inflationary experiences after successful 
stabilisation programmes; (4) the creation o f many autonomous central banks in former 
socialist countries; and (5) recent literature suggesting that inflation and CBA are 
negatively related (Eijffmger and De Haan 1996: 1; Maxfield 1997: 3-10).
The abandonment o f the Bretton Woods system between 1971 and 1973 was a major 
monetary regime change. Under this system there was a de facto  fixed exchange rate 
and the monetary policy framework was directed towards stabilising exchange rates by 
pegging the currency value to gold. Then and for the first time in history the world 
adopted a peacetime fiat monetary regime. Under this new system o f fiat currency there 
are limitless possibilities for expanding money supply and therefore the preservation o f  
the currency’s value became a major concern for monetary authorities (Lippi 1997: 7).
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At the same time, the international policy community became increasingly aware o f  the 
inflationary performance over the past forty years o f countries like Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland with some o f the most autonomous central banks in the 
world.
In 1987, the Maastricht Treaty laid the foundations for the EMU consisting o f  a single 
currency for the European Community and a European System o f central banks to 
manage the single currency. This event heated the debate o f  CBA in European 
countries. The Treaty, for instance, imposed a prescribed standard o f CBA for the 
countries participating in the EMU (Fischer 1994: 301). Finally the pioneering reform to 
the legal status o f New Zealand’s central bank introduced a new contractual relationship 
between these types of organisations and the rest o f  the state. In this contract the central 
bank was explicitly mandated to preserve the annual inflation below 2 percent otherwise 
the state could dismiss the governor o f the bank.
Financial globalisation has increased capital mobility to levels difficult to anticipate 25 
years ago. This process has tended to harmonise policy decisions regarding financial 
systems around the world, producing a convergence in financial standards. CBA is no 
exception and there is now a general trend towards greater autonomy. Financial 
globalisation has increased the cost o f poor monetary policy, the desirability o f  CBA, 
and the competition between state securities from different countries. In other words, 
financial globalisation has increased the competition for investment in international 
capital markets; state leaders are constantly persuading international capital to invest 
into their securities. There is currently undergoing a shift in the balance o f  power 
between national states and international capital in favour o f the latter as a consequence 
o f the increasing globalisation o f financial markets; the leverage o f international capital 
is at an all time high (Bowles and White 1994: 243; Woodall 1995).
CBA influence the perception o f international capital on countries’ economic 
perspectives and therefore states’ trying to improve their securities competitiveness are 
induced to include changes to the legal status o f  their central banks in their agendas. 
CBA represents an attempt to signal creditworthiness. National states seeking to attract 
financial inflows cannot afford to ignore this type o f perceptions and therefore make 
their policy decisions accordingly. A state will be more inclined to do so when it needs
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balance o f payment support and there is a lower degree o f financial regulation (Maxfield 
1997: 35).
The process o f financial globalisation has been accompanied by financial liberalisation 
over the last 15 years, especially in developing countries. Financial repression 
characterised by interest rate ceilings, credit rationing, and directed lending schemes 
was replaced by policies aimed to unleash market forces. Monetary policy is 
increasingly implemented through open market operations and not through central 
bank’s credit or reserve requirements on commercial banks deposits. Capital flows to 
developing countries have increased substantially over the last few years because o f  
financial liberalisation.
Finally, the historical experience o f some countries that faced deep economic crises in 
combination with high inflation, illustrates how successful stabilisation programmes 
often lead to CBA like in the case o f Germany after the World War II, or Israel, Chile 
and Mexico in the 1980s (Cukierman 1992: 454). State and society are well aware o f  the 
costs o f price instability in countries coming out from a period o f high inflation and 
costly stabilisation programmes.18 CBA after stabilisation programmes all over Latin 
America intended to avoid future surges in inflation, specially given the great social 
costs o f  these programmes (Fraga 1994: 68). Most o f the Latin American countries that 
implemented strong stabilisation programmes granted greater autonomy to their central 
banks. However, it is not possible to establish any relationship between their degree o f  
autonomy and the success o f the programme in bringing down inflation as the cases o f  
Mexico and Venezuela serve to establish despite the fact that central banks were 
instrumental actors in the stabilisation programmes o f each country (see Table 7.3).
In the case o f Mexico the strength o f corporatist structures was crucial to bring down 
inflation in the late 1980s. The Mexican stabilisation programme was based on a system 
o f Pacts in which the state called leaders from business and labour corporatist
18 Inflation inhibits the investment process, making very difficult to asses costs and benefits o f an 
investment project; saving decisions are impaired by volatile real interest rates; authorities become 
tempted to establish price controls; prices of goods and services provided by the public sector lag behind 
inflation, deteriorating the public deficit; labour contracts have to be renewed more often, though wages 
are always lagging behind price increases leading to redistribution effects; and at some point, inflation 
destroys the financial system (Volcker, Mancera, Godeaux 1991: 20).
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organisations to control price and wage increases. It was the state advised by BdeM who 
designed and implemented this stabilisation programme. The strength o f  the 
institutionalised corporatist partnership between state, labour and entrepreneurs was 
crucial to achieve price stability by inducing interest groups to forsake distributive 
conflict more than the autonomy o f BdeM itself (Schmitter 1981; Cameron 1984; 
Maxfield 1997: 25).19
Table 7.3
Stabilisation Programmes in Latin America
Country Central Bank Stabilisation Programme
Argentina Currency board Preservation of the value of the currency according to the 
convertibility law. It was highly successful to bring down 
inflation but there is no room for sterilisation of balance of 
payments surpluses
Brazil Weak institutional 
framework
Elimination of monetary budget (quasi-fiscal operations 
performed by the central bank); elimination of subsidised 
credit. Greater legal autonomy not yet made effective. The 
results are still uncertain.
Chile Autonomous since 
1989
The central bank controls the exchange rate policy and it is 
not allowed to lend to the government. It was highly 
successful.
Colombia Not autonomous 
until 1993
It was the only country with relative price stability during 
the 1980s (inflation around 20 percent). Good prospects for 
gradual reduction.
Mexico Not autonomous 
until 1993
Banco de Mexico played a key role in the stabilisation 
programme since 1988, long before it was given formal 
autonomy.
Venezuela Autonomous since 
1992
Stabilisation programme has failed thus far despite the 
reform that granted greater autonomy to the central bank.
Source: Fraga (1994)
In sum, the importance o f  CBA depends very much on the international environment 
(Doyle and Weale 1994; Maxfield 1997). The statutory reform o f  BdeM was the result 
o f the world-wide interest on CBA as has been argued in this section; and o f  the urgent
19 Havrilesky and Granato (1994) found that CBA more than corporatist structures explained the 
comparative inflation performance of eighteen industrialised countries.
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political need to avoid any major economic disruption in 1994, a presidential elections 
year, as it will be argued in the next two sections. The next one turns to the highly 
volatile economic situation that the state faced during the second part o f  President 
Salinas’s term, and the last section deals with the relevant political institutions and 
processes shaping the state’s policy responses.
7.3 The Reform
Political explanations to CBA are based on several arguments: politicians wanting less 
responsibility upon unpopular monetary policy; legislators wanting o f a well-informed 
third party to monitor the monetary policy o f the state; state leaders seeking 
creditworthiness in international financial markets; party leaders leaving office wanting 
to constrain the incoming party to change monetary policy (Maxfield 1997: 12). The 
approach taken in this chapter emphasises the state’s need to abate economic uncertainty 
during 1994, a presidential elections year. The experience in the 1988 elections 
illustrated that major economic disruptions actually impair the electoral performance o f  
the PRI, the state’s party.
This section argues that despite the reform, BdeM was not completely insulated from 
political pressures and therefore its decisions conformed to the policies dictated by the 
President. The argument addresses the issues o f reform team and timing. This section 
also describes the major institutional changes to BdeM and shows how they were 
irrelevant for the overall behaviour o f the bank and to its relationship with the rest o f the 
state. Previous sections have already shown how formal and real autonomy have been 
dissociated throughout the history o f the bank and how BdeM was autonomous in its 
day-to-day operations to a great extent prior to the reform.
Reform Team
The inflationary performance o f  a country reflects to a great extent the economic 
priorities o f the dominant policy coalition within the state. If price stability ranks high in 
their economic agenda then inflation will be low regardless o f the legal status o f the 
central bank. In like manner, policy makers that are not inflation averse always find the 
way to get around the legal status o f  the central bank and promote expansionist policies
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(Fischer 1994: 298). Usually financial groups are more concerned with price stability 
than workers and industrialists who are more interested in economic growth and 
employment (Bowles and White 1994: 245); they have more to lose from inflation and 
have closer institutional links with the central bank. The financial coalition in Mexico 
has traditionally protected the anti-inflationary policy o f the central bank.
According to Adam Posen (1993) the degree o f CBA can be explained in terms o f this 
opposition to inflation. This opposition is higher in the presence o f  universal banking, 
low regulatory power o f the central bank over the financial sector, a federal political 
system and a low fractionalised party system (Posen 1993). All these conditions are 
present in the case o f Mexico where the financial opposition to inflation increased 
sharply after the privatisation o f the commercial banks in the late 1980s. The opposition 
to inflation from the financial coalition since 1982, exercised through institutional and 
policy networks has determined anti-inflationary policy.
MFOs have direct institutional links with central banks. BdeM has been the main link 
between the Mexican state and the MFOs and therefore its reputation before these 
organisations is essential when it comes to get financial support and policy advice from 
them. Stanley Fischer (1993: 264), Chief Economist at the IMF, said: ‘the capacity and 
reputations of, for example, the central banks o f Israel, Italy and Mexico have all played 
a key role in helping bring about stabilisation and stability in their countries.’ BdeM is 
the organisation with the best reputation for sound macroeconomic policy-making 
among the international financial community. At the same time BdeM is also linked to 
the domestic financial groups through networks o f consultation and policy co-ordination 
(see chapter four).
Top officials from BdeM and executives from major banks often share common 
backgrounds and are also part o f common policy networks.20 Expertise and credibility 
are usually considered among the most important sources o f central bank authority 
(Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 76). The central bank’s expertise, credibility to
20 For instance Miguel Mancera, governor o f BdeM, share personal links with Pablo Aveleira, Director of 
the Research Department of Banamex. There is continuous communication between top bank officials 
and the representatives of this financial community on top of other type of informal links. For twenty 
years they have been meeting in a monthly lunch with other executives from the commercial banks and 
other officials from BdeM (Alonso Rios, Interview, Mexico City, 14/09/1995).
212
control monetary policy, ability to regulate financial markets becomes more valuable to 
the extent that the financial system becomes more sophisticated (Maxfield 1997: 24). 
Top officials at BdeM aware o f  President Salinas’s concern for capital inflows used 
their links with international capital to promote CBA (Maxfield 1997: 33).
Timing
Most o f the Political Business Cycle (PBC) literature is built upon elections, political 
parties, state and voters (see Willet 1988).21 Monetary policy, as in the case o f  most state 
policies, is usually under pressure towards short-run goals determined by the electoral 
calendar and the politicians’ desire to remain in power. In the last twenty years, the PBC 
in Mexico has been associated to inconsistent macroeconomic policies— monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate policies. The last three presidential terms, before President 
Salinas, have ended up under the shadow o f an economic crisis. Hence the main 
challenge for President Salinas’s towards the end o f his term was to avoid any major 
economic disruption and consolidate the new bases o f  popular support for the regime. 
The autonomy o f BdeM in combination with the signing o f the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the most important moves for that end. However when 
it looked that NAFTA might fail due to US congressional opposition, the statutory 
reform o f BdeM acquired greater importance.
Timing is a relevant issue for the final outcomes o f any reform, but also illustrates the 
driving forces behind the decision. The timing o f the reform to BdeM was influenced by 
electoral considerations. The state has to legitimise the regime every six years through 
elections and this is becoming increasingly difficult. Before 1988 bad policy outcomes 
never threatened the electoral triumph o f the PRI. As a result o f the poor performance 
on the 1988 elections, President Salinas perceived that devaluation and inflation were 
important determinants o f voters’ behaviour and therefore structured its strategy for the 
1994 elections around the economic outlook o f the country.22 The statutory reform o f
21 The basic idea of the PBC literature is that because the typical lags in adjustment o f inflation to 
changes in macroeconomic policy are larger than for unemployment, a carefully engineered economic 
expansion can give politicians the advantage of a booming economy just before the election, while most 
o f the associated inflationary costs do not follow until the election is safely over (Willet 1988: 14).
22 Inflationary performance in Mexico was very poor during the 1980s reaching its highest annual rate at 
160 percent in 1987. At that point, economic reform speeded up and the state took important decisions
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BdeM was not expected to be an issue in the 1994 presidential elections but President 
Salinas expected that a more autonomous central bank would help to reduce the 
economic uncertainty usually associated to the last year o f  any presidential 
administration.
The presidential initiative to reform the Constitution was sent to the Congress in June 
1993 and the new LOBdeM was enacted in April 1994, just few months before the 
elections. These changes could not have had any significant economic impact on 
inflation in such a short period o f time. However, the signal produced by the reform is 
transmitted instantaneously to international capital and therefore the effect on capital 
inflows is immediate. Besides, around this time there were already some signals o f  
inconsistent macroeconomic indicators and, on top o f  that, it is well known that the 
presidential relay in Mexico usually creates a vacuum o f political power that 
exacerbates economic uncertainty during the last year o f each presidential term. 
Therefore it was essential to accumulate as much confidence as possible from 
international capital to avoid any possible run against the peso in an elections year. At 
this time, most o f the other reforms to the financial system were already in place and 
therefore the autonomy o f BdeM was one o f the few remaining opportunities to reassure 
international capital o f M exico’s economic soundness.
Content
In general, the reform to the legal status o f BdeM followed very closely the 
recommendations embodied in the literature o f CBA, namely: (1) the central bank must 
have a constitutional mandate to preserve price stability; (2) the central bank cannot be 
forced to lend or to buy securities to any extent beyond what its governing body deems 
appropriate; (3) the members o f the governing body cannot be removed before their 
term expires and that such terms does not coincide with that o f elected officials; and (4) 
there must be a mechanism to solve disputes between the state and the central bank
regarding privatisation of state owned enterprises, deregulation, and trade liberalisation. These structural 
adjustment policies were complemented with a very successful stabilisation programme that brought 
inflation down. By the 1991 mid-term congressional elections the economic strategy was already paying 
off political dividends: the PRI’s electoral performance improved significantly compared to that o f the 
1988 presidential elections.
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regarding economic policy (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 72; Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapti 1992: 356; Maxfleld 1997: 20). An additional recommended change 
related to CBA is their own financing from seigniorage.23
CBA usually refers to instrumental or operational autonomy to achieve a predetermined 
objective but not the political autonomy to pursue its own mandate (Gonzalez 1997: 4). 
BdeM can refuse financing to the state and the Mexican President cannot dismiss its 
governor but the bank does not have the faculty to pursue its own mandate. BdeM has 
an unambiguous mandate, at a constitutional level, to ensure the stability o f  the 
purchasing power o f the national currency (Mancera 1994: 316). The bank is free to 
choose the best means to achieve the goal o f price stability but is not free to change that 
aim. However, as it is evident from the history o f BdeM’s autonomy there is not any 
guarantee that this formal reform is not going to be reversed in the future.
The new LOBdeM changed the legal status o f the bank from a public and decentralised 
agency to an agency subject to public law but autonomous. In the statement o f  purpose, 
it is said that it is supposed to be a counterbalancing force to the executive, which means 
that it becomes a new type o f entity, non-contemplated in the traditional division o f  
power. BdeM is supposed to be an autonomous power from the executive, but it is not 
part o f the legislative or the judiciary, which are by definition the counterbalancing 
powers to the executive in a presidential republic. The new legal status o f  BdeM cannot 
be categorised according to the prevailing division o f power established in the Mexican 
Constitution (Diaz 1994: 105). The legal status has become not only an irrelevant 
feature to the bank’s operations but also a contradictory one.
It is commonly recommended that central bank’s top officials must be appointed for 
terms long enough to avoid possible influences from the actor, in this case the President, 
that appoints them. Also certain provisions are needed to avoid the dismissal o f these 
officials without a justified cause. In the case o f BdeM the President appoints, with the 
approval o f the Senate, the members o f the board o f governors and the governor 
himself. Four sub-governors lasting for eight years in their position changing in a two-
23 Most o f the banks are already financed through seigniorage and therefore this change was not included 
in the recent wave o f reforms to Central Banks.
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year scaled form integrate the board. Then to replace the governor, whose tenure lasts 
for six years not coinciding with the presidential period, the President chooses the new 
governor from the other members o f the board, also with the approval o f  the Senate 
(Diaz 1994: 88; Gonzalez 1997: 22). The fact that it is the Senate and not the Congress 
who ratifies the appointment o f governor and deputy-govemors poses a new question to 
the real autonomy o f the bank. The President retained major control on the governor’s 
appointment, by excluding the Congress from the process despite the fact that the 
Congress is the main responsible to assess the bank’s performance. At the moment o f  
the reform the President had stronger control over the Senate than over the Congress.
Provisions for BdeM’s internal policies regarding personnel and staff remained 
unchanged. These policies are nevertheless directly related to its real autonomy by 
impinging upon the prestige and reputation o f the bank, a major source o f  autonomy. 
Among the most important recruitment and career policies are the following: 
recruitment o f the best young professionals; offer o f training opportunities; offer 
prospects o f  promotion enhanced by the tradition o f not hiring people without a career 
in the bank; encourage open discussion o f the problems to be tackled by the central 
bank; and market salaries according to qualifications (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 
1991: 74).
It is important to note that one o f the arguments for CBA is to avoid pressure from the 
state demanding financing from the central bank. BdeM may extend loans to the state 
but is under no obligation to do so. The loans are deposited in an account held at BdeM  
itself; cheques to third persons cannot be extended from this account in order to avoid 
possible overdrafts; and the balance o f this account is limited to an equivalent o f 1.5 
percent o f total public expenditures approved in the federal budget. In case the balances 
exceed this limit, the bank will issue enough state securities to cover the deficit (Diaz 
1994: 81; Borja 1996: 122). Another part o f the reform intended to avoid quasi-fiscal 
operations which sometimes mean subsidised credit to specific sectors: BdeM stopped 
managing the state trust funds aiming at promoting economic development, they went to 
the relevant development banks (Diaz 1994: 97).
The reform intended to turn BdeM into the only body responsible for monetary policy 
and consequently to keep it accountable. BdeM is therefore required to: send a plan o f
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the monetary policy to be followed throughout the year to the executive and the 
congress; send a report on the monetary policy for the first semester and another for the 
second semester; elaborate a yearly report in the performance o f the economy and the 
bank. The congress may call the governor to present and discuss the policies and 
activities o f the bank and the Ministry o f Finance may call officials from BdeM for 
bookkeeping verifications (Diaz 1994: 91; Boija 1996: 140). However, exclusively the 
board o f governors takes decisions over monetary policy and financing to the state.
Yet policy co-ordination is still important since monetary policy is often constrained by 
the state’s standpoints on other economically significant policies — fiscal and exchange 
rate mainly. The Exchange Commission integrated by three members from the Ministry 
o f  Finance and three from BdeM determines the Exchange rate policy. However, the 
President keeps control o f the Exchange Commission since the minister o f finance has 
the quality vote in case o f a draw and each resolution needs the vote o f  at least one o f  
the members from the Ministry o f Finance (Diaz 1994: 84; Borja 1996: 130). The main 
mechanisms to co-ordinate economic policy between BdeM and the state are: (1) the 
participation o f BdeM along with the Ministry o f Finance in different economic boards 
and commissions like the Expenditure-Financing Commission and the Economic 
Cabinet chaired by the President; (2) the right o f the minister and the deputy-minister o f  
finance to be present at the meetings o f the board o f governors o f BdeM; (3) the 
exclusive participation o f BdeM and the Ministry o f Finance in the Exchange 
Commission; (4) the right o f BdeM to be heard by the Ministry o f Finance before they 
issue any financial regulation; and (5) the participation o f BdeM and the Ministry o f  
Finance in the board o f governors o f the Commissions regulating and supervising the 
financial system (Borja 1996: 138). There are also important informal co-operation 
mechanisms between the state and BdeM, the most important being the private meetings 
between the minister o f finance and the governor o f BdeM (Borja 1996: 54).
7.4 The Outcomes
The outcomes from reform to the legal status o f BdeM were not immediate, or at least 
not evidently. However, the observed trends on some key economic indicators are 
consistent with the thesis claim on the main causes o f the reform. Future inflation, for 
instance, was not a major consideration: monetary and credit policies during 1994 were
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rather loose; signal economic soundness became more important as the size o f the 
current account skyrocketed: capital inflows in 1993 reached an all-time high and in 
1994 remained very high despite the political turmoil. These indicators also show how 
the political rationale for the reform contributed to the conditions leading to the crisis in 
December 1994: loose monetary and credit policies, emphasis on capital inflows, delay 
on corrective action on the exchange rate.
Monetary Policy and Inflation
President Salinas stated in his initiative for reform to BdeM that price stability was not 
an end in itself but a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition, to attain social equity and 
economic development. However by the time the state decided to reform the legal status 
o f BdeM in June 1993, the annualised monthly inflation was 6.7 percent, the lowest in 
the last twenty years (see Table 7.4). In this view it was not inflation control what really 
motivated the reform to BdeM. Besides, CBA is not as important to control inflation in 
a context o f low inflation across countries. This was the case in the early 1990s when 
inflation rates in Latin America and some other developing countries were already 
substantially lower than during the 1980s (Doyle and Weale 1994: 64). Yet President 
Salinas deployed a great deal o f his political capital in the stabilisation programme 
implemented during his presidential administration. Controlling inflation was an 
instrumental goal to gain investors’ confidence and secure capital inflows throughout 
his term. Fiscal, exchange rate and monetary policies were all consistent with this goal. 
Granting greater autonomy to BdeM was an institutional change in line with improving 
the investment climate but it was only secondary to the goal o f controlling inflation.
A striking feature o f  monetary policy during the stabilisation programme during the first 
half o f President Salinas’s term is that it was not restrictive. M2, the monetary aggregate 
used as target to control inflation, increased significantly between 1989 and 1991; 
surprisingly, inflation was falling at the same time (see Table 7.4).24 It is important to 
note that at this point the source o f the expansionist monetary policy was not increases 
in BdeM ’s credit, which became negative in this period but the accumulation o f
24 The traditional definition of M2, includes coins and bills in circulation, cheques accounts, and short­
term deposit accounts.
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international reserves, which were not fully sterilised.25 In this case the monetary policy 
was mainly determined by the exchange rate policy under the decision domain o f  the 
state. The state keeps exchange rate policy under its control because its link with foreign 
investment policy also under state control is regarded as more important than its link 
with monetary policy under BdeM’ control (Borja 1996: 37). Besides, exchange rate 
policy has an important political dimension given the costs o f  devaluation. To the extent 
that this remains the case the freedom o f BdeM to conduct monetary policy is severely 
restricted regardless o f its legal status.
Table 7.4
Macroeconomic Policy, 1982-1994











1985 63.7 9.6 51.8 1.4 247.7
1986 105.7 16.0 49.3 -0.8 232.0 -6.3
1987 159.2 16.0 38.7 -9.2 215.8 -7.0
1988 51.6 12.5 40.5 0.8 202.4 -6.1
1989 19.7 5.6 43.0 0.9 241.8 19.5
1990 29.9 3.9 44.8 0.0 272.0 12.5
1991 18.8 1.5 48.3 -1.8 337.2 24.0
1992 11.9 -0.5 49.2 -1.4 362.9 7.6
1993 8.0 -0.7 48.9 -2.6 384.3 5.9
1994 7.1 0.3 55.1 1.9 440.3 14.6
Source: Presidencia de la Republica 1995; Aspe 1993
(1) As % of GDP
(2) Billions of 1994 pesos
(3) Coins and Bills, Cheque accounts and short-term banking accounts
(4) Annual real change (%), December/December
As mentioned above exchange rate policy is still under state control. The crisis o f  
December 1994, greatly magnified by inadequate handling o f the devaluation decision 
and mainly caused by the exchange rate policy, was indirectly fuelled by a monetary 
policy which was not restrictive enough. President Salinas succumbed to political 
pressures to expand economic activity prior to the August 1994 presidential elections 
and BdeM did not have enough power to oppose the President’s standpoint on this issue
25 Sterilisation refers to the operations performed by the Central Bank in which the bank reduces its credit 
as a response of strong capital inflows in order to keep the monetary base constant.
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despite the fact that the bank was very influential at this time as it has been argued 
before (Maxfield 1997: 104). BdeM’s monetary policy in 1994, the year prior to the 
crisis, was considered as neutral. It consisted mainly in meeting the demand for money 
without inducing any expansionist or restrictive effect on output (Carstens 1994: 77). 
However, some indicators like real exchange rate overvaluation and increasing domestic 
credit, specially off-the-books lending through development banks such as NAFIN, 
were pointing towards the need for BdeM to tighten monetary policy.
As can be seen from Table 7.5 it is evident that BdeM relaxed its control on monetary 
expansion, violating its constitutional mandate, i.e. preserve the value o f  the currency. 
Monetary aggregates rose sharply. For instance, M2 the one usually used as target to 
control inflation increased 14.6 percent in real terms during 1994, one o f  the largest 
increases in the last 10 years; BdeM’s credit expanded considerably, it went from -2.6 
percent o f GDP in 1993 to 1.9 in 1994. At the end BdeM did not tighten monetary 
policy despite the increasing real autonomy that it enjoyed and the reform to its legal 
status, signalling once more the continuous weakness o f the Mexican central bank when 
it comes to political crucial junctures as it is the presidential relay.
State Financing and Capital Inflows
As the degree o f competition for investment has increased in the international financial 
markets the relative importance o f signalling creditworthiness has also risen (Maxfield 
1997: 36). In the 1970s excess liquidity in international financial markets— supply o f  
financial funds vastly exceeds demand— reduced the degree o f  competition and 
therefore the importance o f signalling. The state back then had greater freedom to 
choose their own economic policies according to domestic priorities. However as capital 
mobility increased and new emerging economies in Eastern Europe, South East Asia 
and Latin America became big recipients o f  foreign investment, competition for 
investment scaled up towards the end o f the 1980s. There appears to be a closer 
temporal relationship between the rise o f portfolio finance— and the need to compete for 
capital associated with it— and CBA than there is between inflation and CBA. Inflation 
was very severe in developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s, yet CBA 
decreased in the 1970s and changed little in the 1980s. However the rise in portfolio 
finance was especially steep towards the end o f the 1980s and the beginning o f  the
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1990s, precisely when many countries increased the statutory autonomy o f their central 
banks.
State finances are a major constraint to the real autonomy o f any central bank, especially 
in developing countries. In order to have a monetary policy free from state’s influence, 
state finances have to be balanced or at least with enough access to alternative sources 
o f financing, others than central bank’s credit. An important issue leading to BdeM ’s 
autonomy was the liberalisation o f Mexican financial markets, which meant the 
development o f the state securities market. At the moment o f the reform in 1993 the 
state had a positive balance in its finances and was not reliant on banking loans or 
external credit to the same extent it was at the beginning o f President Salinas term in 
1988 (see Table 7.5). Central bank credits to the state and reserve requirements were 
increasingly replaced by international financial inflows buying Mexican state securities 
as the main source o f state’s financing. The cost o f funding, closely linked to the degree 
o f  credibility on state’s commitment to lower inflation, became a major concern for the 
state. And therefore by granting greater autonomy to the central bank, the state sought to 
secure credibility to its policies and reduce its cost o f funding. The delegation o f  
authority to the central bank is used as a device to reduce interest charges on new state 
debt (Cukierman 1993b: 56). CBA contributed to direct increasing amounts o f  




Inflation (1) 159.2 8.0
Fiscal deficit (2) 16.1 -1.0
External public debt (2) 93.0 21.5
Internal debt (2) 27.5 11.1
Bank lending to the public sector (3) 74.0 13.0
Financial savings (2) 28.9 51.5
Source: Carstens (1994)
(1) Percent annual increase in the National Consumer Price Index (January-January)
(2) Percentage of the GDP
(3) Percentage of the total
As it was mentioned above the liberalisation o f the financial markets with the ensuing 
development o f  a market for state securities and the improved public finances reduced 
the state’s reliance on BdeM’s credit and therefore made politically and economically
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feasible to reform. In this context granting greater autonomy to BdeM did not represent 
a major loss o f power to the state because the reform was not accompanied with an 
effective withdrawal o f the President from economic management and BdeM ’s credit 
was secondary in the new scheme o f state financing.
Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate
As it was argued above among the most important factors influencing the relationship 
between the state and BdeM is the exchange rate regime. Exchange rate policy is still 
under state control but BdeM is responsible for operating and regulating the exchange 
market.26 The degree o f freedom to conduct monetary policy is therefore constrained by 
a predetermined exchange rate regime determined in turn by other decisions regarding 
trade policy, external public debt and most importantly capital inflows. In this context 
the reform to BdeM is very limited in terms o f real freedom to conduct monetary policy 
with the aim o f preserving price stability. In 1993 and 1994 when there were increasing 
pressure for devaluation, the state decided to stick to its fixed exchange policy and 
BdeM had to direct monetary policy accordingly.
The decision to reform the legal status o f BdeM was strongly influenced by the outlook 
of the Mexican economy towards the end o f President Salinas’s term. At the beginning 
o f 1993 the President and his economic team were already aware o f the precarious 
situation created by increasing deficits in the balance o f payments. An enormous current 
account deficit required increasing capital inflows, which took the form o f  short run 
portfolio investment. This situation in the context o f imminent presidential elections that 
usually bring along a great deal o f economic uncertainty was especially explosive.
In November 1991 all capital controls were completely removed; the investment into 
state securities markets soared towards the end o f the presidential term (see Figure 7.1). 
However, by the end o f 1993, around the time o f the reform o f BdeM, investment in 
state securities represented almost 80 percent o f total capital inflows. It was not only the
20 Between September 1987 and January 1989 the exchange rate policy was a fixed parity o f the peso to 
the dollar. Then a crawling peg regime was introduced (pre-announced daily depreciation), devaluing 
16.8 percent the peso during that year and gradually reducing it up to 5 percent in 1991. By November 
1991 a band was introduced within which the unified exchange rate may float. BdeM preserved 
nevertheless the prerogative to intervene inside the band to reduce excess volatility (Carstens 1994: 74).
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composition o f capital inflows but also their size what made Mexican economy 
extremely vulnerable to international capital perceptions. This made necessary 
additional measures to avoid any potential source of instability among which the reform 
of BdeM ’s legal status was prominent. Agustin Carstens (1994: 77), Chief Economist at 
BdeM, wrote: ‘The inauguration of BdeM as an autonomous central bank on April 1st, 
1994 should represent a guarantee that financial stability will be pursued in the years to 
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The balance of payments in combination with the country’s export capacity and foreign 
exchange reserves are the main determinants o f a country’ need for international 
financial resources in the short run. However, there is a strong element of confidence 
and perception, which may accentuate or ameliorate the financial needs o f foreign 
currency regardless of the above variables. At the time of the reform the export capacity 
was very low because of real exchange rate appreciation, the trade balance had a deficit 
o f more than 13 billion dollars in 1993 (see Table 7.6). The current account deficit was 
above 23 billion for the same year. These two indicators revealed the strong need of 
capital inflows for the last two years o f President Salinas’s term.
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Summary
The conventional argument for CBA stating that it brings along lower inflation does not 
fully apply for the case o f Mexico. The relationship between CBA and lower inflation is 
not fully established on empirical grounds for developing countries. In fact Miguel 
Mancera, governor o f BdeM once stated that ‘central bank autonomy is not a necessary 
nor sufficient condition to have price stability’ (Volcker, Mancera and Godeaux 1991: 
71). However, there are institutional features o f central banks that bring them closer to 
international capital than any other state organisation. Therefore granting them with 
greater autonomy is perceived as a move towards greater communication and co­
ordination in economic policy between domestic states and international capital; central 
banks with greater autonomy signal greater soundness in economic policy-making to 
international capital.
Table 7.6









1985 800 8,398 -315 -2,328
1986 -1,372 5,020 2,715 985
1987 4,240 8,788 -1,188 6,924
1988 -2,375 2,610 -1,164 -7,127
1989 -5,822 405 3,177 272
1990 -7,451 -882 8,163 3,414
1991 -14,647 -7,278 24,951 7,822
1992 -24,439 -15,933 26,573 1,161
1993 -23,399 -13,481 32,582 6,083
1994 -28,786 -18,464 11,549 -18,884
1995 -619 3,089 3,089 3,817
Source: Presidencia de la Republica 1995 
Millions of dollars
From a historical perspective in the specific case o f Mexico legal autonomy has not 
determined the real autonomy o f BdeM. On the contrary, legal changes usually follows 
from increases in BdeM’s authority with a considerable lag. A stronger BdeM in the 
1950s and in the 1980s led to statutory changes in 1962 and 1993 respectively. However 
the reform in 1962 did not prevented the decline o f BdeM’s authority in the 1970s and 
the reform in 1993 did not insulated the bank from political pressures in 1994. BdeM  
was autonomous to a great extent in practice even prior to the reform to its legal status
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and then after the reform is was not completely autonomous either. Furthermore the 
conditions for attaining price stability in the long run, which was the stated purpose o f  
the reform, were already in place before the decision was taken. The reform was 
motivated by the necessity to attract and secure financial inflows from abroad more than 
by the long-term objective o f price stability. This is not to say that the state officials do 
not regard this goal as a desirable one, nonetheless the autonomy o f BdeM was not 
primarily directed towards that end.
When the ruling party faces a greater probability that it will be removed from office it 
has a stronger interest in developing an apolitical institution that will restrict the range 
o f action o f the opposition if  and when the latter comes to office (Cukierman 1992: 
446). An alternative argument says that states, when challenged by opposition, will 
reduce CBA in order to have more policy instruments to resist the challenge (Eijffmger 
and De Haan 1996: 44).27 The case o f Mexico is more consistent with the second 
argument. At the time o f the reform in mid 1993, President Salinas was at the peak o f  
his popularity, making a victory for the opposition in the 1994 presidential elections 
very unlikely. Without a serious challenge from the opposition the state relinquished its 
control upon monetary policy. Furthermore, legal autonomy is by no means the same as 
real autonomy and therefore even if  the central bank was granted with formal autonomy, 
the state could always find a way to influence the bank’s decisions.
As mentioned before price stability is a major issue in financial markets and, therefore, 
international capital welcomed any safeguard against possible future upsurges in 
inflation. This led to a strong international trend towards CBA, which in combination 
with a development strategy heavily reliant upon capital inflows made the reform to the 
legal status o f BdeM a necessary decision to increase and secure the financial inflows 
from abroad. In general, the case for CBA is based on keeping inflation under control. 
However, from a wider perspective, the decision to grant greater autonomy to the central 
bank follows from the need to signal discipline and credibility on the state economic
27 In the presence of uncertainty about electoral outcomes, the monetary policies o f different parties have 
different effects on economic activity even if voters are rational as the experience o f the Unites States 
between 1948 and 1984 serves to establish (Alesina and Sachs 1988). Right wing governments are 
generally thought to give a high priority to lower inflation, left wing governments are often supposed to 
be more concerned about inflation (Eijffmger and De Haan 1996: 12).
policy (Bowled and White 1994: 237; Maxfield 1997). President Salinas promoted the 
decision to grant greater autonomy to BdeM chiefly concerned with the electoral 
performance o f its own party, the PRI. The decision was clearly not a social demand and 
the debate over the decision never captured the public attention. In this case the only 
relevant level o f political organisation was the state.
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Chapter 8
The Political Economy of Mexico’s 1994 Financial Crisis
The preceding chapters showed how the reforms to the financial system were examples 
o f successful state engineered changes that conformed to the dominant orthodoxy in 
economic thinking.1 However, in hindsight they were clearly insufficient to prevent the 
1994 crisis and in some cases they even contributed to its generation. The crisis brings 
back the question raised at the beginning o f the thesis, namely why did the financial 
reform failed to prevent the end-of-sexenio crisis despite the participation o f  well- 
trained policy makers?
This chapter explores the events leading to the peso devaluation and to the subsequent 
crises in the state finances and the banking sector. I argue that although the financial 
reform created some o f the conditions for the crisis, political change and policy 
miscalculations were crucial for the final outcome as well. The analysis o f  M exico’s 
1994 financial crisis brings together all the elements discussed throughout the thesis: 
external dependency (chapter two), political change (chapter three), financial 
liberalisation (chapter four) and institutional changes to the financial system (chapters 
five, six and seven). Financial liberalisation, for instance, weakened the grip o f  the 
government on the management o f the financial system. The banks’ privatisation turned 
their management ‘too entrepreneurial’ and resulted in too much lending. Political 
change pushed the government to delay corrective action in the exchange rate. 
Dependency on international capital forced the government to swap peso-denominated 
CETES for short-term dollar-denominated TESOBONOS.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the links between 
the financial reform and the 1994 crisis. The discussion addresses the issues o f  portfolio 
investment and banks’ lending boom. These events were direct consequences o f  the
1 By successful state engineered change I mean that the government effectively implemented the desired 
reforms regardless of their outcomes.
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financial reform and contributed to the 1994 crisis. The second section introduces the 
political conditions leading to the crisis. In this part, the main issues are increasing 
electoral competition, the political business cycle and the political turmoil during 1994. 
The third section discusses two crucial policy mistakes, namely the government delayed 
corrective action in the exchange rate and changed the term-structure and exchange rate 
exposure o f  the public debt. Finally, the fourth section describes the main outcomes o f  
M exico’s 1994 financial crisis: foreign investment in the banking sector and the banks’ 
bailout.
8.1 Financial Reform
The 1982 debt crisis created the conditions to introduce a sweeping programme of  
economic transformation in Mexico— the financial reform was an important part o f  this 
programme. However, only twelve years later, another crisis made evident the 
shortcomings o f  M exico’s financial reform. This time, the crisis included the collapse o f  
the exchange rate on December 20th, the subsequent inability o f the government to meet 
its financial liabilities and the decline o f  banks’ capitalisation below ‘financially sound’ 
levels.2 The peso devaluation started the crisis; the state’s over-dependence on short­
term and dollar-denominated securities deepened its consequences; and the banks’ 
bailout transmitted the cost o f the crisis to the rest o f the economy over the following 
years.
M exico’s financial reform produced two important outcomes that contributed to the 
generation o f the 1994 crisis: a surge in capital inflows, much o f  it into portfolio 
investments; and a lending boom — Mexican commercial banks to the private sector 
grew at an average annual rate o f 32 percent from 1988 to 1993.3 Capital inflows 
secured financing for the state and the economy during most o f this period, though in a 
very unstable form. The lending boom provided large financial groups with profitable
2 Although most o f the events related to this financial crisis took place after 1994, the first event, namely 
the devaluation of the peso, happened in 1994 and therefore I refer to the whole set o f events as the 1994 
crisis.
2 The rate of expansion on bank lending in Mexico over this period was very large by any standard. For
instance, bank assets in developing countries grew at an annual rate of only 8.6 percent between 1949 and 
1963 (Goldsmith 1969: 262).
businesses and increased the consumption possibilities o f the population at the same 
time. Large capital inflows and abundant credit created a ‘feel-good’ factor in favour o f  
the government and the PRI in the context o f increasing electoral competition.
Table 8.1





1970 20.1 17.1 3.2 13.9 3.0
1971 18.3 16.1 2.7 13.4 2.1
1972 19.0 17.0 2.2 14.8 2.0
1973 19.1 16.6 4.0 12.5 2.5
1974 20.0 16.0 3.6 12.4 4.0
1975 21.2 16.7 1.4 15.2 4.5
1976 20.8 17.1 3.2 13.9 3.7
1977 19.7 18.0 4.3 13.7 1.8
1978 20.8 18.5 5.0 13.5 2.4
1979 23.1 19.8 5.2 14.6 3.2
1980 25.6 20.5 5.9 14.6 5.0
1981 25.7 19.6 1.2 18.4 6.1
1982 21.5 18.8 3.7 15.1 2.7
1983 19.7 23.4 6.1 17.3 -3.7
1984 18.8 21.1 5.5 15.6 -2.2
1985 20.1 20.5 5.4 15.1 -0.4
1986 17.4 16.4 4.5 11.9 1.0
1987 18.5 21.3 6.5 14.8 -2.8
1988 22.6 21.3 0.6 20.7 1.3
1989 22.9 20.3 3.3 17.0 2.6
1990 23.1 20.3 6.8 13.5 2.8
1991 23.3 18.7 6.5 12.2 4.7
1992 23.3 16.6 6.6 10.0 6.7
1993 21.0 15.1 5.1 10.0 5.9
1994 21.7 15.0 4.0 11.0 6.7
Source: SHCP 1997.
Capital Inflows and Portfolio Investment
The financial reform failed to address the most important structural deficiency o f  the 
Mexican economy, namely the low rate o f domestic savings (see Table 8.1). In fact, the 
financial reform was counterproductive in this sense. Domestic savings decreased 
steadily throughout Salinas’s sexenio. Despite the fact that officials in the Ministry o f
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Finance and BdeM were aware o f the importance o f raising domestic savings they took 
no decisive action.4 The introduction o f the System o f Savings for Retirement (SAR) 
was the only government policy oriented to meet this end. However, the SAR was only 
a partial reform to the pension system and consequently had a very limited reach.5 In 
fact, most policy decisions stifled internal savings and promoted an excessive inflow o f  
external savings in the form o f portfolio investment.
According to Martin Feldstein (1995) the structural cause o f  M exico’s 1994 crisis was a 
low rate o f domestic savings; the economy was investing far more than it was saving. 
Investment increased substantially from 1988 to 1994 (see Table 8.2). Besides, 
consumption rose during the same period and consequently the already low level o f  
domestic savings further decreased. The lending policies o f  the banks induced greater 
consumption and fewer saving. According to BdeM in 1992, when the banks’ 
privatisation was concluded, personal deposits in the banks were greater than personal 
credits in an amount equivalent to 1.7 percent o f  the GDP. However, in 1994, only two 
years later, the opposite was true: personal credits exceeded personal deposits for an 
amount equivalent to 2.6 percent o f  the GDP (quoted by La Jornada, February 9th 
1999).
Capital inflows financed the widening gap between investment and savings. In last three 
years o f  Salinas’s sexenio, the economy recorded net inflows o f capital equivalent to 
more than four percent o f the GDP. The size o f the current account deficit increased 
dramatically from 2.4 billion dollars in 1988 to 28.8 billion in 1994. Besides the 
obvious problem related to the size o f the deficit and to the fact that an important part o f  
the deficit reflected a slump in savings and thus higher consumption; the deficit had the 
additional weakness o f being mostly financed by short-term portfolio investment. 
Almost 75 percent o f the capital inflows went into easily liquidated portfolio 
investments and a significant part o f that figure came from flight-capital repatriated by 
Mexicans.
4 Pedro Aspe stated in his address to the VIII Bankers Convention: ‘...We face the challenge o f increasing 
the level o f internal private savings in order to satisfy our needs o f capital. We know that healthy 
financing for development is based on the strengthening of internal savings, and only in complementary 
fashion on contracting debt from abroad’ {El Mercado de Valores, October 1992).
5 The full-scale reform to the M exico’s pension system took place under President Zedillo.
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Table 8.2




Net Capital Inflows -2.2 5.1
Current Account Deficit (2) 2.4 28.8
Source: Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 20, 68
Notes: (1) As percentage of the GDP 
(2) Billion of dollars
Given the low rate o f savings, the state stressed the importance o f  luring capital back 
into the economy as the only option to boost the economy in the short run and to expand 
the country’s productive capacity in the long run. Therefore the immediate and most 
important point on the economic agenda o f the state became the . improvement o f  the 
investment climate. The government stressed its commitment to price stabilisation and 
structural adjustment in order to gain the confidence o f the large business groups and 
international capital. Foreign investors, usually concerned with stability and economic 
prospects, expected that a privatised economy would create an efficient and 
decentralised process o f decision-making as opposed to a bureaucratised economy 
where management was centralised and highly inefficient (Esfahani 1994). Capital 
inflows were the result o f perceived improved economic prospects associated to a great 
extent to Salinas’s reforms.
The financial reform under President Salinas changed the traditional instruments o f state 
financing. Under the old framework, public indebtedness was determined by policy 
parameters like reserve requirements, monetary expansion and international loans. 
Under the new framework government financing depended on parameters given by the 
market. The state could not determine interest rates and levels o f  indebtedness 
simultaneously anymore. Investment climate became paramount to secure better terms 
for public debt under this framework. The implicit policy demands o f  international 
capital and domestic business groups increasingly circumscribed government policies. 
For instance, the banks’ privatisation served as a clear signal o f the state’s commitment 
to efficient and decentralised economic management (Schneider 1990).
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As soon as President Salinas took office, his economic team started to work on the 
public finances. The government made important moves on three different fronts. First, 
on external debt, a thorough re-negotiation with commercial banks on the terms and 
conditions o f the debt took place.6 Second, on tax income, the Ministry o f  Finance 
implemented a far-reaching tax reform that expanded the tax base and reduced tax 
evasion.7 Finally, on internal debt, the state invested the proceeds from the privatisation 
programme into a special fund to buy back internal debt, and in this fashion these once- 
and-for-all revenues made permanent contributions to the state accounts through 
reductions on debt-servicing expenses. By the end o f 1991, the financial deficit, which 
includes interest payments, amounted to the equivalent o f only 1.5 percent o f  the GDP 
down from 16 percent in 1987 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 51). The stabilisation 
o f the economy and its structural transformation was expected to attract foreign 
investment and bring back flight capital invested abroad during the 1980s.8
The massive inflows o f capital into Mexico in the early 1990s was partly the response to 
Salinas’s economic reforms and partly the result o f  portfolio diversification by rich- 
country investors at time o f low American interest rates. Much o f the capital inflows 
between 1991 and 1993 (estimated around $75 billion dollars) was a one-time portfolio 
reallocation o f foreign investors and also a one-time repatriation o f  flight capital. It was 
a mistake to assume that it was an steady flow rather than a one-time jump in the stock 
o f foreign investment. Early in the 1990s there was a new enthusiasm in the 
international financial system. The new methods o f finance were thought to be grounded 
on firmer foundations: private borrowing is better than public borrowing; portfolio 
finance spreads risk more safely than bank debt; and foreign direct investment brings 
technology, new ideas and access to rich-country marketing networks {The Economist, 
August 25th 1993).
0 The agreement reached in July 1989 meant a reduction of US $53 billion on Mexican external debt 
(Solis 1996: 159). Moreover it also improved the market conditions for the internal debt. Between July 
1989 and July 1990 internal interest rates on government bonds (CETES) decreased by more than 20 
percentage points, representing savings of more than US $10 billions annually (Hanley et.al. 1991: 14).
7 Fiscal revenues almost doubled from US $31 billions in 1988 to US $58 billions in 1991 (INEGI 1994: 
763)
8 The size o f potential flight capital returning to Mexico was difficult to estimate. However a rough figure 
for all Latin America o f flight capital invested abroad tells us that in the late 1980s it was near US $300 
billion ( The Economist, December 9th 1995)
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The surge o f foreign portfolio investment was possible because o f the development o f  
the BMV in the 1980s and the increasing issues o f government securities between 1988 
and 1994. In 1988, internal public debt was contracted 40 percent with BdeM, 40 
percent through government securities and the remaining 20 percent from other sources. 
By 1994, public debt was completely contracted through government securities 
(Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 55). Foreigners became increasingly active in the 
Mexican securities market once the new institutional framework for the financial system 
was in place. Foreign investors, mostly American, according to the Economist (February 
13th 1993), had $27.7 billion dollars invested in the BMV at the end o f November 1992, 
a 21 percent stake. In March 1993 foreign investors already had larger holdings o f  
government securities ($18.4 billion dollars) than their domestic counterparts ($17.2 
billion dollars, half their holdings at the end o f 1991), who were already reducing their 
investments in government securities. Higher yields o f Mexican CETES (around 8.5 
percent after being adjusted for inflation and exchange rate depreciation) and American 
T-BILLS (between 3 and 4 percent) explain to some extent the enthusiasm o f  foreign 
investors for Mexican government securities (The Economist, October 7th 1995).
The crisis, however, showed the imperfections o f liberalised financial markets and their 
inability to secure stability. International capital rewarded M exico’s economic reform 
by pouring investment into the stock exchange but failed to take corrective action when 
the current account deficit was running above sustainable levels. Andrew Crockett, 
general director o f  the Bank for International Settlements, conceded that the financial 
markets ‘failed to spot the point when the carrot needed to be replaced by a stick’ (The 
Economist, October 7th 1995).
Lending Boom
Another major outcome from the financial reform that had distressing consequences 
after the peso devaluation was the lending boom o f the recently-privatised commercial 
banks. State officials were aware o f possible malpractice and abuses from bankers.9
9 Pedro Aspe stated in his address to the VIII Bankers Convention: ‘...The challenge is double. On the one 
hand, it is necessary to avoid excesses and abuses, by promoting good systems o f self-regulation and 
codes of high practices within the institutions. On the other hand, it is necessary to avoid that
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However, when lending was rising very rapidly and interest rates spreads were widening 
the authorities did not step in to stop these trends. Valencia (1997) traced the banking 
collapse in Mexico back to their privatisation, when they were sold to the risk-prone 
stockbrokers and the high prices paid for them demanded risk taking and aggressive 
lending. Business practices in the SBHs, characterised by higher risk taking, replaced 
the traditionally conservative management at the banks (Danby 1996: 72). Furthermore, 
the highly leveraged nature o f the banks and the mechanisms o f deposit insurance made 
them especially vulnerable to the problem of ‘moral hazard’.10 The fact that no bank was 
ever allowed to fail in Mexico since the 1920s exacerbated the problem o f  ‘moral 
hazard’ that encouraged the banks to engage in high risk lending.
Between 1988 and 1993 the stock o f bank loans to the non-financial private sector more 
than tripled, with consumer lending being the fastest-growing component (Danby 1996: 
90). Banking credit to the private sector went from less than 10 percent o f  GDP in 1988 
to almost 40 percent in 1994 (Rojas-Suarez and Hausman 1996: 49). After their 
privatisation, banks had to expand and keep up with other banks and generate increased 
earnings needed to repay owners and finance the banks’ own capital investment. By 
aggressively seeking to expand consumer lending, banks worked counter to the stated 
goal o f financial liberalisation advocates, namely, to raise individual savings.
The larger banks undertook the most rapid expansion, had the larger interest rates 
spreads. The relation between expansion o f consumer lending and profits is also evident 
in data obtained from the CNBV (1994). Between March 1992 and March 1993, 
revenue from mortgage loans roughly doubled from 0.6 to 1.2 billion o f Mexican pesos, 
rising from 14 to 17 percent o f  total bank income. Revenues from other consumer loans 
increased from almost nil to 1.2 billion pesos for the same period, reaching 10 percent 
o f  bank’s total income. Banks profits increased from 0.7 billion dollars in 1988 to 2.8 
billion in 1993.” More illustrative, in 1992, three Mexican banks were among the top 
ten banks in the world in terms o f profits on capital: BANAMEX, second with 107
discrepancies in regulation between Mexico and its competitors, shift the banks’ operations to other 
markets’ {El M ercado de Valores, October 1992).
10 The problem of ‘moral hazard’ refers to the situation when the individual has the incentive to take 
higher risks than optimal because the costs o f his actions are spread among many other agents.
11 Calculated from CNBV (1994: 7) for profits and Zedillo (1995: 77) for the exchange rate.
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percent; BANCOMER, sixth with 82 percent; and Banco Mercantil del Norte, ninth 
with 71 percent (The Banker, July 1993: 75).
The boom in consumer lending consolidated the profitability o f the commercial banks. 
According to Colin Danby (1996: 69), the elimination o f the liquidity coefficient in 
September 1991 reduced the domestic demand for CETES, which had their prices high, 
and allowed the banks to shed their holdings o f these securities in exchange for loans, 
assets which paid higher interest rates. Between October 1991 and August 1992 banks 
liquidated most o f the state securities they held, selling them to foreigners and freeing 
up funds for lending. The prospectuses o f GF BANACCI (1992) and GF SERFIN 
(1993) argued that the greatest source o f profitability was in their consumer lending. 
Expansion in this segment also represented the best way to establish a strong hold on the 
consumer market and therefore deter the other firms entry. Bankers were fond o f  
pointing out that while the stock o f consumer debt in the US and Canada was equivalent 
to over 60 percent o f  GDP in 1991, in Mexico the equivalent figure was barely 6 percent 
(Natella and Mason 1992).
The fact that Mexico was, and still is, under-banked fuelled the surge in lending, 
especially consumer lending like— mortgages and credit cards. Jose Costello, banking 
analyst at Baring Securities in Mexico City, reckoned that lending over the next ten 
years could increase at three times the rate o f economic growth (quoted by Wood 1993). 
Expected profits from an under-banked system lured stockbrokers to pay high prices for 
the banks (3.5 times their book value on average). However, rapid expansion also 
increases the risk o f  losses and too often ends in disaster for financial institutions and 
the economy.
The banks lacked the required risk-management experience to deal with the surge in 
consumer lending. In December 1993, the ABM attempted to introduce a credit bureau 
with the aid o f  Trans Union, a big American credit-rating company (The Economist, 
December 12th 1994). The purpose o f this bureau was to pool information on borrowers 
in order to improve the banks’ risk management systems. This initiative, however, did 
not prosper because the three largest banks — BANAMEX, BANCOMER and 
SERFIN—  who controlled 90 percent o f the market for consumer credit were reluctant 
to disclose information on their best clients.
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As early as 1992, investors had already identified those banks that eventually 
experienced the largest capital deficiencies. In 1992, BANAMEX and BANCOMER  
raised funds at 11.8 percent, whereas the riskier banks had to pay 14.5 percent (Rojas- 
Suarez and Weisbrod 1995: 14). High-risk premiums lured investors to supply short­
term funds to risky banks. These inflows, however, took place under conditions o f  
extreme volatility. Investors were ready to pull away their funds as soon as any sign o f  
financial distress appeared. In February 1993, Ramirez de la O, an analyst o f  the 
Mexican financial system, warned o f a full-scale banking crisis within the following 
eighteen months (Wood 1993). Then, in July 1994 the American rating agency M oody’s 
issued a report noting that Mexican banks lending was growing several times faster than 
the GDP {The Economist, July 30th 1994). According to The Times (July 24th 1998), 
between 1991 and 1994, loans grew 10 times faster than the economy.
Despite these warning voices, bankers, investors and most analysts believed that the 
non-performing loans problem was chiefly caused by the economic slowdown in 1993 
and 1994. As soon as the economy slowed in the third quarter o f 1993 (output shrank by 
1.2 percent), non-performing loans emerged as a serious threat to the stability o f  the 
recently privatised banking sector. The ratio o f non-performing loans to total loans 
climbed from 4.1 percent in December 1991 to 7.1 percent in September 1993 (The 
Economist, January 29th 1994).
By the mid-1990s, the ‘Tequila’ and Asian crises brought hard times to the banking 
sectors all over the emerging economies.12 In Mexico, the banks’ already fragile 
financial conditions were severely damaged after the peso devaluation in December 
1994 and the subsequent economic slump in 1995. Non-performing loans rose from less 
than $7 million dollars at the end o f 1992 to almost $28 million dollars just before the 
peso devaluation in December 1994 {Proceso, May 6th 1996). Non-performing loans 
represented more than ten percent o f the total, a higher figure than those recorded in 
previous banking crises in other countries (see Table 8.3). To make things worse, the
12 According to Valencia (1997), in India and Indonesia, up to 20 percent of the state bank’s loans, and 15 
percent o f the private bank’s loans were non-performing. The figures for Taiwan are similar, where banks 
had little reserves to cope with losses. Lending policies in Thailand and South Korea also had detrimental 
effects for the quality of their bank’s portfolios. In South-America, the countries most badly hit were 
Venezuela, whose banking system was already in crisis before the peso devaluation, Argentina and 
Mexico.
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banks lost, after the devaluation, around 10 percent o f their equity because o f their 
foreign exchange exposure, weakening further their financial health (The Economist, 
October 28lh 1995).
Table 8.3








Source: Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1996: 12
As a result o f the adjustment plan devised after the peso devaluation by the Ministry o f  
Finance, headed by Guillermo Ortiz, interest rates hit 110 percent, inflation reached 52 
percent, unemployment doubled and GDP decreased by 7 percent {The Times, July 24th 
1998). The plan effectively stabilised the economy but at the expense o f  causing further 
damage to the banking system. As a result o f the liquidity crisis, real interest rates 
remained above 30 percent during most o f 1995 causing further defaults on banks’ 
loans. Public spending, private consumption and investment decreased abruptly. The 
draconian adjustment brought about by the Ministry o f  Finance made the economy to 
shrink by 7 percent, sharply contrasting with the estimated growth o f 1.5 percent 
considered in the agreement between Mexico and the IMF at the beginning o f that year. 
At this point, the non-performing loans problems reached alarming levels and threatened 
to cause the collapse the whole financial system.
8.2 End-of-Sexenio Politics
Political factors were as important in the genesis o f  the financial crisis as the economic 
trends. Much o f the political upheaval during 1994 was a reaction to the strong and 
exclusive exercise o f presidential power by Carlos Salinas throughout most o f the 
sexenio. The presidential power usually weakens during the last year o f the term. 
Political groups, from the PRI and opposition parties alike, increasingly challenged the 
President’s authority in this juncture. Electoral competition under President Salinas and
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end-of-sexenio business cycle reduced the capacity o f  the government to steer the 
economy the year prior the crisis. Approaching presidential elections pushed the 
government to take decisions potentially harmful for the economy but necessary from 
electoral and power perspectives.
Electoral Competition
Relatively transparent electoral processes was a new feature o f Mexican politics under 
President Salinas (see chapter three). Wining the popular vote in clean elections became 
the only legitimate way o f remain in power, especially after the 1988 ‘collapse’ o f  the 
system. This ‘Schumpeterian’ democracy forced the government to implement policies 
aimed to secure popular support for the PRI. President Salinas wrote in his PhD thesis: 
‘the state hopes to capitalise in the ballot boxes its economic effort because the 
competition for the vote will be much harder in the following years’ (quoted by Borge 
1993). This element introduced a new constraint on state policies. In fact, the financial 
policy in 1994 was subordinated to the political needs o f the PRI for the presidential 
election that year.
When President Salinas took office in 1988, the most urgent issues in the national 
agenda were economic, i.e. bring down inflation, re-establish economic growth and 
increase personal income. The political costs o f stabilisation and economic stagnation 
under President de la Madrid became evident from the results o f the presidential 
elections in 1988. President Salinas had little political legitimisation as a result o f  the 
bungled elections and therefore sought to overcome this shortcoming by delivering good 
economic results. Since the onset o f his term, Salinas stressed the importance o f  capital 
inflows to finance the structural transformation o f the Mexican economy and to carry 
out the stabilisation programme without the natural economic slowdown associated to 
this kind o f programmes. The results in the 1991 mid-term elections favouring the PRI, 
signalled the clear and strong support o f the population to the government policies. But 
most important, confirmed the fact that electoral outcomes were linked to government 
performance.
Greater electoral competition pushed for policies with popular outcomes like lower 
inflation, higher economic growth and higher real income. An over-valued exchange
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rate served the prime objective o f anchoring domestic prices and consequently bring 
down inflation. However, as a by-product o f this policy, exchange rate overvaluation 
boosted the purchasing power o f the peso and produced a ‘feel-good’ factor that 
translated into support from the urban middle class to the government. According to 
Jorge Castaneda, President Salinas’s liberal trade policies were improvisations to 
maintain an over-valued exchange rate and thus placate M exico’s fractious urban middle 
classes with cheap imports o f consumer goods (quoted by The Economist, March 16th 
1996). The Mexican state arguably needed the consumption boom that an overvalued 
exchange rate brought about in order to foster popular support in an increasingly 
competitive political system. Cheaper imports made easier for the population to bear the 
faltering growth observed during the second part o f  the sexenio.
Political Business Cycle
The political cycle associated to the presidential sexenio has been a permanent feature o f  
Mexican politics since the 1940s and the relay o f  presidential power has been at the 
heart o f these cycles. Most o f the political activity in Mexico is organised by this 
temporal framework. However, the political cycle did not have strong pernicious effects 
on the economy until 1976, when for the first time economic imbalances became critical 
at the end o f the sexenio. Economic cycles o f boom and bust have repeated 
systematically at the end o f each presidential term since then; devaluation and elections 
seemed to go hand-in-hand between 1976 and 1994.
Each President pursues their own government programme with determination and 
single-mindedness because o f the fact that they have only six years to achieve their 
goals. According to Jose Lopez Portillo (Proceso, May 12th 1997), each new President 
arrives with novel and exalted intentions, among which is to remove any remaining 
prestige from his predecessor’s ‘well-intended’ government. The political system relied 
on breaks between incoming and outgoing Presidents to make the transition between 
one government to another. President Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) made the point very 
clearly in the following account:
‘...some days before I handed over presidential power, the closest aide o f my
successor, in a dinner to which he invited my eldest son, confessed to him: ‘at a
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personal level, friendship; but at a political level, w e’ll have to abuse your father 
in order to stabilise the country’. I accepted the fatality o f the cycles I had to go 
through... The closest aide o f Miguel [de la Madrid], is now, in turn, going 
through his own tribulation’ (quoted by Proceso, May 12lh 1997).
The system is always at its weakest in the last year o f each sexenio, as the incumbent 
President prepares to deliver the power to his handpicked successor. As the time for the 
nomination o f the PRl’s presidential candidate approaches, the outgoing President 
gradually loses authority creating a vacuum of power in the political system. Excessive 
concentration o f power in the executive makes very difficult to prevent the political 
uncertainty at the end o f each sexenio from destabilising the economy (Philip 1998). 
President Salinas’s decision to accommodate electoral competition while preserving 
PRI’s hegemony instead o f making a swift move to democracy preserved the essential 
conditions for the end-of-sexenio political crisis.
However no President faced the series o f events at the margin o f the legal and 
institutional framework as Carlos Salinas did. The President became increasingly 
isolated as 1994 went by, partly as a result o f its own success. According to Jorge 
Castaneda, Salinas and his economic team o f technocrats swept away the social checks 
and balances o f M exico’s corporatist system without replacing it with more democratic 
institutions (quoted by The Economist, March 16th 1996). In Mexico, according to 
Torres (1997), a deliberate sharp fragmentation o f authority articulated by a strong 
presidency was replaced with an unintended fragmentation o f political power subjected 
to market forces. Holding regular cabinet meetings weakened the decision-making and 
arbitration powers o f  the President, while enhanced the role o f the ministers in shaping 
policy by increasing its bargaining function. President Salinas’s efforts at reasserting 
presidentialism along traditional lines in an liberalised economy failed as proved by the 
turbulent end o f his term. The danger is that when the presidential grip weakens, there 
are no other institutions capable o f playing an effective role (Philip 1996). As soon as 
the political instability surfaced associated to the natural weakening o f  the outgoing 
President and to the perceived weakness o f incoming President, the economic 
safeguards put in place with the economic reform, including NAFTA, were clearly 
insufficient to prevent the run against the peso.
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Most o f the external observers were concerned with the result o f the presidential 
elections in 1994 and paid little attention to the more subtle features o f  the Mexican 
political system, namely, the power vacuum created by a weakening outgoing President 
and a weak incoming President. Domestic investors were fairly more aware o f  this 
important political phenomenon with its potential consequences for economic stability. 
Foreign investors, in contrast, were relatively calm because their perception o f  political 
risk was confined to the electoral process, which was reasonably clear and transparent. 
Furthermore, foreign investors saw President Zedillo as a good substitute for Salinas in 
terms o f his commitment to sound economic management.
Political Turmoil
By the end o f 1991, Mexico’s public finances were substantially sounder, the economy 
was growing, inflation was declining, and capital inflows were soaring. On the political 
arena, the PRI won the mid-term elections without resorting to major political reforms. 
In the President’s view, PRONASOL was bringing social infrastructure to millions o f  
impoverished Mexicans. This encouraging context allowed Salinas to prepare the 
ground for his own succession well in advance and without major constraints. The 
demise o f the SPP in April 1992 and the creation o f the ministry o f Social Development 
(SEDESOL) were unmistakable steps in that direction (Torres 1997: 161). The 
President strengthened considerably the position o f Pedro Aspe, minister o f  finance and 
Donaldo Colosio, minister o f social development.
Nomination politics in Mexico under Salinas still took place inside the bureaucracy and 
not in the party or in the elections (see Torres 1997). Most o f  the political activity was 
structured around the nomination o f the next President. Contending ministers brought 
together groups o f support for their nomination and created important divisions within 
the executive. This divisions were especially damaging for the economic policy towards 
the end o f the sexenio. The most notorious division took place when Manuel Camacho, 
then mayor o f Mexico City, presented his resignation as a statement against the 
nomination o f Luis Donaldo Colosio as presidential candidate for the PRI. This dispute 
was further exacerbated when Camacho was designated as the government’s special 
peace envoy in the Zapatistas conflict in the southern state o f Chiapas. At the end, this
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personal conflict between Colosio and Camacho became one o f the major elements 
damaging the political climate in 1994.
Stronger political competition and the experience in the 1988 presidential elections 
raised the issue o f electoral appeal for the candidate. Despite the fact that Salinas used 
the state machinery to strengthen the position o f  the PRI for the elections, the lack o f  
public appeal o f Luis Donaldo Colosio at the beginning o f  his campaign posed some 
doubts on the eventual triumph o f the PRI.13 Colosio’s campaign failed to produce social 
mobilisation partly because o f Camacho’s appointment as peace envoy in the Zapatistas 
conflict. This appointment not only revived Camacho’s presidential ambitions and 
placed him in a position where he could fulfil them. However, it also triggered an 
explosive and fierce reaction from those who opposed him. This bureaucratic infighting 
hindered the ability o f the PRI’s candidate to consolidate his leadership and articulate 
enough support within the political elite.
The Zapatistas uprising in the southern state o f Chiapas on January 1st 1994 gained 
great notoriety in the foreign press and wide support all over the world. Despite the fact 
that the conflict remained geographically limited, the movement raised a national issue. 
The Zapatistas were not a serious threat to the government’s hold o f power but they 
represented the best platform to denounce the failure o f Salinas’s policies to address 
national problems. In an election year, the movement alienated an important part o f the 
PRI’s popular constituencies. To make things far worse, Luis Donaldo Colosio was 
assassinated in late March 1994. The crime severely damaged the image o f the President 
and the government. The nomination o f Emesto Zedillo as the replacement candidate, 
though welcomed by international investors, did very little to improve the political 
climate in Mexico. Zedillo was perceived as a weak candidate that could not consolidate 
the political and economic groups upon which the grip o f the outgoing President was 
getting looser. The mere possibility that the PRI could lose in 1994 debilitated the 
system more than strengthened it. The political forces behind the PRI were not as 
committed and disciplined as before in the face o f  a possible defeat in the elections.
13 The nomination o f Luis Donaldo Colosio, made public on December 8"’ 1993, was immediately 
overshadowed by Manuel Camacho decision to resign as Mexico City Major.
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A week before Emesto Zedillo took office, while he was in Washington greeting Bill 
Clinton, Mario Ruiz Massieu, special prosecutor to investigate the recent murder o f his 
brother and PRI’s secretary general, Francisco Ruiz Massieu, resigned alleging that 
Ignacio Pichardo, PRI’s President, and other top officials were obstructing his 
investigations (The Economist, December 3rd 1994). All these events raised the question 
on the President’s capacity to discipline the political elites. Beside these major events, 
there were other trends that also revealed the government’s declining political control: 
the north o f  the country suffered an outbreak o f drug-related violence; Alfredo Harp, 
chief executive officer o f BANAMEX, was kidnapped; and economic growth proved 
more elusive than originally expected.
The problems were not circumscribed to the Zapatistas and the political elites but also 
included groups o f  support for the party at the grass-roots level. The results o f  President 
Salinas’s efforts to restore popular support for the regime were mixed. The PRI won 
with a relatively comfortable margin over the other two major opposition parties in the 
1994 presidential elections despite all the political turmoil o f that year. Nevertheless, 
increasing protest mobilisations took place during that same year. For instance, in 1994 
more than 1200 demonstrations and 550 marches — a daily average o f five acts o f  
protest were organised in Mexico City. On one day in March 1995, there were over 100 
acts o f protest. This and subsequent acts o f street protests in the form o f marches and 
demonstrations that culminated in a May Day rally o f over 150,000 were followed in 
subsequent moths by a huge coalition o f ten diverse social movements and organisations 
o f farmers, peasants, independent business operators, workers and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) to reject the state’s economic model (Veltmeyer et.al. 1997: 51).
8.3 Policy Mistakes
In hindsight, most actors (public officials, investors and economic analysts) agree on the 
major policy mistakes leading to M exico’s financial crisis in 1994— the government 
delayed corrective action on the exchange rate and replaced CETES by short-term- 
dollar-denominated TESOBONOS. However, at that time, policy calculation became 
less precise because o f financial liberalisation. In the preceding months to the 
devaluation, financial authorities were unable to anticipate the size o f  potential capital 
flight and the political turmoil. Furthermore, effective electoral competition pushed the
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government to use their optimistic scenarios o f capital flight and hold o ff devaluation. 
According to Summers (1995) there is natural tendency magnified by the political 
process in every country, to regard good news as permanent and bad news as transitory. 
However, capital inflows are often the result o f transitory changes in the international 
context, while outflows are usually the sign o f structural problems.
Expansionist Economic Policy
The first major policy mistake o f the government was to indulge in expansionist 
economic policies just before the presidential elections. Governments under democratic 
regimes often make the same mistake producing a political business cycle (see Alesina 
and Sachs 1988). President Salinas had to many commitments difficult to reconcile at 
the end o f  his sexenio: continue economic reform, keep inflation down, clean elections 
and PRI’s electoral triumph. Policy decisions during 1994 clearly subordinated the 
economic issues to the political priorities o f the government. Despite the risk o f  a new 
surge in inflation or the collapse in the exchange rate, economic policy was strongly 
expansionist throughout that year.
Apparently the government did not increase public spending in any substantial way 
during 1994, the final balance in the public finances was a modest deficit equivalent to 
0.3 percent o f GDP (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 51). However, the government 
relied on quasi-fiscal operations to expand domestic credit and public spending.14 The 
operations o f  development banking were removed from the balance sheet o f  the federal 
government in 1993. This accounting trick misled many observers and investors 
regarding the real source o f M exico’s economic strength. Interest rates remained 
relatively stable throughout 1994 with a downward trend in the second part o f  the year. 
The rate paid on CETES went from 16.32 percent in May to 13.74 percent in November 
and the rate for TESOBONOS stayed around seven percent all the time (Presidencia de 
la Republica 1995: 59). Decreasing interest rates were the result o f a strong expansion 
o f domestic credit rather than economic strength. The money supply (bills and short­
term banking deposits) jumped from 32.9 percent o f the GDP in 1993 to 36.3 in 1994.
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Banking deposits was the component with the largest growth, more than 27 percent in 
real terms (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 56).
The government used development banking and BdeM to expand domestic credit. 
Credit allocated from the domestic banking sector (BdeM, development and commercial 
banks) increased from 57.8 percent o f  the GDP in 1993 to 81.3 percent in 1994. 
Development banks lending, a form o f off-balance public spending, increased from 14.2 
percent o f  the GDP in 1993 to 21.7 percent in 1994; BdeM’s lending expanded from 1.6 
percent o f the GDP to 5.8 percent (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 62). Government 
banks (BdeM and development banks) observed a remarkable increase in their credit 
portfolio during 1994: more than 60 percent increase in real terms. This abrupt increase 
in domestic credit deteriorated the financial health o f development banks: the ratio o f  
capital to credit fell from 7.8 percent in December 1993 to 4.9 percent in December 
1994 (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 61). The equivalent figures for commercial 
banks were 9 and 7.6 percent respectively (CNBV 1995: 21, 24).
‘Polarisation’ of the Public Debt
Mexican authorities believed that the decreasing appeal o f M exico’s capital markets to 
foreign investors was the result o f temporary shocks (i.e. political turmoil and raising 
interest rates abroad) (Ortiz 1996: 217). The government responded by raising interest 
rates and issuing short-term, dollar-denominated TESOBONOS in vast quantities. 
TESOBONOS were issued during 1994 in order to signal the government commitment 
not to devalue the peso. The ‘dolarisation’ o f the public debt was a government decision 
that caused great economic distress after the devaluation. At first, this decision was 
intended to prevent devaluation; but as dollar-denominated debt piled up, devaluation 
became ever more costly and corrective action became ever more unlikely.
During 1994 Mexico faced increasing difficulties to preserve the size o f capital inflows 
amounting to $21 billion dollars per annum on average since 1990 (or $2 billion dollars 
per month) (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 68). Given the need for these inflows for
14 Quasi-fiscal operations are those undertaken by government organisations not included in the public 
accounts. For instance, BdeM ’s lending to development banks or other public agencies is not included in 
the public deficit.
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the stabilisation and opening up programmes combined with the political events, 
domestic investors changed the composition of their investment portfolios, and the firms 
changed the structure of their liabilities. Domestic investors (firms and banks) reduced 
their holdings o f government securities by more than 40 percent between March and 
November. Foreign investors followed their domestic counterparts and reduced their 
holdings o f CETES by more than 50 percent. However, they increased abruptly their 
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The government increased its exposure to currency-risk by issuing dollar-denominated 
TESOBONOS. As a result o f the devaluation, external indebtedness (denominated in 
pesos) jumped from $149 billion pesos in 1993 to $385 billion in 1994, an increase of  
more than 150 percent (see Figure 8.1). The liquidity crisis arose from a temporary 
inability to repay the TESOBONOS since international reserves were nearly depleted 
trying to support the peso and avoid devaluation throughout 1994. After the devaluation, 
foreign investors refused to rollover their holdings o f TESOBONOS15 leaving the 
government with the difficult task to raise $22 billion dollars to repay the dollar- 
denominated debt due in 1995. In the second half of January alone, the government 
needed $2.2 billion dollars (The Economist, January 14th 1995). According to the 
Financial Times (February 15lh 1995) if  all $28 billion dollars o f TESOBONOS due to 
mature in 1995 were staggered so as to repay $5 billion dollars a year from 1996 on,
15 In the auction of January 10th, the government managed to place only 20 percent of the $400 million 
dollars offered {The Economist January 14,h 1995).
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there would be no crisis. Those extended principal payments could be met, along with 
punctual payments o f interest. January 1995 went down, as the month when the 
enthusiasm for emerging bond and equity markets was suddenly moderated {Financial 
Times April 22nd 1995).
Exchange Rate Overvaluation
The main differences between countries that suffered the consequences o f the Tequila 
crisis like Mexico and Argentina and those that escaped it like Chile and Colombia were 
the exchange rate policy and controls on capital inflows. Mexico and Argentina used the 
exchange rate for stabilisation purposes and removed all controls on capital inflows. The 
devaluation o f  the Mexican peso in December 1987 produced an exchange rate 
estimated undervalued by 32 percent as part o f the PSE (Solis 1996: 87). Since then, the 
government used the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for domestic prices and started 
a process o f  continuous real appreciation. Sometime in 1991, the exchange rate reached 
the equilibrium level and thereafter, it became increasingly overvalued. Solis (1996: 87) 
estimated that the exchange rate was overvalued by 48 percent at the time o f the 
devaluation in December 1994. The government did not attempt to bring back the 
exchange rate to its equilibrium level. Instead the government emphasised capital 
inflows to finance the current account deficit resulting from a clearly overvalued 
exchange rate.
The current account balance deteriorated substantially between 1988 and 1991. The 
current account deficit recorded a dramatic increase: from 3 percent o f the GDP in 1989 
and 1990 to 5 percent in 1991 and then to almost 7 percent in 1992 and 1993 
(Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 68).16 The Ministry o f Finance insisted that the 
deficit was not a problem because it was financed voluntarily from private investors and 
the capital inflow was paying for private investment rather than government deficits.
As early as 1992, the financial markets sent the first signals o f their potential volatility: 
in June the main index o f the BMV, fell by 14 percent after it soared by 111 percent in
16 The current account balance went from a small surplus in 1987 to a deficit o f $7.11 billions in 1990 
(INEGI 1994: 900).
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1991 and 25 percent more in January and February; Mexico lost up to $2 billion dollars 
in foreign exchange reserves in June, before the interest rates were raised to stem the 
flow {The Economist July 17"' 1992) Early in 1993, Rudiger Dombusch, a professor at 
MIT and mentor o f Pedro Aspe, told Wall Street investors that a devaluation o f  the peso 
was unavoidable {The Economist, May 29"' 1993). Throughout 1994 several analysts 
insisted on the dangers o f  an overvalued exchange rate. On July 18"', Marcel Ospel, 
head o f  Swiss Bank Corporation’s International Division, called for a devaluation o f the 
peso if  Mexico was to keep foreign investment flowing into the country {The 
Economist, July 23rd 1994). According to Lawrence Summers (1996: 211), deputy- 
secretary o f the American Treasure, the particular combination o f Mexican monetary 
and exchange rate policies was not sound, and these policies were certain to collide, 
sooner o f later.
According to The Economist (July 23rd 1994), in the first three weeks o f  July domestic 
investors sold over $ 100 million dollars-worth o f pesos a week in the exchange market. 
Between January and December 1994 international reserves fell from $24 billion dollars 
to slightly more than $6 billion dollars. Despite waning investors confidence early in 
1994, President Salinas and his economic team stuck unwaveringly to its commitment 
to keep the peso within a fixed band against the dollar. Salinas’s economic team did 
much to preserve economic stability and the value o f the currency throughout 1994 
despite the continuous political turmoil. BdeM, supposedly autonomous, fully supported 
the President’s position and hurled money into the currency and money markets. The 
American and Canadian governments also backed the position o f the Mexican 
government not to devalue the peso. In April 26"', the monetary authorities from Canada 
and the US announced an agreement on a permanent $8.8 billion dollars swap facility to 
defend the peso {The Economist, April 30"' 1994).
Blundered Devaluation and Capital Flight
Investment confidence deteriorated as a result o f  unreliable information regarding the 
levels o f government indebtedness. According to Solis (1996: 87), economic analysts in 
foreign investment banks received different figures from the BMV, BdeM and the 
Ministry o f Finance. BdeM also kept undisclosed the figure o f international reserves for 
a long time. The severity o f  the crisis was heightened as a result o f  the lack o f  precise
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and timely information. This situation prevented corrective action and produced an 
over-reaction on the side o f the investors to the devaluation o f peso. The mishandling o f  
the affair exacerbated the consequences o f the peso devaluation. The blundered 
devaluation was translated into a vicious circle. Jaime Serra Puche, minister o f  finance 
at the time, did not anticipate a run against the peso as large as the one that actually took 
place and therefore did not make any provision to secure the payments on the short-term 
public debt. Investors refused to rollover their holdings and the few that accepted 
demanded sharply higher yields to do so. The cost and the amount o f funds required to 
refinance the state skyrocketed.
According to a recent report o f the IMF (Kramer and Smith 1995) better-informed 
Mexican investors rather than foreign investors triggered the devaluation on December 
19th and the subsequent liquidity crisis. The report asserted that foreign investors sold 
only $326 million dollars-worth o f government bonds, and actually made net purchases 
o f equity during the three weeks before the devaluation. However international reserves 
fell by a significant $2.8 billion dollars. Mexican investors also mainly carried out the 
run against the peso after the initial devaluation. The figures for December are far more 
dramatic: foreign investors sold only $370 million dollars-worth o f bonds and equity, 
while international reserves tumbled by $6.7 billion. The current account deficit 
represented only $1.7 billion dollars, capital flight o f Mexican investors accounting for 
the rest. Foreign investors, according to Kramer and Smith (1995) only started to sell 
their holdings o f government securities on a grand scale in February 1995.
Domestic investors clearly had a better idea about the precarious financial conditions o f  
the state and therefore about the prospects o f a devaluation than foreign investors. 
Although the Ministry o f Finance and BdeM kept crucial information regarding the 
level o f international reserves undisclosed for very long, domestic investors managed to 
determine the government’s inability to defend the peso against an speculative attack. 
Domestic investors beat the government as to the extent o f how sustainable the 
exchange rate was. The ability o f the Mexican state to deal with the private sector is 
seriously weakened by the ever-present threat o f capital flight; no developed country 
currently faces this difficulty to any similar degree (Philip 1998b).
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8.4 Outcomes
The 1994 crisis further changed the configuration o f M exico’s financial system. Banks’ 
weakening financial health forced the government to step in and avoid a major collapse 
o f the system. The government took two main decisions to face the crisis in the banking 
sector: open up the sector to foreign investment and bailout the whole system. A new 
round o f mergers and acquisitions took place after the crisis, where many foreign banks 
took over troubled banks and other medium-sized banks merged among them. But most 
important, the legacy of the 1994 crisis for the following years was a huge burden in the 
public finances as a result o f the banks’ bailout.
Foreign Investment
President Salinas opened up the financial system to foreign investment only partially. At 
the beginning foreign firms were not allowed to own a majority stake in any domestic 
bank and their market shares were circumscribed to a pre-set limit. In 1994, Guillermo 
Ortiz, deputy minister o f finance at that time, said that 18 foreign banks and 16 
brokerage houses were ready to start operations in Mexico (Associated Press , October 
22nd 1994). It was estimated that they could provide more than $5 billion dollars, in 
lending in their first year.17 Then, during the IX Bankers Convention, Pedro Aspe, 
announced the formal authorisation to 52 foreign financial firms— banks, brokerage 
houses and insurance companies (see Table 8.4) It was an explosive opening up, at least, 
on paper. If all the foreign and domestic financial firms that received an authorisation 
would had started operations in Mexico, the system would have increased from 18 
commercial banks to 117 financial firms {Business Mexico, January 1995). At the end, 
these financial firms did not start operations because o f  the uncertainty produced by the 
1994 crisis.
According to the original schedule for opening up the financial system, signed under 
NAFTA, complete liberalisation was due for the year 2000. This schedule was modified
17 From experiences in other countries, foreign banks were unlikely to go into the retail banking business; 
instead they usually concentrate on corporate banking. They were expected to compete with the large 
domestic banks to serve the high-income segment o f the market: treasuries from blue-chip companies, 
high-income customers, and transnational corporations.
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in February 1995, after the collapse o f the peso, as part o f a programme to capitalise the 
banks. The government allowed foreign firms to fully own domestic banks (.Proceso , 
May 6th 1996). The government changed the legal provisions on foreign ownership a 
couple o f times, gradually making the financial system more open. Then, in June 1995, 
the Ministry o f Finance tried to entice foreign banks to lend by offering them the option 
to swap their debt for equity in Mexican banks (The Economist, July 1st 1995). Foreign 
banks, which were barred from taking part in the bank privatisation in 1992, were urged 
to invest in the banking system only five years later.
Table 8 .4
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Source: Business Mexico, January 1995
Even prior to the crisis there were some cases o f foreign investment into domestic 
banks. By the end o f 1993, three foreign banks had stakes in Mexican banks: Bank o f  
Nova Scotia from Canada controlled 5 percent o f GF INVERLAT; Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya from Spain controlled 20 percent o f GF PROBURSA; and Banco central 
Hispano also from Spain controlled 20 percent o f GF Intemacional {Financial Times,
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November 10lh 1993). Domestic banks also tended to consolidate and by the end o f  
1993, three financial groups have already merged: Banco UNION and Banca CREMI, 
two multi-regional banks; BANCRECER and BANORO, a multi-regional and a 
regional bank; and Grupo AFIN and BANORTE, a brokerage house and a bank 
{Financial Times, November 10th 1993). Foreign investment surged after the changes to 
the law in 1995. Spanish and Canadian banks were the most active investors in this 
second round o f acquisitions (see Table 8.5)
Table 8.5
Mergers and Acquisitions
Bank Buyer Country Date Operation
CREMI UNION Mexican n.a. n.a.
PROBURSA BBV Spain May 1995 $175 m. dollars for 
70 percent





INVERLAT Bank de Nova 
Scotia
Canada July 1996 $225 m. dollars for 
55 percent
SERFIN Hong Kong 
Shanghai Bank
Hong Kong May 1996 buy between 16 to 
20 percent
BANCOMER Bank of Montreal Canada February
1996
$600 m. dollars for 
20 percent
INVERMEXICO Santander Spain 1996 $372 m. dollars for 
100 percent
ORIENTE BBV Spain June 1996 plans to acquire
BANORTE Investment Fund American 24 percent
UNION PROMEX Mexican n.a. n.a.
BANPAIS BANORTE Mexican n.a. n.a.
CONFIA Citibank American 1998 controlling stake
Source: Proceso, May 6th 1996; The Economist, April 23rd 1996; The Economist, January 24,h 1998; 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database, FT Profile. 
n.a.=not available
At present it is possible to have complete ownership o f  any bank whose assets represent 
less than 6 percent o f the entire system. So far, foreign investors have paid roughly $2 
billion dollars for five Mexican banks. According to Valencia (1997) foreign ownership 
rose from 2 percent o f total banking assets in 1995 to around 10 percent one year after. 
Ana Bofin, head o f Mexican operations o f SANTANDER bank, claimed that foreign 
investment was already changing the configuration o f the Mexican banking system  
(quoted by The Economist, April 23rd 1996).
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Banking Bailout
The government usually has four main ways to deal with troubled banks. First, 
liquidation: the authority pays o ff insured deposits and sells any residual assets. Second, 
closure by merger: the government promotes the merger between a sick bank and a 
healthy one— regulators offer the rescuer an incentive, usually withholding a portion o f  
the non-performing loans. Third, government loans or transfers: the government cleans 
up the banks balance sheets by acquiring their worst assets, usually through an agency 
which holds the bad assets until they mature or can be sold.18 Fourth, outright 
nationalisation: the government takes over the ownership and administritation o f the 
banks.
The immediate response o f the Ministry o f Finance to the banking crisis had three 
components: a dollar window in BdeM to enable banks to straighten out their 
mismatched dollar-denominated assets and liabilities; a re-capitalisation programme for 
specific banks; an interest rate reduction for small and mid-sized debtors. As the 
financial situation o f  the banks deteriorated and the government had to implement a 
comprehensive bailout. M exico’s banking bailout was a combination o f the second and 
third options. The government did not liquidate any bank but promoted several mergers. 
In the cases o f corruption, the financial authorities took over the banks’ management but 
only long enough to restructure it and find a buyer.19 The state through FOBAPROA  
(Banking Fund for Savings Protection)20 took over the portfolio o f non-performing loans 
from collapsing banks burdened also with scandals o f corruption and money laundering. 
FOBAPROA exchanged non-performing loans for 10-years government bonds paying 
market rates, took over collapsed banks, restructured them and later on sold them.
18 Examples of these agencies can be found in Sweden (Securum), the US (Resolution Trust Company), 
and Japan (Co-operative Credit Purchasing Company).
19 Venezuela faced a similar banking crisis in 1994. The government bailout, estimated at $10 billion 
dollars or 13 percent o f the GDP, went into banks whose problems were mainly caused by inefficient 
and/or corrupt management. At the end, the government was forced to take over 17 out o f 41 banks in the 
system.
20 FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario de Protection al Ahorro/Banking Fund for Savings Protection), funded 
in 1990, is M exico’s equivalent of the US Resolution Tmst Company, funded 10 years earlier to deal 
with the Savings and Loans crisis. FOBAPROA is allowed to buy and sell banking loans, capitalise 
banks, take over and sell assets.
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The immediate antecedent o f FOBAPROA was FONAPRE (Banking Fund for 
Preventive Aid), created in 1984 as a result o f the reform to the LGIC. It was a fund 
managed by BdeM and financed by the then state-owned commercial banks. A  technical 
committee headed by the Ministry o f Finance directed credits to ailing banks. By being 
ready to bailout any bank and prevent its failure, FONAPRE indirectly guaranteed all o f  
the banks’ deposits and liabilities. Well known examples are the fund’s assistance to 
BACRECER, BCH (now UNION) and BANPAIS {Business Mexico, April 1991). The 
last one made a successful recovery that allowed it to be one o f the first three banks 
offered for sale.
FONAPRE was replaced by FOBAPROA because the government wanted to reduce its 
exposure to a possible banking collapse once the banks were privatised. At first, the 
reform to the fund was intended to make sure the government did not get stuck with the 
bill in the case o f  a massive bank failure, as happened in the US. Although the technical 
committee was made up o f nine members from the Ministry o f Finance, BdeM and the 
CNBV, the government did not finance the fund. Banks contributed 3 pesos per 1000 
pesos o f  insured deposits each month. Because o f  the reform, the fund covered only 
certain deposits (i.e. checking accounts, savings accounts, and all bank promissory 
notes). The reforms tightened the requirements to ailing banks for receiving credits: 
guarantees for borrowing and prompt repayment. Furthermore, the reform considered 
the possibility to increase the banks’ contributions from 3 to 7 pesos per 1000 pesos o f  
insured deposits in case several banks overwhelmed the fund {Business Mexico, April 
1991). However, all these condition and safeguards were completely irrelevant once the 
banking sector threatened to collapse massively. The government stepped in, regardless 
o f the enormous size o f the bailout and did not call for extraordinary contributions.
On July 15th 1994, FOBAPROA concluded the first major deal to reschedule the banks’ 
non-performing agricultural loans, estimated to represent a fifth o f  the total overdue 
loans at that time {The Economist, July 30th 1994). As part o f the deal, FOBAPROA  
agreed to guarantee some o f the principal o f the rescheduled loans. Then, in 1995, 
FOBAPROA agreed to take some $700 million dollars in non-performing loans o ff the 
books o f PROBURSA; in return, BBV agreed to inject about half that much in new 
money into the bank and to take control o f it. Banca SERFIN, the third largest bank, 
looked for a similar deal at that time {The Economist, July 1st 1995). Eventually, most o f
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the banks, including BANAMEX and BANCOMER, sold part o f their non-performing 
loans to FOBAPROA.
Early in 1996 officials from BdeM and the Ministry o f Finance estimated the cost o f  the 
bailout around 5 percent o f  the GDP. However, Moody’s, according to The Economist 
(March 23rd 1996), anticipated that the cost could be three times that figure because o f 
slower growth in 1995. At this time, FOBAPROA already owned 13 percent o f  the 
banks non-performing loans. By mid-1998 the size o f  the banks bailout reached $61 
billion dollars, equivalent to 14 percent o f the Mexican GDP (The Times, July 24lh 
1998).21 According to The Times (July 24th 1998) the state pays to the banks for interest 
on its bonds $11 billion dollars a year, equal to 2.7 percent o f the GDP. The Mexican 
bailout ranks among the most expensive in the world’s banking history (see Table 8.6). 
The Scandinavian countries faced a similar banking crisis in the late 1980s. The size o f 
their bailout reached $16 billion dollars between 1989 and 1992. Around the same time, 
the US savings and loans system collapsed and the government spent, though difficult to 
know exactly, around $150 billion dollars {The Economist, March 25th 1995).
Table 8.6
The Cost of Banking Bailouts
Year Country
Cost as a Percentage of 
GDP Total Loans
1982 Argentina 13.0 42.5
1985 Chile 19.6 22.5
1985 Colombia 6.0 40.0
1988-1992 Norway 4.5 5.5
1989 US Commercial Banks 1.5 3.9
1991 US Savings and Loans 5.1 7.8
1991-1993 Sweden 4.5 5.5
1991-1993 Finland 8.2 9.7
1994 Venezuela 13.0 57.2
1998 Mexico 14.0 n.a.
Source: Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1996: 11; The Times, July 24th 1998
The Congress approved the conversion o f FOBAPROA’s liabilities into public debt in 
the 1998 budget but only after long and exhausting negotiations between the Ministry o f
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Finance, the PRI and the opposition. In the meantime, uncertainty raised the costs for 
the economy, for the banks and for the bailout itself: interest rates remained high, which 
caused further defaults on loans, banks stopped lending completely, and jeopardised the 
banks’ capitalisation programmes. Once more, the banks bailout showed how much the 
government is committed towards the financial sector, regardless o f  institutional 
arrangements. A government official, quoted by Business Mexico (April 1991), accepted 
that ‘even the smallest Mexican bank, Banco de Oriente, is not expected to fail’.
Finally, FOBAPROA was not free from corruption and actually was accused o f corrupt 
and illegal transactions in several occasions. In 1994 the fund poured loans into Carlos 
Cabal’s UNION and CREMI banks, which collapsed anyway some time later in the 
middle o f a corruption scandal. Those were the first rescue operations o f  the fund {La 
Jornada , November 11th 1998). Then in 1996, the fund lent $80 million dollars for 
seven years at 3 percent interest rates to Grupo Lomel, whose owners were on the 
FOBAPROA committee that handled the loan {The Times, July 24th 1998). It is 
noteworthy that FOBAPROA’s charter bars the fund from lending.
Conclusions
At a structural level, the financial reform failed to raise the level o f domestic savings, 
which is often attributed as the ultimate cause o f the 1994 crisis. At an operational level, 
financial liberalisation re-directed capital inflows from commercial loans into volatile 
portfolio investments. Regarding the banking sector, the combination o f  privatisation 
and liberalisation produced a lending and consumption boom mostly financed by 
external savings. Between 1989 and 1993, aggregate demand grew by 5 percent per 
annum on average in real terms, whereas production grew by less than 3 percent only. 
The gap was filled with an increasing current account deficit, which rose to 8 percent o f  
the GDP in 1994, higher even than it had been on the eve o f the 1980s debt crisis 
(Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 21,68; INEGI 1994: 892). Finally, the government 
used the exchange rate as an anchor for price stabilisation. Between 1988 and 1990 the 
pre-determined annual rate o f devaluation fell from 16 to 3 percent, well below the
21 Some estimates put the figure above $75 billion dollars (Patricio Nelson, US economist, quoted by The 
Times, July 24th 1998).
256
differential between internal and external inflation. In the policy trade-off between 
realistic devaluation (and risking feeding inflationary expectations) and devaluation 
below inflation (despite the harm to the exporting sector) it was systematically chosen 
the last option.
Some o f the events that triggered the devaluation in December 1994 — political 
turbulence, a widening current-account deficit, a pre-election public-spending spree and 
a lax monetary policy—  cannot be attributed to the financial reform. Nevertheless, the 
size o f the run against the peso was possible because capital was free o f  controls in the 
new financial framework; ‘the markets simply lost their heads’ {The Economist, October 
7th 1995). Fernando Solis accepted that ‘we have never seen a run against Mexican 
securities nearly as large as the one experienced in the aftermath o f  the peso 
devaluation’ (Interview: Mexico City, September 1st 1995).
The causes o f the financial collapse were a mixture o f policy misjudgements and 
adverse circumstances, but the depth o f the crisis was mostly the result o f  the financial 
reform. The political economy that emerged from the financial reform promoted by the 
Salinas’s government and the increasing electoral competition reduced the space for 
policy management. The combination o f political change and financial reform prevented 
policy makers to take corrective action earlier in 1994 to avoid the collapse o f  the peso. 
End-of-sexenio institutional weakening and the most contested presidential elections in 
post-revolutionary Mexico produced policy paralysis in the months before the 
devaluation. The poor health o f the banking system associated to the financial reform 
(banking deregulation and privatisation mainly), also ruled out the possibility to 
devaluate the peso.
Deregulation o f  banking operations and the banks' privatisation produced new business 
practices in the financial system. Institutional changes in the financial system unleashed 
market forces leading to an excess o f ‘animal spirits’. Government and bankers alike, in 
an under-banked economy, tried to align the lending levels in Mexico to those in the 
OECD countries, but without having the risk management systems available in those 
countries. There were serious gaps in the banks' supervision: reporting procedures and 
provisions for non-performing loans were inadequate. Excessive lending to high-risk 
borrowers boosted the level o f non-performing loans. Then, the devaluation reduced the
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banks’ capitalisation and high interest rates increased the level o f non-performing loans. 
Many banks came to the brink o f collapse.
In hindsight, the two major policy mistakes in 1994 were the delay o f corrective action 
in the exchange rate and the replacement o f CETES by the dollar-denominated 
TESOBONOS. Other minor mistakes, were the lack o f reliable and timely information 
on international reserves and public debt. Exchange rate over-valuation produced a non- 
sustainable current account deficit. The substitution o f CETES by TESOBONOS 
magnified the consequences o f the devaluation and transformed what was supposed to 
be a simple misalignment into a full-scale financial crisis in the state finances. Some o f  
the policy mistakes leading to the 1994 crisis were clearly associated to the lack o f  
accountability o f the presidency. For instance, the President used development banking 
credit, a kind o f quasi-fiscal spending, to expand aggregate demand without the 
Congress approval in the months preceding the elections. As one member o f Zedillo’s 
economic team clearly put it: ‘If there had been any real checks on the executive in 
1994, we simply would not have been able to issue nearly $30 billion dollars o f  dollar- 
denominated debt behind Congress back’ (quoted by The Economist, March 14th 1998).
Economic reform was needed to lure foreign investors but political reform is needed to 
discipline domestic investors. Foreign investors who remained confident in the 
economic prospects even after the devaluation did not trigger the crisis, but domestic 
investors who knew the strong link between the economy and the political calendar. The 
state have had usually little control over capital in the last year o f each sexenio, but in 
the case o f Salinas’s sexenio this control was virtually non-existent. The main causes 
were being the financial reform and a simultaneous process o f political transition. A  
fixed exchange rate policy combined with expansionist fiscal and monetary policies 
were at the heart o f the runs in 1976 and 1982. In 1994, a semi-fixed exchange rate 
policy with a completely open economy produced the current account deficit behind the 
run. However the trigger has always been capital flight during the last year o f the 
sexenio. The structural causes o f the economic disruptions at the end o f  each sexenio 
may have changed but the trigger remained the same. The margin for economic 
miscalculations has become increasingly narrow in Mexico as the economy and the 
financial system has become increasingly integrated to the world economy. The threat 
o f  capital flight is greater than ever.
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Conclusions
At the outset o f this research project, when I was trying to identify the main elements o f  
M exico’s financial reform under President Carlos Salinas, four main themes came forth 
consistently, namely: financial globalisation, political democratisation, institutional 
change and financial collapse. Throughout the thesis I also found that the financial 
reform was relevant for the discussion o f an important theoretical issue: the autonomy 
o f  the state. The conclusions are organised into five sections— one for each main theme.
The financial refonn was part of a wider and global programme o f  economic 
restructuring triggered by the 1982 ‘debt crisis’. At a global level, the crisis persuaded 
Multilateral Financial Organisations (MFOs)— mainly the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)— and domestic governments that a state strongly 
involved in the economy becomes very vulnerable to economic swings. At a domestic 
level, the crisis jeopardised the economic and political leadership o f the Mexican state. 
The reform responded to both external influence and domestic politics. Increasing 
dependence on the world economy forced the state to align its policies with the 
dominant economic orthodoxy. Increasing electoral competition pushed the state to re­
engineer economic institutions in order to re-establish its political leadership.
Financial reform in Mexico took place despite the fact that the electorate was not 
particularly pro-market: Salinas was effectively challenged by a left-wing coalition in 
the 1988 presidential elections. The reform was not the result o f an electoral mandate; it 
was rather the result o f  a technocratic initiative. A  state elite committed to the 
imposition o f a policy paradigm directed from above, the reform (Centeno 1994: 4). The 
specific content o f the reform was shaped by the convergence o f two trends: first, a 
‘revolution o f  the market’, consisting in global economic integration and domestic 
economies increasingly driven by market forces; and second, a ‘technocratic 
revolution’, in which the most important positions in the Mexican state were captured 
by a group with very well defined policy preferences favouring liberalisation. The stated 
objective for the reform was mainly to create a flexible and stable financial system 
where decisions on savings and investment could be made efficiently and in a growth- 
oriented way (Aspe 1993; Ortiz 1994).
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State Autonomy
The state is the political unit at the intersection o f the external and internal dimensions 
o f policy reform. The survival o f domestic states is conditioned to a great extent by 
external factors, especially financing and political recognition, on the one hand; and 
states are the most influential organisations in domestic political systems, on the other. 
According to Theda Skocpol (1985: 9), ‘the linkage o f  states into transnational 
structures and into international flows o f  communication may encourage state officials 
to pursue transformative strategies even in the face o f  indifference or resistance from 
politically weighty social forces.’ Following the tradition o f  Schumpeter (1934), 
Hirschman (1958), Gerschenkron (1962) and, more recently, Evans (1992), I place the 
emphasis on the policy networks that connect domestic organisations with international 
capital within a ‘developmental’ state. Internal autonomy breaks up the existing 
alliances favouring the status quo, whereas external connectedness provides the initial 
drive for reform (Veltmeyer et.al. 1997: 95).
The autonomy o f the Mexican state is rooted at the first level, in the PRI, an electoral 
machine that secures electoral legitimacy rather than articulating the interests o f the 
electorate. At the second level, the autonomy is based on a tacit alliance with large 
business that has developed effective mechanisms o f communication and policy co­
ordination with the state. Finally, at the third level, an extremely powerful President and 
a coherent executive bureaucracy allowed the state to pursue its own priorities and shape 
its policy agenda according to their preferences. The President has the ability to re­
engineer the political institutions every six years. The state is sensitive to business 
groups demands and popular needs since the regime is built upon the tacit alliance with 
business groups and now includes increasing electoral competition.
M exico’s financial reform under President Salinas shows how policy decisions are 
determined by the convergence between two different, though interrelated, sets o f  
variables: international trends in policy-making and domestic political institutions. The 
first determines the range o f feasible policy options available to the state; it highlights 
the context that set the parameters o f political action, whereas the second shapes the 
interaction between the different actors within the system, giving a more precise insight 
into the institutional and circumstantial variability o f  political processes.
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Each one o f the reforms to the financial system supports the original claim: external 
dependency and internal autonomy brought about policy reform under President Salinas. 
However, this finding seemingly turned the autonomy o f  the Mexican state into a puzzle 
(see Bazdresch and Levy 1991). According to the evidence found, the state is highly 
receptive to the policy preferences o f capital and, at the same time, the state has 
institutional resources to align coalitions o f support for its policies. To answer this 
puzzle I approached the question o f state autonomy from a different angle. I accept that 
external dependency, meaning the need for external financing, confines the set o f 
feasible state policies to those agreeable to international capital. However, I recognise 
that institutional arrangements in the Mexican political system create a policy space 
where the state operates to secure its own reproduction and survival. This is very close 
to the notion o f embedded autonomy developed by Peter Evans (1995). In the case o f  
Mexico, however, this combination does not always deliver a developmental state where 
internal coherence and connectedness blend into growth-conducive policies.
Finally, state autonomy does not represent an absolute and fixed condition but the 
capacity o f the state to exercise its own initiative within a given policy space. 
Consequently, this capacity changes depending on the political leadership and the 
specific historical and institutional context.
Financial Globalisation
As a result o f changing conditions in the world political economy, economic reform 
became an imperative for governments in developing countries. The thesis identified 
two major changes, namely: financial globalisation and the emergence o f  a new 
economic consensus in rich countries and MFOs. The combination o f these two trends 
fostered a phenomenon o f ‘policy bandwagoning’ (Ikenberry 1990). Developing 
economies urgently needed to accommodate themselves within the new dominant 
economic paradigm of ‘free market’. Financial globalisation increased the competition 
for investment— governments expected to attract and retain as much international 
capital as possible (Maxfield 1997: 35). The competition for capital pushed 
governments in these economies to implement similar policies to those in vogue in the 
rich countries.
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Financial globalisation increased the ‘policy leverage’ o f international capital. Despite 
the fact that Mexico was running healthier finances in 1988, the government was still 
highly indebted and, therefore, needed access to international capital to rollover its 
outstanding balances. In addition, structural features o f development meat that 
developing countries tended to run deficits on their current accounts (Villareal 1988). 
The current account deficit in the second part o f Salinas’s sexenio further increased the 
dependence on capital inflows.
By the time President Salinas took office, securities issues had already replaced bank 
loans as the main instrument for state financing. Capital inflows under the new 
framework were guided by signals o f economic prospects and ‘sound’ economic 
policies. This scheme implied a whole set o f coherent decisions aimed at improving the 
investment climate according to international standards. The content o f  the reform to the 
financial system— financial liberalisation, development banking reform, banks’ 
privatisation and central bank autonomy— conformed to the policy ideas promoted by a 
powerful coalition o f transnational interests.
Intellectual developments and re-alignments between support coalitions fostered a new 
consensus regarding economic policy. In what could be called a ‘global revolution o f  
the market’, neoliberal ideas and liberalisation policies spread all over the world; 
neoliberalism became the new unrivalled orthodoxy (Centeno 1994: 22). MFOs played 
an important role in the ‘universalisation’ o f orthodox economic ideas. Contrary to 
common belief, these organisations were more effective at fostering reform through the 
construction o f a common base o f consensual knowledge than through direct 
conditionality. I found that shared, and often imposed, ideas were the communication 
mechanism between domestic policy makers and MFOs. President Salinas’s economic 
team featured great ideological homogeneity. Not only were policy preferences shared 
by the members o f this team, but also a way o f perceiving and analysing social 
problems that distinguished them from alternative coalitions.
The new orthodoxy favoured policy coalitions advocating policies like privatisation, 
deregulation and trade liberalisation. Mexico observed a shift in the balance o f  power 
favouring the financial coalition. The efforts o f both Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas 
to regain credibility with international investors and creditors strengthened the position
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o f  the financial coalition within the bureaucracy (Haggard and Maxfield 1993). 
International capital, including MFOs, became the most valuable source o f  support for 
domestic policy coalitions in the new world political economy.
M exico’s financial reform was an example o f how financial globalisation and policy 
consensus conditioned the state’s response to the 1980s economic decline and to the set­
back in the 1988 presidential elections. Stronger political competition forced the state to 
provide a viable development strategy in a more integrated world economy. However, 
the natural short-term planning horizon o f the politicians made them very keen on 
responses that produce immediate results. In this context President Salinas saw capital 
inflows as the answer to bringing back the economy to the path o f long term growth, 
and consequently, to restoring popular support for his government. However, most 
capital inflows went into portfolio investment, making the economy very vulnerable to 
capital flight. From a historical perspective, capital flight has triggered the cyclical 
crises in Mexico since 1976.
Political Democratisation
Regarding domestic politics I identified two relevant issues for M exico’s financial 
reform: the technocrats’ rise to power and the process o f political democratisation. 
Economic decline favoured the rise o f the technocrats to key government positions in 
1982. At that time, universal suffrage was seen as a luxury that Mexico could not afford 
if  the government wanted to administer a hefty dose o f the correct economic medicine. 
The technocrats’ skills and ideas were expected to provide a viable strategy for 
overcoming M exico’s economic difficulties. However, disappointing results during de 
la Madrid’s sexenio weakened the bases o f popular support for the government. The 
results in the 1988 elections persuaded incoming President Salinas that some degree o f  
democratisation was necessary to restore the legitimacy to his government.
Despite increasing electoral competition, the institutional arrangements in the political 
system remained quasi-authoritarian. Most o f the reform and policy initiatives came 
from the state and only rarely from society. The Mexican state under President Salinas 
remained to a great extent autonomous basically for two reasons: first, the state 
apparatus remained highly centralised under the leadership o f  the President; and second,
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the dominant coalition was a cohesive technocratic team with a coherent set o f  policy 
preferences. A powerful coalition o f interests— major domestic businessmen and 
international investors— was aligned behind President Salinas and his economic team.
Mexican financial reform under President Salinas reflected not only the severity o f  
financial constraints but also his political strategy to restore legitimacy (Haggard and 
Maxfield 1993: 317). The capital inflows following his economic reforms allowed the 
state to introduce a programme o f heavy social spending and run increasing current 
account deficits. Rural poor and urban middle classes alike benefited from these 
policies. This strategy produced extraordinary political dividends in the 1991 and 1994 
federal elections when the PRI recuperated its electoral hegemony. Several scholars 
argued that President Salinas never stopped campaigning because o f  his poor electoral 
performance, and that his programme o f economic reform emerged essentially as a 
policy response to the 1988 electoral setback.
President Salinas was a leader praised by the international economic community (press, 
investors and policy-makers). For them, Salinas was the visionary leader who turned 
around a country that had gone bust so publicly only six years before he took office, by 
embarking on a dramatic and successful economic reform. The weekly magazine The 
Economist (February 13th 1993) stated that Salinas, despite o f his controversial 
beginnings, had a claim to be hailed as one o f the great men o f the 20th century.
President Salinas’s attitude towards democracy, however, remained always ambiguous: 
he proclaimed his goal as ‘democracy with stability’ and not democratic reforms that 
promote ‘anarchy or instability’ (Wood 1993). More accurately, Salinas was not 
interested in reforms that could endanger his ability to steer the state and jeopardise his 
programme o f economic reform. His implicit goal was to preserve the existing political 
system, and thus the PRI’s dominance, by reforming it. Under the shadow of  
Gorvachev’s failure to bring about political and economic change in Russia, President 
Salinas believed that the right sequence for the reform— first economic and then 
political— was fundamental for the final success o f his government. President Salinas 
was tacitly a strong believer in Huntington’s (1968) ‘modernisation’ theory: democracy 
is best rooted in prosperous societies. Economic reform was expected to raise Mexican 
living standards. However, the political turmoil revealed the shortcomings o f this
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approach. Running policies which are good for the people, even if  they do not 
appreciate them, may appeal to the technocratic mind. But it is not the way political 
systems are supposed to be run at the end o f the 20th century. Salinas’s government 
might have been the last one to be run according to a technocratic blueprint. The PRI 
cannot afford to maintain its reforming ways without securing real legitimacy through 
real democratic practices regardless o f the costs in terms o f reduced state capacity.
Institutional Changes
M exico’s financial reform represented a genuine institutional change. The financial 
system was heavily controlled by the state prior to the reform under President Salinas. 
The state management o f the financial system was based upon five main pillars: (1) 
statutory control over the determination o f interest rates; (2) control over the allocation 
o f credit through development banking and selective credit programmes; (3) control 
over commercial banks through outright ownership; (4) statutory control over BdeM  
and therefore over monetary and exchange rate policies; and (5) control over regulation 
and supervision through the National Commissions for the financial system. The 
financial reform, however, represented the elimination o f most o f these mechanisms 
through which the state conducted the financial policy. The state kept regulation and 
supervision only to control the financial system. However, as the 1994 crisis served to 
establish, the new framework failed to achieve either o f the two major goals o f the 
financial reform, namely: improving the efficiency o f the financial system and 
promoting economic growth.
The main reforms to the financial system— financial liberalisation, development 
banking reform, commercial banks’ privatisation and autonomy o f BdeM— represent 
cases o f effective institutional change. All the reforms conformed to the dominant 
consensus on economic policy. Furthermore, a bureaucratic elite made up o f  highly 
trained policy-makers successfully implemented all o f them. In fact, the Mexican state 
under President Salinas displayed great capacity to engineer institutional change. This 
thesis evaluated the outcomes o f the institutional changes in terms o f their contribution 
to specific political interests— e.g. state financing, capital inflows and business 
opportunities— and to broad economic issues— e.g. efficiency, stability and growth. 
Table C.l summarises the findings from the case studies. It is evident from the results
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that the financial reform advanced the political issues better than the economic issues. 
This evidence refutes the neoclassical hypothesis o f a benevolent planner implementing 
reform to improve economic efficiency.
Table C.1
Outcomes from the Financial Reform
Political Interests Economic Issues
Financial
Liberalisation
• State mainly financed through the 
stock exchange
• Accumulation of large fortunes in 
the stock exchange
• Alliance between the state and 
large financial groups
• Interest rate spreads did not drop 
and even increased
• Consumer credit rose at the 
expense of productive investment




• Expansion of development credit 
during 1994
• Corruption scandals regarding 
NAFIN operations
• Ultimately reversed
• Large amounts of development 
funds were not allocated




• Large revenues from the sale
• Corruption scandals in the newly- 
privatised banks
• Bankers’ contributions for the 
PRI’s 1994 electoral campaigns
• Consolidation of SBHs and banks 
into financial groups
• Excessive expansion of high-risk 
lending
• Non-performing assets problem
BdeM
Autonomy
• Exchange rate policy under 
President’s control
• The policy agenda of the f in a n c ia l  
coa lition  was furthered
• Loose monetary policy during 
1994
• BdeM did not oppose the reckless 
lending of commercial banks
Financial Liberalisation
Financial liberalisation was the first round o f changes and the most consequential; they 
triggered the subsequent reforms to the financial system. Once the foundations for a new  
framework for the financial system were laid down, the rest o f the reforms followed 
naturally as a matter o f coherence. Financial liberalisation, or more precisely the 
deregulation o f the banks’ operations, were possible thanks to the development o f  the 
securities markets under President de la Madrid. I conclude from the observed outcomes 
o f financial liberalisation that the immediate interests o f  the state and financial groups 
were better served than the more general goals o f  financial efficiency and economic 
growth (see Table C .l). The development o f the securities market and the deregulation 
o f banking operations, policies consistent with international trends, allowed the
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financial elite to accumulate great wealth and strengthened their support for the 
government.
Financial liberalisation improved the instruments for state financing and the profitability 
o f the brokerage houses and the commercial banks. Government securities replaced 
banking loans as the main source o f  finance for the state, while commercial banks 
concentrated on the profitable segment o f consumer lending. The reform, however, did 
very little to improve financial and economic efficiency. The business practices under 
the new framework favoured state financing and consumer credit at the expense o f  
credit for physical investment and technological innovation. The interest rate spread 
(difference between what the banks charge for their loans and what they pay for their 
deposits) did not drop and in some cases even expanded.
Development Banking Reform
The reform to development banking changed the modus operandi o f these organisations. 
The state eliminated the banks’ direct allocation o f credit to specific economic sectors or 
activities at interest rates below market levels. Under the new framework, development 
banks’ main activity is to supply additional funds to the credit markets for specific 
sectors, reducing market interest rates and increasing the amount o f credit available for 
those sectors. The state introduced three major changes: first, development banks were 
turned into second-floor banks exclusively; second, the budgetary allocations to 
development banks were decreased; and private firms replaced public enterprises as the 
main recipients o f development credit. However, the outcomes from the reform were not 
as expected, and development banking is still a two-tier sector in which both the state 
and the market participate very actively.
The reform to development banking was more limited in terms o f both its original aims 
and its observed outcomes (see Table C .l). The changes utterly failed to achieve the 
explicit goal o f improving the efficiency o f the allocation o f development credit. 
Outcomes from the reform include: recent fraud allegations against NAFIN’s 
operations; large amounts o f funds were left unallocated; and huge expansion on 
development credit during 1994, an election year. With regard to the political interests 
o f the state and major businessmen, the reform also had disappointing results. The
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reform failed to advance the reform agenda since at the end it has to be reversed. The 
intended business opportunity for bankers never took place. Commercial banks were 
more concerned with the allocation o f their own funds to profitable sectors like 
consumer credit and credit cards than to participate in the development banks financing 
schemes.
Commercial Banks Privatisation
The privatisation o f the commercial banks was a key part o f  the financial reform and o f  
the more general economic strategy o f President Salinas. The banks’ privatisation made 
a substantial contribution to furthering the wider economic agenda o f  the financial 
coalition. In addition to improving the investment climate in Mexico, large capital 
inflows from the banks' privatisation contributed to the financing o f the increasing 
current account deficit. The banks' privatisation changed the configuration o f  the 
Mexican financial system by restoring commercial banks at the core o f  the newly 
created financial groups. Nevertheless, it is not possible to show on theoretical or 
empirical grounds that the transfer o f banks' ownership improved the internal efficiency 
o f the banks or the stability o f the financial system as a whole.
The privatisation o f  the commercial banks was the reform that received the most 
attention and was most scrutinised given the consequences for the subsequent banking 
crisis. In this case, as in the case o f the financial liberalisation, the reform did not further 
the economic goals o f efficiency, stability and growth (see Table C .l). The business 
strategies o f the privatised banks exacerbated the current crisis. The original revenues 
from their privatisation were far outweighed by the costs o f the required bailout. The 
outcomes regarding the state political interests were rather mixed. The proceeds from 
the sale o f  the banks improved the public finances and secured financing for the PRI’s 
electoral campaigns in 1994. Nevertheless, corruption scandals in the newly privatised 
banks evidenced the tacit alliance between President Salinas and some o f  the new 
bankers.
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Autonomy of Banco de Mexico
Finally, the autonomy o f BdeM included a new constitutional mandate for the central 
bank to secure price stability and a new LOBdeM in which BdeM received greater 
statutory autonomy for the conduction o f monetary policy and for its internal affairs. 
One o f the main political and economic achievements o f  President Salinas was to bring 
down inflation. The autonomy o f BdeM intended to signal a strong commitment to 
avoid future upsurges in inflation. Central banks, given their institutional features, are 
supposed to be more adverse to inflation than governments. However, in 1993, when 
President Salinas decided to grant greater autonomy to Banco de Mexico the main 
concern o f the state was not preserving low inflation in the long run but to avoid capital 
flight during 1994, an election year. The decision to grant greater autonomy to Banco de 
Mexico responded not to the theoretical claim that it would keep inflation under control 
in the long run, but to the need o f reducing the uncertainty usually present in an election 
year.
The reform was cosmetic to a great extent, as can be seen from these outcomes: BdeM  
implicitly acquiesced to the President’s decision not to devalue earlier in 1994; BdeM  
conducted a loose monetary policy during the election year, and BdeM implicitly 
approved commercial banks’ reckless lending. In sum, BdeM yielded to pressure from 
the President, who was seeking to win the elections for the PRI, and did not take an 
active stance to stop commercial banks’ rapid expansion. The only effective change 
from this reform was the advancement o f the policy agenda o f the financial coalition. 
Regarding the economic issues, the reform failed to secure stability and the effect on 
economic growth cannot be properly assessed. Prior to the reform, BdeM enjoyed a 
great degree o f statutory autonomy, but its lack o f  control over exchange rate policy 
(which remained in the hands o f the Ministry o f  Finance) severely limited its real 
powers.
Financial Collapse
The institutional changes discussed above were clear cases o f successfully implemented 
policies that conformed to the dominant orthodoxy on economic thinking. Furthermore, 
the economic team responsible for the reform was among the best qualified in the world
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{The Economist, February 13th 1993). Nevertheless, the financial collapse o f  the 
Mexican economy represented one o f the most severe crises since the revolution and the 
first important setback to the neoliberal paradigm. The 1994 crisis radically changed the 
image o f  President Salinas’s government in the international press. The Economist, the 
same weekly magazine that had praised Salinas’s reforms, wrote on March 14th 1998: 
‘Mexico is still trying to come to terms with the main reason it got into trouble: the 
shady politics and murky economics bom of seven decades o f rule by the PRI’.
M exico’s financial crisis in 1994 resulted from the combination o f  three sets o f  
interrelated factors. First, the financial reform that stifled domestic saving and re­
directed most o f the capital inflows towards portfolio investment. Second, the end-of- 
sexenio political cycle that produced a great deal o f political turmoil and economic 
uncertainty. Third, the policy mistakes that exacerbated the size and depth o f the crisis.
Financial Reform
The financial reform replaced the old framework, present for a very long time and based 
on controls, by a new one based mainly on the stock exchange and, therefore, essentially 
volatile. Securities traded in the stock exchange replaced commercial banks’ loans as 
the main instrument for state funding. Without controls, the state depended completely 
on the securities market for financing, and consequently, the investment climate and a 
sound financial policy became paramount. The financial reform increased the political 
leverage o f capital. In terms o f sequencing, the liberalisation o f banking operations 
kicked o ff the cascade o f further economic reforms, not only in the financial system, but 
in the whole economy. The signals o f healthy policies served their purpose for a while, 
and capital inflows skyrocketed between 1991 and 1993.
However, the failure o f the reform to address the issue o f domestic savings created an 
over-dependence on capital inflows. This problem was further aggravated by the 
exchange rate policy that produced a huge current account deficit. Increasing capital 
inflows going into government securities created a bonanza in the state finances: interest 
rates decreased dramatically. Capital flows responded to investors’ perceptions, very 
often unrelated to economic fundamentals. However, in 1994, prior to the crisis, the 
threat o f  capital flight circumscribed most o f decisions regarding financial policy and
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macroeconomic management. Mexican officials have always been committed to free 
exchange convertibility but the threat o f  capital flight is a recent phenomenon. The first 
major run against the peso took place in 1976 and since then, each successive run has 
increased its size exponentially. The reform o f the financial system under President 
Salinas further increased the exposure o f  the Mexican economy to capital flight.
In a recent report, the IMF argued that it was not international capital that initiated the 
run on the peso in December 1994, but domestic investors (Folkerts-Landau and Ito 
1995). The figures show that Mexicans, perhaps better informed, started to sell their 
securities much sooner than foreign investors. Even in late 1994, international capital 
was still investing very heavily in state securities; partly because long delays in the 
publication o f data on BdeM international reserves had left them without information 
for several months. It was not until February 1995 that foreign investors liquidated their 
holdings on state securities on a massive scale {The Economist, October 7th 1995).
End-of-sexenio political cycle
Mexican politics have introduced a great deal o f  uncertainty to the economic system 
since 1976. In the last four sexenios, the President and political institutions have 
weakened towards the end o f the term. Each President, since Luis Echeverria, lost their 
capacity either to steer the economy or to discipline the political elites during the last 
year o f their administration. In fact, each one o f  the last five presidential terms has 
ended with either an economic or a political crisis. The transition could not have been 
longer or more painful.
In the case o f President Salinas the end-of-sexenio political cycle was overly 
pronounced. The financial reform increased the exposure o f  the economy to capital 
flight. But more importantly, the political turmoil throughout 1994 further impaired the 
government’s ability to steer the economy. Investors perceived the deterioration o f the 
political climate in Mexico and knew the economic consequences. There were clear 
signals o f  a weakening government: the resolution o f  conflicts between political 
fractions took place at the margin o f the institutions and the President. The Zapatistas’ 
uprising in Chiapas, the assassination o f presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio
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and PRI general secretary Francisco Ruiz Massieu represent underlying political 
struggles.
Policy mistakes
Political democratisation also played a part in the genesis o f the 1994 crisis. Increasing 
electoral competition pushed the state to take decisions with potential pernicious 
consequences for the economy. The financial reform was insufficient to protect the 
economy from misjudged presidential decisions. In hindsight, it is very easy to identify 
the three most important policy mistakes: first, the government delayed corrective 
action in the exchange rate; second, the government indulged itself with expansionist 
fiscal and monetary policies; and third, the state changed the term-structure and 
exchange rate exposure o f the public debt.
The political costs o f devaluation in the context o f effective electoral competition 
prevented the government from devaluing the peso. The exchange rate was under great 
pressure throughout 1994 because o f the vcui-of-sexenio political turmoil and the 
mounting current account deficit. However, the government stuck to its commitment to 
defend the exchange rate against any possible run. In order to persuade international 
capital and domestic investors that there was no risk o f  devaluation, the state replaced 
the traditional CETES for the dollar-denominated TESOBONOS as the preferred 
security. TESOBONOS were virtually negligible as a share o f state internal borrowing 
in 1993, but at the moment o f the devaluation in 1994, they represented 55.7 percent 
(Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 55). This decision had disastrous consequences in 
the aftermath o f the devaluation and placed the state on the border o f insolvency. In fact 
the exchange rate losses associated to the devaluation amounted to more then $8 billion 
dollars (Presidencia de la Republica 1995: 55, 77).
Final Remarks
Michael Camdessus, director o f the IMF, labelled M exico’s 1994 financial crisis as the 
‘first crisis o f the twenty-first century’. The crisis represented the first important set­
back to the dominant economic orthodoxy. Subsequent crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil 
have led to a reassessment o f liberalisation policies. These crises have broken the
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‘Washington Consensus’ promoted by the IMF and prevalent in most o f the 
industrialised countries. The institutional framework for the world’s financial system 
still has a long way to go in order to achieve safer and more stable means o f  transferring 
resources from one country to another. At present, the framework effectively benefits a 
small group o f people in rich economies at the expense o f millions o f  people in 
developing countries that suffer the consequences o f these crises.
President Carlos Salinas, despite being one o f the leaders in the developing world at 
promoting globalisation and liberalisation, has now joined the group o f those urging for 
a reassessment o f neoliberal policies (Excelsior, January 13th 1999). The new 
alternative, according to Salinas, must keep the historical move towards market 
economies, but at the same time avoid the subordination o f domestic states to the whims 
o f international capital. In order to minimise the detrimental consequences o f  the free 
movement o f goods and capital it is also required that labour should be able to move 
freely between countries. The new framework must include effective regulation o f  
domestic financial markets and selective controls on short-term capital flows, on the one 
hand, and international agreements between governments on immigration, on the other.
Despite the notorious financial collapse in 1994, M exico’s economic reform under 
President Salinas brought about a genuine institutionalisation o f  economic policy­
making. At present, institutions are vastly more autonomous than they were in 1982. 
Financial markets determine the limits o f public indebtedness. An increasingly 
autonomous BdeM conducts monetary policy. Telecommunications and banking are 
under private management. The provisions o f NAFTA largely circumscribe trade policy. 
Fiscal policy is limited by the ability o f the state to get financing. Moreover, the 
government has now proposed to transfer the exchange rate policy and the regulation o f  
the banking system to BdeM.
According to Miguel Mancera (1994), former governor o f BdeM (1982-1997), the 
autonomy o f BdeM is a strong safeguard o f institutional change, insofar as, unlike many 
other countries, the reform is now included in the constitution. However, constitutional 
changes in Mexico are weak safeguards, considering the still quasi-authoritarian nature 
o f  the political system, where the President can introduce reforms without major 
obstacles. Investors, though warmly welcoming all these institutional changes, did not
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perceive them as sure safeguards against potential economic mismanagement associated 
to politics.
‘To the extent that there has been a strengthening o f genuinely bureaucratic and 
market institutions in Mexico, this has occurred disproportionally in the field o f 
economic management... Outside the field o f  pure economic management, 
Mexican state institutions may prove too weak— too under-financed, too 
clientelistically organised, too incompetent at social reform, too unpopular, too 
weak institutionally— to meet the legitimate expectations o f democracy on the 
part o f the majority o f the Mexicans’ (Philip 1998b).
The Mexican political system is currently changing from a stable and partially 
authoritarian regime to a more open and westem-style democracy in which strong 
opposition, contested electoral processes, higher accountability o f  the executive to the 
congress, and a strong rule o f law all play a role. This process, although initiated in the 
early 1970s, is far from complete and therefore at this moment Mexican political 
institutions are neither the authoritarian but stable institutions o f the past nor the strong 
institutions o f western-type democracies. In the past, the strong discipline imposed by 
these informal institutions on the members o f the political elite assured continuity and 
stability. At present, the political system remains authoritarian in terms o f  
accountability, while globalisation and greater political participation have reduced the 
institutions’ effectiveness (Philip 1998: 24).
It is possible to reform state institutions, but it takes time. Moreover, institution building 
in politics is difficult to carry out without effective executive authority because o f the 
ability o f those who benefit from weak state institutions to block the reforms to those 
same institutions. Strong presidentialism may therefore be desirable at a time o f  crisis or 
rapid transformation (Philip 1998b). President Jose Lopez Portillo anticipated that ‘the 
logic o f  politics in Mexico leads to the conclusion that the changes and modernisation 
currently taking place in the country are also due to presidentialism. The President is the 
only one able to circumscribe presidentialism’ (quoted by Proceso , May 12th 1997). The 
challenge is to find the right relationship between representative institutions and 
executive leadership. Mexico is gradually moving from an essentially authoritarian
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political system to a more open and democratic one. The prospects are encouraging, 
despite the enormous political and economic costs to the current generation.
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Appendix: Methodology and Sources of Information
Methodology
The original aim o f introducing a methodology to the social sciences was to develop a 
‘method o f inquiry which would be both necessary and sufficient to guide the scientist 
inevitably to truth’ (Watkins 1957: 104). Today, methodology has the more modest task 
o f establishing certain rules and requirements that are necessary for intellectual 
discussion. In order to frame my research within academic parameters I considered 
some questions, like what level o f inquiry was appropriate to the study o f  the problem I 
was interested in; how it should be described; whether the explanation should be set in 
terms o f  individuals or institutions; and how adequate was a ‘reductionist’ approach to 
study M exico’s political economy. At the end, I favoured Weber’s (1950) ‘holistic’ 
approach as the method o f analysis for this thesis.1 Explanations under this approach 
start with a broad characterisation o f a historical situation, and then descend to an ever 
closer inspection o f the detailed components until the relevant behaviour and 
relationships o f the individuals involved are established. This method links social facts 
to individuals, but rejects that every social fact do somehow have to be reduced to 
claims about individuals.
This thesis partakes of both theory and history, but is neither a work o f theory nor a 
work o f history. It falls somewhere in between; it is primarily explanatory.2 The 
explanation in this thesis presents an account o f the linkages among several events as a 
process leading to M exico’ financial reform and the subsequent crisis. In other words, 
this thesis is a comprehensive account o f  the reforms, their outcomes and the links 
between them. It was a two-stage analytical exercise. The first stage o f  the analysis 
concentrated on the identification o f the relevant elements amid the complexity o f
1 For a deeper and broader discussion on these two approaches to knowledge in the social sciences see 
Martin and McIntyre (1994).
2 According to Samuel Huntington (1991: xiii), ‘a good theory is precise, austere, elegant, and highlights 
the relations among a few conceptual variables. Inevitably, no theory can explain fully a single event or 
group of events. An explanation, in contrast, is complex, dense, messy, and intellectually unsatisfying. It 
succeeds not by being austere but by being comprehensive.’
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M exico’s political economy where the reform took place. The second stage, once the 
elements were clearly outlined, centred on mapping the cause-effect relationships 
between those elements. The thesis pieces together fact after fact, each piece adding up 
to a causal explanation.
I favoured the approach o f case studies to organise the inference process in this thesis, 
as opposed to experiments or surveys. The fact that the events under study were beyond 
my control ruled out experimentation, while the complexity o f the events excluded the 
feasibility o f a survey study. According to Robert Yin (1984: 22-23), case studies serve 
very well the purpose o f explaining a decision or set o f decisions: why they were taken, 
how they were implemented, and with what result. This approach allowed to retain the 
‘holistic’ and meaningful characterisation o f the social events under consideration and 
provided a framework to study some aspects o f the problem in depth. I selected three 
case studies: commercial banks’ privatisation, development banking reform and Banco 
de M exico’s autonomy. The choice o f the case studies was based on the general public 
interest, namely the underlying issues in each case were regarded as nationally 
important. Each case represented a policy change that had profound consequences on 
the political economy o f M exico’s financial system and all o f them were part o f  the 
more general programme of economic transformation known as ‘structural adjustment.’ 
The case studies were ‘complete’ in the sense that all the available sources o f relevant 
evidence were exhausted. The evidence was presented neutrally, with both supporting 
and challenging data.
Sources of Information
The information used in this thesis is divided into two different categories according to 
the source: primary and secondary. According to Judith Bell (1993: 68), primary sources 
are those which came into existence in the period under research, while secondary 
sources are interpretations o f events o f that period based on primary sources.
Primary Sources
When I started to plan this thesis, in the summer o f 1994 immediately after the 
presidential elections, the consequences o f the financial crisis and the crisis itself were
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difficult to anticipate. During the first stage o f  this project, which comprised the 
literature review and the research design, the banking crisis burst. Over the next few 
years it reached an unexpected scale and depth. Throughout the period while this thesis 
was in progress, one o f the most politically sensitive issues in Mexico was the 
consequence o f the 1994 financial crisis and the banks’ bailout.3 As a result, the 
financial reform under President Salinas came under strong public charge. Most o f the 
public officials that participated in the reform were consequently very reluctant to talk 
about it. As it is argued in the thesis, the small circle o f inner advisors o f  the President 
and the President itself decides upon the financial policy. Because o f the political and 
criminal implications o f these decisions it was virtually impossible to interview these 
public officials. Yet, the main interest o f the thesis was to find the reasons behind 
government’s decisions.
I managed to get some interviews with high public officials in the financial branch o f 
government, whom were useful to hint the future avenues o f research. However, they 
were also very reluctant to speak openly about undisclosed information. The interviews 
carried out in the fist stage o f the research were unstructured and aimed to get broad 
ideas rather specific pieces o f information. At this stage I was trying to find out which 
areas or themes were important and therefore I mainly asked those interviewees to talk 
about what was o f central importance for them. They provided the original evidence 
upon which the rest o f the thesis was mapped out. In other words, they provided the 
original hints as to what to look for and where to concentrate my research efforts. In this 
case, these interviews were carried out with the Presidents o f  the National Commission 
for Insurance and Bonding (CNSF) and the National Commission for the Retirement 
Savings System (CONSAR) and with specialists in the field. The interviews in the 
second round were more structured and aimed to get specific pieces o f information that I 
could not get from anywhere else. The interviewees either participated directly in the 
process o f  decision making or had a position where they observed what happened.
Because o f  the unexpected difficulties trying to get interviews and their obvious bias 
given the sensitivity o f the topics (due to their political and even criminal dimensions), I
i At present, the issue of the banks’ bailout is an issue of political conflict since the Congress has not 
reached an agreement yet on how much the government is going to contribute to it.
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shifted the emphasis from direct interviews to comprehensive evidence collection from 
indirect sources. Instead o f interviewing government officials, who clearly were not 
going to have much to say, I tried to deduce the real motives behind the decision from 
all the evidence I could gather. I researched systematically all possible sources o f  
information looking for the relevant information: press reports, journal articles, official 
documents, statistical bulletins, other studies (official, academic and private), public 
addresses o f government officials, on-line data bases, non-published thesis and 
legislation. The analysis relied largely on causal and descriptive inference and aimed to 
identify the real objectives o f the reform from circumstantial evidence.
Public addresses o f government officials, official documents and studies provided 
information on the arguments, justifications and explanations for the decisions and the 
expected outcomes. The CD ROM version o f El Mercado de Valores provided most o f  
the public addresses o f government officials regarding economic issues and other 
official documents regarding agreements and letters o f intent signed with international 
financial organisations. These pieces o f information were contrasted with the evidence 
found in other studies (academic and private) and in the press in order to get a more 
balanced picture on the possible reasons why the decisions were taken. This analytical 
exercise also shed light on the role o f  exogenous or unexpected elements into the final 
outcomes.
Statistics were an essential ingredient for the elaboration o f the arguments presented in 
this thesis. I collected the statistical information from the reports and bulletins published 
by the Ministry o f Finance, Banco de Mexico, the National Banking Commission, 
Presidencia de la Republica, OECD, IMF and commercial banks themselves. Most o f  
the economic data came from the statistical annex to President Zedillo’s First Address to 
the Nation (Presidencia de la Republica 1995). The information covered in this annex 
included the most important economic indicators for the period 1985-1995. I obtained 
the information on banks’ financial balances and accounts from the statistical bulletins 
published by the National Banking Commission (CNBV 1994). The two volumes o f  
M exico’s historical statistics published by INEGI (1994) provided valuable information 
on general economic variables for most o f this century up to the reform. The web pages 
o f  INEGI, Banco de Mexico and the Ministry o f  Finance provided more recent
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information on economic variables. Finally, the on-line database DATASTREAM  
provided useful series on economic variables at a more detailed level.
I used extensively and intensively press reports and journal articles in the analysis 
presented in the thesis. In Mexico as in any other country, politics are conducted to a 
great extent based on the information contained in the media. By using this source, I 
aimed to reconstruct the picture as the actors saw it at the moment when the decisions 
were taken. In some cases, the information is used to contrast stated objectives against 
final outcomes. This type o f information presented the dynamics o f the events rather 
than simply static statements o f intent as in official documents. CD ROMs and on-line 
services were very useful to facilitate the access and systematic analysis o f  the press and 
data-bases. On-line services like LEXIS and FT-Profile provided me with access to 
important and specialised publications like: Associated Press, American Banker 
Newsletters, Business Mexico, El Economista, El Nacional, El Pais, El Universal, Este 
Pais, Euromoney, Excelsior, Expansion, Financial Regulation Report, Financial Times, 
La Jornada, Latin American Markets, LatinFinance, Proceso, The Banker, The Times 
and World Corporate Insurance Report. I also used the CD ROMs, when available, o f  
other publications. In this case the most important were: Proceso, The Economist and El 
M ercado de Valores: La Politica Economica de Mexico, 1946-1994. The electronic 
access to information facilitated the search o f information. I ran searches for general 
entries in most o f these publications like: Mexico and Politics, Mexico and Finance, 
Mexico and Banking; and for more specific entries like: President Salinas, tequila crisis, 
structural adjustment, Banco de Mexico, banks’ privatisation, development banking, 
financial liberalisation, etc. I also ran searches for most o f  the banks and the main 
investors, especially the larger ones or the ones involved in corruption scandals.
Secondary Sources
The most important secondary sources o f information that I used in this thesis were 
other studies and unpublished thesis. Other studies were used for two purposes: first, as 
an additional source o f information; and second, as a source o f alternative arguments 
and ideas. Most o f  the thesis was aimed to develop my explanation to the problem under 
study using the notion o f  state autonomy and political leadership. The review o f the 
literature was intended to be as complete as possible. I reviewed all the studies that I
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found on the themes included in the analysis, namely: financial globalisation, political 
democratisation, institutional change and financial collapse. I ran searches for each 
theme on several CD ROMs with data bases like the Social Science Citation Index and 
the Journal o f  Economic Literature. EASI (Electronic Access to Systems o f  
Information) provided access to all these CD ROMs.
I used intensively the services available at the British Library o f Political and Economic 
Studies. The great collection o f the library provided me with access to most o f  the 
previous studies on the subject, especially the academic studies and those from 
international organisations. I also visited the libraries o f  the major universities in 
Mexico City: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), Colegio de Mexico 
and Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM). In those libraries, I found 
valuable information from unpublished BSc thesis. They are usually very rich in 
original material and analysis. I also visited specialised libraries in Banco de Mexico, 
the National Banking Commission and Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). In these libraries, 
I found specialised studies not available elsewhere. They were usually studies either 
subcontracted with consulting firms or developed by their own research departments. 
They were also both rich in information and robust in their analysis.
Most o f the historical references prior to the reform were extracted from other studies. 
Brothers and Solis (1966), Goldsmith (1966), Glade and Anderson (1968) Marquez 
(1987), Katz (1990), Maxfield (1990 and 1997) and White (1992) provided most o f  the 
historical information used in chapter four and in the introduction o f each case study. 
Chapter six on the commercial banks’ privatisation benefited from the information 
contained in a special report prepared by International Reports (1990). Chapter seven on 
the Banco de M exico’s autonomy relied on the quantitative analysis o f Cukierman’s 
(1992 and 1993) work. Other important studies were the published accounts o f the 
reform from high public officials. The most important came from the two major 





Interviewee: Fernando Solis Soberon
Place and Date: Mexico City, September 1st 1995
Present Position: President o f  CONSAR (1994-)
Relevant Experience: President o f CONSAR (1994-); Deputy President CNSF (1992- 
1994); Head o f the Research and Development Division at the CNSF (1990-1994)
Interviewee: Juan Ignacio Gil Anton
Place and Date: Mexico City, September 1st 1995
Present Position: President CNSF (1994-)
Relevant Experience: President CNSF (1994-); Deputy President CNSF (1990-1994); 
Head o f  the Mexican Insurance Company for Agriculture (1989-1990)
Interviewee: Isaac Katz Burstin
Place and Date: Mexico City, September 13Ih 1995
Present Position: Head o f the Economics and Political Division at the Instituto 
Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (1992-1997)
Relevant Experience: Expert on M exico’s financial system
Interviewee: Alonso Rios
Place and Date: Mexico City, September 14th 1995 
Present Position: Chief Economist at BANAMEX  
Relevant Experience: Expert on M exico’s financial system
Interviewee: Dionisio Meade
Place and Date: Mexico City, January 22nd 1998
Present Position: Federal Deputy (1997-) and Chairman o f the Congress Treasury 
Commission (1999-)
Relevant Experience: Technical Secretary o f  the Congress Treasury Commission (1994- 
1997); Managing Director at Banco Mexicano (1988-1991)
Interviewee: Guillermo Barnes
Place and Date: Mexico City, February 8th 1999
Present Position: Federal Deputy (1997-)
Relevant Experience: Federal Deputy (1997-); Treasurer o f the PRI (1995-1997); Head 
o f the Unit for Development Planning at the Ministry o f  Finance (1992-1994); Chief o f  
Staff o f  the Deputy Minister o f Finance (1989-1992); Chief Economist at BCH Bank 
(1983-1988)
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